Carl A. Rudisill Library
1976 0027041 1

944
G94s 21109

Guignebert

This book may be kept

FOURTEEN DAYS

A fine of TWO CENTS will be charged for each day the book is kept over time.

Aug 15'55
Apr 12'56
May 15'56
Dec 12'56
Jan 4'57
Feb 26'58
Apr 2 '59
May 18'59
May 18'64
Mar 27 '65
Apr 8 '65
Mar 29 '71

WITHDRAWN
L. R. COLLEGE LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/shorthistoryoffr0001char_x9x0

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

VOLUME I

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS
ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
OF CANADA, LIMITED
TORONTO

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

BY

CHARLES GUIGNEBERT

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS

Translated by

F. G. RICHMOND

VOLUME I

CARL A. RUDISILL
LIBRARY
LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE

NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1930

994R
V.1
21109
Jan. 1946

COPYRIGHT, 1930,
BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Set up and electrotyped.
Published March, 1930.

All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form.

Printed in the United States of America by
J. J. LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK

TO THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS,
MY AUDIENCE IN THE SORBONNE
IN THE SPRING OF 1919,
I CORDIALLY DEDICATE THESE STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THEM.

CH. GUIGNEBERT.

INTRODUCTION

I

THE present writer does not propose to deal with all aspects of French history. He could do so, within the limits of the space assigned to him, only by confining his narrative to a bare recital of mere particulars, too abridged and too barren to be anything but tedious.

The history of France is indeed very long and very complicated. Very long, because those regions which ultimately came to compose France have been inhabited from those remote ages which precede all history; very complicated, because France has always led a life of great activity in many directions, since the day when, on inclusion into the Roman Empire, she first came within the range of Mediterranean civilisation. Every single aspect of her activity might well be considered apart from the others and subjected to a full and separate study. Thus the territorial development of France, the evolution of her political institutions, the successive transformations in her social life, her military and political transactions and their reactions beyond her own borders, the turning-points and original characteristics of her civilisation, the influence of her spirit and that of her art in the world are subjects which, without exhausting the available material, might well be chosen to illustrate the principles which have governed her development. And the most cursory examination will show that each of these categories is at once too general and too packed with intricate detail to be handled with adequate precision and clarity without further sub-division under heads which are less unwieldy. The following pages, accordingly, do not attempt to tell the history of France, but merely

to explain France in the light of that history. That is to say, we shall endeavour to discover, in the vast field of past fact, those leading events and those active influences which, linked together from century to century, have made the France of today.

France, from one point of view, is merely the geographical and historical framework within which certain men have spent their lives; from another point of view she may be regarded as the metaphysical expression of a nation. The life, spirit, culture of France are the culture, spirit, life of the French nation. Our investigation will therefore centre upon this concrete idea of a *French people.*

Study of a people's past is no less essential to the complete understanding of a people than analysis of its life in the present. Is it not by tracing the hereditary antecedents of an individual, the diverse influences which, from infancy onwards, have formed his character and ordered his spirit, that the physician or the psychologist obtains a true view of the man as a whole—his physiological reactions, the play of his intellectual faculties, his moods and emotional interactions? Need it be added that this task involves the exclusion for the time being of every consideration other than the verification and analysis of purely historical fact? I think that on this point, which is of high importance, little argument will be necessary.

II

The history of the French nation, properly so called, begins in 843 A.D. when the countries which gradually and little by little came to compose France were separated, by the treaty of Verdun, from the rest of the Carolingian Empire. Yet it is not merely in virtue of a treaty between three princes, and its signature on a particular date, that these countries and their inhabitants play a part in history. They

had previously formed parts of other aggregates—territorial, political and social; they had been subjected to influences, diverse in significance and character, for periods shorter or longer, as the case might be; in this way they had garnered experiences, acquirements and customs which thenceforward were destined to form part of the fundamental patrimony of France. Silence, therefore, as to this antecedent period would not be justifiable; for although France as such indeed was not yet an entity, yet the period determined many of the essential traits—basic, temperamental, and cultural—of the French people. I shall, however, deal with these remote origins at no greater length than may suffice to indicate the general conclusions to which they appear to lead. The major portion of our inquiry will be concerned with the period subsequent to the treaty of Verdun.

III

It may easily be understood that it will not be possible to give a large number of bibliographical references. Those provided at the end of each chapter will be confined to works of primary importance, with which every educated reader should be acquainted. They will suffice, I trust, to satisfy desire for further knowledge if I should be so fortunate as to arouse it.

The comprehensive works whose titles follow will in any case afford useful information as to collections of documents and standard works which bear upon the subject of each chapter. They are to be found in all public libraries; I refer the reader to such sources in preference to lengthening my exposition and going over ground already adequately covered by other writers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, 8 vols. of 2 vols. each, 16 in all (1900-1920).

E. Lavisse, *Histoire de la France contemporaine,* 9 vols. (1920-1922). A common volume of *Tables* for both these works is announced. I shall indicate each volume under the name of the collaborator who has edited it, and the whole work by the abbreviations H. F. for the first and H. C. for the second.

E. Lavisse and A. Rambaud, *Histoire Générale du IVe siècle à nos jours,* 12 vols. (1896-1901). Successive revisions have brought the bibliography into line with more recent works. It will be indicated by the abbreviation H. G.

The Cambridge Mediaeval History and *The Cambridge Modern History,* in course of publication.

A. Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation française,* 2 vols., and *Histoire de la civilisation française contemporaine,* 1 vol.

E. Glasson, *Histoire du droit et des institutions de la France,* 7 vols. (1887-1896).

P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques et administratives de la France,* 3 vols. (1890-1903).

A. Parmentier, *Album historique,* 4 vols. (1909).

F. Schrader, *Atlas historique,* 1 vol. (1896).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION vii

CHAPTER I

THE CRADLE OF FRANCE AND HER FIRST INHABITANTS

I. THE SUCCESSIVE NAMES OF FRANCE 3
Gallia and Francia.

II. THE PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF FRANCE 5
Harmony of opposites; measure and equilibrium; advantages and disadvantages for men.

III. THE PEOPLING OF FRANCE 10
A. *The prehistoric peoples.* Our knowledge and its origin. (a) Primitive quaternary men; their stages. (b) Primitive men of the modern era; megalithic monuments and lake-dwellings. Civilisations of Hallstadt and La Tène.
B. *The historic peoples:* their classification. (a) The Iberians. (b) The Ligurians. (c) The Mediterranean colonists: Phoenicians and Greeks; Marseilles. (d) The Celts; the three waves of immigration.

CONCLUSION 21

CHAPTER II

GAUL BEFORE THE ROMAN CONQUEST

I. OUR INFORMATION 23
Caesar.

II. THE STATE OF GAUL 24
A. *Lack of geographical unity.* B. *Lack of ethnographical unity.* C. *Lack of political unity.* (a) The *civitas, oppidum, pagi, vici, aedificia.* (b) Political constitution of the *civitates.* (c) Lack of government: remedial expedients. 1. Tyranny. 2. Clientele. (d) Internal dissensions. 1. Strife between cities. 2. Strife within cities. (e) The social state: its foundations; absence of social solidarity.

III. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY 32
Religion; our information. A. *The gods:* greater gods and local deities. B. *The Druids;* organisation, spirit, beliefs and rites, their general relation to the times.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IV. Development of the Natural Resources 38
A. *Scarcity of towns.* B. *The land ill cultivated.* C. *Inadequate communications.* D. *Activity of commerce;* the Mediterranean traders. E. *Industry.*

V. Civilisation 42

Conclusion 43
Character of the Gauls; Gaul between two perils: Roman and German.

CHAPTER III

THE EDUCATION OF GAUL BY ROME

I. Our Information 45
The two crucial questions.

II. The Conquest 45
A. *First relations between Rome and Gaul:* alliance with Marseilles. B. *Provincia:* Roman rule; the discontent it provoked; policy of the Senate in Gaul. C. *Caesar and the Gallic War;* the man and his object; opportunity for his intervention: Ariovistus and the Helvetii; rising of the Gauls (57); Caesar's advantages; Vercingétorix; submission of the country (51).

III. The Assimilation of the Gauls 53
A. *Loyalty of the Gauls;* policy of Caesar; organisation by Augustus; sentiments of the Gauls; revolts of the first century; the Gallic Empire of the third century; Gallic *Romanitas.* B. *Rome's work in Gaul.* 1. Unity. 2. Order. 3. Social system. 4. Taxation of Gaul. 5. Justice and law. 6. Religious transformation: Roman attitude to Gallic religion; Roman gods; the Oriental religions; Christianity, its introduction into Gaul; the persecutions; the Christian Empire; resistance of the *pagani;* characteristics of Gallic Christianity; the Gallic Church. 7. Development of the natural resources of the country; towns and municipal life; the great rural landowners and clientele; roads; cultivation of land; schools, art. Change in manners and morals.

Conclusion 77

CHAPTER IV

THE GERMAN FACTOR

I. Rome and the Germans 79
A. *The German menace to Gaul;* the first invasions. B. *Organisation of the Roman defence;* the incursions of the third century; outward strength and inward weakness of the Empire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

C. *The Germans in the fourth century:* their social condition; their principal groupings; Roman influence in Germany; their feelings towards the Empire. Policy of Rome towards them. D. *How the Germans entered Gaul:* 1. Individually. 2. By groups: the *federals:* position of the federals in the Empire. E. *The federals of Gaul.*

II. The Partition of Gaul 86

A. *The Visigoths:* Alaric; Ataulf; the Visigoths in Gaul. B. *The Burgundians.* C. *The Franks.* D. *Other Germans concerned:* Alamans and Saxons; the Bretons. Aetius; invasion of the Huns; Aegidius. Establishment of the federals; attitude of the Gallo-Romans.

III. The Barbarian Kingdoms in Gaul 91

A. *The Visigothic kingdom:* Euric; Alaric; hostility of the bishops. B. *The Burgundian kingdom:* Gondebaud; Arianism of the Burgundians. C. *The kingdom of the Franks:* 1. Clovis: his support by the bishops; his conquests; the Frankish Empire after him. 2. The Merovingian monarchy: its German character; partitions and civil wars.

IV. Consequences of the Establishment of the Barbarians in Gaul 96

Mixture of races; importance of the condition of the individual. Decline of culture. Authority of the king; the palace; the count; *immunity* and *benefice.* Rôle of the Church.

Conclusion 102

CHAPTER V

THE CULMINATION OF THE EMPIRE OF THE FRANKS

I. The Decline of the Merovingian Family 104

Dagobert; the *sluggard kings;* the mayor of the palace; struggles between Ostrasia and Neustria. The *Pepins:* Pepin d'Héristal; Charles Martel; Pepin the Short; advent of the *second royal race* in 751.

II. Charlemagne 108

A. *The conqueror:* character of his wars; their extension. B. *The Empire of Charles:* its general characteristics; its instability. C. *Reëstablishment of the Empire of the West:* the probable facts; the acquiescence of the East; consequences of the event.

III. The Government of Charlemagne 116

A. *Its general characteristics.* B. *Importance of the personality of Charles:* his physiognomy; his portrait; his dress; his dwellings; his occupations; his morals. C. *Sources of Charles' power:* 1. The king of the Franks. 2. The emperor. D. *Prac-*

PAGE

tical foundations of his government: 1. The oath of allegiance from all. 2. Compulsory vassalage. E. *Resources of Charles:* 1. Finance. 2. The army. F. *Institutions:* 1. The central government: the *palatium* and the *palatini;* the *scrinia;* general assemblies. 2. The provincial government; counts, dukes, margraves. 3. Means of superintendence and control: the bishops; annual convocation of counts: the *missi dominici.* Over-importance of persons in the system.

IV. The Carolingian Renaissance 129

A. *Restoration of culture:* the Palatine Academy; schools. B. *Letters and arts.* C. *Economic life.*

Conclusion 131

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS THE FEUDAL ANARCHY

I. The Dislocation of the Empire 133

A. *Partitions during the lifetime of Charlemagne:* in 806 and 813. B. *Louis the Pious:* his character; consequences of his weakness; the partition of 817; Judith; the birth of Charles the Bald and the partition of 829; the end of Louis the Pious. C. *Lothaire:* the war of the three brothers; the oaths of Strasbourg; the treaty of Verdun (843); situation which it created.

II. Decay of the Work of Charlemagne 138

A. *End of the Empire:* Charles the Bald; Charles the Fat; the last emperors. B. *The disorganisation of each kingdom:* the Edict of Charles the Bald and inheritance of benefices; government by persuasion. C. *The auxiliaries of decadence:* Slavs, Hungarians, Saracens; the Normans. Consequences of their incursions.

Conclusion 147

CHAPTER VII

THE FEUDAL RÉGIME

I. The Principles of Feudalism Considered 148

A. *Definitions:* characteristics of every feudal society; importance of the land; importance of the seigneur. B. *Origin of the seigneurial system:* its duration in France; its general features: 1. disappearance of central authority; 2. importance of landed property.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

II. DIFFERENT FORMS OF LAND TENURE 151

A. *Allod or freehold.* B. *Benefice: fief* and *censive.* C. *Contract:* obligations of the contracting parties; the hierarchy in theory; its practical complication and confusion; their causes; insufficiency of the ties of vassalage and of the ties of hierarchy.

III. THE TROUBLES OF FEUDAL LIFE 157

Chronic war: the château; the armament of the seigneur. The feudal condition of the common folk: famines, epidemics and poverty.

IV. FORCES ANTAGONISTIC TO DISORDER 161

Attitude of the Church: her canonical weapons; her attempts to combat feudal anarchy; the Judgment of God; the Truce of God; the Peace of God and the Leagues of Peace; chivalry.

CONCLUSION 167

Religion the principle of unity and civilisation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE AGENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE CAPET KING AND THE BOURGEOIS

I. THE ADVENT OF THE CAPETS 170

The passage from the second to the third dynasty. The Robertinians. Their fortunes in the tenth century. The accession of Hugh Capet (987). The part of the Church.

II. THE ROYALTY OF THE CAPETS 173

A. *In theory:* Its general character. Election and coronation of the king. Nature of the royal power. The mission of the king. Bearing of the king's pretensions on the future. B. *Its possibilities:* The king's means of action. 1. His domain. 2. His privilege as sovereign. 3. His quality of supreme judge. 4. His efforts to establish the principle of heredity. 5. The great feudatories. The two Frances.

III. THE AUXILIARIES OF THE KING 180

A. *The feudatories:* their spirit of adventure and distant expeditions: in Spain, in Italy, in England. The Crusades, their advantage to the king. B. *The Church.* C. *The bourgeoisie.* Feudal tyranny over the lesser folk. Their first reactions. Efforts to obtain a *contract.*

IV. THE TOWNS 189

Their position towards the end of the eleventh century. New towns and free towns. The communal movement. Policy of the king towards it. Results of the movement: The bourgeoisie on the king's side against the feudatories.

CONCLUSION 194

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX

THE POLICY OF THE CAPETS UP TO THE DEATH OF PHILIP AUGUSTUS, 987-1223. THE DAWN OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

PAGE

I. THE FIRST CAPETS 196

Their appearance, government, resources, difficulties. Their policy. Royalty at the beginning of the twelfth century.

II. THE FORERUNNERS 200

A. *Louis VI the Fat:* his character; his action in his domain. Conflicts with the great feudatories. Marriage of his son with *Eleanor of Aquitaine.* The *Eldest son of the Church* and the *Father of the Communes.* Suger. B. *Louis VII the Young:* his character, his faults. (a) The crusade. (b) The divorce. Marriage of Eleanor with Henry Plantagenet; its consequences: the Angevin Empire. Progress of the royal authority under Louis VII.

III. THE ERA OF DECISIVE PROGRESS 206

The Angevin peril: its advantages. The chief assistants in the royal task. *Philip II Augustus:* his character. A. *The first difficulties: the feudal coalition.* B. *The great work: the destruction of the Angevin Empire.* Understanding and embroilment with Richard the Lion Heart: his death. *John Lack-Land:* his character. Policy of Philip towards him. Conquest of the Angevin domain. Situation in 1208. C. *Philip's great design: the conquest of England.* Its failure. D. *Reaction of John Lack-Land.* The coalition of 1213. The battle of *Bouvines* and its consequences. Expedition of Louis of France to England. Its failure. E. *Penetration into the south of France.* The *Cathari.* The Albigensian crusade. Its results for Philip.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT OF PHILIP 217

A. *Increase of the domain and influence of the king.* B. *Weakening of feudalism.* C. *Domination over the Church.* D. *Philip and the bourgeois.* E. *The administration.* 1. The old organisation: the *curia regis;* the great officials; the provosts. 2. The new departure: *the baillis.* 3. The results; increase of the resources of the king.

V. THE DAWN OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 222

General view of the time of Philip Augustus. A. *Persistence of the feudal spirit:* violence and cruelty. Manifestations of a *new spirit:* Courtesy. B. *Persistence of the forms of feudal life.* Insecurity and disorder. The universal scourges: the *routiers.* C. *Signs of social progress.* 1. Development of the towns. 2. Organisation of urban workers. 3. Restoration of trade. D. *Conscience and thought.* Contemporary religion. *The Children's Crusade.* Hostility towards the clergy. Attacks on the faith. The *era of Cathedrals.* The beginnings of the *Universities.*

CONCLUSION 230

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER X

THE CULMINATION OF THE FEUDAL MONARCHY OF THE CAPETS (1223-1270)

PAGE

THE SITUATION AT THE DEATH OF PHILIP AUGUSTUS.

GAPS IN HIS WORK 231

I. LOUIS VIII 232

A. *His policy.* His government: the *apanages.* B. *Regency of Blanche de Castille.* The feudal agitation: its failure. The government of Blanche.

II. ST. LOUIS 237

A. *The man.* His life ruled by his conscience. Character of his piety. B. *The king.* Sense of justice; care for charity; respect for law. C. *Soldier and politician.* D. *Principal events of the reign:* The coalition of 1242. The treaty of Paris (1258). The question of *Francia Media.* Agreement with the King of Aragon: treaty of Corbeil (1258). Results of the policy of St. Louis. *The crusade:* The expeditions of 1248 and 1270. Prestige of the king in Christendom. His intolerance. E. *The government,* its spirit. 1. Desire for peace. Institutions of peace. 2. The kings and the barons. 3. The king and the Church. The monks. The *Inquisition.* 4. The king and the towns. Action of the king's agents (*les royaux*). 5. Development of governmental institutions: the household. Departments of the *curia regis.* The *Parliament* and the *legists.* 6. General survey of the government. Contemporary opinion.

CONCLUSION 249

CHAPTER XI

THE NEW ORIENTATION OF THE CAPETIAN MONARCHY. PHILIP THE BOLD. PHILIP THE HANDSOME AND HIS SONS (1270-1328). THE EXPANSION OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

I. PHILIP III THE BOLD 250

The man. Territorial dispositions; general policy; the campaign of Aragon.

II. PHILIP IV THE HANDSOME 251

A. *The man.* His entourage: the legists. Our view of the reign. B. *Foreign policy;* its general character. (a) Settlement of the question of Aragon. (b) The question of Guyenne. (c) The question of Flanders: interests and parties concerned: the count and the king: conquest and revolt: Peter Coninck; battle of Courtray; settlement: treaty of Athis-sur-Orge

PAGE

(1305). (d) The effort of Philip eastwards. (e) His acquisitions. (f) Conflict with the pope: 1. Its origins. 2. The first phase (1296-1298): the question of the tenths. 3. The second phase (1300-1305): Bernard Saisset; attitude of Boniface VIII: the bull *Ausculta fili* and the bull *Unam Sanctam*. Guillaume de Nogaret and the outrage of Anagni. Benedict XI. Clement V and the victory of Philip. C. *The government:* its general characteristics. (a) The centre: the king's household: the *curia regis*. (b) Personal service of the king; the State services. 1. The Great Council. 2. The Parliament. 3. The Court of Accounts. (c) The army. (d) Slowness of governmental evolution: an apparently new departure: the States-General. (e) Philip's finance: the affair of the Templars.

III. The End of the Capets in the Direct Line 269

A. *Opposing forces:* feudal leagues. B. *Death of Philip IV*. C. *His sons:* their policy; increase of the domain; the feudal reaction and its failure.

IV. The Expansion of the Thirteenth Century . . . 27?

A. *Economic life:* improvement of material life in the countryside; commerce; industry; obstacles to economic progress; persistence of feudal troubles; the towns. B. *Moral life:* religion; witchcraft; scandals and irregularities. C. *Intellectual life:* 1. Schools. 2. Intellectual trends: philosophy: Aristotle; Averroes; the tide of mysticism. Science: Roger Bacon. D. *Artistic life:* 1. Architecture; tendencies; styles; monuments. 2. The other arts.

Conclusion . . . . . 28(

CHAPTER XII

THE DISASTROUS STROKE OF FATE: THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR. THE DESOLATION OF THE KINGDOM UNDER PHILIP VI (1328-1350) AND JOHN II (1350-1364)

I. The Advent of the Valois . . . . . 28?

A. *The situation at the death of Charles IV*. Election of Philip VI. The man and the king. His entourage. B. *Before the English war:* Affair of Flanders and projects for a crusade.

II. The Hundred Years' War . . . . . 28?

A. *Its causes:* characters of the two kings; memories of the Angevin Empire; the question of Flanders; the question of Scotland; the question of Brittany; broils of seamen; Robert d'Artois. Edward III claims the French crown (1336). Rupture. B. *The divisions of the war.* C. *The resources of the two sides.* (a) The King of France: his finances, his army. (b) The King of England: the English nation, finance, the army. D. *Strategy of the Hundred Years' War.* The raids.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

II. The First Period (1337-1364) 290

A. *First hostilities.* Insurrection in Flanders: Jacques van Artevelde. Battle of l'Écluse. The Breton succession. Edward III in France. Battle of Crécy (1346). Capture of Calais (1347). The black death. B. *John II the Good* (1350-1364): his character; his entourage. The King of Navarre, Charles the Bad. The raids of the Black Prince. Battle of Poictiers (1356).

IV. The Government of Charles the Dauphin 295

The attempt of Étienne Marcel and Robert Le Coq. The States of 1356. The *Great Ordinance* of 1357. Why it remained a dead letter. Marcel and the dauphin in 1357 and 1358. The *Jacquerie.* How Marcel is compromised with it. End of Marcel and Le Coq. Failure of the bourgeois.

V. Desolation of the Kingdom 305

The treaty of London. The treaty of Brétigny (1360): Its reception. The King of Navarre and the *Companies.* End of John II. Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy.

Conclusion 307

CHAPTER XIII

RECOVERY AND RELAPSE. THE REIGNS OF CHARLES V (1364-1380), AND CHARLES VI (1380-1422)

I. Second Period of the Hundred Years' War (1364-1380) 309

Charles V. A. *His person:* his way of life: his political ideas. B. *His government:* finances, army and navy. The king's councillors. Du Guesclin and Jean de Vienne.

II. Preparations for Revenge 313

A. *War on the King of Navarre.* B. *Settlement of the Breton succession.* C. *The Great Companies.* Du Guesclin in Spain. D. *Rupture of the treaty of Brétigny.* Appeal of the Gascon nobles. Alliances of Charles V. The new tactics. Death of Edward III (1377). Victory of Charles V. E. *New complications.* 1. End of Charles the Bad. 2. The affair of Brittany. 3. The Companies recover. Death of Du Guesclin and of Charles V (1380).

III. Third Period (1380-1422) 319

Charles VI. A. *The situation:* precautions taken by Charles V. The king's uncles and their individual interests. B. *Difficulties encountered:* The plague of no money; disturbances in Flanders and the "good towns"; the Maillotins in Paris. Expedition to Flanders; the battle of Roosebeck (1382). Punishment of the rebels.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IV. THE MADNESS OF THE KING 324

A. *The English war.* Plans and truces. Expedition to Guelders and dismissal of the dukes. The *Marmosets* and return to the government of Charles V. Influence of the Duke of Touraine. Unpopularity of the Marmosets. Journey to Languedoc. Madness of Charles VI. B. *Rivalries round him.* The Duke of Orléans and Philip the Bold. Revolution in England: Henry IV. Louis of Orléans and John the Fearless. Murder of Louis of Orléans (1407). C. *Armagnacs and Burgundians.* The Parisian movement of 1413: the Cabochians and the *Cabochian ordinance.* Failure of the reformers.

V. THE ENGLISH VICTORY 332

Henry V; his plans, his expedition in France. Battle of Agincourt (1415). Agreement between Henry V and John the Fearless. John takes Paris. The dauphin escapes. Massacre of the *Armagnacs.* Conquest of Normandy by Henry V: hesitation of John the Fearless. The murder of Montereau (1419); its consequences. Treaty of Troyes (1420). The dauphin saved by the death of Henry V (1422). Death of Charles VI (1422).

CONCLUSION 337

CHAPTER XIV

VICTORY OF THE KING OF FRANCE (1422-1453)

I. THE SITUATION IN 1422 339

A. *Accession of Charles VII.* His resources. B. *The English aims in France.* Intentions of Bedford; obstacles to their realisation. Necessity for Bedford of an understanding with Philip the Good and difficulty of attaining it. C. *Character of Charles VII:* principal obstacle to his success. Domination by favourites: the *Armagnacs.* Yolande of Aragon and Richemont against these. Pierre de Giac; Le Camus de Beaulieu; La Trémoille. D. *The relative positions of Charles VII and Henry VI.*

II. JOAN OF ARC 347

A. *The war from 1422 to 1428.* Battles of Cravant and Verneuil (1424). Siege of Orléans (1428); inertia of the king. B. *Joan of Arc,* her impressions from childhood upwards. Historical roots of her mission. Its psychological origin. Her decision. Vaucouleurs, Chinon, Orléans. Relief of the town (May 8, 1429). Its effect. The journey to Rheims; battle of Patay; coronation of the king (17th of July). Attempt on Paris. Joan taken prisoner before Compiègne. Indifference of the king. Trial and execution at Rouen (May 30, 1431).

III. RECONCILIATION WITH THE BURGUNDIAN 355

Situation in 1430. Fall of La Trémoille. Richemont in power. Negotiations with Philip the Good. Congress and treaty of Arras (September 21, 1435). Conditions of the pact.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IV. The End of the War 358

The awakening of the king. Methodical war. Richemont recaptures Ile de France and Paris (1436). Truce. Reconstitution of the army. Suppression of the Flayers. England during the truce. The war resumed (1449). Conquest of Normandy (1450). Conquest of Guyenne (1451). Revolt; second conquest: battle of *Castillon* (1453). End of the Hundred Years' War.

Conclusion 362

France in ruins. The king strengthened.

CHAPTER XV

FRANCE AND HER KING AT THE END OF THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

I. Influence of the War on Political and Social Life . 364

Tendencies in France at the beginning of the fourteenth century. A. *The king: obstacles to his authority.* (a) *The seigneurs.* Advantages given by the war. Why it did not leave them in a better position. (b) *The bourgeois.* Their successive failures. Their position about 1453. Money: its new power. The bourgeois and the king. (c) *The good towns.* Their rôle during the war. Why their influence was transitory. B. *The people:* 1. *The peasants.* Brigands and mendicants. Depopulation and labour crisis. Good out of evil. 2. *The craftsmen:* Progress of corporations. Ruin of commerce. Resources and reaction of the country.

II. Influence of the War on Moral and Intellectual Life 373

A. *Church and religion.* Impoverishment and relaxation of discipline. The religious sentiment. Desire for reform. Devotion. The devil and sorcery. The haunting fear of death. Immorality. Rage for relics. *The Flagellants.* B. *Intellectual culture:* Persistence of life of the mind. Universities. The new intellectual movement outside the Universities. C. *Art:* The losses incurred. Amateurs and Patrons. Buildings erected. The *flamboyant style.* Foreign influences on the plastic arts. Burgundian sculpture. Flemish painters. Music. D. *General survey.*

III. The Exploitation of the Victory 384

A. *The king.* How he gained by the war. Loyalty a form of patriotism. B. *The government of Charles VII:* His bourgeois councillors; the Bureau brothers; Jacques Coeur. 1. *Justice.* 2. *Finance:* taxation practically permanent. 3. The *army.* 4. New claims of the king. C. *Administration of the domain:* bailiffs and seneschalships; fiscal revenues. D. *The Church.* Liberties of the Gallican Church. The reforms of Basel. *The Pragmatic Sanction* (1438). Religious policy of the king. E. *Opposition of the seigneurs.* The *Praguerie* (1440). The Duke of Burgundy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

IV. The Material Recovery 394

A. *Country life.* B. *Industry and commerce.* Results of effort. C. *Signs of vitality in France:* appetite for pleasure; Court life and courtesy. Return to normal intellectual activity. D. *The new foreign policy.* The policy of frontiers. Attention turned to Italy.

Conclusion 397

CHAPTER XVI

THE RUIN OF APANAGED FEUDALISM (1461-1491)

I. The Feudatories about 1461 400

A. *Authority of the king at the death of Charles VII. Its limits.* B. *What the apanaged are.* Feudatories of the old stock. The Duke of Burgundy. His domain. Philip the Good and his court. Burgundian policy.

II. Louis XI 404

A. *His appearance.* His conduct as dauphin. His government in Dauphiné. His flight to Philip the Good. His accession. B. *His manner of life.* His disposition and tendencies. His character. His first proceedings.

III. Louis XI in Opposition to the Feudatories 408

A. *How he makes enemies.* Charles the Bold. B. *The leagues of the public good.* Monsieur Charles. Partisans and adversaries of the Leaguers. Louis XI in the struggle. Treaties of Conflans and Saint-Maur. The second coalition and the treaty of Péronne. The third coalition and death of Monsieur Charles. C. *The struggle against Charles the Bold.* Plans of the Duke of Burgundy. Their failure. 1. At Treves. 2. In Alsace. 3. In Switzerland. 4. In Lorraine. His death (January 5, 1477). D. *The Burgundian succession.* Marriage of Mary of Burgundy and Maximilian of Austria. Treaty of Arras (1482). E. *The king victorious over the apanaged.* The situation at the end of the reign. Policy of Louis XI in Spain and Italy.

IV. The Government of Louis XI 415

A. *Its spirit of absolutism.* The king's plans. The Royal Council. Justice. Administration. Expenditure and taxation. Unpopularity. B. *Policy towards the Church.* C. *Efforts for economic restoration.* D. *Interest in the life of the mind.* E. *End of Louis XI.* General view. His death (August 30, 1483).

V. Completion of the Work of Louis XI 419

A. Charles VIII and the Beaujeus. The first reaction. The States-General of 1484. B. *New agitations among the nobles.* Louis of Orléans. The *Mad War.* The Breton Succession.

PAGE

Charles VIII marries the heiress Anne (1491). C. *End of the great seigneurial houses.* 1. Brittany. 2. The apanage of Orléans. 3. The house of Bourbon. The king is master.

CONCLUSION 422

CHAPTER XVII

THE POLICY OF ADVENTURES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATIONAL POLICY (1494-1559)

I. THE ITALIAN QUESTION 425

A. *The interests of France and the Italian adventure.* B. *The kings:* 1. Charles VIII. 2. Louis XII. 3. Francis I. 4. Henry II. Causes of the Italian wars. C. *Italy at the end of the fifteenth century:* 1. Territorial divisions. 2. The policy of balance of power: diplomacy and *condottierism.* 3. Wealth and brilliance of civilisation. D. *The foreign pretenders.* 1. The Emperor. 2. The King of Aragon. 3. The King of France. The game of the Italian princes.

II. THE ITALIAN WARS 430

A. *The general interest they present.* 1. From the military point of view. 2. From the political point of view. Evolution of the question. B. *Expedition of Charles VIII* (1494). Conquest and loss of the kingdom of Naples. C. *The policy of Louis XII.* Its total failure. D. *Francis I, the Milanese and the Swiss.* Battle of Marignan and diverse conventions. Situation in 1517.

II. THE STRUGGLE OF THE HOUSE OF FRANCE AND THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA 433

A. *Constitution of the house of Austria.* The inheritances of Charles Quint. Charles dangerous to France. Difficulties which he encounters. B. *Divisions of the struggle.* Grave hours for France. 1. Invasions (1521 and 1524). 2. Defeat of Pavia and treaty of Madrid. 3. Fresh invasions (1536 and 1544). Situation at the death of Francis I (1547). C. *Henry II and Charles Quint.* Conquest of the Three Bishoprics. Abdication of the Emperor. D. *Henry II and Philip II.* Recapture of Calais (1558). Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559).

CONCLUSION 439

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

Volume I

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

HE CRADLE OF FRANCE AND HER FIRST INHABITANTS

I

The successive names of France

Gallia

HE country which ultimately became France received its rst collective name of Gaul (*Gallia*) from the Romans, who ave the name of Gauls (*Galli*) to those of the inhabitants ith whom they came in contact. The Romans, being in no ay instructed ethnologists, and, as observers, imperceptive of ay but superficial differences between one race and another, tended the use of the term "Gauls," first applied to the Celtic opulations of northern Italy (*Gallia Cisalpina*), to all of the en comparatively unknown peoples on the north and west of e Alps (*Gallia Transalpina*), all of whom seemed to them be much alike. Caesar is apparently the first observer whom it occurred to distinguish Germans from Gauls, out the middle of the first century B.C. He states that the hine separates the one from the other and must continue to parate them. Thus the idea that Gaul had natural boundaries as born in the minds of the Italian conquerors. And thus the me of Caesar's Gaul was retained for the countries lying tween the Atlantic Ocean, the Channel, the North Sea, the hine, the Alps, the Mediterranean and the Pyrenees.

It is easily seen that these alleged natural boundaries are ot defined throughout their whole length with the rigorous recision long claimed for them in France. The Rhine itself is

more of an obstacle than a boundary—before Caesar's time many Germans had crossed to the left bank. In those remote times, too, men living within the precincts of Caesar's Gaul had no conception either of their country as a geographical unit, or of themselves as units of a community, possessing a common resemblance and common interests. Such questions were altogether beyond their ken.

Francia
The Franks

The name France (*Francia*) did not come into use nor displace the name Gaul till a much later date. It originated from a community of Germans, the Franks, which evolved from an amalgamation of several tribes for military ends about the middle of the third century A.D. on the right bank of the Rhine, north of the entry of the Main. The group had two objects: resistance to pressure from Saxons on the east, and expansion into Roman territory on the west.

The meaning of the word *Frank* is disputed. Its most probable etymology traces it to a German root *frank*, connected with the Latin *ferox*, implying something like *bold, intractable, overbearing*. This in any case is of minor importance. *Francia* was the country inhabited by the Franks and the name was applied to different regions as the tribe moved from one to another. In this way it entered Gaul and began to be used there after the middle of the fourth century; its establishment and extension followed the imposition of the Frankish domination after the end of the fifth century.

Western France

In the established kingdom of the Franks (*Regnum Francorum*) France (*Francia*) extended considerably beyond the limits of Caesarine Gaul, since it included parts of Italy and Germany. Charlemagne's great empire was *Francia*, so that when in 843 the treaty of Verdun divided this kingdom into three each kept the name Francia. The portion assigned to Charles became *Francia Occidentalis*, that assigned to Louis, *Francia Orientalis*, and that assigned to Lothaire, *Francia Media*. In Germany the term *Francia Orientalis* fell gradually into di-

e after the tenth century; the name *Francia Media* is as ort-lived as the kingdom of Lothaire; the name Francia sur-ved only in the western division of the *Regnum Francorum*, id finally, as the king of that division ceased to control its out-ing districts, the name ceased to apply except within limits milarly contracted.

Francia in the tenth century

In the tenth century when Hugh the Great, chief of an nportant feudal clan, received from King Louis d'Outremer 936-954) the title of Duke of the Franks (*Dux Francorum*), rancia was still, broadly speaking, the region lying between ormandy, Burgundy and Aquitaine, but in a strict sense was no ore than a small territory bounded by the Seine, the Oise, its ibutary the Tève, the Beuvronne, a tributary of the Marne, id the Marne itself.

Further expansion of Francia under the Capets

Some forty years later the Duke of the Franks chanced become king and to reconquer most of Caesarine Gaul by e unremitting application of a policy followed by his suc-ssors for more than twenty-five generations, in fact from ugh Capet to Louis XIV. Thus the name of Francia, widen-g in significance with the expanding authority of the King the Franks (*Rex Francorum*), regained its earlier meaning id came to signify the whole region ruled by the Capets.

II

The physical structure of France

Saying of Michelet: France is a "person"

In what respect an exaggeration?

The historian Michelet has said and many have said after m that France, by virtue of her physical structure, of her ography, and of the sum of her natural endowments, is in uth an individual, a person. This is, of course, merely a gure of speech, emphasising some broad aspect of truth by metaphor, poetical rather than scientific; it alleges, in fact, at the diverse parts and parcels of France, however dif-rent they may seem, are nevertheless as conjoint, coördi-ated, conscious and as capable of action for a common end as

are the members and organs of a human being within his bodily limits. A comparison of this kind necessarily oversteps truth, possibly so far as to trespass into untruth, and the truth is that geographical France, even if taken as identical with Caesarine Gaul, is not either a complete or a homogeneous whole.

France not physically a complete whole

1. *France is not a complete whole.* Her mountains are not hers alone; she holds the whole neither of the Alps, Jura, Vosges, Ardennes, or Pyrenees. Her northern plain is no more than an extension of the great northern plain of Europe. Only one of her principal rivers, the Loire, bears to the sea waters which are entirely French in origin. The Garonne rises in Spain, the Rhône is Swiss, and the Oise, a tributary of the Seine, is Belgian. Inversely, the Moselle, Meuse and Escaut divert French waters abroad. Even the Channel is hardly more than a trench, physically insignificant, which separates the two very similar river basins of Paris and London.

France not a homogeneous whole

2. France is not a homogeneous whole. So many are the differences between one part of France and another, that in exemplifying them the only difficulty is which to choose. Brittany resembles Provence neither in the nature of her soil and its configuration, nor in climate, nor in the forms of her river systems, her natural products, or the sum total of her qualities. So, too, with Lorraine and Gascony, Auvergne and Normandy. And Normandy differs greatly from Brittany her neighbour, Auvergne from Lorraine, and Gascony from Provence. Instances could easily be multiplied and elaborated. But it would be difficult indeed to suggest any general principle under which these diversities could be, as it is suggested they are, combined into a harmony like that of a living being.

Any traveller who crosses France either from north to south or from east to west can hardly fail to be struck, though his outlook may be no wider than that afforded by the window of a railway carriage, by the varied landscapes, crops and

rms of cultivation which all testify to the physical diversity the regions traversed.

What truth is in Michelet's saying?

Is there any truth in Michelet's words? There is this: that rance has no physical feature anywhere in excess, no ranges impassable mountains, no table-lands elevated and uninterpted, no waterless or overflooded plains, no torrential rivers, extremes of climate, no soils fit perhaps for one single owth but for nothing else; all is in moderation. This is perps the first of her two distinctive physical attributes. The secd is that nature in making her diverse in parts has made her rmonious as a whole. Glance at a map of France. See how e plains encircle and interpenetrate the higher lands; how e mountain ranges are accessible by valleys, deep but slopg gradually; how the rivers, moving highways for traffic, in up one region with another and lead into the passes which ovide ways between the more abrupt elevations—the gate of oitou, the gate of Naurouze, the gate of Longpendu,[1] the te of Burgundy, the "trench" of Belfort, the gate of Saintientin. Her physical dissimilarities do not conflict with, but pplement, one another; they promote commerce between gions whose natural products are different, and that onomic union in turn has led to political union. Thus the akers of France have had nature with them rather than ainst them, and France, one may say, has been a work of ture. This does not postulate the operation of any occult mysterious power: natural conditions have favoured man's ndiwork. For France, like other nations, has been made by en who have found in her a fortunate arrangement of natal features, a fairly homogeneous area affording easy communication between all parts. Thus with less toil than in any places, I will not say than in *all* places, a marked national

Measure and equilibrium

Harmonisation of opposites

Natural conditions which favoured men in the making of France

[1] The "gate" of Longpendu derives its names from a lake which lies in the ntre of a depression between the Morvan and the Monts du Charolais, across ich communications are easy between the Loire and the Saône.

individuality has been built up, a *personality*, in fact, political, economic, social and self-conscious. Thus Michelet's aphorism is explained.

The physical aspect of modern Frenchmen; the lesson it teaches

Consider the present descendants of the men who made France; their faces and ethnographical characteristics reveal and reflect their ancestry, and bear the impress of their land, variety and contrast never carried to extremes and so moving together in one harmony.[2] In Lille, for instance, blue eyes and sanguine complexions predominate; in Toulouse, black hair, brown eyes and sallow skins; yet in both places other types occur, and so elsewhere from one frontier of France to another the observer will be struck by the number of types of mixed blood, of men in whom the traits of many races are blended, who are living evidences of the aeonian intermingling of races in the land of France, and the complex racial factors which have formed her people.

Characteristics of the French mind; variety of aptitudes

France has given men of genius to the world, but she is not unique in that; other nations have produced such men, some possibly of greater depth than hers. She is unique in variety of aptitude, in power of comprehension, in lucidity of mind, and above all in that avoidance of extremes which is the supreme characteristic of her people; a moderation, in fact, which enables the diverse qualities of her diverse races to act in unison as do the diverse qualities of the diverse parts of her land.

Advantages of the geographical position of France and of the disposition of the soil

It is her position in western Europe which has enabled so many and such different peoples to collect, communicate, intermingle and unite in France. She is a natural centre for assembly and settlement. On the north, west and south her shores are open to the three European seas. The two continental mountain ranges of central Europe and of the Iberian Peninsula meet upon her soil. Nine hundred kilometres greatly obstructed by mountains separate Hamburg and Trieste; four hundred

[2] It may be remembered that France has an area of about 550,000 kilometres.

only of a wide valley divide Bordeaux from Cette with only one low rise between (one hundred and eighty-nine metres in height). A journey around the Vosges and the Jura presents no difficulty; to traverse the wide strip of flat land bordering the Baltic, the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic is even easier still. The Pyrenean barrier, on the contrary, can be surmounted, except by the aid of the engineer, at its two extremities only. The fortunate disposition of the valleys and the way in which they lead to one another, already referred to, facilitate communication throughout the whole country. Even the ancients, little accustomed as they were, compared with ourselves, to pay much attention to purely geographical considerations, were impressed by these advantages. Strabo, a contemporary of Augustus, in a well-known passage of his *Geography* (IV, 1, 14), after having twice referred to (cf. IV, 1, 2) "*the relation, in some degree symmetrical, which exists between the different rivers of Gaul, and consequently between the two seas, internal and external,*" ends with this noteworthy conclusion: "*One is here tempted to believe in a direct act of Providence, seeing how the country is laid out, not at random, but as though in accordance with some well-considered plan.*"

Disadvantages

Access to the Mediterranean, upon which the older Western civilisation centred, was an indubitable advantage to uncivilised Gaul. But the approach which lay open from the eastern plains was something of a disadvantage, opening, as it did, the way to invasions of uncultured barbarians. Strabo took into account the facilities afforded by geography for exchange of traffic; invaders of all epochs took advantage of them as well. We shall see later that eastern France had difficulty in separating her historical existence from that of Germany: an irksome consequence of the easy passage across the Rhine. In some sense France was indeed peopled from the East.

Some parts of France, as might easily be shown, are better

The balance between the worse and the better districts

fitted for the sustenance of man than others. But the better parts outnumber the worse and are never so far distant that they cannot give help to the latter. Yet, it may be pointed out, the earlier comers drew less advantage from this compensatory possibility than the later. They had to encounter conditions as nature had made them. Their successors entered into the fruits of the labours of their forerunners and profited by the breaking of the ground which the needs of social life had enforced upon them. France, situated in the central European region of marsh and forest, afforded at first unfavourable conditions for the growth of communities of any size, and still more so for their rapid unification. Much time and long-continued effort was needed before the fundamental excellencies of the soil could triumph over certain disadvantages, superficial but troublesome to deal with, which its early inhabitants encountered. Only by long and patient labour in deforestation were the little clearings in the primaeval forest extended into the wide and open spaces of today.

III

The peopling of France

Its early date

France was inhabited, if not exactly peopled, at an early date. Man, apparently, was to be found within her borders as early as we can trace him on the earth. The sands of caverns, the mud on the margins of lakes and rivers, have preserved for us the traces left by the little primitive communities; we can still follow their progress from afar. Their great mentor was the soil itself; they needed, so to say, to do no more than to look, to listen and to act on its intimations in order to emerge from barbarism. For this reason, it has been justly said that the soil, considered in the full complexity of its reactions, is in deed and in truth the foundation on which the individuality of France is built. Conditions favourable to the most ancient form of human habitations—the cavern, the forest hut, the

lake-dwelling—are to be met with in France; also aids to the earliest forms of social life, those of the nomadic hunter, of the almost settled pastoralist, and of the agriculturist attached to the land.

Peoples, *prehistoric* and *historic*

A distinction is to be drawn, in the complex confusion of our ancestry, between the *prehistoric* peoples, who have left no historical or documentary evidence, direct or indirect, which throws light on the events of their existence, and the *historic* peoples, concerning whom we have some general information.

A. *Prehistoric peoples*

Our knowledge of the prehistoric races is confined to that which can be derived from a study of their material remains, in the form of bones, utensils, weapons and articles in common use, which enable us to obtain some idea of the living beings who made and used them. Much caution is called for in drawing conclusions, and our knowledge can only be meagre at the best; we can get only fragmentary glimpses of the way of life and the habits of individual men; their life as a community almost entirely eludes us.

Our knowledge and its origin

History being our concern here, we shall not dwell at any length on these prehistoric peoples. Assuredly France owes something, though how much we cannot say, to these her remote progenitors. The fragments which chance or fortunate research have secured for us enable us to do little more than classify different types and infer the order of their appearance in time; in doing so we must bear in mind that the distinctions which we draw are, on more counts than one, hypothetical and dubious, and that the chronological data, which history proper demands, are completely absent.

(a) Classification of primitive quaternary man

Geologists recognise two quaternary periods, *diluvial* and *glacial*. The men of both have left noteworthy traces in France: diluvial man at Saint-Acheul near Amiens, at Menchecourt near Abbeville, at Le Pecq and at Chelles near Paris; glacial man, at Moustier in the Dordogne department, at Solutré near Mâcon, and in the Madeleine grotto near that of Moustier.

Progress from one age to another

The three last-mentioned sites are associated by specialists with three stages of civilisation, marked by modest but distinct advances in the manufacture of implements and utensils.

The *Magdalenian* group, of which the objects found at La Madeleine are typical, shows us the existence even at that early date of a form of art in frescoes painted on the walls of caves. Since their discovery, many others of the same type have been examined and classified in the mountainous parts of France, particularly in the Pyrenees. The list of these interesting discoveries is assuredly not yet complete. The most recent of these three civilisations whose memorials have been preserved for us in the caves of our mountains and in the alluvium of our rivers probably dates back to the eighth or tenth millennium B.C. The progress indicated from era to era entitles us to infer that that Magdalenian man, whose tools and drawings show singular dexterity of hand and keenness of visual perception, had already definitely emerged from the condition of the primitive savage.

Arrest of progress and decline in culture

It is a singular fact that towards the end of the quaternary age, when the reindeer, till then a common animal, disappears, this progress ceases and the culture which has been acquired dies out. The men of the caves disappear as into a dark gulf, and we do not know what becomes of them. Suggestions have been made: that they followed the northward migration of the reindeer; that they were the victims of some great cataclysm of nature—obvious hypotheses which afford little consolation for our ignorance.

The new civilisation

However this may be, the next type of civilisation which comes into view, at a later date, is so markedly poorer and lower in the scale as to be clearly of an elementary kind; it is as though a new type of man were making a fresh start in culture, profiting nothing from the advance made by his predecessors.

Science has agreed to divide the obscure ages from which

emerges the historical period, which is still unrolling under our eyes, into three main epochs. (1) *The palaeolithic age*, the old stone age during which weapons and implements of crude shape were made of stone either chipped or rudely carved. (2) *The neolithic age*, the new stone age in which the art of shaping the stone has improved and methods by which it is polished have been devised. (3) *The bronze age*, preceded by an age of copper, longer or shorter, as the case may be, in which metal gradually supplanted stone as material.

(b) Classification of primitive man of the modern era

All three are well represented in France. It must be borne in mind that these ages are not separated by clearly cut chronological divisions, but merge into and overlap one another—sites of the bronze age, for instance, often contain implements of stone—and that they do not synchronise in all parts of the country. Mediterranean influences in all probability first brought bronze into France; this would explain why bronze first came into general use in the southern districts of the country.

The men who through these long ages thus climbed the laborious ascent to civilisation have left us not only the wherewithal to furnish glass cases in public museums and private collections with weapons, implements and diverse oddments; they have left for our contemplation two interesting mementos of their way of life, the *megalithic monuments* and the *lake-dwellings*.

The megalithic monuments

We find dispersed throughout France, but more especially in Brittany and the Pyrenees, huge standing stones (*menhirs*), sometimes set up as tables (*dolmens*) or corridors, sometimes set in circles or avenues.[3] The labour which these monuments

[3] Consider that the great *menhir*, now overthrown, at Locmariaquer (Morbihan) is twenty-one metres in length, four metres in thickness, and has a weight of 250,000 kilogrammes. The avenues of Carnac (Morbihan) contained over 4000 menhirs, of which 2000 still remain. *Dolmens* are often buried under a *tumulus*, an artificial mound of earth. The tumulus of Mont-Saint-Michel-en Carnac is twenty metres high, one hundred and fifteen metres in diameter at the base, and contains 40,000 cubic metres of material.

must have represented is such as to astound us. They were long called *Druidic*, after the supposed builders, the *Druids*, priests of the Gauls, but are now known to be of a much earlier period, as early in fact as from the twentieth to the fifteenth century B.C. They are not peculiar to France. Their significance is supposed to be religious or funerary—the dolmen indeed is generally built on the lines of a tomb—but they are still far from being fully explained.

The lake-dwellings

These are villages built on piles placed on the shore of a lake, or rather some little way out in the water, whose accidental subsidence has made known to us their existence and that of their contents.[4] The most ancient belong to the age of polished stone, but the greater number are as late as the bronze age or even later. The best examples occur in Switzerland and northern Italy, both lands of many lakes; but France, too, has several around the lakes of Savoy. Their construction indicates the attainment of considerable manual skill by their builders.

Defects in our knowledge: hypotheses

Unfortunately, the lake-dwellings and the great stones set in ordered ranks, so fascinating to the archaeologist, have little to tell the historian. What manner of men raised these huge bulks of stone or drove these millions of tree-trunks into the beds of so many lakes? Whence did they come and by what ways? To what race did they belong? What was their way of life, and what vicissitudes did they encounter? We do not know. At most we may permit ourselves to suppose that the organised labour of so many hands demanded by the megalithic monuments indicates a society of an aristocratic type.

Progress

We are assured, too, that a great advance had been made by the domestication of certain animals and the acquisition of the art of cultivating grains, and that the passage from chipped stone to shaped stone, thence to polished stone, then

[4] The first discovery dates from the unusually dry winter of 1553-4 and was made at Meilen on the Lake of Zurich.

to copper and on to bronze, and in the end to iron, serves to mark the stages, evidently not sharply differentiated in reality but nevertheless distinct, by which our ancestors proceeded little by little from the lowest barbarism to a comparatively high standard of civilisation.

The gains achieved

The culminating point attained by those long aeons of dimly described struggle is shown us in the *civilisation of Hallstadt*, so named after a town in upper Austria in the district of Salzbourg, where its characteristic relics were first discovered. There, although bronze predominates, iron already appears in weapons, and is almost entirely employed in the *civilisation of La Tène*, named after a lake village in the Lake of Neuchâtel in Switzerland. The sword of Hallstadt is the sword shown to the world by the Gauls of the fourth century B.C. We enter the domain of *history* properly so called.

B. *The historic peoples*

Our knowledge of the historic peoples whom we meet with in Gaul before the Roman conquest is unfortunately almost entirely derived from the writings of Greeks and Romans, who, being by no means accomplished ethnologists, based their opinions on outward and superficial appearances. We can, however, distinguish and identify three different racial groups, which, as it seems, represent three successive invasions of the country. An "invasion," be it noted, is not necessarily the raid of a nation or a tribe; it may be no more than the pacific infiltration of a country not fully populated by the journeyings, sometimes far apart in time, of men in search of a livelihood denied to them elsewhere. These three ethnic groups consist of Iberians, Ligurians and Celts. It must be remembered that, before the arrival of the last named, certain Mediterranean colonists, Phoenician and Greek, had already established themselves on the southern coasts.

Their classification

(a) The Iberians

It is quite possible that Iberians entered Gaul before the historical epoch and were among the men who built the lake-

dwellings or raised the menhirs. We do not know where they came from or where they settled. When we first become aware of them they are dwelling between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, but their range was at one time certainly much more extensive, their concentration in this corner of the southwest being due to pressure from the Ligurians and the Celts. Their descendants, known to themselves as *Eskaldunacs* and to us as *Basques*, still occupy both slopes of the western end of the Pyrenees. Their racial type [5] is quite different from that of their neighbours and their language is unrelated to any other in France or in Spain.

(b) The Ligurians

We know rather more about the Ligurians.[6] They succeed the Iberians and must have been numerous, for it seems that at one time they had spread over all western Europe; their traces are found from the shores of the North Sea to southern Italy and Spain. There is some reason to suppose that the lake-dwellers were of their race. When the Greeks and Romans encountered them they inhabited northern Italy and southeastern Gaul, having apparently been partly absorbed and partly expelled elsewhere by the Celts, as were the Iberians, though in a different direction.

When Marseilles was founded by the Greeks about 600 B.C., it was with Ligurians that the new-comers debated terms of settlement; at that time Iberians were still found on the right bank of the Rhône, and it was not till the fourth century that pressure from the Celts altered their position. According to Strabo, the population of what is now Provence in the first century A.D. was composed of both Celts and Ligurians; it is highly probable that this was the case in several other districts, and that not all of the Ligurians whom the Celtic in-

[5] Or more accurately *their types*, of which there are at least two among them, a fact which may indicate that they had mingled with some other people before they were driven back to the south of the Garonne.

[6] Cf. D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*,[2] Paris, 1889.

vasions found dwelling in Gaul were driven to seek refuge in the southeastern corner of the country.

(c) The Mediterranean colonists

The earliest of the Mediterranean colonists were the Phoenicians, who reached the western Mediterranean basin about 1100 B.C. and continued for two centuries the establishment of trading posts in increasing numbers upon the coasts. No Phoenician remains have ever been identified in France, and no definite information about them has been transmitted to us in writing; some names of places alone have, here and there, preserved their memory. Thus one of the Pomègues islands off Marseilles is called Phoenica; the town of Monaco apparently derives its name from a Phoenician word implying "halt," "repose," and the myth of a Phoenician deity, Melkart (the Greek Heracles), has been transmitted in the ancient folk-lore of Gaul. These Asiatics visited Gaul not to colonise but for commerce; they established trading centres and posts in places where nature facilitated access inland and thence despatched caravans into districts which yielded raw materials. In return they imported manufactured goods. They probably gave to the inhabitants their first instruction in the arts of working in metals.

The Phoenicians

The Greeks

When the commerce of the Phoenicians subsided with the decline of Tyre from the eighth century onwards, the Greeks became active as their successors. They set out to establish themselves permanently on the coasts by founding cities which in turn sent out colonies as and when this appeared advisable or possible over the circumference of the Mediterranean. Among these cities the two of most interest are *Massilia* (Marseilles), founded by the Phoceans about 600 B.C., and *Rhoda* (Rosas), founded by the Rhodians in 578 B.C. Both became centres from which Greek influence radiated inland in every direction and in course of time both established numerous trading posts to left and right of them on the adjoining coasts.

Marseilles

Marseilles alone calls for notice here, as Rhoda is now in

Spain. The history of this great Provençal city is far from being well known to us, but its commercial prosperity can be appreciated. Its trading stations formed a chain which is linked together for the whole distance from Nice to Malaga; many have grown into towns whose names reveal their origin, for instance, Nice (*Nikè*), Antibes (*Antipolis*), and Agde (*Agatha Tychè*).

The Massiliots attempted no inland conquests; they were content with the control of the Rhône delta by the establishment of one colony on the site of Avignon and another on the hill of Cavaillon which commands lower Durance. They were in no sense artists; even today the archaeological poverty of Marseilles is surprising to the visitor; but they attended with diligence to the sciences which bear on navigation and were active, for the furtherance of commerce, in geographical exploration. A Massiliot, Euthymenes, penetrated to the mouths of the Senegal about the same date when Nearchus, an admiral of Alexander the Great's fleet, reached those of the Indus (326), and another named Pytheas, undervalued indeed by his contemporaries but now recognised as one of the great figures of ancient geography, beginning in 330, explored the coasts of Brittany, England and Scotland, and even penetrated into the Baltic Sea.

Relations with the native inhabitants

The Massiliots, under a government essentially aristocratic and a traditional moral code of great severity, proud of their origin and prosperity, long maintained an attitude of reserve, at once defiant and disdainful, towards the native inhabitants. It was only very gradually that they became permeated by the latter; whereas they, on the other hand, made at first no attempt to obtain any influence over the natives, and thus it is not easy to estimate their effect upon the inhabitants of the interior. They introduced the olive, which, first planted in the environs of their city, has become and remains one of the many riches of Provence. The art of writing, Greek characters being

Their influence

used, and that of coining money were disseminated by them among those of the natives with whom they bargained for the commodities in which they dealt. The Rhodians, soon subordinated to the Massiliots in this as in other respects, behaved apparently in the same way and with much the same general effect. The extent of the influence emanating from these two towns is undoubtedly a matter of considerable interest. I think, however, that it was quite superficial; it comprised, in fact, no effort to civilise a lower race but was merely a commercial undertaking for its exploitation. The Greek world probably had, through Marseilles and Rhoda, much more knowledge as to the natural resources and configuration of Gaul than Gaul had of Greek civilisation.

(d) The Celts

The Celts are the Galli properly so called, the Gauls who form, by common agreement, the essential ethnic element of the French race. When we first encounter them in ancient records, they are on the site of Germany, and the Greeks consider them as identical with the *Hyperboreans*. Hekateos of Abdera applies this name to them as late as the middle of the fourth century, placing them between the Ligurians and the Scythians. Names of Celtic type, too, are still common in Germany; it is a notable and curious fact that the great river which the Germans regard whole-heartedly as their own peculiar property—*Vater Rhein*—bears a Celtic name, *Renos*, which the Celts have carried with them elsewhere.

Their establishment in Gaul

Their expansion towards Gaul appears not to have begun before the fifth century; their penetration of the country appears to have been accomplished on three principal occasions by three main waves of invasion.

The first wave

The first wave, during the fifth century, flooded all western France and overflowed into Spain through the passes of the western Pyrenees; it passed over, but left no permanent settlements in, the country south of the Garonne.

The second wave

The second, probably at the end of the fifth century, did

not affect Gaul directly, but indirectly reacted upon that country. It is divided into two streams, one of which covered northern Italy, submerged Etruria and broke upon Rome, captured in 390; the invaders settled in the plain of the Pô or Cisalpine Gaul. The other stream rolled eastward as far as the approach to the Balkan Peninsula. The fourth century saw a vast Celtic empire covering the British Isles, the whole of northern and central France up to the Rhône and the Garonne, and most of central Europe, Switzerland excepted, as far as the lower Dniester. Legend attributes its foundation to a certain Ambigat.

The empire of the Celts

The third wave was due to a rising of the Germans (third century) against the Celts, to whom they had been subordinated. It resulted in a series of obscure movements upon which light is thrown only by their ulterior consequences. The expelled Celts overflowed their ancient boundaries on east and west, on the east invading Greece (281 and after) and going on to establish themselves in Asia Minor (*Galatia*), and on the west penetrating to the district of the Rhône. Hannibal during his march across the Alps in 218 found Celts alone established in places where, in the middle of the fourth century, according to Aristotle, the population was exclusively Ligurian. In 113 the Helvetii, themselves Celts and hitherto dwelling between the Black Forest, the Main and the Rhine, were pressed back by the Cimbri into Switzerland.

The third wave

Dissolution of the Celtic Empire

The Celtic Empire, under the attacks and inroads of Carthage in Spain, of Rome in Italy, and simultaneously devastated in its south and centre by the Germans, fell in ruins; but the Celts became more compactly concentrated in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine; so those countries were distinguished by the Romans as *Gaul*, the land of the *Galli* or *Celts*.

It must nevertheless be remembered that these latest comers were superimposed upon a previous population which already

formed an ethnic miscellany of considerable complexity. We cannot estimate the relative numbers of each group, but there is good reason to believe that the older inhabitants were in the majority. The fact that Celtic influence is far from predominating in the French race may support this view, it being assumed that the typical Celt is a man of high stature, with fair or auburn hair, blue eyes and a fair skin—very like, in fact, to Germans in general. Unfortunately anthropologists are far from agreement on this point, and it is probable that the Celts when they first settled in Gaul were already a much mixed race. Any affirmation made upon an ethnographical question in those remote ages must necessarily be qualified by saving clauses.

Importance of the Celtic element

It is, however, certain that most of the country must have fallen under the domination of the invaders who, more vigorous or better armed, gradually assimilated and imposed their language and customs upon the ancient population. The last Celtic invasion caused displacements of peoples which were still in progress when Roman influence began, while the Germans had already begun to exercise that westward pressure which continued, with some interruptions, till the fifth century A.D. They also contributed important elements to the French race, as did the Saracens after them in the eighth and the Normans in the ninth and tenth centuries. Nevertheless the region which was to become France acquires, with the definite establishment of the Celts, the fundamental elements of a characteristic ethnic constitution.

Conclusion

In the remote origins, roughly delineated above, many points necessarily remain obscure and indeterminate. This much is clearly to be seen: the country attracted and gave a home to many settlers, very diverse in character. Even the first comers succeeded under the influence of the local conditions in emerging from primitive animality and in getting a footing

on the ladder which leads to civilisation; they passed, step by step, from the early stage of nomad hunters to the later stage of the cultivator attached to the soil. The last comers had added some rudiments of culture to the purely practical acquirements of their ancestors. An infant Gallic civilisation was painfully growing up amid trouble and dissension, when development was quickened and its direction modified by the influence upon the Gauls of Roman discipline and the Roman spirit.

The precise contribution made by these ancient inhabitants of our soil to the life and soul of modern France is not now measurable; we know too little about them. But we know at any rate that they founded the French race and were the first element to contribute to the characteristic genius of France.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: G. Bloch, *Les origines* (vol. i, part 2 of Lavisse, *H. F.*, book i.) chs. i and ii.

On Geographical Conditions: Vidal de la Blache, *Tableau de la géographie de la France* (In Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. i, part i).

On Primitive Man and the First Inhabitants of Gaul: Boule, *Les hommes fossiles*,[2] 1921; J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique, celtique et gallo-romaine*, 1910-1914, 4 vols., the last containing a general index; Dr. Capitan, *La préhistoire*, 1922.

On the Historical Peoples and the Celts: J. Déchelette, *Manuel*, vol. ii; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, vol. i: *Les invasions gauloises et la colonisation grecque*,[4] A. Grenier, Les Gaulois, 1923.

CHAPTER II

GAUL BEFORE THE ROMAN CONQUEST

I

Our information

Caesar's *Commentaries*

OUR knowledge of independent Gaul is mainly derived from the Roman general, Julius Caesar, the conqueror of the country, who, in his work *De Bello Gallico*, or *Commentaries Concerning the Gallic War*, written between 51 and 49 B.C., describes in considerable detail the country and its inhabitants as they were when he encountered them about the middle of the first century B.C. He devotes several chapters (book vi, 11, 20) to a general description which is of the greatest interest. It is, indeed, less precise and accurate than we might wish, but Caesar's standards are less exacting than ours; he does not, as a rule, see much below the surface and outward seeming of things and men, and writing, as he does, for Roman readers, he is more concerned to indicate resemblances which will enable his public to form a general idea of the Gauls, their political and social institutions and their manner of life, than to dwell upon idiosyncrasies which have no analogy with anything Roman. This preoccupation has obviously prevented him from fully understanding the political and social institutions which he met with in Gaul. Nor can we be certain that he has given their due respective weight to the facts which he has observed; it is possible that he considered some to be of primary importance which the Gauls themselves would have considered secondary, a danger to which imperfectly informed observers in a new country are particularly exposed, and which may lead them, and us who come after them, into serious error.

Before Caesar, Greek and Latin authors contribute a few

Other evidence

isolated facts about ancient Gaul, and after Caesar only Strabo adds a little to the knowledge derived from the *Commentaries*. Celtic archaeology contributes little and is not likely to contribute more in the future. Thus it is no easy matter to draw any trustworthy and intelligible picture of Gaul as a whole. In fact, it is easier to say what independent Gaul was not than to picture more than vaguely what it was. All evidence, however, shows us that above all it lacked *unity*, the one thing requisite if its natural resources were to be explored and utilised, and if its individuality was to be preserved.

Our main impression, its lack of unity

II

The state of Gaul

A. *Lack of geographical unity*

The Gauls knew nothing of Gaul

The inhabitants had no idea that their country possessed natural boundaries, or even that it was a distinct country, as, for instance, the Romans saw it. They had no name for it as a whole and no conception of it as such. They could not see farther than the boundaries of the pigmy states into which it was divided. Caesar recognised, outside Roman *Provincia* on the Mediterranean coast, three main groups, differing in physique and in manners, inhabiting respectively Belgium north of the Seine and the Marne, Aquitaine south of the Garonne, and Celtic Gaul between the two.

It is doubtful whether the Gauls themselves drew any such precise distinctions. Quite unconscious of the natural geographical fitness of their country for union, they were incapable of any design to achieve it; while the jealousies between clan and clan, to which they were keenly alive, must have given ostensibly adequate motives for separation and persistence in a narrow particularism. Thus Gaul had no geographical unity.

B. *Lack of ethnographical unity*

The Galli, in the common Roman sense of the word, were Celts. But we know that Gaul was not peopled by Celts alone: Iberians peopled Aquitaine and Ligurians all the southeast, while the Germans in the second century B.C. had crossed from

the right bank of the Rhine and settled in the plain of Alsace and in what we know as the Palatinate. We know, too, that there were Celts outside Gaul; there still remained some important settlements in Germany, for instance the *Volcae Tectosages*, on the plateau north of the Danube; and in Great Britain, north Italy and Asia Minor. Even the Gallic Celts had probably no idea that they belonged to *one race*, still less that they were *one people;* they were merely *peoples* and far from brotherly to one another. It is very doubtful whether they ever had any collective name for themselves.

Time and varying factors, among which the distances of the respective settlements from the Mediterranean and their proximity to Germany were important, produced striking differences, noted by Caesar, between tribes established to the north or to the south of the Seine and the Marne. The Belgians appear to have been less civilised and ruder than the Celts; they have a different dialect, if not a different language, and different customs. The Iberians and Ligurians retained traces of their origin in their speech, as did the Germans. Thus Gaul was quite without ethnographical unity. No common sentiment united the men who found themselves associated together on the soil of future Roman Gaul.

C. *Lack of political unity*

(a) The *civitas*

There was no kind of political unity in Gaul. The normal political unit was that called by Caesar the *civitas* (the city), a little state comprising a *gens*, one community and one population. There were many *civitates;* Cæsar counted about ninety in Celtic Gaul alone. How far they were stable or how far liable to change and to break up into fresh groups, larger or smaller, is not known. At any rate, they differed greatly in size and in population. If we accept, for want of a better, Caesar's estimate of the armies which they could respectively put in the field, we may count their population as varying from 50,000 to 400,000 apiece. None was more than a small political group, and as a whole they offered the best possible field for the growth

of local resentments, personal feuds, jealousies and susceptibilities of all kinds, a hot-bed, in fact, of perennial division and disorder among communities, no one of which was strong enough to subject and enforce union on the others.

The *oppidum*

Each *civitas* centred upon a more or less compact group of dwellings, hardly to be called a "town" without unduly enlarging or contracting the meaning of the word. Commonly it was no more than an *oppidum*, a fortified enclosure, larger or smaller, forming a refuge in time of danger and a place of barter in peace, at once an entrenched camp and a market-place.

Pagi and *vici*

The territory of each *civitas* was divided, according to Caesar, into *pagi*—translated as *pays* (district)—and each of these into *vici* or villages. A *vicus* is a group of huts together with the land which supports their inhabitants. An appreciable proportion of the population lived also in isolated dwellings

Aedificia

called by Caesar *aedificia*. An *aedificium* is the primitive stage of that which will be called by the Gallo-Romans a *villa*, the rural abode of a considerable landowner with his house and farm buildings.

The *pagi* appear to have kept enough independence in the *civitas* to form individual territorial units, having in case of need an individual voice and even an individual power of action in affairs of interest to the whole *civitas*. *Pagi* and *vici* mean groupings more stable and united than the *civitas* itself. Roman rule modified them outwardly and improved them, but did not affect their territorial structure which has survived through the centuries to this day; they may still be identified in current phrases employed by our peasants, side by side with or underlying official administrative divisions.

(b) Political constitution of the *civitates*

No uniform government controlled these Gallic *civitates*. Examination discloses among them nearly every kind of political constitution known to antiquity. We can form but an approximate opinion about them, the exact details being too

often wanting. A few general observations may, however, be worth making.

Disappearance of ancient royalty

1. Ancient hereditary royalty, generally omnipotent, which seems to have been dominant in Gaul for the century or two before Caesar, is in course of disappearance. Eight only out of fifty chiefs (*duces*) named by Caesar bear the title of king (*rex*); and three of these are usurpers, of the kind called by the ancient Greeks and Romans tyrants (*tyrannoi, tyranni*). The oldest form of royalty apparently survives only among the *Arvernes* (in the highest part of the Central Massif). Elsewhere it had been overthrown, almost without exception, by the aristocracy, and had been restored only in some cases and in spite of the aristocrats with the aid of popular revolutionary feeling. All who know anything of ancient history will recognise in this a phenomenon familiar in Greece and even in Rome. The Gauls follow more tardily the paths already trodden by their earlier Aryan kindred whom Mediterranean civilisation has developed more rapidly.

Domination of the aristocracy

2. Power is usually in the hands of an aristocracy. The "aristocrats" here mean men of property—that is to say, rich in land, cattle and movable goods—though we are unable to learn why and how they acquired these all-important elements of power. The *aristocracy* rules through a *council* or *senate*, probably multitudinous and tumultuous, which decides all matters of importance and appoints the *magistrates*. What are those magistrates and their functions? We do not know, and they are probably different in the various *civitates*. We see among the Aedui [1] and among the Lexovii [2] a *Vergobretus* (*summus magistratus*, at least on the civil side) who appears to be a supreme chief; elsewhere the *Vergobret* is perhaps merely a judge. His appointment may be annual or for life.

[1] The *Aedui*, or *Haedui*, inhabiting the region between the Saône and the Loire, about the present town of Autun.

[2] The *Lexovii* occupied approximately the department of Calvados and part of that of Eure, around modern Lisieux.

With him are notables (*principes*), not actually magistrates, but influential men whose personal position is such that their views must be taken into account. Influence of this kind, unconnected with any public duties, is always unfavourable to the justice, impartiality and strength of a government.

Discontentment of the *plebs*

3. The small folk, the *plebs*, who own no land, are oppressed, often poverty-stricken, and always discontented. They make blind and blundering attempts to free themselves from the burdens laid on their shoulders by the aristocracy, usually by the classic method of antiquity, the only resource indeed of a wretched and unorganised people, by promoting the access to power of tyrants, the natural enemies of aristocracies. These upheavals from below are of great interest.

Inadequacy of institutions

4. Nowhere can we find stable institutions inspired solely and impartially by desire for the common weal. All that come under our eyes are partisan and unstable. Some *civitates* may have had laws in writing, but this is uncertain; moreover public law, where it exists, seems to be more or less at the mercy of influential individuals.

Taxes

We find public taxes, direct and indirect. The direct taxes, as always in an aristocratic society, are thrown almost entirely on the shoulders of the people, whom they overwhelm. The indirect imposts, tolls upon highways, at bridge-heads, in mountain passes, and sundry others (*portoria et vectigalia*) are farmed out to the rich and influential, who draw from them large revenues of which only a small proportion returns to the *civitas*.

The army

Military service, too, is obligatory on all free men. Functions relating to war are naturally of the highest importance among so belligerent a set of communities, and it is therefore all the more interesting to note among some *civitates*, particularly among the Aedui, a tendency to separate civil and military authority. The *Vergobret* is never the leader in war, a fact possibly explicable as a safeguard on the part of the

aristocracy against the enterprises on the part of a prospective tyrant.

Justice

It is uncertain whether justice is always administered by the State; where it exists it is harsh, partial and inspires no confidence. Thus anarchy is encouraged; in the absence of trustworthy courts, ready to convict and punish without fear or favour, everyone takes the law into his own hands, seeking reparation as he best can.

(c) Lack of government

In fact the government of these Gallic *civitates* seems to us very bad indeed, generally promoting anarchy far more than it ensures public order. Disputes and quarrels among the chiefs, each with his clan at his back, increase the indiscipline due to the weakness or the tyrannical violence of the governing authority. The lesser folk, tired of suffering without prospect of release, and harshly and continuously oppressed, in seeking remedy for their ills, ignore the government which has left them to their fate.

Expedients employed by the lesser folk

1. Tyranny

Despair may incite them to blind revolt, for the moment perhaps successful in destruction, but rarely fruitful of lasting benefit; or they may help some tyrant into power who will be able at least to give them revenge on their oppressors—a dangerous expedient, for a tyrant is never democratic except at his start and he generally comes to oppress rich and poor together with equal severity. For these reasons the lesser folk rarely have recourse to collective revenges; each man does for himself what he can. Usually he seeks shelter under some great man, giving loyalty and bodily service in return for protection. In this way the system of clienteles (*clientela*) grows up in Gaul, the poor and weak voluntarily grouping themselves around some rich and powerful neighbour. This practice greatly augments the strength of the *nobiles* and *potentes*, who on their own lands, where their clients are assembled, have the attributes of petty kings, their taxes, their troops and their courts of law. Their passion for individual independence is

2. Clientele

fostered, and the feudal spirit is already born among them. When the *civitates* make war they take the field with their men at the head of their *soldurii*, the clients with whom their relations are closest, attached to their persons by stringent vows and often so loving their lord that they refuse to survive his death. A war chief thus finds himself hampered in decision and initiative by the wishes, interests and caprices of his allied chiefs, each ready to obstruct and to take offence. Thus Gaul had neither political unity nor political equilibrium as a whole or in its component provinces.

(d) Internal dissensions

1. Strife between cities

The whole country is a scene of frequent and sanguinary strife between city and city, usually due to reciprocal hatreds between neighbours of different political constitution, a state of affairs analogous to that which ultimately cost Greece her independence. Leagues indeed are made from time to time between *civitates*, but these are merely temporary combinations against some common enemy, and last no longer than the occasion which gave them birth, sometimes representing no more than an attempt by one *civitas* to dominate its neighbours. There is no trace of any federation freely entered upon by mutual consent for the common good, duly safeguarded against the predominance of one member by concession from all; these leagues, in fact, so far from setting Gaul upon the road to unity and concord, apparently provide incentives for hatred and division. It is obvious that, taught by experience, they may change in nature and spirit in a more or less remote future; but there is no sign of any step's being made in this direction.

2. Strife within cities

In every *civitas* order is unstable, no matter for surprise in the absence of any solidarity between class and class, or of any collective and coherent action for the common weal. Permanent dissension, in fact, as far as can be seen, is a normal feature of city life. It must be admitted that, here and there,

men, cooler and more considerate than most of their compatriots, have some vague conception of the inconvenience and actual danger incidental to this lack of order, and attempt remedial measures, attempts which, however, are necessarily fumbling and ineffective, being directed to no well chosen or clearly apprehended end.

(e) The social state: Its foundations

The social state is no better than the political. It would appear to be based (1) upon a constitution of the family, which is of great power and is analogous to that of ancient Rome. The wife and children are strictly subordinated to the husband and father, although the wife can own land and so has made a first step towards emancipation. (2) Upon a system of large estates, public and private, the State's and the family's, the integrity of the latter being preserved by a scheme of entail. The holdings, often very large, are worked by slaves or by settlers from among the clients of the landholder. The urban population is quite insignificant compared with the great proportion who live on the land, and the whole system of tenure and culture thus produces a very large rural proletariat, which is always a dangerous social phenomenon. Its immediate and logical consequence is that the poor of the countryside are constantly accumulating more and more debts; living as they do from hand to mouth in grinding dependence on the vagaries of soil and season, they are driven, if their crops fail, to incur debt from which they can rarely free themselves afterwards. Invariably its crushing weight creates a grave social problem; as it did in the ancient Roman republic, so it did in the Gaul of Caesar's time. The system of clients, already described, is at once a proof of the defective distribution of land, an empirical remedy for its evils, and the cause of its continuance.

Absence of social solidarity

Thus in Gaul, social solidarity, like political solidarity, is lacking. The still solid remnants of a once strict social hierarchy survive and are but slightly impaired. Yet outside it

Masterless men (*perditi*)

live large numbers of men ready at the first opportunity to combine and organise themselves as bandits living on the country. They are sick of agriculture, which hardly gives them a living; robbery offers them an easier and better paid occupation. Here is another very grave social danger.[3]

General impressions

To sum up, the position of Gaul, from whatever point of view it may be regarded, appears to be anything but fortunate. Those who suffer most severely under it clearly show signs of endeavour to improve it, but do not appear to have any chance of succeeding or even of stating clearly to themselves what they desire. They merely grope in the dark for some means of escape from an intolerable situation.

I have already mentioned the presence in Gaul of a few men, outside the poorer classes, clear-sighted enough to realise the inconveniences and dangers of disunion; we shall meet with the most active and intelligent among them in the domain of religion.

III

The principle of unity: Religion

Our information

We know little about the religion of the Gauls. On no subject was a Roman less capable of accurate observation and real understanding. He was too accustomed to look for resemblances between foreign deities and his own to possess the freedom of outlook or the detachment of mind indispensable for the objective study of religious phenomena. Although archaeology and epigraphy have garnered abundant material for our study, this material dates almost entirely from the time of Roman domination, when the religious customs, myths and iconography of the conquerors had permeated the religion of the conquered. Before the conquest the Gauls had been unconscious of any need to represent their deities in human form;

[3] These men are those called by Caesar *egentes* (indigent) and *perditi* (outlaws); cf. *De Bello Gallico*, III, 17, 4: *Magna praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat: quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agricultura et cotidiana labore revocabat.*

after it, they changed completely in this respect, following the example of the Romans.[4]

A. *The gods*

The Gallic religion, before it was changed by contact with Rome, was a naturalistic polytheism; its gods were many and they typified natural forces. These were common to all Gaul. Besides them various local gods (*dieux topiques*[5]) were recognised; each attached to some particular spot, either as a guardian genius or as a personification of the gifts which it gave to men. Thus fountains, springs, trees had their popular divinities. Their worship in some cases extended over a whole district,[6] and in some to all Gaul. French place-names still preserve the memory of several. The god of hot springs, *Borvo* or *Bormo*, has given his name to many health resorts: *Bourbon-Lancy*, *Bourbon l'Archambault*, *La Bourboule*, *Bourbonne-les-Bains*, and also, indirectly, to the family which gave France her last eight kings, the *Bourbons*. The goddess *Deva* or *Diva* survives in names of rivers, *Dive*, *Divonne* and in *Divonne-les-Bains*. Even *Teutates* (whom Caesar identifies with Mercury and who is the most venerated among the greater gods of Gaul) or *Taran*, god of the sun, or *Belen*, god of battle, had less hold on the hearts of the people than these local divinities. They outlived paganism itself, and the Christian Church did not entirely succeed in discarding them in the localities where they were worshipped by putting saints or the Virgin in their places. French folk-lore is still full of their traces.

Their beliefs

The beliefs of the Gauls, interesting as their details are to the historian of religions, do not appear to have any marked originality. Possibly the assimilation of Roman elements helps

[4] The case of Gaul is analogous to that of Rome, when she came in contact with Greece. The Greek gods transformed and as it were absorbed the Roman gods, at least the greater among them.

[5] From the Greek *topos*, which means place, neighbourhood.

[6] For example that of *Vosegus* over the whole region of the Vosges, and that of *Arduinne* over the whole region of the Ardennes.

to produce this impression. One religious institution, however, which impressed Caesar as singular, calls for notice—the Druidic priesthood.

B. *The Druids*

This priesthood has been supposed to have been exclusively Celtic, as it was not found among the Aquitanians. Druids,[7] however, do not seem to have existed at the time of the Celtic migrations, when the chiefs were the priests, as is usual in antiquity; and we do not meet with them before the end of the third century. On the other hand, since the Gauls in Caesar's time believed Druidism to have originated in Great Britain, it may reasonably be believed that it was a recent acquisition so far as they were concerned. I see no serious reason for disputing its Britannic origin; we know that youths who intended to become Druids crossed the Channel for their training, and later on when Druidism, forbidden and persecuted by Rome, had died out in Gaul, it survived in Ireland and Scotland up to the time when it succumbed before Christianity.

Organisation and spirit of Druidism

The Druids, as described by Caesar, formed a *brotherhood* rather than a *caste*, ruled by an elected chief and entered only after a long novitiate. Side by side with the Druids properly so called, but linked with them by a hierarchic bond, which we do not fully understand, were the *eubages*, who specialised as diviners, and the *bards*, who were both minstrels and poets. These priests accepted the general beliefs and current observances of the Gallic religion, but possessed besides a kind of theology and practised various rites peculiar to themselves. They passed for men of learning, even some modern authors have accepted them as such, easily earned as such a reputation must have been in such a country as Gaul then was. In reality their whole science was comprised in a few notions concerning

[7] The meaning of their name is not exactly known. It has been thought to be an adjective analogous to the English "true" and the German "treu," and signifying *true, faithful, sure.* Another suggestion is that of the Greek δρυς, meaning the *oak;* the Druids being the *men of the oaks.* But we do not really know.

astronomy and medicine together with a set of magical formulae—three branches of knowledge complementary with one another and perfectly harmonising, Druidic astronomy being astrology and their medicine sorcery. Their knowledge was transmitted from generation to generation in long poems which the *novices* had to learn by heart. They are alleged to have possessed a secret doctrine of man and the world, an idea based upon a misunderstanding of Caesar's, who thought that their teaching was entrusted to the memory of their pupils instead of to writing, in order that it might be kept secret. The real reason undoubtedly was that oral transmission was traditional, and writing little practised in Gaul. Everything shows that, far from desiring to keep their doctrines secret, they endeavoured to disseminate them as widely as possible. The essential feature of their creed consisted in a representation of the soul's destiny, whence derived we know not, superimposed upon the Gallic belief in survival after death. In Gallic tombs which have been opened, the dead man lies with his weapons and appliances about him, as though he were destined to continue under the earth the life that he had led above it.

The Druids spiritualised this conception; they believed that at death the spirit, leaving the flesh, entered a kind of Elysium, somewhat vague and nebulous, lying beyond the sea, and there animated another body. There was no death for the spirit and no question of reward or punishment beyond this present life. Thus the Druidic doctrine of metempsychosis may be described as being devoid of moral character, and indeed of any particular moral significance.

The Druidic rites

The Druidic worship of the gods admitted no employment of temples or of idols. It was conducted entirely under the open sky, on high places or in woods, a feature which shows the antiquity of the religious usages to which it conforms, and one common to all the oldest Aryan religions. Further, the Druids were prominent in all public or private ceremonial. They pre-

sided over the cutting of the sacred branch of the mistletoe from the oak, an impressive rite; and over the *holocaust*, a sacrifice to the sun god, when yearly at the summer solstice a huge fire was kindled, symbolising the fertilising radiance of the sun. We do not know the precise significance attached by the Druids to this holocaust, in which victims, sometimes human, were consumed on the pyre; but I am inclined to see in it a survival of the primitive belief that man can stimulate and aid the work of beneficent natural forces by acts of symbolic magic, to which supreme potency is attributed.

Survivals of their rites

These rites have left remarkable traces behind them, so deep as not yet to be effaced. We still look on the mistletoe as a symbol of good luck. We pluck it when winter begins; on the threshold of the new year, as we exchange expressions of joy and good will, it decorates our festivities. An ancient phrase, or rather popular catchword, expressing lightness of heart, is associated with it and perhaps goes back to the time when joyous crowds followed the procession on its return from cutting the *golden bough* with the sacred sickle.[8] "*Au gui l'an neuf!*" (to the mistletoe the new year). In the patois of Maine, a new year's gift is still called *aianneuf*—an obvious corruption of *au gui l'an neuf*, the *neuf* being pronounced *neu* as *oeuf* is pronounced *eu* in this district. The holocaust survives, too, in the bonfires of St. John's Eve (June 23) when not long ago it was still customary to throw animals into brushwood fires.

Authority exercised by the Druids

The Druids enjoyed high prestige and great moral authority. Private persons and even cities would, at any rate on some occasions, submit disputes for their decision. Their judicial competence was acknowledged, particularly in matters having any connection, near or remote, with religion, disputes involving inheritance or land, allegations of murder and the like.

[8] It may be remembered that Sir James Frazer in his celebrated work, *The Golden Bough*, concludes that the bough which the future priest of Diana was to cut in the sacred grove of Nemi was of mistletoe.

Their jurisdiction in some measure compensated for the defects of that of the civil power, or at least was superadded to the latter.

The Druidic courts did not sit in every city. Important annual assizes were held in the country of the *Carnutes*, that of modern Chartres, at the season when the whole brotherhood assembled for the great celebrations of spring. Suitors from all parts of Celtic Gaul attended.

The Druids commanded effective means for the execution of their decrees, none other than that which gave power to the Church in the Middle Ages—*excommunication* and *interdict*—the power to place a person or a people outside law and outside religion, the rupture, under sacred sanctions, of all ties which unite man with men or a people with peoples. Unfortunately recourse to their tribunals was not obligatory. It is only too clear that the cities submitted only unimportant suits for their decision and that among individuals the nobles only could have recourse to them, all slaves and clients being restricted to the judicial authority of their overlord.

The problem of their influence

A true opinion as to their real weight and influence is not easy to form. The principles and spirit of their order might obviously do much good in the Celtic welter of anarchy, disunion and violence. Did they not incarnate moral force? The representatives of just law and in some degree of peace, good will and union? No doubt they were all this. But we know how great is the distance between an ideal and its realisation. We cannot be sure in what measure the druidic ideal was, I will not say, realised in Gaul, because we are sure that this measure was small, but even generally accepted by the Gauls. Any such general acceptance would weigh as a happy portent for the future. Records do not enable us to answer the question; on the contrary they increase our perplexities. Caesar, after dealing with the Druids at length and with some precision in his general description (VI,·13), mentions them no more; during the conquest nothing

happens in Gaul which shows the Druids to have any importance. Historians have not yet been able to supply a satisfactory explanation of this singular fact. Some have supposed that the conqueror had no wish to mention the difficulties made for him by the Druids, great though they may have been, lest too much weight should be given to opponents whom his victory had only partly subdued. Others have thought that in Caesar's time Druidism may have been only a shadow of a past greater self, and that the proconsul refers to it only as a thing of former times. The first of these hypotheses, though far from well established, appears to me on the whole less unacceptable than the second.

The Druids and unity

In view of the silence of the documents, we lack the necessary equipment. However this may be, we may well believe that the Druids, by the one fact that they had authority of some kind among the confusion and division of the Celtic cities, were a factor in furtherance of union. Yet though credit may be due to them for an endeavour to make their religion a common concern and a bond of union for the Celts of Gaul, it must be recognised that their practical success, by the time of Caesar, must have been far from encouraging. Even religious unity had not been attained in any degree; many years must have passed, I believe, before by their efforts national unity could have dawned on the horizon.

IV

Development of natural resources

The development of the natural resources of a country in the political and social condition of Gaul must inevitably have been imperfect. The population was sparse; it could hardly have exceeded five or six millions, a small force indeed to cope with the obstacles of forest and marsh.

A. *Scarcity and small size of towns*

The most conspicuous demographical phenomenon is the scarcity of towns. Only four or five aggregations of inhabitants

appear to have been really entitled to this description, and they were all small; of large towns there were none. We can form some idea of *Bibracte*, the capital of the Aedui, situated on the Beuvray mount, twenty-five kilometres west of modern *Autun*. Bibracte was an *oppidum*, of great strength owing to its position, which plays an important part in the strategy of Caesar; yet it was no more than an entrenchment about five kilometres in circumference, within which permanent dwellings occupied only a very small space. The rest served as a camp of refuge and as a market-place for the inhabitants of the country round. There was certainly no comparison between Bibracte and a Greek or Roman town. Apparently *oppida* of this type, consisting of a rampart and a permanent agglomeration of houses, houses usually of wood, were numerous in the most thickly peopled parts of the country; Caesar tells us that the Gauls, when they decided to lay the country waste before him, "*burnt more than twenty towns of the Bituriges*" (VII, 15). These could hardly be more than villages with a stockade. The people mentioned here are, no doubt, those *Bituriges* who owned "*the fairest town in all Gaul*" (*pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem*), of which they were so proud that they had not the heart to burn it with the rest. Caesar called it *Avaricum*, and it is now *Bourges*. It had, apparently, streets and squares and some title to the name of *town*. But in Roman eyes it was certainly a poor affair. Cicero asks,[9] "*Is there anything more unsightly than a Gallic oppidum?*" His opinion corresponded with that of the conquerors and, I expect, with reality. Such public monuments as formed the common embellishment of all Mediterranean towns were absent from the *oppida*. Excavations have never revealed even one building of masonry.

Bibracte

Avaricum

The land is ill cultivated; the established system of land tenure is of a kind unfavourable to agricultural progress. The

B. *The land ill cultivated*

[9] *De provinciis consularibus*, 12: Quid incultius oppidis?

holder is satisfied with such production as is needed to supply his personal wants and those of his clients. Cultivation properly so called is restricted; the proceeds of the chase form an important part of the current food supply, and the principal rural wealth consists of flocks and herds, above all herds of swine, which find a living under the oaks of the forest. A Roman, traversing these thinly peopled and ill-cultivated lands which in many districts were mere clearings continually threatened with encroachment by forest and thicket, with their rude farms, poverty-stricken villages of huts made of mud and unmortared stones, dense woods and interminable marshes, could hardly avoid forming an impression like that which Cicero expressed in the words, "*What can be harsher than this land?*" [10]

C. *Inadequate communications*

Roads

Travel could have been no easy matter in Gaul. The inhabitants used vehicles, the remains of which have frequently been found in the graves of chiefs. They must therefore have had roads. No doubt, but what kind of roads and how many? A road was the customary track between one place and another which, continually trodden and consolidated by men and animals, ultimately became hardened and defined. Rains washed it away, chariot wheels cut it up; its users repaired it at haphazard. At most, we may suppose roads used by the Mediterranean traders, which followed the principal trade routes, to have been systematically maintained by those who dwelt along them. And even this is far from certain.

Bridges

The marshes, I expect, were crossed on fascines of brushwood, like those still used in the bog lands of the Jura and Auvergne, and the smaller streams on tree-trunks, trimmed and laid from bank to bank. The larger rivers were crossed by fords. Bridges indeed existed, all built of timber; but they were very few and each was an income to its owner.

Waterways

It is possible that use was made at this date of waterways for commercial purposes. It is certain that there was an im-

[10] *Loc. cit.:* Quid illis terris asperius?

portant coastal trade, which was mainly in the hands of the *Veneti* (about modern Vannes).

D. Activity of commerce

Poorly peopled and ill-cultivated Gaul is remarkable for having had an active commercial life. Its inhabitants had apparently a native instinct and taste for traffic, which found scope for exercise and development in the natural products of their country. The extent of this commerce must not be exaggerated, but the existence of a metallic coinage, imitated, more or less, from that of Marseilles and Rhoda, testifies to its importance and activity. In its future development lay the only opportunity which Gaul was likely to meet with of achieving some stability and of grasping to some extent the truth that her different parts naturally formed one coherent whole. We have, of course, no statistical information as to the number of these traders or the extent of their transactions. The most enterprising and active were probably Greeks and Italians, who made use of the principal highways and established trading posts at the principal centres of population: at Cenabrum (Orléans), Neviodunum (Nevers), Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saône), Durocorturum (Rheims), and elsewhere. They came for metals, furs, wool, salted provisions, and the slaves with which the constant internal wars amply supplied the Gallic markets; they brought manufactured goods from their own country. Celtic Gaul welcomed them. Belgic Gaul held herself somewhat aloof. Caesar at the beginning of his enterprise is obviously imperfectly informed as to the latter region, which gives reason to believe that Italian merchants did not at that time much frequent it.

The Mediterranean traders

E. Industry

Native industry supplied the current needs of the country in cloth, linen, weapons, chariots, pottery and jewelry. The enamel work of the Aedui had already made a name for itself. Above all, workers in metals were prosperous. Nowhere in the first century of our era, except in Spain, were copper and iron more copiously abundant and more capably turned to use.

Tin, too, and the precious metals, gold and silver, were sought out, worked up and manufactured. Production in small quantities, which today would be unprofitable, in those days was remunerative. We have no data for estimating the precise value of this industry, nor do we know whether it was carried on by the labour of slaves or of free men.

V

Civilisation

In attempting to form any general idea of Gallic civilisation, we must first realise that her different peoples are in different stages of progress; for instance the Belgians are ruder than the Celts. Culture grows both in depth and extent as one proceeds, from north to south, towards the Mediterranean and its influence. None of the Gauls are absolutely savages, though they have much in common with men to whom this name is applied. They are fond of finery, brightly coloured stuffs, clumsy and gaudy ornaments. The dwellings of the poor are the meanest of huts; those of the rich combine a complete absence of comfort, a naïve, ostentatious and barbaric luxury, and the crudest rusticity. Their inhabitants delight in full feasting and deep drinking; seated on faggots or trusses of straw they gorge to repletion on the coarsest foods, or drink to intoxication, till the evening ends with a quarrel or a brawl. A puerile, ceremonious and very punctilious etiquette regulates their intercourse. These characteristics, added to the impression we receive from the economic survey of Gaul which we have just made, indicate a civilisation akin to that of the Soudan of today, in those parts where indigenous habits, manners and customs have not yet been appreciably modified by contact with European civilisation. The parallel is exact, even to the existence of a common instinct for decoration expressed in ornaments, pottery and weapons, the infantile stage in the development of a capacity for the fine arts.

Conclusion

In fine, independent Gaul is shown to be as a whole unorganised. No idea of her capacities or of her future destinies has yet dawned on her peoples. Their conduct from day to day is ruled by the emotions of the moment, which are violent, disorderly and transient.

Character of the Gauls

The Romans, in summing up the most striking characteristics of the Gauls, have drawn a picture, hardly flattering to our ancestors but probably not far from the truth. They grant them a light-hearted and reckless courage, an alert and receptive intelligence, a delight in and a turn for the amenities of social intercourse, a keen instinct for language and a gift for its use—noteworthy qualities but attended with grave defects —an extreme readiness to take offence, an unconscionable love of war and adventure, an intolerable habit of boasting, little tenacity of purpose and little perseverance in undertakings, an incapacity to support reverses with unimpaired resolution, on all occasions great emotional instability, and above all a native and inborn horror of rule and discipline.

Frenchmen who are conscious of themselves and have the frankness to confess openly will have no difficulty in agreeing that their national character has points in common with that of the Gauls as thus depicted, in so far as it is not that of all nations insufficiently policed. And this admission is at least indirect evidence that the character of the Gauls has had some influence on that of their descendants, though many serious faults, such as a propensity for violence and a belligerent disposition, are perhaps not inherent by nature, but proceed from the unfortunate political, social and economic condition of the country.

Their incapacity for union

The Gauls appear incapable of union, or even of rising to the conception of union as an abstract idea. Their most striking characteristic is their division by endless acrimonious and rooted animosities. These feuds between warring factions, in the absence of any patriotic sentiment competent to assuage

or absorb them, are of capital importance in every city, and as they grow more and more bitter they induce their partisans to seek victory by invoking external aid. Thus the aristocracy, in the apprehensions induced by plebeian agitation and upheaval, will be ready to turn their eyes and their hopes towards Rome, ever the champion of oligarchies.

Gaul between two perils

From another point of view we see a race, full of vigour as yet unimpaired by civilisation, having many Latin affinities, and thus well adapted for control and even assimilation by Rome. It is incapable of holding its own for long against a coherent, energetic and persistent attack. Any movements which might promote union in the future are too tentative and confused, and too slowly developed and organised to bear any fruit before Gaul is overwhelmed by those two perils between which she stands, that of German appetite on the east and the spread of Roman covetousness on the south. In the middle of the first century the question is which will overcome the other. Both in turn were to descend on Gaul in the future, but for the moment Rome outstripped the Germans and was first on the spot.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: G. Bloch, *Les origines,* book ii, ch. i. in Lavisse, *H. F.,* vol. i, second part; C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule,* vol. ii: *La Gaule indépendante.*

On Life and Civilisation: S. Reinach, *Catalogue of the Museum of Saint Germain.*

On Religion: Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique,* vol. i; d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Druides,* 1906; various papers by S. Reinach in his study entitled *Cultes, mythes et religions* (see index); C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule,* vol. ii: *La Gaule indépendante,*[3] chs. iv and v.

CHAPTER III

THE EDUCATION OF GAUL BY ROME

I

Our information

WE now enter upon comparatively firm and well-explored ground. The Romans, once established in Gaul, wrote of Gaul as they did about the other parts of their empire. The Gauls themselves, acquiring some taste for things of the mind, took to writing and composed works, several of which have come down to us. Above all, the Romans brought with them into Gaul their passion for fine, solid and durable building, and their habit of inscribing on stone or bronze the texts of published laws and decrees, and accounts of events so memorable as to appear worthy of preservation. So Gallo-Roman archaeology and epigraphy supplement our essentially literary information by contributions no less abundant than valuable. Every year enriches our store by the discovery of documents, more or less interesting and instructive, and this supply shows no signs of becoming exhausted. Though our knowledge of Gallo-Roman Gaul is not without *lacunae*, on the whole it is satisfactory, and at any rate sufficient to provide answers to all the principal questions that present themselves. These may be resolved into two of primary importance: 1, Why did Rome overcome Gaul? 2, How did the Romans come to assimilate the Gauls?

The two crucial questions

II

The conquest

A. *First relations between Rome and Gaul*

Rome and Gaul first came into contact through Marseilles, which like Rome felt the need for defence against an enemy whose growing power and commercial ambition threatened the

great Greek city with ruin and caused disquietude to the Italian republic. This enemy was Carthage, which, descended from colonists of Tyre, aspired to reëstablish, to her own advantage, the ancient Phoenician control over western Mediterranean trade. From the beginning of the fourth century, Rome and Marseilles had thus been allies and friends, illustrating the truth that "*our enemies' enemies are our friends,*" and this friendship opened Gaul to Italian trade. This trade did not fully develop till after the Second Punic War (201 B.C.), when victory gave Carthaginian Spain to Rome, whose Senate, in order to ensure safe communication by land between the new province and Italy, proceeded to occupy the whole coastal region between them. The increasing power and prosperity of Marseilles which resulted from the fall of Carthage soon aroused the jealousy of her allies. So when disputes arose between the Massiliots and their Celtic and Ligurian neighbours, Rome took advantage of them to intervene and obtained a footing in the country in the middle of the second century B.C. (155).

Alliance between Rome and Marseilles

Those interventions, some solicited by Marseilles herself, gradually brought all the districts on the seaboard between Italy and Spain under Roman control in the form of military occupation of a continually widening zone of country, until in 121, after a great victory over the Allobroges [1] and over Biturit, King of the Arverni, this zone became the "*Provincia,*" which has given its name to modern *Provence*, though the former had much wider boundaries than are now assigned to the latter. By successive encroachments upon neighbouring *civitates*, by annexations, either direct or disguised as protectorates or colonies, the *Provincia* ultimately comprised the whole territory bounded by the Alps, the Lake of Geneva, the Rhône, the Cévennes and the Pyrenees, and even extended an

B. *Constitution of "Provincia"*

[1] They inhabited the Alpine region which corresponds approximately to our Savoy. The *Arverni* are the ancestors of our *Auvergnats;* they occupied the most elevated portion and the large valleys of the Central Massif.

angle for some distance into the plain of the Garonne as far as Toulouse and the junction of the Garonne and the Tarn.

Unpopularity of Roman rule

In the *Provincia*, Rome was far from being beloved. The exactions of financial adventurers, who always followed in the wake of the legions, were a sore grievance. These men settled in the country, farmed the *State* taxes, and made fortunes by shameless exploitation of the inhabitants, with the complicity or at least the complaisance of the Roman governors. This scourge was not peculiar to Gaul, but it occasioned no less scandal and aroused no less ill feeling in Gaul than in other provinces.

Invasion of the *Cimbri* and the *Teutones*

Thus when the Germanic invasion of the *Cimbri* and the *Teutones* occurred in 109, the Gauls, whom Rome had subjugated, were in no way cast down by the danger which she ran and from which she was delivered only by the two victories of Marius over the Teutones at Aix [2] in 102 and over the Cimbri at Verceil in 101. They were greatly tempted to revolt, and the opportunity was favourable, but they proved incapable either of union or decision; they wasted time in holding meetings and considering plans, and only the *Tolosates*, who occupied the western end of the *Provincia*, found heart to rise and massacre the small Roman garrison of Toulouse. Their punishment was prompt and severe, and the whole country fell again under the weight of the yoke which they had not known how to shake off, and indeed could not have shaken off for long.

Disturbances in *Provincia*

Effects of the revolt of Sertorius

The revolt of Sertorius (82-72), which covered Spain and gave Rome so much trouble, encouraged other insurrectionary movements in the *Provincia* which continued up to the year 58 when *Transalpine Gaul* found herself included in the government entrusted to the proconsul, *Caius Julius Caesar*.

[2] *Aquae Sextiae*, deriving its name from a hot spring and from the consul Sextius, who founded it in 122 after a victory over the natives of this region.

Policy of the Senate in Gaul

Up to this time, admittedly, Roman rule could not have appeared to independent Gaul as a benefit; rather quite the reverse. The Senate had seen no advantage in extending Republican territory through regions which appeared to them too sunk in barbarism to be of any practical use, and had remained content with establishing diplomatic relations with the principal *civitates* (that of the Aedui, for instance, who boasted that they were brethren of the Romans), and with making friends among the aristocrats. They also promoted, probably by means of commercial treaties, imports by Italian traders of raw materials from Gaul. The name and renown of Rome sank deep into the consciousness of Gaul; but Rome wielded her influence not to lessen Gallic dissension, but rather to promote and organize it for her own advantage.

C. *Caesar and the Gallic War*

The proconsul, on whom the *Lex Vatinia* had conferred for five years the government of Cisalpine Gaul and whom the Senate had in addition entrusted with that of Roman Transalpine Gaul—that is to say, of *Provincia*, also known as *Provincia Narbonensis*—was a man of the highest eminence. His

The man

abilities were such as fall to the lot of but few. He united in himself the gifts of statesman, general, organiser and administrator, besides those of orator and writer. His lack of moral sense and scruple must be admitted, but this is a not uncommon failing in men who are conscious of great superiority over their contemporaries and are animated by a determination to realise at all cost their dreams of ambition. Caesar having once decided on an end was capable of anything and everything to attain it; refined and delicate, he could yet act with the most inflexible rigour, the most revolting cruelty, if success

His object

appeared to demand it. His end was to be master of the Roman government. The Republic, incapable of reformation from within, had been in travail, for more than a century, with frequent and recurrent crises, from none of which had stability been born. Stability, it appeared, could be attained only by

the establishment over all of some strong and enlightened personal power. The cases of Marius and Sylla, among others, had shown that no such power could have any foundation but on brute force, or be wielded except by one who had known how to provide himself with an army, strong and devoted to its commander. Caesar had no such army; no sooner had his consulate ceased than he determined to make use of his provincial government to obtain one. The turbulence of the Gallic states would give rise, day by day, to positions and complications, fertile, to an adroit politician, in pretexts for raising troops and making war. It may be said therefore that the conquest of Gaul was for Caesar not an end but a *means* to an end. The loss to the Gauls of their independence was none the less its outcome.

The occasion for intervention in independent Gaul

Caesar had no need to look far for a pretext; the Gauls themselves provided him with a weighty reason for intervention in their affairs. Shortly before his arrival in the province, the *Sequani*, who dwelt between the Jura, the Rhine, the Vosges, the Saône and the Rhône, and whose capital was *Vesontio* (our Besançon), finding their independence menaced by the Aedui, enterprising "friends of the Roman people," had thought that they could not do better than appeal for aid to a German chief, Ariovistus. Caesar gives him the title "King of the Germans" (I, 31—*Rex Germanorum*), but he was no more than the king of a large German clan in which the *Suevi* predominated. His quarters were in the region now called Baden. In response to the Sequanian appeal he had crossed the Rhine and fallen upon and vanquished the Aedui, who in turn appealed to the friendship of Rome (59). The Republic, fully occupied with internal troubles of its own, had been content with merely diplomatic intervention and had entered into negotiations with Ariovistus, whose permanent position on the left bank of the Rhine was a threat to all Celtic Gaul. The Suevian chief in a moment had grown great in his own eyes, and other

1. The invasion of Ariovistus

Germans, encouraged by his success, had started to cross the Rhine, particularly that part of it which separates Germany from Switzerland. Their pressure drove the *Helvetii*, a Celtic tribe, to whom perhaps the opportunity was not unwelcome, to quit their own country, Helvetia, with the intention of settling in that of the *Santonii* (our Saintonge), to reach which they would have to cross all Celtic Gaul; the *civitates*, menaced by their impending flood, appealed to Caesar for aid. He thus found in his hands the very opportunity which he desired (spring of 58).

2. Emigration of the Helvetii

Hastily raising an army he threw himself across the path of the Helvetii. A battle under *Bibracte* settled the matter and the unfortunate emigrants were obliged to retrace their steps and turn homewards. Caesar then marched against Ariovistus and defeated him decisively in what is now Upper Alsace, throwing him back across the Rhine. The Gauls, saved in a few weeks from two alarming perils, were favourably disposed towards the victor, whom they congratulated and acclaimed as their deliverer.

Repulse of the Helvetii and of Ariovistus

But his army, victorious and growing in strength, remained quartered in the heart of Gaul, and the inhabitants soon realised that there was little prospect of its return to *Provincia*, and that Caesar had designs of no good omen for themselves. Some resigned themselves to the position on grounds more or less illusory—Roman policy, as has been said already, had long known how to make itself some friends in the country—others took up arms against the intruder, especially the Belgae, and thus began the *Gallic War* properly so called (57).

The Gauls against Caesar

Its history will not be told here. Be it sufficient to say that it consists of eight successive campaigns, divided into two periods, during the first of which (from 57 to 55 inclusive) Caesar had to meet unorganised risings which could be dealt with one by one as they occurred. In the second (from 55 to

The war

52), resistance gradually grew stronger and culminated in a vigorous attempt at united action under Vercingetorix.

Caesar's advantages

Caesar's army never exceeded 120,000 men, far fewer than the Gauls could oppose to him, but he was greatly superior in armament, in tactics and in the discipline and military experience of his troops. He was dependent on himself alone; his opponents were disunited, rash, as foolishly confident as they were easily cast down, and jealous of each other, opponents among whom, pursuing a policy laid down for him by his predecessors in *Provincia*, he could easily secure partisans or even allies. Real eagerness to take the field against him prevailed only among the masses, who knew him for the friend of their detested aristocracy. It is probable that the war would have been shorter if the Romans had been less ruthless in their exploitation of the conquered districts as each was compelled to lay down its arms. Numerous serious revolts that occurred were due far more to the inordinate and shameless greed of the victors than to any resentment of foreign domination by the vanquished. Two or three times Caesar found himself in a position of real peril, and owed his escape to his personal energy and ability, to the courage of his lieutenants, and above all to the incompetence and inefficiency of his adversaries.

Inefficiency of the Gallic resistance

The danger of losing her independence was not sufficient to induce Gaul to unite in a common effort of all her communities. Even the great effort originated and led by Vercingetorix may be seen, on close examination, to have been far from *national* in character and extent.

Vercingetorix

Vercingetorix was an Arvernian, one of those *principes* made strong by the number of their clients, who paraded good will towards the populace in order, by their assistance, to push themselves to the head of their *civitas*. His father, Celtill, had tried this course, but had failed and perished in the attempt. Vercingetorix, displaying more skill, had succeeded.

He thus became king or rather tyrant over the Arverni.[3] His position compelled hostility to Rome; conviction, it seems, strengthened this sentiment. He was a man of energy and ambition, and clearly lacked none of the gifts called for in a leader of men and armies. It was not long before the force of events involved him in inextricable difficulties.

Uselessness of his effort

He was accepted as chief by those affiliated to a confederation against Caesar which was formed in the beginning of 52, but he could never exercise regular and effective authority. Ill obeyed, challenged, even threatened by those who had placed themselves under his control, he was soon reduced to humiliating expedients for carrying out even the smallest plan. He was obliged on every occasion to debate, convince, bribe, terrorise, perhaps bring religious influences to bear. All the weaknesses of the Gallic character joined, as it were, in conspiracy against him and paralysed his activity, and only a portion of Gaul seems to have supported him; of the whole he enlisted in his cause only the cities of the west and centre and he proved powerless to prevent quarrels among these and to impose union and fidelity upon the factions which tore them apart. He was not able even to secure himself against treachery.

His failure

In these circumstances he could not succeed, the more so that his adversary, resolute to do so, employed against him methods both energetic and ruthless. Caesar treated the Gauls as rebels to be punished and terrorised by implacable severity. The example made of *Avaricum*, where a general and pitiless massacre followed a victorious assault, made more than one city of the coalition take thought. His repulse before *Gergovia* did not counteract this fatal impression. The principal result of such union as Vercingétorix achieved was to collect together the enemies of Rome, hitherto widely dispersed, and to hand them over, thus collected, to the swords of the

[3] It may be remembered that the ancients gave the name of *tyrant* to a man who attained royal power by stratagem or force without right to it. The word did not necessarily imply the bad qualities now attached to it.

legions. The great Arvernian himself, besieged in *Alésia* (Alise-Sainte-Reine, department of the Côte d'Or), and seeing the efforts of a relief force broken on the entrenchments with which the Romans had protected their lines on the land side, gave himself up to Caesar in the hope of engaging his clemency for the vanquished (September, 52).

Submission of Gaul

The capitulation of Alésia did not end the resistance, but it broke its back, though to end it more than half a score of small campaigns were needed. The last ended at *Uxellodunum*[4] in the country of the *Cadurci*. The hands of all its defenders were struck off (51).

Gaul had lost the independence which she had used so ill, and had never valued at its worth, mainly by the logical effect of the weaknesses that we have described. Caesar had known well how to profit by them.

III

The assimilation of the Gauls

A. *Loyalty of the Gauls*

Policy of Caesar

Gaul submitted with an instant resignation which proved conclusively the absence of any Gallic patriotism. Caesar indeed took some pains to conciliate the vanquished and to make them forget his severities. Their natural levity assisted him. He took care not to pose as a conqueror, and not to humiliate, by any display of arrogance, their childish susceptibility to affronts of any kind. He enlisted their sympathies and allayed their apprehensions by the enchanting social gifts with which nature had endowed him so liberally. He devised a safety valve for their warlike propensities, advantageous to them and to himself, by admitting them to his army and even to legionary status. To one legion mainly recruited in Gaul he gave the name of *Alauda*, the Lark, after one of the most familiar, lively

[4] It is uncertain where this last post of Gallic resistance should be placed. The *Cadurci* dwelt about our Cahors in the north of *Provincia* and west of the *Arverni*. Quite ten identifications of *Uxellodunum* have been suggested; none have been authenticated. *Uzerche* appears to be most favoured by the best opinion.

and joyous of the birds which still frequent the French countryside. Thus he provided himself with first-rate troops, in whose fidelity he placed a trust which they amply returned. At the same time he made ready against any sudden uprisings by covering the country with a network of strategic roads and by establishing outposts in districts where danger might be expected. In every city, moreover, he favoured the Roman party and encouraged its preponderance. He was careful to keep his hand off the city itself, the city being to a Gaul the only subject of any really patriotic feeling; but at the same time he prohibited leagues between city and city. He applied, in fact, with matchless dexterity the ruling principle of Roman provincial administration: "Divide to rule."

Augustus and the first real organisation of Gaul

Augustus, the first real organiser of Gaul, followed a policy like that of his uncle. He took an active interest in the country, paid it many and long visits, and trusted its government only to subordinates in whom he had complete confidence. He was careful to avoid the encouragement of any movements towards Gallic unity which might lead to danger, and though he established some measure of centralisation in the country, this was wholly administrative. He left the government of *Provincia*—then known as *Narbonensis provincia* from its capital, Narbonne—to the Senate. Ancient independent Gaul was divided into three provinces, the three Gauls (*tres Galliae*), as they were currently called: Aquitania, Lyons (*Lugdunensis provincia*) and Belgium. Their boundaries, accurately determined, did not at that time coincide with those indicated by Caesar for Aquitania, Celtica and Belgica. Unity of control was obtained by the appointment of a Governor-General (*legatus Augusti*), resident at Lyons,[5] under whom were three governors (*legati*)

[5] Lyons (*Lugdunum*) originated from a colony established in 43 B.C. by Lucius Plaucus, a lieutenant of Caesar's, on the plateau of Fourvières, to command the junction of two rivers, the Rhône and the Saône. It had an admirable situation on the great trade routes of Gaul and it rapidly became prosperous.

for the three provinces. The function of this important personage was, however, designed by the Emperor to be merely transitional and to pave the way towards the usual provincial status. In 17 A.D. his office was abolished, and the three Gauls became ordinary imperial provinces. Together with three small prefectures, taken from the Alpine mountaineers, and, later in the first century, two new provinces on the Rhine, Lower and Upper Germany, they made up the whole of Roman Gaul.[6]

Attitude and sentiment of the Gauls

No sooner was the conquest completed than the Gauls, realising the prestige which the title of Roman citizen conferred, became ambitious to acquire it. Assimilation and amalgamation with their conquerors by admittance to Roman civic rights became their cherished aim, and the imperial administration naturally knew how to exploit this ambition and to keep it alive by judiciously doling out concessions to satisfy it. The civic right was at first a special favour bestowed upon an individual in recognition or expectation of meritorious personal service, but from the second half of the first century, in the time of the Emperor Galba, the grants of citizenship became collective. Prominent Gauls, members of the noblesse of their city, had access to the *cursus honorum*, the Roman administrative career, and many even reached the Senate by this road. A speech of the Emperor Claudius to that assembly in 48 has been preserved, in which he advocated the granting of the *jus honorum*, which gave access to all Roman honours, to the *primores*, that is the aristocracy of all *Gallia Comata* (Long-haired Gaul), as the three Gauls were usually called. The Senate consented to confer this privilege on the *Aedui* alone, the ancient allies of the Republic; but the restriction was not permanent, and it was not long before all Gauls of

[6] Under the Latin Empire, about 312, all Gallic territory was divided into *seventeen provinces*, grouped into two dioceses, ten in the *diocese of the Gauls* and seven in that of *Vienne*. The two departments formed a *prefecture*. These changes correspond to a more vigorous centralisation of Roman administration.

position obtained the full political and civic rights of Roman citizenship.

Extension of Roman civic rights in Gaul

Gallic usage gave each man one name only, adding to it for greater precision that of his father. Thus *Cassitalos Versicnos* would mean one *Cassitalos*, the son of *Versos*. As Roman citizenship extended, the Roman usage of three names (*praenomen, nomen, cognomen*) became customary. A superabundance of *Julii* and *Claudii* in Gallo-Roman onomastics testifies curiously to the gratitude felt by the Gauls to the three men who had contributed most to their Romanisation: *Caius Julius Caesar*, *Augustus*, himself another *Julius*, and *Claudius*. The true Gallic names disappeared or became Latinised. The *edict of Caracalla* (between 212 and 217) which gave civic rights to all free men in the Roman Empire, certainly made no great change in Gaul; by that time all Gauls who were not indigent or slaves were Roman citizens.

The revolts of the first century: their meaning

The eagerness of the Gauls to be merged in the ranks of their conquerors should be noted. It did not indeed prevent sundry outbreaks of revolt in the first century of our era; but in no case was any of these due to any desire to recover independence; all either arose from personal grievances or were consequences of administrative mistakes. We know that Caesar undertook the conquest of Gaul only in pursuance of his design to become master of the Roman Republic. He succeeded in this design only at the cost of a civil war which gave the Gauls an excellent opportunity for taking up arms again, but they did not accept. Nor did they make any attempt to profit by the differences between Octavius and his rivals which ended in a second civil war. There were merely some risings among the Aquitanians and the Belgians about 38 B.C. Agrippa dealt with these and order was completely restored by 28. Nor did the revolt of the legions of Germany, at the beginning of the reign of Tiberius, receive any support from Gaul.

On the other hand, under the same Tiberius in 21, two

Gauls, *Julius Sacrovir*, an *Aeduan*, and *Julius Florus*, a *Trevian*, both Roman citizens and officers, instigated a rising, due undoubtedly in the first instance to fiscal causes, but apparently developing also a social character. The two insurrectionary chiefs found their main support among the lower classes, to whom the conquest had brought neither advantages nor honours but, on the contrary, by everywhere assuring aristocratic predominance, had taken away all their ancient hopes of emancipation. Alarm in Rome was acute but soon over. Florus was easily subdued. Sacrovir raised 40,000 men, but had not sufficient arms for their equipment and was unable to hold out against regular troops. The breeze of trouble merely stirred the surface and subsided. The triumphal arch of Orange has perpetuated to our own day the memory of this insurrection and its failure.

1. *Sacrovir* and *Florus*

Under Nero in 68 A.D. a Gallic noble, *Vindex*, had recourse to arms, but not against Rome. His object was merely to overthrow the wicked Emperor, but he perished in his attempt. Nevertheless it appears probable that the peace experienced through inclusion in the Roman Empire began to have effect in the gradual growth of a conception of Gaul as an individual entity in the minds of her inhabitants; her independence found advocates among her *principes* at a time when her common people still groaned under oppressions which the conquest had only aggravated. Traces of the feeling may be seen in the revolt of Vindex, though he did nothing to encourage them; they are conspicuous in that of *Civilis* and *Sabinus*, facilitated by the troubles of the years 69-70, when *Vitellius* and *Vespasian* contended for the imperial power. The affair was sufficiently serious.

2. *Vindex*

Julius Civilis was a Batavian, a German, although the Batavians were attached to Belgic Gaul; he was also a Roman citizen and officer, and he started his enterprise with a force of Batavian auxiliaries, discontented at having been sent

3. *Civilis* and *Sabinus*

home by Vitellius at a time when they hoped to share in the pillage of Italy. This Civilis obtained the adherence of several nobles, among whom was *Julius Sabinus*, a *Lingonian* (from near modern Langres), and *Julius Classicus*, a *Trevian* (from near Treves). The people rose, and the Druids promptly initiated a widespread propaganda supported by vehement incitements and encouraging prophecies.

Their divergent views

Civilis, it appears, had at the back of his mind the idea of opening Gaul to the Germans. Sabinus and Classicus had been too deeply impressed with Roman influences to throw them off in a moment. Their conception of emancipated Gaul was cast in a Roman mould, and took the form of a *Gallic Empire*. Sabinus had himself saluted as *Caesar*, and posed as a descendant of the conqueror. He did not hesitate to declare that his great-great-grandmother had forgotten her marriage vows in favour of the "Bald-headed Buck"![7] Concord could not endure for long between these Gallo-Romans and Civilis, and in fact lasted only until, by a common effort, they were freed from any really Roman troops. The Gauls went in much fear of a German invasion and would do nothing to promote one. In other respects the old jealousies between cities reasserted themselves. It was generally agreed that the Lingoni and the Trevii thought too much of themselves. There was much general discussion and no decision.

Defeat of Sabinus

Sabinus was first to be put out of action. In an attempt by force to compel the Sequani to join him he was defeated by them, fled, pretended that he had killed himself, and took refuge in a cave where he lived for nine years with his wife Eponine until the day when he was discovered and handed over to Vespasian, by whose order he was put to death.

The *Remi*, with the object of clarifying the situation,

[7] On the authority of Suetonius (*Caesar*, 51) Caesar's soldiers, participating in his triumph, sang a satiric song before him, which began, "Romans, take care of your wives—we bring with us the Bald-headed Buck" (*Moechum calvum adducimus*).

called together a congress of Gallic cities in their capital, Durocorturum (Rheims), which decided in favour of submission to the rule of Rome. The Trevii alone refused. The Roman general, Cerealis, coming up with a large army, reduced them to subjection. In a proclamation full of good sense, he attempted to show the other cities the extent of their folly and the dangers to which this exposed them, and emphasised the consequent inevitable return of disorder, anarchy and the menace from Germany. His indulgence converted them completely, and he had no difficulty in subduing Civilis and his Germans and in reconciling them with Rome. Classicus and the more deeply implicated of his Gallic aristocrats had to spend their remaining days on the other side of the Rhine.

Congress of Durocorturum

Submission of Civilis

Of the *sixty-four* cities on the official roll of the three Gauls, *four only* had proceeded to open revolt—those of the *Lingoni, Trevii, Nervii* (between the Sambre and the Escaut), and the *Tungri* (on the west of the Nervii), the last two being half German. It is clear that regrets for the old independence, not that of Gaul but that of the Gallic cities, still lingered on, among men who found Roman rule oppressive and irksome, for instance the Druids, who had to remain in hiding, probably from Tiberius onwards; but these irreconcilables were certainly few and could do nothing without the German assistance invoked by Civilis. They made no further attempts.

Partial character of the revolt

In the third century a provincial empire was established in Gaul, arising from the disorders of the period known as that of "military anarchy" in Rome; it resembled others of similar origin in other provinces and had with that of Palmyra the longest life of them all. It was inaugurated by Posthumus at Cologne in 257, and it ended with the defeat of Tetricus by Aurelian in 273. It was Gallic only in territory, drew no inspiration from local conditions, and was as Roman to all intents and purposes as it was in practice and in spirit. It belongs to the

The Gallic Empire of the third century

general history of the Roman Empire rather than the internal history of Gaul.

Gallic *Romanitas*

A day came when a degenerate imperial government alienated the Gauls; but there was no wavering in the admiration and love for Rome to which they had borne, since the time of Vespasian, on many occasions the shining testimony of their affection and their gratitude. *They felt themselves Romans.*

B. *Rome's work in Gaul*

What had the victors done to merit and justify this feeling? They had revealed the geographical unity of their country to the Gallic territories, then separated and unorganised. From this point of view they had in fact created Gaul.

1. Unity

Geographical unity

Ethnographical unity

They equally paved the way for, and in some measure brought about, ethnographical unity, by bringing the diverse populations of the country under the uniform control of their rule, their spirit and their tongue. The indigenous idiom withdrew in fact rapidly in favour of Latin, at least among the upper classes, but they left it a place,[8] indeed a large place, among the people. Roman schools, Roman ways of conducting daily life, a religion which induced common beliefs among all minds, highways which made commerce easy and increased demand were other agencies which forged out of Gallic diversities the unity of the Gallo-Roman, a unity which was no mere mental abstraction or figment of imagination, but a reality, embodied in flesh and blood, from one end to the other of a country saturated with Roman influence.

The Gallo-Roman

Political unity

From the political point of view the Romans had instilled two new ideas into the Gallic mind, both unknown to it before. 1. The idea of a power above that of the city, which is that of *Romanitas*, that of the Roman Empire itself; a power under one aspect divine and so regarded in a cult: the worship of Rome and Augustus, which was established in Gaul from 12 B.C. onwards. In that year an assembly of *principes* from

The cult of Rome and Augustus

[8] It is probable that Celtic had ceased to be spoken by the end of the Roman domination in the fifth century; it had no influence on the constitution of the Romance language.

all parts of Gaul, called together at Lyons by Drusus, decided on the erection of an altar consecrated to this worship. Each separate city followed this example on its own account, and all participated in a ritual of allegiance, alike political and religious, which made them members of sacred Rome. 2. The idea of a common interest. This was fostered by an institution of great interest, known as *concilium Galliarum*, the assembly of the Gauls. Every year, on the first day of August, at the beginning of the month sacred to Augustus, deputies appointed by the cities of the three Gauls met together to conduct in the name of all the worship of Rome and Augustus, before an altar raised at the junction of the Rhône and the Saône, near Lyons. There, under the presidency of a priest elected from year to year, they held high religious festivals. But in addition they held official and formal meetings where the affairs of their cities were discussed, addresses and petitions drafted, and statements of grievances drawn up for presentation to the Emperor.

Assembly of the Gauls at Lyons

Above all, this assembly, in some degree representative of Gaul and of her common interests, acquired a moral significance, attested by the right to receive and to possess. It was through her religious delegates, who affirmed on her behalf her unity with vaster *Romanitas*, that Gaul became gradually aware of her own essential being and destiny.

From a practical point of view the Romans had established order in the country by the application of their provincial system, at once elastic and firm, and by constraining with the strong hand all disturbers of the peace. The feuds between and within cities were extinguished; the clients, as factors in the political activities of the aristocracy (*principes*), became ineffective. In other respects, the establishment on the Rhine of impressive entrenched lines gave the Gauls a somewhat fallacious, as we shall see later, sense of security in regard to the menace of Germanic invasion, but nevertheless gave them

2. Order

needed confidence to undertake and carry on the great tasks of peace which were to effect so large a transformation in their country.

3. Social system

Roman domination made no essential change in the social system and conditions of the country; but enforcement of discipline put bounds to the more violent forms of oppression of the poor by the rich, and to disturbances of order by lower classes, to whom, moreover, the development of the country, now undertaken on a large scale, gave employment and a degree of prosperity. Here, however, we encounter a weak point in the work done by Rome. In Gaul, as at home, Rome was never able to establish a durable system of small landed properties which would result in the formation and consolidation of a middle class. Nor was she any more able to devise an effective remedy for the chronic distempers of the rural classes, which she inherited from independent Gaul. It does not appear that she was even seriously concerned about the question, though it caused her many difficulties, producing as it did continual brigandage in the less accessible parts of the country, which the police were never able entirely to repress, and it gave rise, in the third and the fifth centuries, to veritable "Jacqueries," insurrections of exasperated country folk—known as the *Bagaudae*—who committed grave excesses, as is usual with abject poverty on these occasions. They were repressed with the utmost severity, but massacre and punishment can never take the place of reforms based on good sense and justice in the solution of a social problem. It is not surprising that the inhabitants of the lowlands failed to support their government against the onset of the barbarians and were often inclined rather to give it welcome. They had nothing to lose by any change; or at any rate they might well believe that this was the case.

Continued existence of a rural proletariat

Brigandage and risings in the countryside

The Roman Peace

The Roman Peace was, in sum, nevertheless an inestimable benefit to Gaul, and it was because they realised this that the

deputies to the congress of Durocorturum decided to remain Romans.

Rome, in return for the *Pax Romana* and partly indeed to maintain it, claimed from Gaul two things only: her *tax* and *military service*. The first was indeed most burdensome and grew more so as the Empire fell into decline. The Roman was a born spendthrift. But the fiscal burdens imposed were at least regular and known beforehand; they were not arbitrarily altered, and further under the High Empire, the financial administration of the provinces was better and more honest than it was under the Republic. The Gauls were certainly conscious of an alleviation, though indeed their terrible exploitation in the fourth century might well lead them to forget it. Military service laid no excessive burden on peoples who had no fear of war, and from whom also no excessive levies were demanded.

4. Taxation of Gaul

The burdens of the *fiscus* and the *militia* were perhaps not too dear a price to pay for two benefits, at that time of inestimable value: well-organised justice and Roman law. The permanent acclimatisation in our country of this law, "reason itself in writing" as it has been called, may be said to be a crucial event, destined to produce in the future effects, whose importance cannot be exaggerated, upon its political, social and even intellectual life. We shall meet with them later on our road.

5. Roman justice and Roman law

The Roman governor was first and foremost the judge of a court, who by exercising justice justified his name of protector (*praeses*). He took local custom into consideration in private cases, but the suitors were always at liberty to appeal to Roman law, and this, as time went on, they did more and more frequently. After the time of Caracalla, Celtic law had gone out of all use, and no appreciable trace of it remains in our customary rural usages of today.

In ancient societies, religion was far more bound up with

6. Religious transformation

public life than it is in those of today, because it concerned itself far more with the political and social aspects of life than with the individual conscience. The Roman conquest had in Gaul religious consequences which are of no less interest than the juridical consequences to which we have just referred.

The Roman attitude towards Gallic religion

The Romans were by no means intolerant to the gods of those whom they vanquished; on the contrary they freely added them to their own, and it was in this way that the Roman religion ended by being so extraordinary a *pandaemonium*. The only limitations to their tolerance were that they countenanced no cult which refused respect to the gods of Rome, that they did not allow human sacrifices, and that they proscribed religious associations or fraternities which might play a part in politics, embody a power independent of that of the State, or above all have relations with secret societies (*collegia secreta, collegia illicita*). On these grounds they prohibited the Druidic holocausts and took vigorous measures against the Druidic fraternity.[9]

After all, as the *naturalistic* basis of the Gallic divinities was the same as that of the Roman gods, the passage from the one to the other and the assimilation of the first to the second could have presented no great difficulties. I will indicate briefly the principal effects of prolonged contact between the two religions.

Disappearance of the greater Gallic gods

The greater Gallic gods soon disappeared; they were assimilated by Roman gods, becoming merely certain forms of the latter. Application to them of the iconographic practices and the nomenclature of the victors made them ultimately indistinguishable. The change was so rapid that we cannot now say

[9] Pliny, *Hist. Natur.* 30, 1, 13, tells us that they were suppressed by Tiberius; and Suetonius, *Claudius*, 25, asserts that this Emperor passed laws against them. The geographer Pomponius Mela (3, 19) represents them as surviving as a secret society; this explains their unexpected opposition and anti-Roman enthusiasm at the time of Civilis' revolt. They must have gradually disappeared by the loss of disciples.

which Gallic god, in Gallo-Roman iconography, represents this or that Roman type.

Survival of the lesser gods

On the other hand, the lesser *place gods*, local and specialised, held their own. They were certainly affected by Roman influence; thus *Borvo* became *Apollo Borvo*. Each received an image and attributes, but they kept their seats and their functions. A host of the *Genii* and *Tutelae*, brought in here as elsewhere by the Romans, were installed side by side with them. In the end every city had its own particular *Genius*, the worship of which was at least as much a civic as a religious obligation.

Introduction of Roman gods

The greater gods of Rome found their way into the religion of the Gauls, without any such disguise as personation of an indigenous deity, as themselves and by themselves. Thus *Iupiter Optimus Maximus*, the supreme god of the Capitol, was equally supreme in the Gallo-Roman pantheon.

The Oriental religions

The Oriental religions, lawful in their countries of origin, but at first barely tolerated at Rome—from the Punic Wars onwards—then little by little making ground against official antipathy by conversion of private individuals, also made their way into Gaul. They were brought in by Eastern traders and soldiers and their dissemination throughout the Empire, from the first to the third century, helped to give them an equally considerable vogue in our own country. *Isis*, the Egyptian goddess, in the south of the country; *Cybele*—the *Great Mother* of the Phrygians—and *Attis* acquired many followers in nearly all parts. The cult of the Great Mother seems even to have received official recognition, given in the name of cities and provinces (between the second and the fourth centuries). A large number of inscriptions referring to this cult have been discovered in the territory covered by Caesarine Gaul. The success of these religions is of great interest, not merely because they enriched the Gallo-Roman pantheon and added

Spirit and importance of these religions

impressive ceremonial observances to those already practised but because they introduced into Gallic religion mystic and emotional elements, both spiritual and sensual, altogether unknown to the ancient worships of the West.

All these religions are founded on myths, fabular and symbolic, all more or less alike, having similar religious schemes all make similar promises to man, overwhelmed by the weight of his own shortcomings, discouraged by his impotence and infirmity, living in wretchedness upon earth, of effectual help from a divine saviour who will lead him after this life to a place of immortal bliss. A beneficent god has taken thought for man and has descended to the level of man, to share his pains in the flesh and the death that he dies; in the end he has vanquished pain and death and has risen again. His disciples, in order one day to share his glorious destiny, must seek assimilation with him through rites of communion all potent to this end: by baptism in the blood of a bull or a he-goat (*taurobolium* or *criobolium*) for the followers of the Great Mother and Attis, or of Mithra; and in the sacred meal and partaking of the divine elements for all. These ideas find expression also in Christianity, and the chief historical importance of the religions which introduced them into Gaul is, for us, in the fact that they prepared the way for the reception of Christianity.

Christianity

Its introduction into Gaul

Christianity was introduced into Gaul without the knowledge of Rome and it certainly remained there against her will. It entered from the south by way of the Mediterranean coast, brought like the others by Orientals, and it spread in the same manner as the other Oriental religions. Like them, it proceeded at first step by step and it may be said from man to man by individual propaganda and like them it followed the great trade routes. Later in the Middle Ages miraculous stories will be told in the Church of France attributing the conversion of the country and the foundation of its older episcopal seats to the personal initiative of St. Peter himself and to the action

of the immediate disciples of Christ or of the Apostles. Much persevering effort by the learned of today has proved that all these much vaunted traditions are based on legends which are groundless. The truth is less romantic but has the advantage of being true. It is probable that Christianity first landed at Marseilles, coming from Asia Minor or Antioch about the time of the Emperor Domitian, between 81 and 96. Thence it spread, by gradual penetration, through the towns of *Provincia Narbonensis*, then in those of the three Gauls in which Orientals did business, seeing that it is at first and for quite two centuries an exclusively *urban* phenomenon. The chance of a popular rising against the little church of Lyons, in 176, in the reign of Marcus Aurelius, a rising followed by police measures of some rigour, has given us a letter,[10] written by survivors from the torment, to convey the news to their brethren in Asia. It is evident from this document that the Christians of Lyons were already in a great majority, if not nearly all, of the resident foreigners, Greeks and Asiatics.

The evangelisation of the third century

The expansion of Christianity was quickened when the Church of Rome in the course of the third century took in hand the conversion of the Gauls. An organised mission was despatched into the country, certain members of which were assigned to some of the larger towns: *Paulus* to Narbonne, *Trophimus* to Arles, *Gatianus* to Tours, *Dionisius* to Paris, *Martialis* to Limoges, *Saturninus* to Toulouse, and so on. Mother churches were thus founded which became centres for the radiation of the faith. They met with more or less active opposition from the State and from the country folk, the latter more passive but possibly more effective.

The opposition of the State and the persecutions

The charge brought by the State against Christianity was its refusal to conform to the laws of the Empire by declining to observe the civic worship of Rome and Augustus, by preach-

[10] Preserved by Eusebius (fourth century) at the beginning of Book V of his *Ecclesiastical History*.

ing abstention from military service and neglect of civic duties to its disciples, by discountenancing marriage and the procreation of children. As is natural, the public authorities were impressed chiefly by utterances of the most enthusiastic and irreconcilable of the Christians, who, in a society so State-ridden, might easily be taken for anarchists. The State thought it a duty to destroy them and to ruin their religion, which made them thus undutiful as citizens, not from religious intolerance but for the sake of public safety.[11] The Christians, on their side, asserted, in reply to these demands, the rights of conscience and the recorded will of God. The two views were irreconcilable, and a conflict followed in which the Church at first suffered severely. No doubt she would have succumbed had her adversary's efforts been continuous and well chosen, but they were haphazard and at once violent and intermittent. Martyrs were made, but between crises the pastor retrieved and reorganised his flock, whose faith persecutions had only intensified. A moment came when, at the beginning of the fourth century, in Gaul itself, a prince whom good fortune was to make master of the Empire, Constantine, understood, through the experience of his father, Constantius Chlorus, who had governed the country before him during the great persecution of Diocletian, that Christianity henceforth would be too widespread to be stamped out by force, and that it was wiser to make terms with it and to have it for an ally rather than for an enemy. From benevolence he soon passed to acceptance, and from tolerance to conversion. With him and through him the State became Christian and placed its authority at the service of the Church which, forgetful of the tolerance which she

Their failure and its reason

Constantine and the Christian Empire

[11] In the first two centuries, many grave calumnies against the disciples of Christ were spread abroad and caused dangerous popular indignation against them. These calumnies were in no way original; they were such as, in all times, have found credence among the ignorant, against faiths compelled to secrecy: adoration of monstrous symbols—in this case the head of an ass—abominable and secret debaucheries, ritual murder, and the like. In the third century the State, better informed, took no further notice of these horrible imbecilities.

preached when she was persecuted, proceeded forthwith to the destruction of paganism.

Resistance of the *pagani*

The *pagi* or *pagani* were in the etymological sense of the word the inhabitants of the *pagi;* that is to say, the *peasants*, the folk of the countryside who, here as elsewhere, are a stronghold for old beliefs against new ones. They held their lines in Gaul unbreached by the Christian faith till the beginning of the fourth century, and their main body held out much longer. The reason for their resistance is clear. The peasants, indifferent to the greater gods who loomed too distant and too great, were devotedly attached to their own local and specialised divinities, who seemed to them, unlike the former, familiar, benevolent and helpful in every emergency of daily rural life: drought, flood, diseases of stock, plagues of parasites and the like. They divined, or at least believed that they could divine, their presence on every side, in woodland shades, on river banks, by springs, in every corner of their fields. The Christians alleged that these divine and benevolent realities were no more than vain illusions or abominable demons. They attacked them with annihilating hatred, casting down the holy images, cutting down the sacred trees, breaking down the much-venerated little shrines. Simple folk, under the spell of their ancestral faith, considered the indiscretions of these zealots as acts of dreadful sacrilege, bound to bring misfortune upon themselves if they allowed them. They accordingly did not allow them, and drove away by force the missionaries who had been sent to convert them. When the latter were able to reinforce their personal persuasiveness by vigorous pressure from public authorities and could act under the protection of the police, they experienced better success.

The conversion of the country folk at the end of the fourth century

It was not, however, till the last quarter of the fourth century that the conversion of the country districts in Gaul was methodically undertaken by the Christian priesthood. Legend, which delights to simplify and *personify*, if I may

St. Martin

say so, complex historical phenomena, has attributed the main glory of this conversion of the Gallic peasantry to St. Martin, Bishop of Tours between 372 and 397, but has certainly exaggerated the part he played in it. The good bishop, celebrated after his death as a typical worker of wonders for the conversion of the heathen, did not in fact even reach many parts of Gaul where legend places him, or perform the miracles which are attributed to him; his biographer [12] *Sulpicius Severus* has embellished his life with many fictions. None the less he was one of the chief agents whose labours converted the folk of the country to Christianity; others were bishops like himself; others, still more important, were monks who exercised from their monasteries, placed far from towns [13] and among the *pagani*, an influence more continuous, more adaptable to the occasion, and altogether more effective than could the urban clergy.

Resistance of the aristocrats

The Church as she triumphed over this rural opposition also overcame that of the aristocracy, which, though less formidable, was nevertheless tenacious, and, being founded on family traditions or prejudices, and supported by a customary laxity of life reprobated by Christian morality, still eluded conversion during the fourth century. The bishops were, often enough, obliged to rest content with conversions more apparent than real, which made very little change in the way of life of the converted; it probably appeared to them that the essential point was the official enrollment of conspicuous names; a view probably justifiable politically. The day would be won to all intents and purposes when the principal cities had

[12] The posthumous reputation of St. Martin was prodigious; he was regarded as in some degree a national saint for Gaul. More than 400 towns or villages in France bear his name, and more than 3000 churches were dedicated to him. His shrine in Tours soon became the most frequented place of pilgrimage in the country.

[13] St. Martin himself founded not far from Tours, *Marmoutier*, i.e. the Monastery of St. Martin (*Martini Monasterium*) where missionaries were trained. He liked living there himself.

realised from the example of a few great families that it was the proper thing to be a Christian.

Characteristics of Gallic Christianity

Illusions should be avoided as to the depth or orthodoxy of the Christianity which prevailed in Gaul at the end of the fourth century and before which the pagan beliefs gradually disappeared during the fifth century. It is largely a *superimposed religion;* one that, finding itself impotent to root up and destroy ancestral superstitions and inveterate custom, could only make use of these by sometimes transposing them, adapting them to itself, or on occasion itself to them. Thus its saints were substituted for the lesser deities and assumed their appropriate offices; the sacred trees, the wonder-working springs, the cross-roads, the solitary shrines which had enthroned fairies, genii and all the multitude of spirits familiar to the people were sanctified by placing over them the cross of Christ and connecting their legends with its own. There would be much to tolerate among the new disciples in the way of pagan customs which accorded ill with Christian precepts.

Organisation of the Church

Furthermore, and this is important, the Church established her organisation in Gaul. This organisation was modelled on that of the State. She had her districts corresponding to the *city* (the seat of a bishop assisted by suffragans or auxiliary county bishops), the *province* (seat of a metropolitan); her assemblies: *councils* or *synods;* her established hierarchy; her ordained duties, her property; and already at this date, her courts of justice. She became a government, side by side with that of the State, resembling the latter, and no less material, justified by her *spiritual* basis.

Importance of the bishop

The bishop, in particular, holds, in the fourth century, a post of primary importance in the city; not only does he rule, like a lord, over a numerous priesthood whose influence descends even to the lowest ranks of the people, but he is the natural guardian of the poor and miserable, who, on their side, provide him with a far from negligible material power. He is the protector of his flock against all abuses of

the imperial authority, and he ends by receiving formally from the Emperor himself the title of "Defender of the City" (*defensor civitatis*).

The Church the inheritor of Rome

This government of the Church will endure when the barbarians have destroyed that of the State; it will bring the barbarians themselves under its jurisdiction; it will force itself upon them as a permanent element of social life which cannot be left out of account, and thus through it the Roman idea will ride out the storms of Germanic invasions and surmount safely the waves of barbarism with which they flooded Gaul.

7. Development of natural resources

One result of the fundamental changes in political and social life, which I have just described, was a rapid and large increase in the general wealth of the country, a veritable transformation, in fact, which revealed how great were the resources of the land and the race.

Urban development

In the first place we observe a remarkable development of the towns. Of these the Romans founded but few; we know no more than ten colonies established by them in places where there was nothing before: Narbonne, Arles, Béziers, Orange, Fréjus, Vienne, Lyons, Valence, Nyons, Cologne; all but one, as may be seen, in *Provincia*. The majority of Gallo-Roman towns start as *oppida* or villages of moderate size which are transformed by imitation of Roman models. They are rebuilt, embellished with impressive monuments, and develop their industrial production and their trade. Their population increases in number and in wealth; a real municipal life appears, based on Roman tradition and custom, and by means of public institutions which are sufficiently well known to us.

Municipal life

There are still many towns in France in which ruins, more or less impressive and often magnificent, attest and evince their Gallo-Roman prosperity: Fréjus, Narbonne, Toulouse, Nîmes, Arles, Orange, Vienne, Lyons, Autun, Sens, Paris, Rheims,

Treves, Langres, Besançon, Clermont, Saintes, Bordeaux are the chief but not all of them.

These towns, at first, were not fortified, and there was nothing to hinder their extension. It was only in the third century that Germanic invasions led to their enclosure within high walls, traces of which still remain in many instances, and which necessarily restricted the space available for the dwellings which they protected, owing to the need for keeping the line of defence as short as possible.

Organisation of the great rural domains

While the citizen grew more prosperous and more polite, the great rural landowner grew wealthy. The old *aedificia* grew into towns (*villes*). The *villa* is a large landed estate with land, farm buildings and mansion (*praetorium*). Many of the villages of today had their origin in a *fundus* of this kind. The landowner, often titled and high up in the hierarchy of official honours, for instance a senator, lived the life of a lord, ample and sometimes even sumptuous. The government little by little left the exercise of public authority on his own estates more and more to him. It was a principle of the Romans to hand as much administrative work as possible to their subjects.

Revival of clientele

The great landowner is, in fact, the great man of Roman Gaul, and may perhaps be said to be its most stable institution, a state of affairs not without serious disadvantages—the landowner becoming in fact a *patron* surrounded by a group of slaves, settlers and clients, and thus continuing under a fresh form the old Gallic institution of *clientele*. He drew into his own hands, monopolised and controlled at his own will every source of work or of production so effectively that the free labourer could retain his freedom only at the risk of remaining poor or of being reduced to poverty. This was the principal cause of the rural discontents which were later to find violent expression in the uprisings of the Bagaudae.

Roads

The Romans laid down a veritable network of roads, but

these were intended less to assist commerce than to facilitate progress of troops from place to place in anticipation or for the suppression of revolt. By the time of the proconsulate of Caesar many highways had been established in *Provincia*, and the three Gauls did not long lack similar provision. All the great urban centres and strategic points of the country were joined by roads long, straight and well built, resistant to wear and tear, and easy to repair, which, across valley and mountain, carried the spirit and civilisation of Rome, the *Romanitas*, into the remotest regions of the country. All the Middle Ages travelled upon the magnificent Roman roads; there were no others, and they would still exist if any pains had been taken to keep them in repair. Many sections of them have been found in modern times.

Navigation of rivers

The conquerors also attended to the utilisation of rivers, and with a thought to their improvement, they established in many places corporations of *nautae* or sailors, who carried goods by water. Nevertheless much less pains were taken with the riverine network than with that of the roads. Under Nero (54-68) a canal between the Saône and the Moselle was projected—an idea which anticipated our own Canal of the East—but owing to personal rivalries the project fell through.

Progress in deforestation

It need hardly be added that the Gallo-Romans enlarged considerably the open country and the arable land by energetic destruction of the forests and of the marshes whose control and drainage were now seriously undertaken.

Agriculture, manufacture, commerce

The development of agriculture made it a chief source of wealth. The land, better handled, yielded at once better returns and more varied products. The methods of mining and working of metals were improved, and like other native trades made such growth that the Gauls were soon recognised throughout the whole wide Roman world as men able to turn their hands to anything. With the establishment of order and the improvements of communications commerce spread wings and the ad-

vantages offered by Gaul to exchange both within and without her boundaries irresistibly asserted themselves. This threefold effort of agriculture, commerce and manufacture made the country a centre of most active economic life.

Schools

The Gauls before the conquest were just big untaught children. Their conquerors gave them teaching. Roman schools were established in all towns, some of which developed into veritable universities. This was the case with Marseilles and with Autun, and later, in the fourth century, with Treves, Narbonne, Toulouse and, above all, Bordeaux. The schoolmaster and the university professor were the chief agents in introducing Roman culture into Gaul, and at first in furthering the triumph of Latin over the indigenous tongues.

Latin literature in Gaul

With the knowledge of Latin came interest in Latin literature, and, in due course, a desire for distinction in its several departments; success was greatest in that of oratory, the Gallic gifts for which had long ago and often been recognised by the Greco-Romans. Much originality must not be looked for in the Gallic rhetoricians; they added nothing to the methods taught them by their masters; they were eloquent according to the rules—but still they were eloquent, and the last gleam which comes from the dying lights of Roman letters in the decline of the Empire is from among the Gauls. Could there be better proof how profound and thorough was the assimilation of the vanquished to the victors?

Art

Art, too, bears witness to the same effect. Archaeology shows us the extraordinary fecundity of Gallo-Roman architecture, sculpture and mosaic work. The museums of such towns as date back to this time of achievement contain many of its relics, often interesting, occasionally admirable, without mentioning monuments which still stand in their neighbourhoods. This art is not original; it reproduces or imitates Roman models, but it is skilful and prolific, and it indicates a disposition to *go Roman* which is significant. If this bias were

less general and less imperious Gallo-Roman art would certainly have what it lacks, the interest which arises from the reproduction of the thoughts and feelings of artists who are entirely free; but it must be admitted that, within the limits of derivative art, results of great value have been attained. The *Pont du Gard*, the *Maison carrée* at Nîmes, the temple of Augustus and of Livia at Vienne, the amphitheatres of Arles and Nîmes, the theatre of Orange, the Venus of Arles, and the magnificent collections of sarcophagi at the Louvre and at the museum of Arles, are altogether worthy of our admiration, which need not cease with them but may be given to many other achievements of their times which still stand here and there about our country. Had the conquerors given to the Gauls no more than the supremely Roman art of fine and firm building they would have rendered them a service beyond price, beneficial alike to the private houses and the public buildings of Gaul.

Changes in manners and morals

But change was not confined to the material surroundings and framework of life; manners and habits underwent no less alteration. Manners became in every way more refined and men's tastes in general became more civilised. Progress was naturally unequal in different social classes; the commonalty still kept some of its pristine rudeness, but none the less there was a deep-seated and auspicious advance on the standards of independent Gaul.

How should the Roman assimilation be regarded?

Some modern opinion has maintained that Rome did more harm than good to Gaul by coercing her, as it were, into the Roman mould, making her a mere slavish copy of her conqueror, and checking the development of her native genius upon original lines. This is a paradox which can hardly be maintained. Assuredly time would have done its work: in due course the Gauls would have settled down, have disciplined, united and policed themselves, discovered appropriate means of expression for their thoughts, feelings and observations,

would have made actual the latent prosperity of their country; but how many centuries would have been needed for this task? And would not Germanic intervention have interrupted this evolution towards civilisation by an attack no less formidable to the "Gallic genius" than that of Rome? How many centuries backwards would Gaul have recoiled if she had had to encounter Germanic barbarism as she was when Caesar first saw her?

Gaul not coerced

However this may be, it should be noted that no element in the transformation of Gaul under Roman influence was due to coercion of the conquered by the conquerors, except that which related to military precautions; the Romans never determined to *assimilate* the Gauls and they made no conscious attempt to do so. Their presence and their example alone were all the agencies and advocates needed; it was the Gauls themselves who determined, and were persistent in their determination, to become Romans. They succeeded, and in doing so conferred a magnificent prosperity upon their country; a prosperity indeed not free from shortcomings and blemishes and even from misery: the internal disorders of which the German incursions of the third century took advantage, the persistence of brigandage in parts difficult of access, the social injustice which left the rural classes to hardship and oppression. Nevertheless from the first century to nearly the end of the fourth, from Josephus to Ammianus Marcellinus, a long chain of texts eloquent in eulogy and admiration bears witness to the opulence of Gaul. It is impossible to believe that they were merely repeating untruths. Judgment may have been based on appearance, but appearance was clearly fair.

Conclusion

Independent Gaul, overflowing with vital energy, was torn by need for action, by impulses at once confused and violent; this energy, precious in itself, was frittered away in disorderly, incoherent and fruitless action. Rome gave it dis-

cipline and turned it to practical work. A happy phrase of Strabo (IV, 1) summarises this transfer of energy and its results. "*Yesterday,*" he says of the Gauls, "*they fought; to-day they work.*" Their racial and spiritual affinity with their conquerors favoured their evolution and the attainment of that beneficent equilibrium for which they were groping, as it were, in the dark before the conquest.

When the Roman empire fell, brought down rather by its own structural defects than by the barbarians, *Gaul* was in being, and the word Gaul was no longer the artificial and arbitrary geographical expression which it was in the time of Caesar; it expressed a clear concept and a real feeling to the Gauls themselves. They were conscious that their country existed and hoped that it would continue to exist as their *fatherland.* The concept and the feeling might grow dim and weak almost to extinction, but would never entirely die, and thus France was France at a time when Germany had still with much toil to find herself as Germany. *Our country will never, throughout her history, entirely forget what Rome had taught her;* Rome remains, with the Christian Church, which is at base an aspect of Rome, the very foundation stone of our culture.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: G. Bloch, *Les origines,* book ii, ch. ii: all the *second part;* C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule,* vol. iii: *La conquête romaine*[2]; vol. iv: *Le gouvernement de Rome;* vol. v: *La civilisation gallo-romaine, état matériel;* vol. vi: *La civilisation gallo-romaine, état moral;* Fustel de Coulanges, *La Gaule romaine,* 1891.

On Intellectual Life: Th. Haarhoff, *The schools of Gaul,* 1920.

On Christianity in Gaul: Ch. Bayet, *Le Christianisme et les Germains en Gaule* (vol. ii of Lavisse, *H. F.,* pp. 1-42); A. Harnack, *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten,*[2] 1906, vol. ii, p. 222 et seq.; L. Duchesne, *Les Fastes épiscopaux de l'ancienne Gaule,* 3 vols., 1894 et seq.; E. Babut, *Saint Martin de Tours,* 1912; H. Delehaye, *Saint Martin et Sulpice Sévère,* 1920.

CHAPTER IV

THE GERMAN FACTOR

I

THE Germans had been a constant menace to Gaul since the end of the second century; massed together beyond the Rhine, they needed only an excuse to cross it, and in the days of independent Gaul no power existed which could prevent them from finding one when they would. In 109 B. C. two huge bands, in fact two peoples, the Cimbri and the Teutones, made their way into the two Gauls, Transalpine and Cisalpine, inflicted several severe defeats upon the Romans, and were finally defeated and destroyed by Marius—the Teutones at *Aix* in 102, the Cimbri at *Verceil* in 101.

Rome and the Germans

A. *The German menace to Gaul*

Plunder had accompanied their passage—they were rough and violent by nature and by necessity had to live on the country—but plunder was not their sole object; they desired land on which to settle and establish a community. The Suabian invasion under Ariovistus, cut short by Caesar, would, if it had succeeded, have probably instigated a general advance of the German tribes along their whole line on the Rhine. The Gauls lived in continual dread of such a contingency, and a chief care of the Romans was to safeguard them accordingly.

Cimbri and Teutones

From the time of Augustus onward a vast defensive system on both banks of the great river was laid out and organised, which the emperors of the first and second century took pains to extend and perfect. It consisted, on the upper Danube and on the middle Rhine, of a military territory or *march*, known as the "Decumate lands" (*aegri decumates*).[1] A strategic road

B. *Organisation of the Roman defence*

The Decumate lands

[1] This name probably comes from the *dîme* (*decima* or *decuma*) which the inhabitants paid to the State which had granted them their lands.

(*limes*) covered by an entrenchment continuous throughout except for a short distance where it followed the course of the Main and flanked at every ten or fifteen kilometres by guard towers (*castella*), covered the whole length of this march on the barbarian frontier. It started on the Danube not far south of *Regina Castra* (Ratisbon), and ended after taking in the Taunus on the lower part of the Lahn. The works, begun under Domitian (81-96), were completed under Hadrian (117-138). Gauls, probably attracted by grants of land, peopled these advance posts of *Romania* and soon made them prosperous.[2] These Decumate lands and their *limes* were assuredly not adequately equipped to hold back a real invasion unassisted, but they were sufficient to give warning of an advance and to protect Gaul against Germanic raids.

The line of the Rhine

They were supported from the rear by a strong military organisation. Eight legions and their auxiliaries (about 60,000 men) in the first century and four legions still remaining in the second century with their auxiliaries (about 30,000 men), and a considerable flotilla, which cruised up and down the Rhine, guarded the two Germanies.

The troops were quartered in great entrenched camps, at Noviaesium (Neuss), Bonna (Bonn), Maguntiacum (Mayence), Argentoratum (Strasbourg), Vindonissa (Windich, at the junction of the Aar and the Reuss); manoeuvres were practised at frequent intervals, and strong contingents sent out to patrol the whole frontier. Time-expired men remained in the country at the end of their service, and formed the nucleus of an urban population inured to war, to which was due the foundation of *Colonia Agrippinensis* (Cologne) and *Augusta Vindelicorum* (Augsburg).

Germanic incursions in the third century

The watch and guard thus kept proved sufficient to make the frontier secure until, for one reason or another, vigilance

[2] The museum at Stuttgart is enriched with many Roman antiquities found in the central region of the Decumate lands.

was relaxed, and the barbarians, always on the watch, made their way into Roman territory either one by one or in small bodies; sometimes even large bodies broke in. Thus in 259, in the time of the Emperors Valerian and Gallien, some bands of *Alamans* penetrated into the valley of the Rhône, crossed the Alps, and advanced as far as Ravenna; they were destroyed near Milan by Gallien. At the same time bodies of *Franks* crossed Gaul from northeast to southwest, entered Spain, and reached Africa.

So, too, in 275, after the assassination of Aurelian, and assisted by the long-continued civil troubles known as the *military anarchy*, the Germans again became active and did much damage in Gaul. *Probus* drove them out and reëstablished the *limes;* but for only a short time, since it was probably about this time that the Romans abandoned the Decumate lands and fell back on the Rhine. The menace of invasion was constant because the temptation was equally so. It grew greater in proportion as the Roman Empire grew weaker and as Germany suffered more and more from the prevailing anarchy.

Outward strength and inward weakness of the Empire

For a long time the Empire, outwardly fair and stately, kept the respect of the barbarians; they admired, envied and feared. But towards the end of the fourth century her impressive exterior no longer availed to conceal her immense interior weakness, and no sooner was this realised by the Germans than their fear of her departed. The *imperial unity*, theoretically respected in the division made between the two sons of Theodosius, Arcadius and Honorius, was in reality shattered, owing to the existence, since 295, of two independent and often, in fact, hostile governments: Eastern and Western. The *administration*, becoming more and more complicated and elaborated, had lost all sense of its reason for existence; its one thought was to make as much as possible out of its subjects, and its exactions finished by killing their Roman patriotism; the Roman subjects continued to look down on barbarians

and their manners, but they came to feel that any kind of deliverance from the hated taxation would be welcome. The *army* was Roman no longer; the citizens abstained from military service and their place in the legions had been taken by mercenaries of all other races, professional soldiers in whom *esprit de corps* filled the place of patriotism. *Economic prosperity* and accumulated wealth still seemed to wield great power, but though their life continued, their growth had ceased. Outward well-being ill masked the terrible social inequality which placed an impassable gulf between the great landowners and the poor, while a caste system, growing continually more rigid, tended to imprison men in categories from which none could ever escape, and to destroy all sense of solidarity. The refinement and brilliancy of the *civilisation* ill concealed the degradation and paralysis of all higher energies; it was barren and lived entirely in its own past. In literature and art it could copy and imitate, but could do no more. Great Rome, seen from without, might still present an illusory semblance of strength, but she was in reality incapable of withstanding any serious shock; she was like a back cloth of a theatre, ostensibly the stout wall of an impregnable fortress but really painted cloth which yields passage to a child if he does but stumble against it.

C. *The Germans in the fourth century*

Their social condition

The men whom the Gallo-Romans called *Germans* had no collective name for themselves, just as the Gauls of Caesar's time had none. They were above all things warriors. Their institutions, which aroused some interest in Roman observers,[3] had few original characteristics; they were those common to the stage of civilisation which they had reached at the time when they first intervened in Gallic affairs (from the first to the third century). They had been long accustomed to the

[3] Especially Tacitus, in his *De origine, situ, moribus ac populis Germanorum,* commonly known as his *Germania,* written towards the end of the first century.

mode of life known as pastoral; dependent, that is, for subsistence on the products of their flocks and herds, reinforced by those of the chase, and they were on the way to become agricultural. Just as they had begun to practise agriculture seriously, the land of Gaul was a great attraction to them. Their own country, far less originally favoured by nature than was the half wild Gaul of before the Roman conquest, still remained less adapted for the exploitation of the resources which it possessed.

Their principal groupings at the end of the fourth century

In the fourth century they consisted of large aggregations of men organised for war and conquest. Three groups of these communities were in occupation along the frontier of Gaul: (a) the *Franks*, whose cantonments extended from the mouth of the Rhine to its juncture with the Main, or nearly so; (b) the *Alamans*, south of the Franks, nearly to the Alps; (c) the *Burgundians*, between the two in the lower part of the region around the Main. In their rear others waited, ready, if the first line should make a step forward, to advance in their turn: the *Frisons*, *Saxons*, *Thuringians*, *Marcomans*, *Quadi*, taking them from north to south. Still farther back were the *Goths*, and behind the Goths the *Alains*, these last probably not German but akin to the Asiatic race.

The Roman influence in Germany

Roman civilisation had long had some influence, though slight, on the western regions of Germany, as it had had on Gaul in the time of her independence;[4] but this influence, always very superficial, rapidly grew less from west to east, and was soon lost in undiluted barbarism. Germany, as a whole, was in a condition of trouble and poverty which made life a hard business for its inhabitants. The Roman Empire appeared to them to be a very paradise, to which they dreamed

[4] It has been remarked that German dialects contain some words of Latin origin whose introduction corresponds to progress in civilisation; such are *Kammer* = *camera*, chamber; *Fenster* = *fenestra*, window; *Kamin* = *caminus*, chimney; *Flasche* = *flasca*, flask; *Tafel* = *tabula*, table; *Wall* = *vallum*, rampart, wall, etc.

that they might some day be admitted, and in which they could not fail to find perfect felicity.

German feeling towards the Empire

The Germans cherished no racial hatred for the Romans. They were on the contrary full of veneration for the Emperor, whose remote and inaccessible majesty, not unmagnified by report and rumour, appeared to them almost divine. There would be great honour in serving such a master, and material profit in enrollment in the ranks of the majestic imperial organisation. Those dwelling closest to the Rhine frontier thus hoped for admittance to the Empire and its fertile lands; they expected in return to defend the Empire against their less favoured kin who were in Germany and could remain there.

Roman policy towards the barbarians

The Romans for their part, though they looked down on the barbaric rudeness of the Germans, had no deep dislike for them; but they feared them greatly. The imperial government, with no hope of being able to hold them back indefinitely or, from its own resources, to render them harmless, judged it good policy to set them against one another, to accept their good will, and to turn to its own profit their courage and their energy.

Its danger

It did not see the danger of allowing them access to Roman territory without taking measures to ensure their assimilation. Doubtless it could confer Roman garb and titles upon their chiefs, it could affect to regard them as good subjects and submissive sons of the Emperor, though these chiefs were actually doing just as they pleased; but there was no way to provide that they should not quickly come to know how weak the Empire was and act upon this knowledge to its detriment. With no deliberate intention to do harm, merely because they were turbulent and undisciplined and because every concession made them demand more, they would soon become unbearable and then it would be too late to get rid of them.

D. *How the Germans entered Gaul*

Historians have for long devoted most of their attention to the great barbarian incursions which mark the beginning of the fifth century. These, dramatic, terrifying and devastat-

ing as they were, have passed and left no traces behind them but ruins; they founded nothing. It was by less tempestuous proceedings that Germans, whose activities had permanent results, were introduced into the Empire and particularly into Gaul.

1. Individually: as slaves, settlers, soldiers

The first entrants came as *individuals*, it might be as slaves, reduced to this condition by the consequence of some unsuccessful raids into the Empire, or sold on the frontier by their compatriots at the end of some civil war; it might be as *settlers*, engaging themselves of their own free will in the service of some Gallo-Roman landowner as labourers;[5] it might be as *soldiers*, enlisted by the leaders of troops stationed along the Rhine. This immigration by individuals might continue for a long time without any great risks, since the new-comers would easily become merged in the general mass of older inhabitants.

2. By groups: auxiliaries, federals

But in time entry in *groups*, greater or lesser, was permitted: to some as *auxiliary troops*, which were stationed here and there in small bodies and in diverse parts of the Empire; to some as allies (*foederati*, federals) under treaty (*foedus*) with the imperial authorities. These formed armies, large or small, in the imperial service, accounted as Roman but led by their own chiefs, who were held as imperial officers. Each group was settled in a territory, smaller or larger, under the usages which regulated military hospitality *hospitalitas militaris*), that is, the quartering of troops imposed upon the civil community. Imagine a right of requisition carried to an extreme length, imposed on the ancient owners, in respect both of their lands and their slaves, in order to provide subsistence for the "soldiers of the Emperor."

The real position of the federals in the Empire

These auxiliaries, stationed among the other troops, could well acquire in normal circumstances, in place of the patriotism which they lacked, an *esprit de corps* and a loyalty which

[5] A kind of permanent market in men was established about the camps and towns of the frontier to which the Gallic landowners could have recourse for providing themselves with labour.

made them good servants. But there was evidently greater difficulty in ensuring obedience to the civil power and military discipline of a body which was really either a separate tribe or even a separate people, transferred, together with their families and movable possessions, to a region of which they would find themselves to be practically the masters. The Emperor soon found himself obliged, in order to preserve at least the semblance of subordination on the part of the federals, to trust their chiefs with civil functions in addition to their military duties, in the regions where they were established, and thus, fatally and in spite of himself, to pave the way to their complete independence. It profited him little to adopt the more powerful among them as "sons" and to conform to the official fiction that various large and wealthy provinces of the Empire were governed by his trusty and well-beloved children.

E. *The federals of Gaul*

There were three groups of German federals, the *Visigoths*, *Burgundians* and *Franks*, who established in Gaul Germanic elements which had permanent and appreciable effects upon her ethnic and political constitution.

II

The partition of Gaul

A. *The Visigoths*

Their entry into the Empire

The *Visigoths* were dwelling on the lower Danube, in the region that is now Roumania, when they were driven across the river by the savage onset of the Huns. Valens, the Emperor of the West, consented to receive them as federals, though indeed he had small choice in the matter (376). They amounted in all to about six or seven hundred thousand souls and their numbers gave them confidence and audacity. They were to be given land on which they must live by labour, but meanwhile they, to whom the Emperor had promised food, went hungry. They declared, truly or untruly, that the imperial agents were planning their starvation and rose in revolt.

Valens, attempting to subdue them, fell before Adrianople (378); Theodosius came to terms with them, distributing them among the Balkan provinces and gaining good military service in return. On his death (395) they were encouraged, by the weakness of the government of Arcadius, to become unduly exacting. They complained that they had been ill rewarded for their services, and rallying round *Alaric*—who claimed the office of "master of the militia," the highest military appointment in the Empire—started to pillage Macedonia and Greece. The Emperor granted them *Illyricum* (all the Dalmatian coast and its back country, Serbian and Croatian). They did not, however, remain there, but went forward into the Western Empire, in which Alaric had proposed to play the protagonist. He sought to assert himself by force, but had ill fortune, being beaten by the Vandal Stilico, the best of the imperial generals, at Pollentia (Liguria) and at Verona (403). He then offered his services to the Emperor Honorius, from whom he was not long in demanding the position of "master of the militia" for the West. Dismissed once more, he proceeded to the capture and pillage of Rome (410), the news of which sent a long shudder of consternation and horror through the whole Roman Empire. More than one Christian, hearing of the fall of the Eternal City, believed that the end of the world must be at hand; while Romans of the old type, irreconcilable to the religion of Christ, declared that it was Christianity which had drawn down the vengeance of the outraged gods upon the glorious city.[6]

Alaric

Alaric died some time afterwards while he was ravaging the rich provinces of Campania and Lucania. The Visigoths came under the rule of his brother-in-law, Ataulf, who led

Ataulf

[6] St. Jerôme, then at Bethlehem, wrote (*Epist.* 127, 12), "My voice fails and my groanings prevent my speech. She who conquered all the universe has been conquered." The celebrated work of St. Augustine, *The City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*) was composed to reassure the Christians and to justify Christianity.

them into Gaul. He affected the greatest devotion to the Empire, alleging that he had no object in entering Gaul but to pacify and restore her, an essential task in view of the terrible convulsions which she had just endured.

The great invasion of 405

In 405 a flood of German tribes, flying before the Huns, had begun to roll westwards and southwards. Stilico, in order to protect Italy, had recalled nearly all his troops from Gaul, and the "Great Invasion" had broken with full force upon that unhappy country (406). The hungry invaders swarmed over Gaul, leaving desolation in their track. Some, carried away by some irresistible impulse, a mania for movement and adventure, had even spread as far as Spain and were only brought to a stop in Africa at Carthage. Under the shock the Roman framework was shattered in Gaul and only the habits of order fostered by municipal life saved the country from complete anarchy. With the passing or dispersal of the barbarians, life, little by little, with reorganisation, became less anguished.

Establishment of the Visigoths in Gaul

At this point Ataulf came on the scene. A Goth who had been won over to the side of Roman civilisation, he sincerely wished to promote it. His marriage with Galla Placidia, sister of Honorius, who had been captured by Alaric in Rome and had been held captive by the Visigoths, was celebrated at Narbonne in 414 and seemed, as it were, a symbol of his engagement in the cause of Rome. He even went so far as to invest an Emperor, one Attalus, in order to enter his service and

Wallia

to reconquer Spain in his name. It was not, however, till Wallia had succeeded Ataulf, who was assassinated in 415, that the status of the Visigoths was legally established, when in 419 Honorius granted them Aquitaine as federals.[7]

B. *The Burgundians*

At about the same time (413) the Burgundians, driven,

[7] Contemporaries considered this agreement a great boon. The historian, Paul Orose, who wrote at this time, says of Wallia (*Adversus paganos, VII,* 43) that the Goths had made him king in order that he might break the peace and that God had chosen him to establish it.

at least the larger part of them, onto the left bank of the Rhine by the Great Invasion of 406, obtained permission to settle along that river in the district of Worms. In 443 Aetius, the imperial commander in Gaul, transported them to *Sabaudia* (Savoy). There they mingled and lived on good terms with the old Allobrogian inhabitants. In 457, upon a summons from the people of the *Provincia Lugdunensis* (Province of Lyons), they descended into the valley of the Saône, through which they gradually spread, at the same time ascending the slopes of the Jura and descending again towards the Swiss plain. At the end of the fifth century they had reached on the north the plateau of Langres, on the east the Aar, on the south the Alps, and on the west the Morvan.

Sabaudia

As to the *Franks*, they had entered the Empire in the fourth century in small bodies or by tribes and had established themselves in Belgium, with the tolerance if not the approval of the Emperor. Their division into several independent groups seemed reassuring, and the Roman troops were sufficient to hold them to their prescribed bounds. Thus when the *Salian Franks*, settled about Tournai, had attempted expansion southwards in 430 or nearly so, they were harshly turned back by Aetius. The chiefs of the various Frankish peoples, one after the other, were admitted to the *foedus*, thus legalising their possession of territory, probably in the first half of the fifth century.

C. *The Franks*

Outside the three groups of federals just named, mention must be made of bands of *Alamans*, driven into Gaul, like others, by the invasion of 406; they spread over Alsace, in the valley of the Moselle, in that of the Doubs, and in Switzerland. But they never formed a coherent organisation or became *federated* with the Empire. Neither did the *Saxons*, who made descents on the northern and western coasts of Gaul at the beginning of the fifth century. It was about the middle of the same century that the *Bretons*, coming from Brittany on

D. *Other Germans concerned*

The Alamans and Saxons

The Bretons

its abandonment by Rome during the Great Invasion, peopled *Armorica.*

The "Roman General" Aetius

The authority of the Emperor continued to be exercised over the regions occupied by the federals and the invaders just mentioned. Thus Aetius held for twenty-five years the post of "Roman general" in Gaul with the title of *patrice,* waging war sometimes against one and sometimes against another of the federals who might be attempting undue encroachments beyond their boundaries.

His troops were Roman only in name; they were recruited from every barbarian tribe in the district, but the prestige of the Roman name alone was such as to confer an altogether exceptional authority on the army which bore it. Aetius was thus the greatest personage in Gaul, and it was around him that the federals rallied when the *Huns* in their turn reached

The invasion of the Huns: Attila

the Rhine and crossed it in 451. Their King Attila also professed himself the friend and ally of Rome, but it was not easy to believe him in view of the universal devastation which he spread. Aetius directed the campaign against him, compelled him to raise the siege of Orléans, and inflicted upon him in the *Champs Catalauniques,* not far from Troyes, a defeat which, though it did not overthrow him, decided him to leave Gaul. Aetius perished three years later (454), falling a victim to the jealousy of the Emperor Valentinian III, who slew him with his own hand; his removal furthered the complete emancipation of the federals. An Emperor named Avitus, chosen by the Gallo-Roman nobility, and the new "Roman general," Aegidius, could never recover on their own account the prestige attained by the conqueror of Attila.

Aegidius

Establishment of the federals

The establishment of the federals, though authorised by the Emperor, was not effected without disturbances which added to the hardships arising from military hospitality as the latter was then practised. The barbarians, feeling themselves the stronger, proved incapable of confining themselves within their

prescribed boundaries and of abstaining from encroachment when temptation arose. It is certain that the prosperity of Gaul must at first have suffered from their presence. To hear the lamentations of contemporaries is to wonder why all was not dissolved in ruin. These clearly exaggerated *quantitatively;* really grave disturbances were less frequent than they represent them to have been. It must not be forgotten that the German intruders were much less numerous than the old population. In many places a good understanding was quickly reached and a supportable mode of life established between the two parties. It appears indeed that in Belgium the Franks proceeded to expel the Gallo-Roman population in some cantons of the Vosges and the Ardennes, but this was an exception of which the barbarians had no interest in making a rule. The Gallo-Romans on their side appear to have been imbued with a kind of fatalism for which the resignation inculcated upon Christians was no doubt mainly responsible; they gave themselves up to the will of God, who raises up masters for them whom he will judge in his own good time. Real unity is realised in the Church, whose bishops exercise a growing influence. *Avitus* of Vienne, *Sidonius Apollinaris* of Clermont, *Germain* of Auxerre, *Aignan* of Orléans, *Loup* of Troyes, were the shining lights, the great characters in these unhappy times, and all are bishops, true chiefs and brave defenders of their cities. They continued to meet in council and to fight in concert for the spiritual and material welfare of their flocks. In them and through them Roman Gaul survived its dissolution.

Attitude of the Gallo-Romans

III

The kingdom of the Visigoths attained actual independence in the second half of the fifth century. *Euric* (466), the third successor of Wallia, by the end of his reign (485) had conquered Provence, with Arles and Marseilles, and also

The barbarian kingdoms in Gaul

A. The Visigothic kingdom

Euric

Auvergne, and had pushed his rule even as far as the Loire. He also ruled over Spain. His court at Toulouse became the real political centre as well as the centre of attraction for all Gaul. He was a man who aimed instinctively at what should be politically permanent. He cast aside the fiction of his subordination and caused the laws of the Visigoths to be embodied

Alaric II

in writing. His successor, *Alaric II*, ruled in the same spirit, and continued the legislative work already begun by adapting to the usage of the Gallo-Romans the *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, better known as the *Breviary of Alaric*, which established the essential principles and precepts of Roman legislation in the judicial and civil practice of southern France. These two last-mentioned princes are themselves thoroughly Romanised, and tend more and more to Romanise their German subjects.

Hostility of the bishops

It seems at first surprising that they did not extend their hegemony over all Gaul, and, to their own advantage, reëstablish political unity. The reason is a religious one. These Visigoths had been converted to Christianity by Arian[8] missionaries; they were therefore establishing a heretical Church in the domain of Gallic Catholicism. They did not hesitate to display ill will towards the bishops, who, on their side, detested them, did their utmost to keep them and the Gallo-Romans apart, and obstructed the fusion of the two races. The Visigoths, owing to this attitude of the orthodox episcopate, remained foreigners even in Aquitaine till 586, when they adopted Catholicism. They then rapidly amalgamated with the older inhabitants, but at that time their political power in Gaul had for about eighty years been abolished by the Frankish attacks, directed and supported by the bishops.

[8] Arianism, or the doctrine of the Alexandrian priest *Arius* (+336) essentially asserted that the Son, in the Divine Trinity, was not equal to the Father, because he had been created by the Father and was not of the same substance. Arianism had been brought among the Visigoths by Ulfilas about 341.

B. *The Burgundian kingdom*

Gondebaud

The Burgundian kingdom, too, had been advantaged by the wane of Roman power; it had found a king of real mark in the person of Gondebaud (491-516). His domain extended southwards and southwestwards till it joined that of the Visigoths. He aspired to Romanise his Burgundians, and the *Gombette law*, which he enacted for the administration of his state, bears witness to his desire to place his German and Gallo-Roman subjects on an equal footing. The *Roman law of the Burgundians*, also his work, shows the same intention. His government was greatly influenced by Roman ideas, and he himself never broke with the Empire; his coinage continued to bear the imperial image, and his laws to be dated by consulships. Though less prosperous and less renowned than the Visigoth kings, he held a high place in Gaul, as much by his military success as by his good government.

Arianism of the Burgundians

Unfortunately both he and his Burgundians were Arians, just like their neighbours in the southwest. Gondebaud himself was interested in theological questions. Yet, unlike Euric, he was never aggressive against the orthodox, but on the contrary had the self-restraint to show himself well disposed towards the bishops, so successfully that those of the Visigothic kingdom looked upon him with some sympathy. Had he been converted before the appearance of Clovis he would without doubt have attracted to himself all the episcopal favour by which the Frank profited. To make the needed gesture was beyond him, and he had to pay the penalty. The bishops supported Clovis against him and he lost the day. In 514 the Burgundians became Catholics—too late.

C. *The kingdom of the Franks*

1. Clovis

It was this same *Clovis* who, thanks to a favourable conjunction of circumstances, became the founder of the kingdom of the Franks, Clovis, or rather *Chlodovech*, King of the Salian Franks of Tournay (481-511), did not at the start of his career rule over all the Franks, who were then divided into small, separate peoples; and he had at his command only a

small force, not more than a few thousand fighting men. But he had what proved to be the good fortune of having remained a pagan; for the bishops, when they came to realise that he was a man of energy and enterprise, gave him whole-hearted support in the hope of converting him and using him for their own ends. From one end of Gaul to the other there was a kind of episcopal conspiracy in his favour.

His support by the bishops

Conquest of the kingdom of Syagrius

Son of *Childeric* and grandson of *Merovius*, by whose name the whole family (dynasty) is known (Merovingian), Clovis took advantage of the disorder in Gaul to resume the enterprise of his great-grandfather Clodion which was cut short by Aetius: expansion southwards. He attacked the son of Aegidius, *Syagrius*, whom the barbarians called "King of the Romans," the sole remaining representative of vanished Roman power in the country.[9] His capital was Soissons, under whose walls Clovis vanquished him in 486, and about ten years later had made himself master of the kingdom. During the same period, probably, Clovis removed, by assassination, the other little kings of the Franks and attained sovereign power. He also made friends with *Remigius*, Bishop of Rheims, and through him, with the other bishops. They made a marriage between him and *Clotilda*, niece of Gondebaud and a *Catholic*, who would naturally endeavour to convert her husband.

Remigius

Clovis a Christian

She succeeded after a victory which he won over the Alamans,[10] and he with 3000 of his warriors received baptism at the hands of Remigius on December 25, 496. Thenceforward he is the soldier of orthodoxy in Gaul. The Bishop of Vienne, Avitus, writes to him, "*Your faith is our victory; wherever you join battle we are victors.*" And it was with the Arians

[9] As the Western Roman Empire had ceased to exist since 476, Syagrius who in 464 had succeeded his father as commander of the "Roman army" of Gaul, was subject to no higher authority than himself at the time Clovis attacked him, and he had no difficulty in assuming the title of king.

[10] Wrongly called the battle of *Tolbiac* (496). Tolbiac is now Zülpich, between Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne; the battle in question took place more probably in Alsace or in the district of Baden.

hat he joined battle: first with Gondebaud and his Burgunlians, whom he subdued and laid under tribute; then with Alaric II and his Visigoths, whom he would have driven from Gaul if Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths in Italy, had not ntervened to restrict his success, and to whom he left only *Septimania*, approximately our maritime Languedoc from the Rhône to the Pyrenees. Theodoric, it is true, had won Provence or himself. At the end of and during his conquests, which had brought almost all Gaul under his authority, Clovis was still a *federal* of the Roman Empire. Athanasius, the Emperor of he East, appointed him *patrice* and *consul;* he thus ended in triumph and renown a life full of activity but also of crime, nd, in itself, little consistent with the benevolence with which he Church had regarded its proceedings. The pious bishop, Gregory of Tours, after recounting the murders which relieved im of the other Frankish princes, his relatives, concludes as ollows: "*Thus God cast down his enemies before him and gave ncrease to his kingdom, because he walked with a true heart efore the Lord and did that which was pleasing in his eyes.*" n other words the Church condoned his cruelties and perfidies ecause he freed her from the Arians, and requited his zeal in er service by helping him, with all the influence which she ielded, to become master of Gaul, a result certainly in excess f his merits and indeed of his early hopes.

Clovis a Roman dignitary

Complaisance of the Church towards him

His sons completed the conquest which he had begun by ubduing Burgundy and Septimania; they even made some dvance into Germany, adopting unconsciously the idea of stablishing a march on the east. Under Clothaire, the last urvivor of the four brothers, who united all *Francia* under is rule (558), the Merovingian power reached its zenith. Its enure nevertheless remained precarious and its structure ragile.

The Frankish empire after him

The Merovingian kings were fond of assuming Roman attiudes; they had themselves addressed as "*Your Glory*," "*Your*

2. The Merovingian monarchy

Its German character

Sublimity," "*Your Excellency*"; they clad themselves in the purple, the imperial colour, and signed official documents with purple ink. Yet they never rose to a complete comprehension of the Roman notion of the State. They considered the kingdom as a patrimony, and shared it, as would the heirs to a private estate, when the throne became vacant by the death of the head of the family. This was done by the sons of Clovis in 511, those of Clothaire in 561, and by those of every king who left more than one male heir. A law barred daughters from inheritance. As the divisions made were based neither on geographical considerations, nor political logic, nor on good sense, but were merely compromises between different inordinate claims, all heirs were invariably dissatisfied and, to obtain satisfaction, had no hesitation in fighting. Thus in *Francia* civil war knew no intermission and disorder was the normal state of the country. The chief with his following of liegemen, or those vowed to his personal service, remains at bottom a German war chief.

Partitions among Clovis' sons

Civil wars

IV

Consequences of the establishment of the barbarians in Gaul

The definite establishment of these German tribes in Roman Gaul profoundly modified the population, society, manners and government of the country. The two elements thus brought into contact, the Gallo-Romans and the barbarians, reacted upon one another. Neither remained without admixture, and some fusion even occurred during the reign of the Merovingian dynasty. It is not easy to say which of the two, at the time in question, made the deeper impression on the other. Authorities are not agreed on this point. But as far as can be seen, the Gallo-Roman factor was at first the more potent and in the future it certainly became supreme.

Mixture of races

It is evident that the ethnographical constitution of the population must have become altered, owing to the number of Germans added, by the events just recounted, to the Gallo-

Romans. Unfortunately, lacking all statistics, we cannot say in what proportion. It seems certain that the invaders were far fewer than the inhabitants whom they found in the country, and that outside the north and the northeast of Gaul they could have been no more than a sprinkling either of individuals or of very small groups among the indigenous inhabitants.

Importance of the condition of the individual

But in Merovingian society what most counts is not the race of a man but his individual condition. There are nobles, clerics, free men of simple condition, citizens of towns, settlers in the country and serfs. Germans as well as Gallo-Romans are found in all these social classes. The way in which the feudal Germans became established in Gaul explains how this was the case. What determines the dignity and, in essence, the value of a man is, firstly, whether he is or is not free; and secondly, the nature of his relations with the king. The man of weight is he who is known to the king, and can approach him more or less familiarly. And some Gallo-Romans had this privilege. We do not therefore receive the impression that the Germans were a race apart and in a privileged position. This is a fact of great importance in that it singularly favoured and quickened the mingling of the two ethnic elements.

Decline of culture

It is in manners and morals that the influence of the barbarians is most conspicuous; they indicate a marked retrograde movement towards ignorance, brutality, grossness and depravity. The kings themselves are examples of every kind of vice. All intellectual light seems extinguished. The Church alone keeps a flickering flame alight, though even the Church is infected by barbarism. The towns, compelled by fear of pillage to confine themselves within high walls, lose their importance and their beauty. All really active life abandons them as commerce becomes more and more difficult, and takes to the country. There it organises itself within the narrower frames of the *villa* and the monastery. Each of these two organisations

becomes a kind of little world in itself, self-contained, living for itself, and producing as far as it can all supplies that it needs. Art becomes neglected and degraded; technique becomes *barbaric*.[11]

Authority of the king

All authority, in theory, is vested in the king, even when he does not refuse to acknowledge the supremacy of the Roman Emperor. The king is hereditary and absolute. His abode, the

The palace

palatium, is the centre of government. There he lives with his following of men whom he admits to intimacy at his discretion, and who call themselves *palatines*. They are the king's friends and servants, and the *mayor of the palace* (*major palatii* or *majordomo*) controls them; they are also the depositaries of his authority for the execution of his orders in the administration and government of his realm. *Thus the service of the king's house and the king's person fails to be distinguished from the service of the State.*

The count

His emissary to the ancient *civitates* of Roman Gaul is a *count* (*comes*—that is to say, *companion* of the king) who represents him and directs public business in his name.

The cities, accustomed for centuries to a wide municipal autonomy, could perhaps have continued to govern themselves upon Roman lines by the strength of precedent and momentum; but neither the kings nor their agents are disposed to allow them to do so. The Roman administrative machine is far too complicated for their heavy barbaric hands, and they can only pay it the tribute of admiration at a distance; if they touch, they will break it. They do, in fact, break it almost to pieces, and substitute their own arbitrary will for the rules whose value had been proved by the usage of many years.

[11] Architecture, whose principles are easier to grasp than those of other arts, has left us some interesting monuments, such as the crypt of Jouarre, the ancient parts of St. John's baptistery in Poictiers, the crypt of St. Laurence of Grenoble, and others. Regression is chiefly shown by the awkward execution of sculptures and ornaments.

Misunderstanding of *law*

Firstly the German kings let fall into disuse the great Roman principle, the unity and uniformity of the law. Every man who came before a court had the right of invoking the law of his own people [12] and of judgment under it. Secondly, they did not understand the character of imperative and inalienable force which must attach to *law* in all circumstances. They instinctively substituted their German practice, as is usual with all ill-governed men—that of *contract*, of an individual agreement between man and man, the ill-advised application of which in the end deprived them of all means of governing. I refer particularly to the abuse of *immunity* and to the practice of *benefice*. *Immunity* is relief from some public duty accorded by the king to a particular man; *benefice* is a gift which he makes to a man—a grant of the king's land, the exercise of some remunerative privilege such as the toll of a bridge, or a gift in money or in material.

The diverse laws

Private contract

The practice of *immunity*

1. Taxation

Before immunity, public taxation withdrew and disappeared. Combated by the Church, tenaciously resented by the Gallo-Roman, too complicated for the royal agents, and abhorrent even in principle to the Franks, the imperial system of finance soon became the object of individual and collective exemptions which grew more and more numerous. Its justification and acceptance called for a conception of the State to which the Merovingian princes were incapable of rising. They themselves, in their hearts, represented it to themselves as an unjust exaction which the anger of Heaven might well one day chastise. Gregory of Tours tells us how Chilperic, a grandson of Clovis, and otherwise a man without morals or virtue, panic-stricken by the ill fortune which struck him blow after blow, accounted for his fate by

[12] Thus the Merovingian tribunals were engaged in the application of the *Roman law*, the *Salic law*, probably the work of Clovis, the *Ripuarian law* drawn up under Dagobert and applicable to the Franks of the East, the *Gombette law*, the law of the *Alamans*, that of the *Visigoths*, etc.

the rigour with which he had collected the tax, and caused the tax-rolls to be burnt that God might be appeased.

As a matter of fact, as State services supported by the public treasury no longer existed, the impost appeared to be merely one form of the king's revenue. And men of that time held the opinion that the king should live on the products of his private domains; in addition there were the fines lavishly imposed by his judiciary, and the multiplying taxes and tolls; but immunity laid hands on these also. When he had to provide for something essential to general order, for instance a war, the king exercised a kind of right of requisition over all his subjects and called his vassals together. In practice a royal treasury, more or less well administered, remains; of public finance, only shreds are left.

2. Justice and administration

Immunity does its work, too, upon the *justice* and *administration* of the king. The Church altogether disrupts the justice of the courts, which, furthermore, is often neither impartial nor disinterested; she seeks to extend her jurisdiction to the advantage of her bishops and abbots ruling in rural monasteries. The great landowners do likewise, seeking to obtain judicial rights in respect of their tenants, settlers and serfs. The king, to whom a counterpoise to the augmenting authority of his courts is not unwelcome, often favours these emancipations which extend sometimes from the court of the count till they cover the whole administrative province of the prince. Theoretically no more change is made in the obligations which the king imposes on his subjects than in the department of finance, but the governmental framework into which men are fitted becomes more and more ignored in actual life. More exactly, all men of any importance escape from this framework one after another. Immunity even extends to *military service*. The standing army has disappeared. The king is habitually guarded by his own special adherents; to make war he

3. Military service

must have recourse to requisition, carried out in each *civitas* by the count. Immunity has power to revise even this requisition and to diminish the number of the king's soldiers as well as that of those subject to his administration and justice.

Consequences of immunity

In principle, immunity only protected the man who had obtained it from the authority of the king's agents. It subtracted nothing from the authority of the king himself, but in practice that authority was too remote to be exercised, and the man who need not obey a count need obey no one but himself. The king had no means of recalling a landowner in this position to the semblance of allegiance but by making him count in his city, and it can be understood that, under a weak king, the principal effect of this artifice was to extend the power and consolidate the independence of him who profited by it.

The practice of *benefice*

There remained another means by which the king could secure adherents and regulate loyalties; by purchase, and that is what the practice of *benefice* comes to. It is, however, perilous to the prince in that it diminishes his private revenues. The competition produced between kings when they shared the kingdom between them stimulated the generosity of each to an extent highly prejudicial to their wealth. The benefice is always revocable and is not hereditary; but it is, in fact, never revoked and a king always hesitates to make an enemy by refusing to a son the favour granted to a father.

The government bad

The result

Altogether the government is bad and the weak have no security whatever. Unless the king is gifted with a personal energy and vigour which command respect, he is at once autocratic and ill-obeyed; his power is tyrannical as well as feeble. Thus men of low condition, for lack of protection from the State, seek it individually from the strong, whose approval they seek and whose vassals they become; hence there is a singular increase in the power of the great landowners. The

Place of the Church in this society

CARL A. RUDISILL
LIBRARY
LENOIR RHYNE COLLEGE

richest and most highly regarded of all is often the bishop or the abbot. He is likely to be the king's man, having been arbitrarily chosen by the king, contrary to the canons of the Church, among his palatines and his liegemen. He acquires, in entering the great clerical body, a vivid sense of his own dignity, of the rights and duties of his office; he feels himself a man of God. Unworthy prelates are evidently not rare among the Merovingian clergy, but nevertheless the Church possesses some most engaging characters. I have already named Gregory of Tours (middle of the sixth century), whose writings are our principal authority for the history of his epoch. His generous charity and his strength of character were justly extolled. The Church was alone in taking thought for the poor and the powerless; she was the one benevolent power in those rude ages. At the same time she preserved in herself something of the Roman tradition and the Roman rule.

Conclusion

Much time will be needed before this fruitful tradition can reassert itself in the habitual disorder and political incoherence which the Germans brought with them into Gaul, and restore the culture which was her ornament and the prosperity which was prevalent during the time of Roman domination. The barbarians undoubtedly infused new blood into the ancient population, a fact which, while it must not be exaggerated either in point of quality or of quantity, is by no means negligible; the advantage that it gave by adding a new element to the ethnic variety of the French race did not compensate for the return of barbarism and the long centuries of misery which resulted from the German conquest. In the end the Germans surrendered to the Gallo-Romans whom they had subdued; they forgot their own language and their own customs as they forgot their religion, and conformed to the habits of their subjects in language and manners; these by their mere

contact they had made ruder and more gross. In this province, as in those of economic life and of culture, they had been the destroyers of much wealth and beauty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Bayet, Pfister and Kleinclausz, *Le christianisme, les barbares. Mérovingiens et Carolingiens,* vol. ii in Lavisse, *H. F.,* books i and ii; Fustel de Coulanges, *L'invasion germanique,* 1891, and *La Monarchie franque,* 1888.

On the Visigoths: G. Yver, *Euric* in *Mélanges dédiés à G. Monod,* 1896.

On Clovis: Junghans, *Histoire critique des règnes de Childérich et de Chlodovech,* translation from G. Monod, 1879.

On Merovingian Society: M. Prou, *La Gaule mérovingienne,* 1897; S. Dill, *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age,* 1926; F. Boissonnade, *Le travail dans l'Europe chrétienne au Moyen-Age,* 1921, ch. ii.

CHAPTER V

THE CULMINATION OF THE EMPIRE OF THE FRANKS

I

The decline of the Merovingian family

THE royal family of the Merovingians sheds its last radiance in the reign of Dagobert (629-639), a prince who was personally a man of activity and courage and found good advisers in the Bishop of Rouen, *Audoenus*, whom we call *St. Ouen*, and in the able goldsmith *Eligius*, whom we name *St. Éloi*. It is remarkable that Dagobert, in his time a redoubtable sovereign, survives today in the memory of the French people only in a grotesque song in which he plays a ridiculous part; children sing it everywhere. It is modern and in no way proves that the old Merovingian has come down through the ages in the popular legend.

Dagobert

The *sluggard kings*

After Dagobert the family rapidly degenerated; those of its representatives who succeeded him on the throne showed themselves so insignificant as to have obtained in history the name of the *do-nothing kings*. They were men given up to and enervated by debauch; for the most part they died young. Much effort, indeed, was not demanded from them; they had to meet no hostile popular movement nor any systematic opposition from the aristocracy, an aristocracy, indeed, which their own concessions were creating. But they possessed no longer even the minimum of morals and energy needed for reigning at all, and they lost all sense of public obligation in a society in which men grew steadily worse and worse, and more and more ungovernable. They were as clay in the hands of those about them, intimates and servants; and one of these men, who was in theory no more than the chief officer of the royal

household, the mayor of the palace (*major palatii*), became in fact the real ruler, the king being practically a puppet in his hands. He acted, indeed, as though he were the representative of the lieges; that is to say, of the king's *men* and of the prominent men (*optimates et proceres*) of the kingdom. Nevertheless traditional and tenacious respect for the family of Clovis continued to ensure the nominal possession of the crown to one of its members.

The mayor of the palace

During the whole of the second half of the seventh century Francia was in a state of trouble and chronic civil war. Associations of the lieges were formed in the two small kingdoms over which effective Frankish rule still extended: *Ostrasia* or *Francia of the East*, placed in contact with and under the influence of Germany, and *Neustria* or *Francia of the West*[1] in which more of the Gallo-Roman spirit still survived. These associations continually quarrelled and fought. Their contentions, in some degree personified by the blood-stained rivalry between Ebroïn, Mayor of the Palace of Neustria (+681), and St. Léger, Bishop of Autun, chief of the lieges of Burgundy (+678), had for their principal result the turning of the balance in favour of a family of large Ostrasian landowners who were destined in the end to enter into the heritage of the Merovingians and to restore the position of the Frankish monarchy.

Struggles between Ostrasia and Neustria

At the beginning of the seventh century, two families dominated the region which lies between the Meuse, the Moselle and the Rhine, one having for chief Arnulf and the other Pepin, known as the *Old*. They owed their wealth largely to grants from the kings. From this time onwards they found themselves strong enough to impose upon Clothaire II, the father of

Origin of the *Pepins*

[1] From the death of Dagobert, *Burgundy* was reunited to Neustria up to the time when it was conquered by Ostrasia after the battle of *Testry* in 687. As to *Aquitaine*, the kings of Ostrasia and Neustria in theory divided it for their own benefit, but the country made itself little by little independent in fact. In the last third of the seventh century a *duchy of Aquitaine*, which has no longer any connection with *Francia*, comes into existence.

Dagobert, the creation of a special mayoralty of the palace for Ostrasia, which was conferred upon Pepin, and on Dagobert himself, the creation of the kingdom of Ostrasia. The two families became one by marriage between a son of Arnulf's and a daughter of Pepin's (630), whose issue was Pepin, known as *d'Héristal*, the true ancestor of the *Carolingian* dynasty.

Pepin d'Héristal

The fortunes of the house were supported by the Church, one of whose saints is Arnulf, made Bishop of Metz in 615. A consistent enthusiast for the causes of unity and order, he showed effective good will towards men who appeared to him likely to establish them. Pepin, skilful to profit by the dissensions of Francia, and mayor of the palace of Ostrasia almost by hereditary title, overcame the lieges of Neustria at Testry in 687 and made himself mayor over the Neustrians as well. He thus had dominion over all Francia. His son Charles, known as *Martel*, succeeded him in the double capacity, and at first in the name of the Merovingian Thierry IV (721-737), afterwards without sanction of power delegated by any king, governed the kingdom as sovereign from 737 to 741. His conduct towards the Church was, indeed, marked by shamelessness and brutality; he confiscated large areas of ecclesiastical land for distribution among his adherents. But the bishops over whom he tyrannised pardoned him everything, since he freed them from the Moslem nightmare by checking at Poictiers, thanks to his alliance with the Duke of Aquitaine, the great Arab invasion of 732. Francia, perhaps, might have gained by passing under the rule of a race under whom so magnificent a civilisation came to flower in Spain, but at that time the religious repugnance of the Gallo-Franks towards Islam so dominated their whole outlook that an Arab conquest would have appeared to them the greatest of calamities. The victory brought Charles great prestige. Moslem incursions continued to give anxiety to the south of France, Aquitaine, Septimania and the Rhône valley; but the grand enterprise of 732 was

Charles Martel

Victory over the Arabs at Poictiers

never renewed. Further, Charles favoured the evangelisation of Germany conducted by St. Boniface. For these reasons the Church remained well disposed towards his family.

Pepin the Short

Before his death (741) Charles Martel divided his sovereignty between his children, just as though it had been his private estate. They thought it worth while to restore the kingship in the person of the insignificant Childeric III (743), who was to be the last of the Merovingians. Pepin the *Short*, left in 747 sole Mayor of Francia, was not long in deposing Childeric and in making himself recognised as king by the lieges in 751. Thus the principle of *election* was substituted for that of patrimonial *heredity* on which the Merovingian monarchy had rested. It is said that in order to relieve himself of his last scruples he sought the advice of the pope, Zacharias, who answered him, "*He who has kingly power had best be called king.*" Zacharias' successor, Stephen II, who needed the Franks to protect him against the Lombards, came himself to Saint-Denis to crown the new king on the 28th of July, 754. This ceremony has great importance. In the first place it marks the understanding between the Church, represented by her head, and the new Frank dynasty; secondly it gives to the monarchy of the Pepins a character lacking in that of the Merovingians: the king becomes the elected of God. Such an election raised him high above the level of the dignity which he owed merely to the lieges; he affirmed this election by calling himself king "by the grace of God" (*gratia Dei*), a formula which expressed the essential justification of his authority.

He becomes king in 751

Coronation by the pope in 754. Consequences of this event

Thus a second royal family was enthroned in place of the degenerate and impoverished Merovingians. The substitution was effected with the minimum of violence at the end of a long period of disturbance, at the moment when, the Frank aristocracy having definitely ruined the power of the Merovingian kings, the abuses arising from disorder exacted their necessary

Import of the advent of *a second royal race*

remedy, a new kingship and a strong one. This was to devolve upon the man who in the end had drawn into his own hands all the gains won by the lieges from the Merovingian monarchy, and who had been their lieges' representative before the monarch. The Carolingians, otherwise, did not regard their advent as marking any political revolution in Francia; they believed that they merely continued the Merovingian succession, and they were not deceived in this belief. We may at the most suppose that the Ostrasians, large landowners established in a highly Germanised region of Gaul, formed in the Frank community a fresh factor with German attributes, at the precise time when the Arab invasion, by severing Gaul from the life of the Mediterranean, gave added importance to Eastern influences. It is under a prince of this Carolingian dynasty, which derived its name from him, Charlemagne (*Carolus Magnus*), that the empire of the Franks attained at once its greatest extent and its most brilliant prosperity. The work of this famous king has not endured, but it seemed to the men who beheld it, and still more to those who heard what was told of it after it had passed away, so stupendous and so wonderful, that they could explain it only by transforming Charlemagne himself into a superhuman being, a hero of marvel and of legend.

Its zenith

II

Charlemagne

At the death of Pepin the Short in 768, Charles, his eldest son, was twenty-six years of age. At first he shared the throne with his brother Carloman, but the latter dying in 771, and the Franks being unwilling to recognise the rights of his children, Charles thenceforward ruled alone.

A. *The conqueror*

Character of his wars

His contemporaries saw in him, above all, a *conqueror*, and the extent of the empire which he built up by conquest is still to us of today the best witness to the intensity of his effort and to his energy in action. This empire was the fruit

of many wars; Charlemagne engaged in no less than fifty-three campaigns in the course of his life, the greater number waged in the cause of God and the Faith. Charles regarded himself as a kind of armed evangelist under an obligation to diminish, as far as in him lay, the number of infidels. Other campaigns were in defence of Francia, pressed by the barbarians on the north and on the east. Some again appear to have been inspired simply by desire for and delight in action and conquest.

Principal expeditions

Thus Charles made war in *Aquitaine*, to recall the country to obedience; in *Italy*, to free the pope from the Lombards and to gain desirable territory; in *Germany*, to subdue and convert the Saxons (he succeeded only after thirty years and eight onerous campaigns) and to hold back the Danes and the Slavs; in *Hungary*, to destroy the power of the Avars, whose huge fortified camp, or *ring*, was stormed and pillaged; in *Spain*, to overcome the infidels.

Charles soon saw that the adversaries with whom he engaged on the far side of the Pyrenees, at the instigation of certain emirs who had revolted against the Caliph of Cordova, were of very different calibre from the barbarians of eastern Germany. He contented himself with a few successes, and at the first check—when he failed to take Saragossa—he persisted no further and returned home. It was on the withdrawal from this expedition that his rear-guard, surprised by the Vascon or Basque mountaineers in the defiles of Roncevaux, suffered complete disaster (778). There perished *Roland*, "*Prefect of the marches of Brittany.*" This unfortunate episode formed the occasion and provided the historical foundation for the celebrated *Song of Roland*, the most remarkable of the epic poems of the High Middle Age of France.[2] The Arabs were

Roncevaux

[2] The *Song of Roland*, properly so called, dates from the eleventh century, but it is probable that the insignificant accident at Roncevaux had been "poetised" well before that period. It undoubtedly made a very great impression when it occurred.

quick to deal vigorous counterstrokes; they invaded and ravaged southern Francia in spite of the efforts of the famous Duke of Toulouse, William with the Short Nose. Fortunately for Charlemagne, internal dissensions broke out again in the Caliphate of Cordova after 796, of which he took advantage to establish a *march*, that is to say, a covering military province, between the Ebro and the Pyrenees.

Brittany

Charlemagne never subdued the Bretons. He sent three expeditions against them (786, 799, 811) whose very repetition proves their unsuccess. He did not consider the moment opportune for the effort which would have been necessary for the subjugation of these stubborn Celts, and was satisfied with establishing a *march* along their borders to protect his territory from possible attacks on their part.

B. *The Empire of Charles*

Its extent

In the course of his wars Charles enlarged Francia in every sense. In the end his empire embraced all Caesarine Gaul with the exception of Brittany; Germany almost up to the Oder; Bohemia and the Austria of before 1918; the valleys of the Save and the Drave; northern Italy and Tuscany, Catalonia and Navarre. These indicate approximations only, more or less indefinite—accurate determination is difficult because the boundaries of the Carolingian Empire were in a continual state of flux. Not only were there on the side of Francia, in every zone where danger threatened, *marches* of ill-defined territory, but on the farther and foreign side of the military zones there might be tributary regions extending for great distances, varying from year to year, which might or might not be reckoned as belonging to the empire.

Its general characteristics

It is indispensable for us, in forming a conception as to the real nature of this huge aggregation of territories, to divest our minds of all modern conceptions of the State, of the frontier, and of centralisation. There was no question of unity or of geographical equilibrium. Charlemagne pushed on with

his conquests as circumstances dictated, with no preconceived plan and with no regard to the whole. Every year he came to a halt wherever the bad weather of winter found him, consolidated as best he could the gains made during the past campaign, and made conventions with the local chiefs, who were delighted at the prospect of his departure. He then returned to pass the winter in one or other of his favourite towns, such as Aix-la-Chapelle or Attigny.[3] In the following spring his attention would probably be diverted to some other point, where he would act again in the same way. Thus his empire never came to a definite boundary, and indubitably he never clearly envisaged any such boundary to himself.

Its instability

His empire, never reaching a limit, never further acquired any great stability. Frequent revolts disturbed it and even modified its structure for a time, shorter or longer as the case might be. They would break out at one place while Charles was occupied at another. For the rest, the great conqueror seems never to have felt the need for unity and uniformity of rule, which in our eyes are essential to the creation of a State out of disparate groups of men with divergent characteristics.

Subjects and vassals

He made no attempt to assimilate his subjects. Their obedience decreased with the increase of the distance between their abodes and the centre of Francia, which was at this time situated in the district of northeastern Gaul whence Charles' family had sprung. Those peoples who inhabited the outlying districts of the kingdom kept their customs and their chiefs unchanged; the only marks of their subjection were a kind of oath of vassalship which they tendered to Charlemagne, an annual tribute which they paid him, and their spiritual submission to the bishops dispatched to them by the Frank king if they were recent converts to the Christian faith. There was never any

[3] Attigny is today a chief town of canton in the arrondissement of Vouziers in the department of the Ardennes.

question of assimilation of the vanquished by the victors; no more was demanded of them than that they should resign themselves to their subjection and keep the peace.

C. *Reëstablishment of the Empire of the West*

The ceremony of December 25, 800

In the year 800 an event occurred which appears to have raised the power of Charles to its culminating point. He found himself at Rome, brought thither by the desire to put an end to the grave troubles in the course of which the pope, Leo III, had nearly perished the year before. He was assisting at the solemn Mass on Christmas Day, in the basilica of St. Peter, and was bowing before the altar, when the pontiff placed a crown upon his head and at the same moment the congregation cried out with one voice and three times, "*Life and victory to Charles Augustus, the crowned of God, great and pacific Emperor of the Romans!*" Eginhard, to whom we owe an account of this remarkable ceremony, asserts that the Frank king was greatly astonished and even shocked (*aversatus*), and that notwithstanding the deference due to the day and ceremony he would not have entered the basilica if he had had any idea as to what would take place (*si pontificis consilium praescire potuisset*). He could thus have had no knowledge beforehand as to the action taken by the pope. This is quite incredible.

The allegations of Eginhard

The probable facts

Position of Leo III in relation to Charles

It must first be noted that Leo III is entirely in the hands of Charles, to whom he had run to implore succour at Paderborn.[4] His restoration to the pontifical throne and his acquittal from the charges brought against him in his own city of Rome had been dependent on the royal decision. The Frankish king was in no way disposed to regard him as a sovereign with crowns to give away; on the contrary he had very clearly given him to understand, on his arrival on the scene, that he would see in the pope no more than the highest among his bishops. Is it probable that a person thus humiliated and in so humble a position would have ventured to incur the responsi-

[4] Paderborn is today a city of Westphalia in the district of Minden; it was then one of the residences of Charlemagne.

bility of an act which would by itself reëstablish, to the advantage of Charles, the Roman Empire of the West, which had been in abeyance in actual fact since 476, and in theory reunited to the Empire of the East?[5] He could never have imagined that his gratitude could justifiably be expressed in a manner so extraordinary. His contemporaries still held too high a conception of the Roman Empire for them to regard as acceptable the idea that the Bishop of Rome could dispose of it at his own arbitrament. The truth was certainly less simple and Eginhard either did not know it or did not think it timely to tell it. We can, however, very readily divine what it was.

The versions of the *Royal Annals* and the *Liber Pontificalis*

The Frank chronicler is not our only informant as to the coronation of Charlemagne. Two other writings, the *Royal Annals* and the *Liber Pontificalis* (Book of the Popes),[6] recount it and agree in stating that it was at the signal of the pope that the acclamation of the emperor arose from the congregation of the faithful. A ceremony followed, whose ritual dated from the time of Diocletian, entitled *The Adoration of the Emperor;* while immediately afterwards Leo III proceeded to the anointing, as king, of Charlemagne's eldest son, like him named Charles. This was manifestly no unforeseen improvisation, but the execution, in due order, of a programme arranged and organised beforehand. It cannot be doubted that the Frankish king collaborated. Far from appearing so shocked as Eginhard represents him to have been, he proceeded, in concert with his son, directly mass was over, to lay rich offerings on the tomb of St. Peter. His generosity was a sign of his satisfaction.

Origin of the allegations of Eginhard

[5] The young Emperor of the West, Romulus Augustulus, had been in this year 476 deposed by a barbarian chief, Odoacer, under whose pressure the Roman Senate had written to the Emperor of the East, Zeno, that the majesty of a single monarch was sufficient to fill at once the West and the East.

[6] Eginhard, in his *Vita Caroli,* has given us a biography of Charles much more well-intentioned than well-informed; he is an apologist rather than a truthful chronicler. The *Royal Annals,* although they represent the official Frankish version of the events, are much more trustworthy. As to the *Liber Pontificalis,* it is a Roman collection, in greater or less elaboration, of biographies of the popes.

It was only somewhat later, in face of the high disapproval of the Byzantines and of the accusation that he was merely a vulgar usurper, that he allowed credence to the version made current by the officious Eginhard: namely, that the pope alone had done all and that he, Charles, had at most allowed the doing, in order that no scandal might desecrate the church of the Prince of the Apostles.

Reasons which decided Charles on the deed of the year 800

The reality appears to have been as follows: Charles had long regarded himself as the champion of the Christian faith in the ancient Empire of the West, but he would not deny that the protector, official and consecrated, of the Christian Church was always the Roman emperor, resident at Constantinople. Now, in 800, there was no longer a Roman emperor; the young Constantine VI had been, in 797, dethroned, blinded and imprisoned by his own mother, Irene. It was thus a woman who, by an unheard-of usurpation, exercised the imperial authority, and moreover could keep it only at the price of continual effort, from day to day, against ambitious competitors. Charles therefore was able, in this default of any emperor, to regard himself as uniquely responsible for the security of the Christian churches,[7] and to believe himself authorised to adopt, in relation to the imperial crown, the course of argument and action formerly followed by his father Pepin in relation to the royal crown. Stephen II had already conferred upon Pepin the title of *patrice of the Romans*, which Charles had inherited from him and still bore; might not the successor of Stephen, elected by the Roman people, be regarded as the depositary of the Roman sovereignty, and as competent to transmit it to the man who was in fact achieving in the West the main task demanded by

[7] His familiar friend Alcuin wrote to him about the middle of 799 that in the present abasement of the apostolic sublimity (*apostolica sublimitas*) of the Roman pontiff and of the imperial dignity (*imperialis dignitas*), nothing remained for the protection of the Christian peoples but the royal dignity (*regalis dignitas*). And Alcuin concludes, *"Thus the whole safety of the Christian churches rests upon you alone"* (*Ecce in te solo tota salus ecclesiarum Christi recumbit*).

Christianity of an emperor? The pope on his side, all personal and conventional considerations apart, must have regarded with approval a reëstablishment of the Western Empire which, appearing to emanate from his own authority, could not fail to increase it, and which, above all, freed him from the tutelage of Byzantium.

Attitude of the Orientals

Negotiations

It may well be believed that in Constantinople a very different view of the event prevailed. Bitter protests were made, and as Charles could not reasonably maintain that the protesters were altogether in the wrong,. he bargained. Negotiations dragged on at great length. It is said that the Frankish king proposed to cut them short by offering marriage to Irene, a plan which failed at first to find favour with the Byzantines. The difficulties did not diminish when, Irene having been overthrown, Constantinople acquired a new emperor, Nicephorus. In the end, after much coming and going of ambassadors, some hostilities on the coasts of the Adriatic, and at the cost of more than one unavoidable sacrifice of personal pride, Charles prevailed and the Emperor of the East, Michel, resigned himself to the accomplished fact. In 812 a Byzantine ambassador travelled to salute the Frankish king by the title of *basileus*—that is to say, *emperor*—in his palace at Aix-la-Chapelle.

The results for Charlemagne

Thus the enterprise had succeeded, though with much less ease than was hoped for at the start. It brought Charles great prestige among those who had not yet lost their ancestral admiration for the Roman Empire; it spread his renown over the whole known world of the period, even as far as Bagdad, whence the caliph, Haroun-al-Raschid, sent him ambassadors and magnificent gifts; but it made no change in his habits of life or in his methods of government. Nevertheless the fact that the *Rex Francorum* could on one day have been accepted as a Roman emperor is far from unimportant in its bearings on the future of the royal authority in France.

III

The government of Charlemagne

A. Its general characteristics

It is German, not Roman

There was nothing Roman in the government of Charlemagne. We must be careful not to be influenced by illusions created by such official formulas as *salus patriae et utilitas regni*, and the frequent use of such words as *respublica* or *regnum*. Their multiplication after the coronation of the year 800 proves, no more before than after, that Charles was much concerned to make the Empire his exemplar. The Merovingians were far more strongly inclined to this course, awkward as their imitation was. He neither understood nor desired to realise the Roman conception of the State; much less did he think of restoring the Roman administration. Nor did he ever profess to have made any break with the administrative usages of the Merovingians, with whom his continuity is obvious. His monarchy is distinguishable from theirs only by the substitution of the principle of *election* for that of inheritance by relationship and by a feature to which I have already alluded, the anointment which made it a sacred office, a *ministerium* established by God, so that the king, in one of his aspects, took station as a dignitary of the Church and became in practice her veritable head.

B. The personality of Charles

Its great importance

What is really new, and new here, is the activity, the intelligence and the personal authority of Charles himself, thanks to which he was generally both feared and obeyed. The historian, indeed, may well be surprised when he has to conclude that the institutions renovated or established by the great Carolingian had, in relation to order and internal peace, no actual value whatever, except in so far as they were operated by himself—except, if it may be so said, as functions of his individual personality. In and by themselves they bear within them the hidden seeds of a future of anarchy, and pave the way to feudalism. Charles evidently did not foresee these re-

sults, a fact which shows that his political vision never extended far beyond the limits of his personal horizon.

Physiognomy of Charles

The admiration of subsequent generations, whose knowledge of his person and work is derived merely from tradition, distant at once and dazzling, has attributed to him a physiognomy quite other than the reality. It has made him a legendary hero, superhuman in personal appearance as in the power of his genius. He was, in reality, a Frank, raised by his natural gifts above the common run of men of his nation, but not otherwise distinguished either by his attributes or his dress or his manner of life.

His portrait

The emperor "*with the flowing beard*" whose stature amounted to eight of his own feet—which were naturally very large—whose terrific appetite did not shrink before a quarter of a sheep, or a whole hare, a goose or a peacock, without counting the side dishes and the dessert; whose stalwart arm could lift in the palm of its hand a fully-armed warrior head high from the ground; the invincible conqueror who subdued Jerusalem and Constantinople, is the Charlemagne of the *Chansons de Geste*. The Charlemagne of history is impressive but in no way monstrous. We do not, it is true, know him perfectly; the celebrated portrait which Eginhard has left us is inspired far more by a desire to make him resemble the Emperor Augustus and to place him on an equality with the latter than by care for the truth.[8] He seems to have been large-framed, vigorous and majestic in bearing; but he had no beard and wore pendant moustaches after the fashion of the Franks. His dress was equally that of the Franks and not that of the Romans; he donned the latter only on the day of his coronation in 800, when the pope endued him with the imperial chlamys and

His dress

[8] It has been clearly established (v. Halphen, *Études critiques sur l'histoire de Charlemagne,* p. 93 et seq.) by convincing comparisons between texts, that Éginhard, in drawing the portrait of Charles, has stolen from Suetonius, the biographer of the Caesars, and that the most characteristic features which he attributes to the king of the Franks belong to one or another emperor of the Romans.

placed on his feet the purple buskins embroidered with gold. In winter a jerkin of otter's or martin's fur protected him from the cold and if, in bad weather, he went hunting in the woods he did not disdain a stout overcoat of sheepskin.

His dwellings

He lived, when he was not in the field, in one or other of his villas. I have already mentioned those of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, *Attigny* and *Paderborn*. He had others, at *Héristal* on the Meuse, at *Kiersy* near Noyon, at *Compiègne*, at *Worms* on the Rhine, at *Frankfort-on-Main*, at *Ratisbon* on the Danube, and others as well. A *villa* of Charlemagne must not be figured as a royal residence such as occur in all western countries where kings have been or are still; nor is it in any way like a fortress of the feudal type. It was a large rectangular dwelling in whose construction timber probably played a larger part than stone, but which might, nevertheless, be comfortable and sumptuously furnished and decorated. Other smaller buildings surrounded it for the accommodation of officers and servants. The *palatium*, the palace, was thus a little centre of life and activity which travelled about with the king from villa to villa. It even seems that its population was so compounded that Charles found it necessary to have recourse from time to time to personal inquisition into its doubtful elements and at times to energetic expulsions. The time which Charlemagne did not devote to public affairs and to the administration of his domains, during which he sojourned in one of his villas, he spent in the chase, and when he could in swimming, which seems to have been his favourite pastime and the one in which he claimed special success. For this reason he had a particular fondness for his villa at Aix, where the warm waters enabled him to build a swimming bath in which he was able to take his pleasure during the cold season of the year. His whole court bathed with him. It must have been a sight worth seeing; one difficult, in any case, to reconcile with our current ideas regarding the etiquette of an imperial court, which ill consort with

His occupations

this swimming match to which, it seems, Charles invited together all his entourage.

His intellectual pursuits

Further, the Frankish king did not undervalue intellectual diversions. He liked to have read to him, particularly during his meals, some useful and edifying book, above all the *City of God* of St. Augustine. He knew Latin well and had some understanding of Greek. Above all he took interest in serious conversation, carried on for him and about him, by learned men, whom he took pains to attract to his court and on whom he heaped favours: such as Peter of Pisa, Paul Diacre, Clement of Ireland, Dungal, another Irishman, and above all the illustrious Alcuin of York. Finally he was fond of music and took delight in singing at Mass, before a chorister's desk, with a large and well-trained choir.

His piety and morals

Religious duties, too, took up much of his time; he was most assiduous and his piety was great. It did not, however, altogether avail to keep him on all occasions in the straight path. The liberties which he allowed himself were far from affording a good example to those about him. Nor was the conduct of his daughters always irreproachable, and when their brother Louis became emperor in his turn in 814 he inaugurated his reign, that of a religious devotee, by a drastic purgation of the palace from which the dismissed suffered severely, though it was doubtless far from superfluous.

General impression of Charles

If Charles had in him indeed nothing of all that constitutes a Roman emperor, in person, mind, attributes and way of life, he would appear to us at the best as a barbarian king of some acquired refinement, intelligent, full of desires and aspirations which were not those of a vulgar spirit, active and authoritative. He placed before himself a very high ideal of the duty which he believed God had laid upon him on earth, and he laboured hard to fulfil it conscientiously.

C. *Sources of the power of Charlemagne*

There is some complexity in the principles on which the power of Charlemagne reposes. He is king of the Franks and

he is Roman emperor; these two dignities are not confounded with one another; each has its own justification. The second, too, does not come to account until the year 800 and after.

1. The king of the Franks

The sources of his authority

There were three basic factors in the elevation of Pepin the Short to the throne in the month of November, 751: "*his election by all the Franks, his consecration by the bishops, the submission of the chiefs.*" Then, when the pope, Stephen II, had come to consecrate the new sovereign in July, 754, he had solemnly proclaimed that the Franks, on pain of excommunication, must thenceforward always choose a king of the family "*which had been raised by the divine care and consecrated on the intercession of the holy Apostles by the hands of their vicar the Sovereign Pontiff.*" The idea of the pope had thus been to extend to the descendants of Pepin the privilege conferred by the divine choice which he consecrated in Pepin's person. This was not, however, properly speaking, a hereditary right. The right of choice, a privilege of the Franks recognised by Pepin, was thenceforward limited but it was not abolished, and the succession could devolve upon a member of the royal family other than the eldest son of a deceased king. Supposing that they make no use of this power, it does not follow that the new king raises himself to the throne by himself, or to royalty by right; he must be raised; that is to say, it is necessary, at least, that the whole people, represented by an assembly more or less numerous, the bishops and the chiefs, shall agree to his succession. In this way Charles and his brother Carloman had been enthroned, the first at Noyon, the second at Soissons, on October 9, 768.

Character of this authority

The authority of the Carolingian king was not, under Frankish custom, absolute, except over his army in time of war. Assuredly the character of delegate, of lieutenant of God, conferred upon him by consecration, armed him with such authority of which he need render account only to God who had given it. In other terms, from this point of view he had the absolutist

right of a Biblical king. But the chiefs, the lieges, would never admit that royalty among the Franks was a power of religious origin alone; for this reason Charles thought it prudent to consult them in all serious business of the State and before any one of his great enterprises. It may be understood that this consultation did not, in fact, limit his power; his native force and personal prestige would prevail over any sign of opposition; but it confirmed the principle of limitation in law and maintained the principle that the *king must govern in accord with the people of the Franks.*

2. The emperor

His legislative authority

The prince was considered by the jurists of the empire as law alive on earth (*lex animata in terra*); that is to say that his person itself, because it stood for the entire Roman people whose will had always been, in principle, *the law*, carried in itself all law; he had only to promulgate it for it to become law. This representation accorded perfectly with the *right divine* of a Biblical king, and it will have its importance in the history of royal power in France; it does not, however, appear that Charlemagne profited greatly by it or that his authority as emperor added any gain to his authority as king except that of various pompous formulas.

D. *Practical foundations of his government*

He himself appears to have relied for the maintenance of his authority on practices rather than on principles. Two above all had, in his opinion, particular importance. 1. He exacted a personal and direct oath of fidelity from all his subjects, from "all the general folk," including infants over twelve years of age, settlers, and even such serfs as were of the higher grade in serfage. This oath had to be renewed at any time when any considerable change occurred in the career of the king. It was renewed in 800 when Charles received the imperial crown, and again in 806 when he arranged for the future division of his empire among his children. This custom of the oath was not invented by Charlemagne; it existed under the Merovingians and even in the time of the Roman domination, but

1. The oath of allegiance from all

Its consequences and its drawbacks

it was Charlemagne who made it a mainspring in the machine of government. Thus *all subjects became vowed to fidelity to the king*. It was an advantage not without its disadvantages. What still remained of the Roman idea of the necessary subordination of the individual to the State and to the law came to disappear and the German practice of personal vassalage completed its disappearance. Further, *fidelity* may become *infidelity* if fear of the king declines. Further, too, he who, for one reason or another, has been able to escape taking the oath easily believes himself absolved from all obedience whatever. This excuse was, in fact, one which rebels did not fear to allege on occasion.[9]

2. Compulsory vassalage

2. He determined that all "simple" free men should choose an overlord for themselves. Till then the recommendation and the contract of patronage had been practices or expedients dependent only on the will of the parties concerned. Charles made it a state institution in virtue of which obligatory ties, indissoluble in law and almost hereditary, were established.

His intentions and the dangers

Evidently his intention was not to emancipate "other men's men" from his own authority; he expected to assure and simplify the exercise of this authority by limiting its direct application, leaving this to the nobles and making them responsible to him for their own men. This was assuredly a dangerous expedient, since, if a feeble king should succeed to authority, the lords would exercise authority over their "own men" and at the same time would refuse obedience to the king. Charles thus had prepared with his own hands the pulverisation of his empire into a detritus of petty states. From this circumstance it has been stated with good reason that *the empire of Charlemagne was already a feudal state.*

[9] It even seems that it was because the accomplices of Count Hardrada, who attempted to raid Thuringia in 786, gave this in excuse that Charles determined to strengthen and universalise the oath of allegiance.

E. *Resources of Charlemagne*

This general character becomes more definitely confirmed if we consider the resources at Charles' command for governing. There are, properly speaking, no public finances.

1. Finance

The king's revenue

He provides for his expenditures from his private income, to which are added gifts received from the nobles who attend the annual assemblies, tribute from the conquered, and the booty of wars. The gifts, indeed, having become obligatory, form a kind of impost, and certain individuals, as in the preceding period, remain subject to personal taxation. Some of the "tonlieux" (*telonea*) also remain in force; these are mainly tolls or taxes on the passage of merchandise, of which some part at least comes to the king. Further, as he has no public services to pay for, he provides for them by requisitions and "corvées" (*opera publica*), and as he avoids disbursements for his own movements from place to place, as well as for those of his functionaries and various envoys, his expenses are correspondingly reduced. It is no less true that he has not restored the lost principle of taxation by the State, due, for the common good, from all subjects whatever. Nothing shows more clearly how remote his government was from anything Roman. Nothing, indeed, if not perhaps the military institutions with which he was content, and by means of which he had to provide for continual wars. He had no permanent army and no general service for the supply of equipment and provisions. When a campaign is decided upon he issues the "heriban," the call to the warriors to arm and meet at the rallying-point assigned to them. Immediately, in every province to which this royal order applies, the local authorities—counts, bishops, abbots, nobles of all degrees—must set about the task of choosing the men who are to go, compelling them to provide themselves with arms, utensils, clothing and provisions, and of then personally leading them to the army. Nothing can excuse a man from these responsibilities but a royal diploma of immunity, which was

2. The army

very rarely accorded by Charlemagne and never without full inquiry into the circumstances.

Disproportionate importance of Charles himself. Insufficiency of his institutions

Charles conducts himself in his kingdom as a large landowner might do on his estates: he is exact in drawing all due profit from his property and his men. He sees, personally and most carefully, that his lands are well cultivated and due returns from them secured.[10] He is punctual in exaction of the diverse services owed him, and he visits with heavy penalties those who do not respond to the "heriban". But it is evident that all this work is transacted with any regularity at all only through him and the respect and fear which his personality inspires. There is no real organisation to ensure its performance apart from him. Should a king weak and without prestige succeed him, his estates would be ill managed, his revenues would be frittered away, all duties would be evaded. Charlemagne's great mistake was to govern as though he would live and be all-sufficient to the State forever. He made this mistake in all innocence; he never understood that an empire like his could not be ruled by methods which sufficed for the government of a little German kingdom.

F. Institutions

1. The central government.

The *palatium*

The *palatini: ministri* and *ministeriales*

He had, properly speaking, no capital city. The centre of government moved from place to place according to his own changes of residence. It so centred on the *palatium*, the palace, which was, as is known, the dwelling of the king, that servants of the prince's household were at the same time high officials of the kingdom. They were generally called the "palatines" (*palatini*). Those in high employment and confidential posts were called *ministri*. The others, confined to subordinate functions, were the *ministeriales*. Of the principal *ministri*, the "archchaplain" directed the clerics of the palace and the chapel[11] royal; he was the usual intermediary between the king, the

[10] We have a long and most detailed order drawn up by him on this subject, the capitulary *De villis*.

[11] The chapel (*capella*) in its proper sense was the oratory of the palace, where the cape (*chape*) of St. Martin was preserved as a precious relic.

clergy and the pope. The "arch-chancellor," a clerk, had charge of the drafting of all ordinances and different writings which were despatched from the *palatium*. The "count of the palace" was chief of the lay personnel of the king's court, and was engaged in the administration of the king's justice; at the same time he was in some degree an intermediary between the king and the nobles of his realm. The "chamberlain" (*camerarius*), the "seneschal" (*dapifer*), the "butler" (*buticularius*), the "constable" (*comes stabuli*), have names which indicate their domestic duties; but they also have a part in the government. For instance the *camerarius* has charge of the royal treasury. The *ministeriales*, on the other hand, are confined to the service of the household and have no share in public affairs.

The *optimates*

Certain palatines, without being charged, doubtless, with any precise functions, held, probably in virtue of the friendship and favour of the king, a high rank, but below that of the *ministri;* they were called *optimates*, *proceres*, titles somewhat vague, and indicating only the personal importance of those who bore them. These *optimates* together with the *ministri* formed the secret or privy council whose opinion was ordinarily consulted by Charles before any important decision.

The *scrinia*

"Scribes" (writers) grouped in *scrinia* or *bureaux* (offices) which, naturally without having the fixity and regularity which characterise our ministerial departments, assured the despatch of the writings of every kind needed by the government—one which, simple though it seems to us, must in reality have been complex, confused and incoherent. The pivot-bolt of the machine which held all parts together was then the person of Charles himself.

The General Assemblies

Such part as the *nation* takes in government is taken through the *General Assemblies*. In principle every year, usually in March (*campus Martius*) or in May (*campus Madius*), but sometimes at some other time, Charles assembled

his people about his dwelling.[12] Attendance at the assembly was a most expensive duty, hence the eminent, clerics or laymen, took but few followers with them. Only the most highly placed of those attending had access to the palace and participated in the king's deliberations; the others camped about the dwelling and awaited the decisions. These, when reached, were communicated to them; all they had to do was to approve them without discussion. They dealt with a great diversity of questions; the planning of an approaching campaign, legislative dispositions drawn up in the form of *capitularies*,[13] sentences of justice, etc. But the will of Charles was master everywhere. It is none the less true that under a different kind of king these assemblies could constitute a serious danger to the authority of the sovereign.

2. The provincial government

The provincial government needed to be particularly well organised in an empire so extensive, with boundaries so ill defined, peopled by men so different from one another, and in which so many centrifugal forces might so easily come into action. Charles understood the necessity if he did not always take the best means to provide for it. He at least attempted to establish unity in his governmental activities and to reinforce them with such diverse precautions as appeared to him necessary to assure a close control of all his agents by himself.

The county

The administrative territorial unit is the "county," which is substituted for the Roman unit (the *civitas*) and the traditional unit (the *pagus*). The counties vary greatly in extent; they do not include the exclusively vassal districts of the Frankish Empire. Their number in the France of today is reckoned at one hundred and ten, and thus for the Francia of those times about three hundred. The county, if large enough, may be divided into *centenae* (hundreds) and *vicaria* (vicar-

[12] These assemblies had diverse names: *conventus generalis* or *universalis*, *placitum* (plea), *synodus*, etc. They were often prepared for by a limited gathering in the autumn.

[13] The word *capitulary* indicates a series of *capitula* or articles.

ships), whose chiefs, *centenarii* or "vicars," are appointed by the count, on whom alone they depend directly. The count is appointed by the king, whose complete representative he is, exercising in the king's name all the king's civil, judiciary and military powers.

The count

Charlemagne suppressed the great commands known as "duchies" which existed under the Merovingians, but he occasionally and temporarily reëstablished some of them, grouping several counts under one duke to deal with some particular defensive need. I have already said that the frontiers were bordered by "marches," the chief over which was a "margrave" (count of a march).

Duchies and marches

Counts and dukes were often from among the palatines, but were also at times chosen by the king from among the great landowners of the district in question. They were paid with a share of the revenues accruing to the king in their district. Sometimes he gave them, under the name of benefice, one of his estates in order to secure their attachment to him by the ties of recommendation and of vassalage. They, on the other hand, gifted in theory with a *ministerium*—that is to say, a public appointment revocable at the king's will—instinctively tended to consider it a *beneficium*—that is to say, a personal grant for life, if not yet hereditary. To choose these functionaries in the very district which was to be entrusted to them was undoubtedly to encourage this tendency and effectively to create beneficiaries. Further, the inhabitants of the county, accustomed to the exercise by the count of practically full kingly authority, tended to regard him as their immediate sovereign, to rally round him, and to *recommend* themselves to him. This was for them a veritable school for inculcating decentralisation, which was already the besetting sin of the Frankish kingdom.

Origin, condition, privileges of the counts

Charlemagne was not blind to the danger the unity of the kingdom might one day incur from the growth in the

3. Means of superintendence and control

authority of the counts. As a safeguard against this danger he sought to make many of them his own men. He took various other precautions against their encroachments. First he gave a parallel share in public authority to the bishops. He regarded himself as the head of the Church, for which he made laws and over whose councils he presided; the episcopal elections were so entirely under his hands that it might be said that for him there was little difference between the nomination of a count and the appointment of a bishop. There were, in fact, two functionaries, each of whom represented one of the two aspects of the royal authority, the temporal and the spiritual, each of which should reciprocally maintain and support the other; that is to say, to watch over and in some measure to complete it.

The political authority of the bishops

Disadvantages

In practice, conflicts on questions of jurisdiction are frequent. Each side encroaches on the other's ground and takes what it can. This was a sad disillusionment to Charles and one of his most constant anxieties. A provision more effective in maintaining the subordination of the counts was the obligation which he laid on them to visit him and remain in his near neighbourhood every year for some weeks, during which he informed himself at his leisure about their management. In their own districts, too, he placed them under the supervision of veritable district inspectors, known as *missi dominici*, whose office was definitely regularised in 802. The empire was then divided into departments for inspection, or *missatica*, each of which, comprising several counties, was placed under the supervision of two *missi*, a cleric and a layman, both always men of high position. Their appointment was usually for a year. In the course of their progress they received the oaths of allegiance due to the king, inspected his domains, assured themselves that the capitularies had been published, and that they were applied. They saw to the maintenance of church buildings, to the discipline of the clergy, the doctrinal correctness of the faithful and their punctual attendance at worship; above

Annual rendering of accounts by the counts

The *missi dominici*

all they received complaints of all kinds and gave redress in cases, only too frequent, where the justice of the count had erred. Unfortunately, it appears, their own justice was not free from malversations, and they were accused, not without reason, as being too easily bribed. Custom demanded that they should be offered gifts on their way, a practice leading to abuse. Thus the incompetence and iniquity of men subverted or made largely ineffective the best intentions of Charles. The respect and fear which he inspires at close quarters cease to influence his agents when they are no longer under his eye and his hand. In this lies a formidable danger for the future and for the stability of a government where institutions are almost nothing and persons almost all, where all depends on their honesty, their devotion to the public good, and their capacity. It can be seen that even in the time of Charles things often did not go too well, and that even he was often impotent to assure real justice and tranquillity to his subjects.

IV

The Carolingian Renaissance

None the less the great German had feeling and appreciation for a civilisation in which stability and permanence would be necessities. He made efforts, by methods curious to us, to establish one; but the results, called perhaps somewhat too pompously the "Carolingian Renaissance," remained superficial and fragile.

A. Restoration of culture

His desire to restore learning and letters proceeded from a religious motive. He believed that it was his imperative duty to remedy the religious shortcomings of his people and the ignorance of their pastors. The aim which he proposed himself was "*the understanding of the Holy Scriptures*" [14] as being the foundation of all culture of the spirit. Thus he assembled at his court from all parts, by the prospect of his favour and largess, all educated men of whom he heard. They formed

[14] See his letter to Baugulf, Abbot of Fulda.

The Palatine Academy

about him the "Palatine Academy"; that is to say, a sort of assemblage of the wise and learned and of poets, intended to set an example of the higher culture in the empire and encourage its diffusion. We should not be under any illusion as to the great depth of their knowledge and the high quality of their talents; but they nevertheless represented the intellectual élite of their time, and the motive which had assembled them need not appeal to us the less.

The schools

By a capitulary dated March 23, 789, Charles ordained the organisation of schools at the seat of every bishop and in every monastery. Some bishops had this need so much at heart as to take in hand the establishment of schools in the boroughs and towns of their dioceses as well. They were to be kept by priests by whom the faithful were enjoined to send their children and informed that no payment but a voluntary one need be made. Charlemagne's sedulous determination to give his people at least a practical knowledge of reading, writing and song does him great honour, as does the trouble that he took in person to encourage the children who attended the school of his own palace.

Tradition, most justly, has ended by making him the patron of scholars and the friend of good pupils.[15] Unfortunately the reëducation, even elementary, of a whole people is a matter which takes much time, and the scholastic foundations laid by Charlemagne shared the character of all his enterprises: they were too *personal;* they were not supported by real institutions.

B. *Letters and arts*

In letters and in arts, too, the achievement of the Carolingian Renaissance appears equally modest and precarious. Its bequests to our own times, whether in the works of Alcuin or of Eginhard, or in the chapel at Aix, which still stands almost

[15] As is known, Charlemagne in the lycées of Paris is celebrated as a saint and his day is the 28th of January. On that day a banquet is given in his memory, to which the best pupils of each class are invited. This custom was definitely established in 1661.

intact, do not appear to us very impressive.[16] Its most noteworthy product seems to have been a school of calligraphy, to which we owe some most beautiful manuscripts.

C. *Economic life*

Nevertheless the men who lived under the rule of Charles had, on the whole, a better kind of life than that of their parents or still more of their grandparents. His efforts to maintain internal security by stringent policing, to repair roads, to put in circulation no money that was not good, to regulate weights and measures, were not without favourable results. Commerce revived and trade was extended as far as the Arabian East. Associations of mutual defence (guilds) were organised by merchants (*negotiatores*). Great fairs—notably at Saint-Denis—were held and much business was done at them. Charles, in order to promote traffic, interdicted the levy of new tolls by the seigneurs. Agriculture also extended its domain by a resolute pursuit of deforestation. Yet all these beginnings and hopes have unfortunately no guarantee for the future but the will of the king himself.

Conclusion

The Empire of the Franks under Charlemagne incontestably made an imposing figure in the world; but we perfectly understand that its grandeur is factitious and its power fragile, because it rests entirely on the energy and capacity of its founder. An intelligent barbarian, active, laborious, well intentioned, and already considerably developed in the sense of a more refined civilisation, Charles had not the genius needed to renovate the Frankish monarchy in spirit and in institutions. He knew too little; he could only apply with vigour the old methods of government, and in attempting to improve them he often made them more dangerous than useful to the good administration of his estates. With his own hands, by the impor-

[16] Contemporaries made much of the historical frescoes which adorned the palace of Ingelheim, of which a poet, Ermold the Black, has left us a description. Unfortunately they have completely disappeared. It is probable that to us they would have appeared very crude.

tance which he gave to the oath and to vassalage, he prepared the dislocation of his kingdom and the annihilation of his governmental work. For this reason it may be said that the course of Francia towards anarchy, already determined in its deeper causes and begun under the Merovingians, had been but slightly retarded by the reaction, most interesting but altogether personal, under the great Carolingian.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Kleinclausz, *Les Carolingiens* (vol. ii of Lavisse, *H. F.*), book iii.

On Charlemagne: Eginhard, *Vie de Charlemagne,* text, translation and commentary by L. Halphen, 1923; L. Halphen, *Études critiques sur l'histoire de Charlemagne,* 1921; Abel and Simson, *Charlemagne,* vol. i,[2] 1888, and vol. ii, 1883; A. Dopsch, *Die Wirtschaftsentwickelung der Karolingerzeit,* 1912 and 1913; P. Boissonnade, *Le Travail,* etc.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS THE FEUDAL ANARCHY

I

NEITHER the empire nor the institutions made by Charlemagne in his own country long survived him. What was to become France issued from the dislocation of the one, *feudalism* was born from the disintegration of the other. The dislocation of the empire

We already know that, before Charlemagne, succession in the kingdom of the Franks was governed by principles practically identical with those of private inheritance. At the death of the king the sons who survived him shared the kingdom among themselves, as they did his private estate. On this occasion, however, the king, desiring to prevent the contentions and troubles which too commonly accompanied such adjustments of succession, took the precaution, during his lifetime, of allocating his portion to each heir, and at the same time of assuring the concurrence of the people, essential among the Franks, in the arrangement proposed. Charles modified in no respect the usage of his ancestors; he was determined to make such dispositions as would ensure that after his death all should proceed with regularity and order.

A. *Partitions during the lifetime of Charlemagne*

He naturally well understood that the imperial dignity which he had attained was indivisible; the reverse would be contrary to all reason. It must be transmitted intact to an heir, who from this fact would have some preëminence over the others. All should, however, continue in peace and mutual love if they would but follow the earnest advice and the explicit orders of their father.

In 806

Charles proceeded to an initial division in 806. He then

had three sons. Two died prematurely, and Louis, the
In 813 sole survivor, was crowned as emperor, thus becoming a colleague of his father in 813. But the kingdom of Lombardy had to be detached from the empire and given to Bernard, the son of Pepin. This shows that Charlemagne remained faithful to the old Frankish practice, though he had among his advisers men capable of rising to the ideal of unity and its necessity. These were a grandson of Charles Martel, named Wala, and certain clerics such as Adalhard, Abbot of Corbie, and Agobard, who became Archbishop of Lyons, both brothers of Wala.

B. *Louis the Pious*

His character

Louis the Pious, whom posterity has distinguished by the name of *Débonnaire*, in token of the fact that he was a man of no firmness of character or energy, had been most carefully brought up and educated in view of the office which he was to fill; he should have found himself perfectly fitted to succeed his father. Unfortunately education was unable to counteract his character. He had but mediocre talents for war; he considered the cares of government a burden hard to bear, and at most he displayed a moderate zeal in the doing of justice. He delighted above all things in the practices of religion, in reading the Scriptures, and in chanting the Psalms. His liegemen, seeing him wrapped up in church work, said, not without contempt, that this was a priest and no king. He chose his councillors and friends mainly among the monks, who, as was natural, were themselves mainly interested, and interested him mainly, in monastic affairs. One of them, the celebrated Benoit d'Aniane, whose chief preoccupation was reform of the monasteries, made this question the supreme interest of the new sovereign. The king was not, nevertheless, entirely devoid of moral worth; his life was sober, chaste and charitable; his piety was profound; he was neither brutal nor intolerant. But he lacked character, and, in face of the responsibilities bequeathed to him by Charles, his weakness became a formidable vice and an hourly danger.

Those whom he favoured all took advantage of this weakness. First there was the new pope, Stephen IV, who allowed himself to be enthroned without waiting for the imperial confirmation, an act of independence which he would never have dared to allow himself if Charlemagne had been alive (816). Secondly there were the partisans of dismemberment of the empire, who secured, as early as 817, a preliminary partition. Louis immediately formed a kingdom for his son Pepin; another for his son Louis; and made his eldest son Lothaire his associate in the imperial dignity. Thus the son of Charlemagne gave way to his own children. His nephew Bernard, King of Italy, feeling himself wronged, revolted; but he was deserted by his liegemen and gave himself up to the emperor, who ordered his eyes to be put out. The operation was conducted with such brutality that the unhappy man died of it. Louis the Pious experienced a lively attack of remorse, which led him to an act well worthy of his piety and praiseworthy from a moral point of view, but impolitic and imprudent. He did public penance for his faults at Attigny, confessing that "*in his life, in his faith, and in his duties, he had been so often guilty that it was impossible for him to enumerate all the occasions where he had been weak.*" His humility in no way enhanced his prestige.

The first consequences of his weakness

Partition of 817

Revolt of Bernard

The penitence of Attigny (822)

He became a widower in 818, and from grief had desired to seclude himself in a monastery; but he found consolation, and in the following year married the beautiful Judith, who obtained great ascendancy over him. When in 823 she bore a son, named Charles, she insisted that he, too, should have his share in the Frankish kingdom. In spite of the opposition encountered from the bishops and nobles, the emperor remodelled, by his authority, the act of 817 in favour of the youthful Charles (829). A revolt of the three original beneficiaries followed. At the end of four years Louis the Pious fell into the hands of Lothaire, who compelled him to abdicate and to read in public,

Judith

The act of 829

Abdication of Louis

The penitence of Soissons

in the church of St. Médard of Soissons, a declaration which admitted his faults and confirmed his humiliation. Naturally the brothers did not agree among themselves, and in the following year Louis was reinstated in his imperial dignity.

End of the reign

He passed the remainder of his life in arranging new partitions and in combating new revolts among his sons. He died in 840 in the course of an expedition against Louis of Germany. He left the royal authority diminished, the imperial prestige impaired, and all the causes of disorder deplorably intensified.

C. *Lothaire*

War of the three brothers

His son, Lothaire, who retained the imperial crown, was determined to be master in all things. As soon as his determination became evident, his brothers set themselves against him. Pepin died in 838, but left a son who bore his name and exercised his rights; and Charles, the son of Judith, had grown up. The lieges declared in favour of whichever of the three brothers succeeded in enlisting their individual support by the baits of privileges and gifts. No man any longer appeared to have any thought for the interest of the kingdom; personal interests and private ambitions alone came into account. Lothaire, by nature indecisive, managed his own affairs unskilfully, and, having failed to take advantage of several favourable opportunities, was vanquished by Louis and Charles at Fontenoy-en-Puisage [1] in spite of the support of Pepin II. The victory was not decisive, but it encouraged the victors to redouble their exertions. For this reason they resolved to join themselves and their subjects in a solemn alliance. This was the occasion

The oaths of Strasbourg

of the famous "oaths of Strasbourg," taken on the 14th of February, 842. Louis of Germany made oath in the *Romance* tongue which was understood by the soldiers of Charles, and Charles in the *Tudesque* which was understood by the soldiers of Louis. Each army then associated itself in the oath by recit-

[1] Thirty kilometres to the southwest of Auxerre (Yonne).

ng a formula drawn up in its own language.[2] Thus the time nad come when the men of eastern and western Francia no onger understood each other's speech. The Gallo-Roman idiom nad ended by absorbing and supplanting that of the German nvaders in the greater part of ancient Gaul. Nothing proves nore clearly how true it is that the Franks had never been more han a minority in our country. In the oaths of Strasbourg we ee the beginnings of the German and French languages, and ve become assured that Germany and France were now ready or separation.

The treaty of Verdun

This was achieved in the following year at Verdun, where he three brothers, renouncing the perilous instrument of war, agreed to a definite partition. This treaty of Verdun (August, 843) was of much greater importance than its signatories knew or cared.

Though it took little account of geography, and though in many districts it fixed the frontiers of the new kingdoms in a manner which was precarious, it arranged for a division of Francia which corresponded in some degree to natural conditions and to the situation which history had created. Louis of Germany received eastern Francia (*Francia Orientalis*); that is to say, the country on the east of the Aar and the Rhine, of which he retained, however, the large towns on the eastern bank, Spires, Worms and Mayence; Charles the Bald received western Francia (*Francia Occidentalis*), namely the territory situated on the west of the Rhône, of the Saône, of the Meuse and the Escaut. Italy and the districts situated between the portion of Louis and that of Charles, forming middle Francia (*Francia Media*), were placed under the dominion of Lothaire, who thus possessed the imperial capital, Rome, and Charlemagne's town, Aix-la-Chapelle.

This *Lotharingia* will be, down to modern times, it may be

[2] The following are the first words of the *Romance* text: *Pro Deo amur et pro christian poblo et nostro commun salvament, dist di en avant, in quant Deus savir et podir me dunat, si salvarai eo cist meon fradre Karlo. . . .*

said indeed almost to our own day, a prize to be coveted by the two other kingdoms which issued from the treaty of Verdun —and their battlefield. It is not a whole in itself; its population and characteristics are partly derived from Germany and partly from France; and both, seeing themselves in it more or less, will lay claim to it, first one and then the other, through the centuries which follow.

The situation in 843

Thenceforward the empire of Charlemagne is in fact destroyed. Most of the votaries of union are dead, and at the treaty of Verdun the fiction, accepted till then, of the subordination of the kings to the emperor is finally discredited. Some laments by poets, in which it is difficult to say how much is literary convention and how much sincerity, alone salute the vanishing of the great and visionary ideal cherished for a moment by some of the councillors of Charlemagne.

The irresistible movement which drew the West towards feudalism has reduced it to an illusion and an anachronism. Charles the Bald will be an active sovereign; he will take every opportunity to increase his kingdom at the expense of his nephews after the death of his brothers; he will even possess himself of the imperial crown in 875; but in all these undertakings he will be guided merely by the desire to make himself personally strong and more wealthy. No great general idea will guide his ambition.

II

Decay of the work of Charlemagne

Discord between the three kings

The three brothers, in concluding the treaty of Verdun, intended no more than, by an opportune expedient, to terminate civil war. They had agreed to meet from time to time to take counsel upon the general needs and the common well-being of all Francia. But meeting in an occasional interview was insufficient to produce mutual understanding and action in common. In fact the three kings continued to live in discord; their reciprocal ill-will proceeded even to open quarrel. Their

fair promises and reconciliations did not change the foundation of things. In requital, *their disputes facilitated the encroachments of the nobles*, who, often possessing estates in the three kingdoms, sold, as dearly as possible, a loyalty, always doubtful and unstable, to him who offered most and bid last. The kings tried, but vainly, to strengthen their position by intermarrying with the principal families among their vassals; they succeeded only in aggrandising them the more, without making them any the more obedient.

A. *End of the empire*

The empire had a miserable end. When Lothaire died, in 855, he left three sons. Following the custom of the Franks, they shared the kingdom between them in such a way that the one who retained the imperial crown, Louis II, did not possess as his own more than a third part of *Francia Media*. This was little indeed to maintain the distinction of a dignity which was insufficient to itself. At the death of Louis II in 875 Charles the Bald, who for twenty years had been striving, in concert with Louis the German, to despoil his nephews, possessed himself of Italy, the kingdom of Louis II, and laid claim to the imperial crown. He received it from the hands of the pope on December 25 of the same year, seventy-five years after Charlemagne, on the same spot but in very different circumstances.

Charles the Bald emperor

Position of the pope in 800 and in 875

In the year 800 the Roman pontiff found himself in the hands of the mighty Frankish king, to whom he played the humble servant; and in crowning him he did an act of service; that is to say, in proclaiming, in the very domicile of the principes which should rule the imperial authority, that Charlemagne, because he played in the West the part allotted by God to an emperor, should be held as emperor, indeed. In 875 it is the pope, in the name of the Church and for her own profit, who disposes of the empire and makes an emperor of his own choosing. Underlying this deed is in embryo a theory of the pontifical authority, of a primacy of the pope over the kings of this earth, which Charlemagne would never have accepted,

and which, furthermore, would in his time have corresponded to no reality. In fact, in the time of Charles the Bald, the Pope is emancipated from the emperor, and if he is not yet in a position, owing to his material weakness and the disorder of Rome, to derive from his independence all the advantage that he might desire, he has none the less, if I may say so, reversed the values established by Charlemagne, and it is he who now stands suzerain over the king of the Franks. He might well boast, and he did not refrain from boasting, that he had made an emperor.[3]

Charles the Fat

Charles the Bald did not wear his imperial crown for long; he died in 877. The year before, his brother Louis had come to the end of his life; his three sons had, in their turn, divided *Francia Orientalis* between them. It was to one of them—Charles, called the Fat—that the pope, John VIII, transferred the imperial throne in 881. A series of premature deaths, from 882 to 884, made this same Charles the heir to all Francia. Unfortunately he was a man of inferior mind and worse character, quite incapable of comprehending or undertaking the work of restoration for which occasion gave him the opportunity. It must be admitted that he was here confronted with difficulties great enough to discourage a better man. Ashamed of his pitiful conduct in face of the Normans, the chiefs of the kingdom met at Tribur near Mayence in 887 and deposed him. Francia fell to pieces for a second time, and the opportunity was lost, never to recur again. Every group, more or less definitely organised at the time, chose a king for itself, and thus seven kingdoms were brought to birth: Germany, France, Italy, Provence, Burgundy, Lorraine, Navarre. Yet this was no more than a prelude to a still more anarchic disintegration of Frank-

Further decomposition of the empire

[3] The pope who crowned Charles the Bald was named John VIII (872-882). The last but one of his predecessors, Nicholas I (858-867) had made excellent use, to increase his authority, of the internal dissensions of Francia, the competition between its kings, and their weakness. He is one of the great founders of the theocratic power of Rome.

ish territory, now destined to end in a mere dust-heap of fragmentary fiefs. Imperial unity is definitely dead. A petty Italian prince, great-grandson of Charlemagne, a pretender to the Italian throne, Guy of Spoleto, thinks himself powerful enough to possess himself of the title of emperor, to which no one any longer attaches any importance. Guy of Spoleto

In each of the kingdoms that emerged from the disintegration of the Carolingian empire the same phenomena appeared nearly at the same time. The authority inherent in the person of the king is split up and passes into the hands of a certain number of great landowners; at the same time the royal domain, little by little curtailed by the abuse of benefice, in the end reduced to almost nothing, leaves its possessor possessed of no more than a personal power insufficient and shrinking day by day. It will be enough here to indicate the principal stages of this decadence in the kingdom of Western France. B. *The disorganisation of each kingdom*

I have already said that Charles the Bald had been no indolent sovereign; he had certainly made remarkable exertions to arrest the decadence of royalty. Unfortunately no one man could expect to arrest the movement which impelled his period towards political institutions which should be in harmony with its social conditions; and Charles, furthermore, had not either the knowledge or the power to set other than old methods at work, methods suggested at once by his habit of mind and the necessities of his environment, but no more efficacious in his day than when they betrayed the confidence which Charlemagne had placed in them. By the edict of Mersen, in 847, every free man was enjoined to choose a *seigneur* for himself, the king or one of the king's lieges; in this way Charles expected to restore his authority, direct or indirect, over all his subjects; in reality he only increased the strength of the seigneurs. By the capitulary of Pitres in 864 the king ordained the demolition of all the strongholds with which the country was beginning to bristle; he even threatened to have them de- Efforts of Charles the Bald

The edict of Mersen

The capitulary of Pitres

The capitulary of Kiersy-sur-Oise

molished by his own authority, but he lacked the force necessary to compel obedience. By the capitulary of Kiersy-sur-Oise, in 877, which has often been wrongly considered an abandonment of the rights of the king over the beneficiaries and as the charter of inheritance of benefices, Charles, on the point of departure for Italy, on the contrary most clearly affirmed his right and his will to nominate the counts and, at their death, to choose their successors himself, and to have the same powers in relation to the succession of his vassals; that is to say, over the bestowal of benefices made vacant by death. The concessions made in the capitulary—namely, a kind of promise to confer on the sons of counts or vassals, who might die during the expedition which was about to commence, the benefice or the office of their fathers—are expressly stated to be exceptional and conditional upon the circumstances. The king takes precautions to assure order during his absence and to reassure his lieges at a moment when he has need of their services. Nevertheless the capitulary proves clearly that the practical rule consecrated by usage is that the son succeeds his father in his appointment and in his property; the king no longer exercises his right of resumption except as a formality. One article of the capitulary of Kiersy is of special interest; it contains these words: "*It is our express will and ordinance that all bishops, abbots, counts and others our lieges take heed to do likewise in regard to their men.*" This indicates that the same tendency towards the transmission of benefices from fathers to sons, a somewhat attenuated form of inheritance by heredity, which, in any case, it is ushering in and preparing the way for, exists from top to bottom of this disintegrating society, and that the king has come to consider its regular observance essential to the maintenance of public order. For this reason this famous capitulary, while maintaining the king's sovereignty, implies at bottom a real abdication of the sovereign power, a tacit recognition of the fact of feudalism.

In spite of his intelligence and activity, Charles the Bald saw, year by year, his authority diminish. Not only had he to conduct a lifelong struggle in order merely to maintain his suzerainty over his outlying provinces like Brittany, Septimania and Aquitaine; but in the very heart of his kingdom, in Neustria, he encountered incessant trouble from the insubordination of members of his own family and from the ill faith of his lieges. Ultimately he is reduced to government by persuasion, a method of administration far from effective in times so troublous. The State, in fact, has no longer any effective existence; it is confronted with individuals more or less wealthy, more or less influential, more or less well disposed towards the king. The royal domain tends, by the practice of benefice, to pass more and more out of the king's hands into those of the nobles and the Church, while immunity works the same devastation among the rights and privileges of the sovereign as it did among those of the Merovingians whose ruin it effected.

Ill success of Charles

Government by persuasion

The son of Charles, Louis the Stammerer, obtained recognition as king, in 877, only by ample distribution of benefices and immunities, and the same was the case with his sons in 879. The last Carolingians, Louis IV, Lothaire and Louis V, retained effective authority only over the regions of Laon and Rheims; this is the reason why, in very many poems of the "Charlemagne cycle," the King of France is called the "King of Montlaon."

C. *The auxiliaries of decadence*

In a moment of discouragement, Charles the Bald, in appraising his efforts and his ill success, wrote that "*the invasions of the pagans and the evil plottings of men who were Christians only in name*" had brought his best intentions to nought. He spoke truly; the men of that time were not to be governed with ease, but the "pagans" who were beginning to surge into Francia added greatly to the general disorder, helped to weaken royalty still further, and hastened the grouping of men to-

gether in small organisations for the purpose of local self-protection.

Slavs, Hungarians and Saracens

I merely mention in passing the *Slavs* and the *Hungarians*, who at the end of the ninth century began to play the part of a scourge to Germany, and the *Saracens*, who from the first half of the same century onwards possessed themselves of the large Mediterranean islands and in the second half of the same century pushed their incursions as far as the coasts of Provence, where they made some durable settlements. The most enterprising of the "pagans" mentioned by Charles the Bald were the *Normans*, whose first appearances on the coasts of Francia date from the last years of Charlemagne.

The Normans

They came from the Scandinavian countries, for the most part from Norway and Denmark, and their incursions may in some sense be regarded as the last wave of the Germanic invasions. They did not break exclusively upon Francia; on the contrary, large bodies carried their activity into eastern Europe and conquered the country now known as Russia (about 862). Our information concerning them is incomplete, and we know little about the cause which set them in motion. It seems, however, probable that it may be looked for in the fondness of the Germans for profitable adventure. Over-increase of population, too, has been suggested, natural in countries not well fitted to maintain numerous people. It is possible, as well, that a rigorous application of the right of the elder by birth and even a kind of religious passion, hostile to Christianity, also contributed to their exodus.

Character of the Norman incursions

In France the Normans appeared mainly as pirates. They came by sea at the beginning of the season of fair weather and ascended the rivers as far as they could, spreading out from their banks to ravage and pillage. They attacked, by preference, churches and monasteries, either because their fanaticism specially called for their destruction or because experience had quickly taught them that their capture was profitable.

Frequently they would take up their quarters on an island at the mouth of a river and remain for the winter. Thence they would despatch expeditions, sometimes in considerable force, into the country as far as Burgundy and Auvergne, which did great damage. Horrifying tales were told of them, sometimes justified by their conduct; and some of their chiefs, by their stratagems, exploits and cruelties, became heroes of legend in their own lifetime; for instance, Ragnar Lodbrog, Hastings or Rollo.

Why they continued

Their bands were not very large certainly, but they were extremely mobile, and the rapidity of their movements spread a terror before them of which they took full advantage. Furthermore, there were in the counties no permanent troops capable of encountering them to advantage or of stopping their progress. Before the count had got his men together the Normans would be out of touch. The king himself, under the need of calling for aid on his lieges, often could not tell in what direction to seek for an enemy so elusive. As a result the towns were fortified, the landowners built themselves dwellings capable at least of withstanding an assault, and the peasants had recourse to some kind of camps of refuge. Each man sought to meet the necessities of the occasion, on his own account to supplement the deficiency of the State by his own action.

How they became changed

Charles the Bald neither underestimated nor misunderstood the Norman peril. To meet it he took measures and made exertions which were not ineffective, but which needed continual renewal before an enemy who, though often beaten, was always ready to renew operations. The death of Charles redoubled the audacity of the invaders and enlarged their cupidity. For the rest, their incursions little by little assumed a different character. Beginning as mere raids for plunder, they began to take the form of attempts at settlement in a country so attractive. The Normans lost their savagery and

their repugnance for the Christian faith, and more than one chief, weary of going up and down upon the earth, ended by accepting baptism and some fertile land on which he might end his days in tranquillity. Thus Hastings himself became a Christian, and by the grace of Charles the Bald was made Count of Chartres. The weakness of the son and of the grandsons of Charles and above all the remissness of Charles the Fat were much in favour of the invaders, and we see them, in 886, throwing a real army into the valley of the Seine for an attempt upon the wealth of Burgundy. Paris held them in check for ten months, but the emperor, who had the means to oppose them, preferred to let them go by and to allow them to take the prey which they coveted.

Rollo in Normandy

Although they found many auxiliaries among the poor and the adventurous, who were far from rare in Francia of the ninth century and who allowed themselves to be attracted by the profits of plunder, the Normans finished by wearing themselves out. Their last large bands, under Rollo, obtained from Charles the Simple, by the treaty of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte, in 911 the right to settle in that part of France which has kept their name. Their influence in the formation of the French race is far from negligible, and they hold a place in the history of their adopted country. They very quickly mingled with the ancient population, probably because they had not brought many women with them from their own Scandinavia. In other respects Normandy, naturally rich, and excellently administered by its new masters, soon attained a prosperity which strongly contrasted with the economic stagnation prevailing elsewhere in the kingdom.

Consequences of the Norman incursions

The Normans, however, before becoming models of order and good economy to France, had done her great harm; their presence had been favourable to the attacks of feudal particularism upon the little that remained of the royal authority.

The impotence of the king in face of a danger so instant had, further, completed the ruin of his prestige.

Conclusion

Thus at the end of the ninth century the empire has disappeared, as have the results of Charlemagne's work in his own country. Of the great king of the Franks only a memory or a legend will live on, both to be magnified in the future more and more as the people of France become more and more aware of the miseries of their condition. The ideal of a Western Empire still lingers, a mystic dream, in the minds of some churchmen, but it is devoid of all reality. For the average Frank "The Emperor" is no more than one of Charlemagne's names. A new political and social organisation is being imposed upon the country, consisting at first of empirical expedients dictated by the necessities of life, developing later into institutions more or less determinate. The latter are designated by the term *feudalism.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Pfister, *Le démembrement de l'Empire Carolingien* (vol. ii of Lavisse, *H. F.*), book iii, chs. iv and vii; Fustel de Coulanges, *Les transformations de la royauté pendant l'époque carolingienne,* 1892.

On Louis the Pious: A. Himly, *Wala et Louis le Débonnaire,* 1849.

On Charles the Bald and his Successors: F. Lot and L. Halphen, *Le règne de Charles-le-Chauve,* 1909; F. Lot, *Les derniers Carolingiens,* 1891; E. Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersy-sur-Oise,* 1885.

On the Normans: E. Favre, *Eudes,* appendix, pp. 207-226.

CHAPTER VII

THE FEUDAL RÉGIME

I

The principles of feudalism considered

A. *Definitions*

THE term feudalism[1] is derived from the low Latin word *feodum*, *fevum*, or *feudum*, signifying *fief*. A fief is, in principle, a grant made in consideration of a service. The *feudal régime* is thus a species of society in which the relations between men take the form of grants made and services rendered in return. The distribution of property and the social position of men is dependent on private contract, and this fact influences the manner in which public authority is organised. Many peoples besides the French have passed, in the course of their history, through a feudal stage. It is a phenomenon so general that sociology has been able to study it, so to say, *in abstracto* with a view to ascertaining the laws by which it is governed, with, of course, due consideration to the particular exceptions which they may present. In this place I shall mention only such results of these observations as are clearly applicable to French feudalism and emphasise its particular features.

Characteristics of every feudal society

Every feudal society is *agricultural*, all real wealth and power being derived from the ownership of land. It is *warlike*, because strength in arms ordinarily justifies the personal position of individuals, who in proportion as they command it or not are among the oppressors or among the oppressed. Finally, it is *aristocratic;* the ownership of land and the com-

[1] Its primary origin is certainly German; it is the *fihu* or *fehu* of ancient High German, meaning *flock, cattle;* the Gothic *faihu* has the same sense, which is extended to *property, possession*—which is also the meaning of the Anglo-Saxon *feoh* and the modern German *Vieh*. It dates from the time when cattle were the principal form of exchangeable wealth.

mand of armed force establishes great inequalities between classes, of which the lower are thus constrained to labour without intermission to make life easy and pleasant for the higher. In such a society the *land* plays the part taken by money in our modern capitalistic organisation; it is the basis of all exchanges, the current coin which serves to create the demand and pay for the supply of all man's needs. *This is the essential feature of feudalism*, distinguishing it from other societies of aristocratic type where a few men equally own the land and control military force, but where property in land does not play a preponderant part in social relations. In the feudal system the land is nearly always, in principle, the basis of all contracts.

Importance of the land

The land carries, to speak more definitely, a burden of services, to be rendered by the receiver to the transmitter, which passes with it if the holder should sell it. The land determines, too, the position of individuals and their relations with one another. The *fief* thus becomes the centre of *social life;* the ties of sovereignty and vassalage are formed by it, and it is in relation to it that the *hierarchy of individuals* is determined.

Importance of the seigneur

On this hierarchy depends, in every feudal society, what may be called its *political life*. Sovereign power being in fact split up between a number of chiefs of small feudal groups, the State survives only by means of the ties which join them together between themselves, subordinating some to others in the whole hierarchic aggregate. Outside this organisation, which may show itself, in practice, precarious and ineffective, the real political *unit* is the small feudal state on which devolves the exercise of all public power. Most men no longer can conceive of any other authority or any other law than that of the master of the group to which he belongs, which forms a little whole in itself. For this reason the feudal is sometimes called the *seigneurial régime*, an expression which emphasises its essential political feature, the dominant power of the seigneurs.

B. *Origin of the seigneurial system*

The establishment of this régime in a country is not always due to a decline in the power of the State. It may be imposed by a conqueror upon a conquered country, as happened in England after the Norman conquest, and on Christian countries occupied by the Turks in the fourteenth century. But, most commonly, it is by the impotence of the central authority which compels men to seek protection closer at hand. We have described this practice of *commendation* in the ill-governed Gallic city before the Roman conquest as well as in the Roman world during the decline of the Empire and in the anarchy arising from the German invasions. The feudal régime installed in France and throughout the ancient empire of Charlemagne, by the interplay of circumstance narrated in the two preceding chapters, is not therefore a historical phenomenon without analogies elsewhere. However, as it ruled the destinies of our country for a long time, the forms in which it clothed itself are worthy of detailed attention.

Duration of the feudal system in France

The feudal régime was established in France in the ninth and tenth centuries, and was not altogether destroyed until the Revolution of 1789. It lasted, therefore, in whole or in part, for about ten centuries. The feudal period proper comprises, however, only the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. The customs and usages which, during this period, found favour more or less extensive or deep-seated, present in detail an infinite variety, which can be studied only by considering each instance individually. Two general features are dominant, and representative of those which sociology considers characteristic of the régime in question.

General features of the system: 1. Disappearance of central authority

1. The central authority of the State has become practically nil, and every man must make provision for his own security. The common life is dispersed among a crowd of little groups formed under *commendation*. The king, Louis IV (936-954), was reduced in property to a few rural estates and a single fortified town, Laon; when one of his greater vassals,

Hugues, took the latter from him (946) he was able to recover it only through the intervention of his brother-in-law, Otto I, King of Germany.

2. Importance of landed property

2. Strength attaches to the possession of land, which is divided—unequally—among a very small number of owners. The richer of these provide themselves with adherents (*fidèles*) by granting to free men who *commend themselves* to them the usufruct of a parcel of their land. The less rich, to evade the risk of being despoiled, offer their own land to men more powerful than themselves, under whose *protection* they place themselves. Their land is then returned to them under certain conditions. The one and the other operations result in a *contract*, which fixes the reciprocal obligations of the parties concerned. Those who have nothing, or can find no protector because they have no consideration to offer in return, fall into complete dependence on the landowners, who exploit them. They become their servants and serfs; they work for their master and not for themselves.[2]

Car chevalier et clerc sans faille
Vivent de ce qui travaille.[3]

A particular system of land ownership and a series of private contracts thus form the first foundation of feudal society in France.

II

Different forms of land tenure

There were at this time two ways in which land could be held; or, in other words, two forms of land tenure. The property could be *freehold;* that is, not entailing any obligations or charges on its possessor, or *not freehold;* that is, subject to charges of diverse character.

A. *Allod or freehold*

[2] "The feudal régime rests above all, in the last analysis, on an organisation which, in return for a protection often illusory, places the working classes at the mercy of the idle classes, and apportions the land not to those who cultivate but to those who have known how to possess themselves of it." —Boissonnade, *Le travail dans l'Europe chrétienne au Moyen-Age,* p. 162.

[3] Piers the ploughman bears, alack,
Knight and parson on his back.

The free property was called *alleu* or *allod* (*in alaudis* or *allodis*). The owner who held it thus was its absolute master. In practice the allods were not usually large properties, and for this reason their owners found themselves obliged at an early stage, in many places, to alienate them by contract; that is, to transfer them to larger owners in exchange for protection, receiving them back as a land no longer free, but subject to charges. So the number of freeholds was continually dwindling in the course of the feudal period. In certain countries, such as Brittany and Beauvaisis, they finally disappeared. In the thirteenth century they survived only sporadically in northern and central France. The last freehold in the north was the seigneury of Yvetot [4] in Normandy.

The King of Yvetot

In the fifteenth century it appeared so singular that any estate should have no seigneur—that is, should depend on no suzerain—that the seigneur of Yvetot, his own sovereign, took the title of *king*, in token of this independence. It is said that the Marquis of Albon, actual heir of these *princes* of Yvetot, has still right to this royal title. The song writer Béranger has amused himself at the expense of this petty potentate,

Peu connu dans l'histoire,
Se levant tard, se couchant tôt,
Dormant fort bien sans gloire. . . . [5]

He had at least the glory of being the last survivor of the extinct species of freeholders. Its longer survival in the south was due, no doubt, to the resemblance of the allod to the Roman tenure, more closely corresponding to the usage of the southerners, who continued to retain a large infusion of Roman law in their customary law. Thus it was commonly said that the

[4] Yvetot is now a chief town of arrondissement in the department of Seine-Inférieure and has about 7500 inhabitants.

[5] There was a king of Yvetot
Of whom renown hath little said,
Who let all thoughts of glory go,
And dawdled half his days in bed.
(W. M. Thackeray)

Roman law was the mother of the freeholds (*lex romana mater allodiorum*).

Non-freehold property took different forms. First there is the *benefice*. A *benefice* is, in its first sense, a *benefaction*. This may be, in principle, a grant of land, or of money, or of useful objects, or a productive privilege (such as the toll of a bridge, or some remunerative office). The grant carries a title *for life*, and is *always revocable* at the death of the beneficiary; it is subject to certain services which must be rendered to the donor. A benefice is therefore, in sum, a usufruct of some particular kind. But in practice, its dues being discharged, it is treated by the holder as a veritable possession; he modifies it as he may wish and, at need, alienates it, provided that he transmit with it the charges which it carries. He has so much the appearance, in such cases, of being definitely the master of the land, that he is sometimes spoken of as owning it in *allodis*, in form of a freehold, as though it were one in reality.[6]

B. *Benefice*

The word *benefice* little by little retires before the word *fief*, and towards the end of the eleventh century it becomes exclusively applied to ecclesiastical usufructs granted by bishops or abbots to clerics. *Fief* has a synonym, *censive*, but little by little the two words become differentiated; *fief* becomes the designation of grants of land involving *noble obligations*, such as military service; *censive* designates grants involving only *plebeian obligations*, such as payments in money or in kind, or labour, and the like. But it was not until the end of the thirteenth century that the two words became completely separated.

The fief and the censive

The fief is thus the characteristic form of land tenure of the feudal régime. It is properly an estate which has a seigneur (*dominus*) and a hereditary tenant (*feodatus*, *homo*, *vassalus*)

Definition of the fief

[6] Certain benefices nevertheless long retained their character of being for life; these were the *beneficia militaria;* that is, those granted by the barons to their soldiers. They could not be alienated or held by women, and they returned to the donor at the death of the beneficiary.

bound, in regard to the seigneur, to certain services. These services are regulated by a contract. Here a distinction must not be overlooked. Certain fiefs were *seigneuries;* that is, they carried with them the exercise of rights of administration and of justice, which in times past would otherwise have appertained exclusively to the State and been exercised by its agents. Certain other fiefs—and these were the majority—were *not* seigneuries, but simply domains, on which the holder (*feodatus*) possessed no rights but those of a proprietor. For the rest, and like the benefice, the fief could apply to subjects quite other than land. The seigneurs grant in fief every kind of office, those of their administration and those of their personal service; a cook even may hold his post as a fief. They *infief* similarly all their *useful rights;* in one case a vassal of the Count of Champagne received in fief half of all the bees which he could find hiving in the woods. They also grant as fiefs a sum of money—a rent, a pension drawn from their treasury—and in these cases it is a kind of investment which they make or a means of buying *men.* The fief is thus, in all its degrees and under all its forms, the current coin of feudalism; the *fief in office* and the *fief in money* complete the action and extend the power of purchase of the *fief in land.*

C. *Contract*

From top to bottom of the feudal ladder there are practically no real obligations but those which result from an agreement, a contract, which fixes rights and duties. When the owner of a freehold offers his land to a man more powerful than himself that he may receive it back as a fief with his protection, he is said to *commend himself* to the latter. He accepts the latter as *suzerain* and for *seigneur* (*dominus*) ; he tenders him *homage;* that is, he avows himself openly his *homme* (man), and his *vassal* (*homo, vassalus*). When a free man receives a benefice or a fief from a seigneur, the procedure is the same (except for the commendation, for which there would sometimes be no reason in this case). The union between the

suzerain and the vassal, in both cases, is ratified by a *symbolic ceremony* and an *agreement in writing*. The ceremony consists of the *homage* properly so called, the *oath of fidelity* and the *investiture*. The future vassal kneels before his future seigneur, places his two hands upon those of the latter, and declares himself his man. If it is a case of commendation of a freehold he delivers a sod of earth, which symbolises his whole estate. Then, raised up by the suzerain, he swears fidelity on the Gospels and on relics. The seigneur, for his part, invests him with the fief which he grants him by handing him some object which is taken as representing it—a sod of earth for a domain, a branch of a tree for a wood, and so on. A formal record is made of this ceremony of *avowal*, and at the same time the reciprocal engagements are embodied in writing, together with something like an inventory of the estate, known as the declaration (*dénombrement*). The rights of the seigneur over the fief are affirmed by the homage which he receives, by the services rendered in respect to the fief, and by the supplementary fine which he receives when the fief changes hands either by inheritance or sale.

Obligations of the contracting parties

The contracting parties are equally bound by the provisions of their agreement. If the vassal violates them he is said to be *félon* and to have made *forfeit* of his fief, which the suzerain has the right to resume, if he can. If, on the other hand, the seigneur has not kept his engagements, the vassal *disavows* him, considers himself liberated from all his duties, and proffers homage to some other seigneur, keeping his fief the while, if he has the strength to do so.

Consequences of their violation

The hierarchy in theory

In theory this system of contracts included all free men of the kingdom, the seigneurs of every rank, and the king himself, in the ranks of a hierarchy which subordinated each man to a greater man. The king is the supreme suzerain. "*There is a scale of dignities of seigneurial lands; some dominate in relation to the others, the greater part at once domi-*

Its practical complication and confusion

nating and dominated" (Luchaire). In reality the rigour and regularity of this hierarchy rising by well-established degrees from the squire to the king have never existed except in the imagination of the legists of the thirteenth century. The seigneurs who did not figure in more than one capacity or in more than one place in the hierarchy were few indeed. The holder of several domains might occupy a highly complex feudal situation, suzerain here and vassal there. Did not the king himself find himself vassal to the Abbot of Saint-Denis for Vexin? He held it in fief to the abbey, of which otherwise he was the immediate suzerain. It was common in the same way for a seigneur holding several fiefs to be the vassal of several suzerains at once. If these different suzerains quarrelled among themselves his own engagements might be contrary to one another, whatever precautions had been taken to reconcile them in his different contracts. Thus the Count of Flanders was vassal to the King of France for one part of his estates and vassal to the German emperor for another part. In case of war between the two he might well hesitate; he ordinarily followed the path which seemed to promote his own interest at the moment. This game of see-saw between two suzerains was a current part of feudal politics, and was employed as a means of increasing influence and consolidating independence; it was one which introduced extreme confusion into the world of feudalism. It represents its reality; the beautiful equilibrium of the theoretic hierarchy may be regarded as an illusion.

Their causes

It is easily understood that this confusion is mainly due to the fact that the ties of vassalage and of the hierarchy are too loose to keep every man in his regular place. Only uninterrupted honesty, moderation and good will on the part of all feudatories could remedy the gross imperfections of the system, and these are exactly the virtues which are rarest in epochs of violence. It must not be forgotten that the feudal period re-

spected hardly any right except that which the Germans call *Faustrecht*, the right of the fist.

Insufficiency of the ties of vassalage

The vassals in many cases make disavowals; by caprice or for interest they transfer their homage from one seigneur to another when they can. Some end by not exactly knowing from whom they hold their fief; and when enumeration is made of the fiefs of a large seigneury, it may happen that in the record opposite the name of such or such feudatory will be found the words *nescit a quo feodum tenet*—"does not know from whom he holds the fief." This occurred most commonly on the marches of the kingdom or of the larger feudal provinces.

Insufficiency of hierarchic ties

In principle the over-suzerain should not attempt to extend his direct authority over the vassals of his vassals; that is, his vassals at one remove. One formula clearly sets out this fundamental rule of the hierarchy: *Vassalus vassali mei non est meus vassalus*—The vassal of my vassal is not my vassal. But in practice this principle was violated in both senses. The over-suzerain found it convenient to give orders direct to his man's men, and these men found it advantageous to cultivate the good graces of a seigneur more potent than their own and disposed to seem far more indulgent or at least less oppressive in proportion as he was farther away. The interest of the over-suzerain and that of his arrière-vassals thus combined to promote a short-circuiting of allegiances which respect for the hierarchy was insufficient to prevent and which caused constant embroilments.

III

The troubles of feudal life

Feudal life appears to us extremely troublous. There are perpetual wars; in fact it may be said that war in all its forms was the law of the feudal world. Every difference, quarrel, interest, or piece of greed is an occasion or pretext for fight among the feudatories, and when they are not fighting seriously they fight for amusement. They *joust* in *tourneys*, where

Chronic war

rivalries grow sometimes so hot that a bloody conflict ensues. Every feudal baron, in the course of his life, makes war at least once against each of his suzerains, each of his co-vassals (the feudatories of the same seigneurs as himself), each of his own vassals, and each of the bishops and abbots in his neighbourhood. In every feudal family internal and endemic war rages continually; feelings of relationship and ties of blood are insufficient to restrain its passions. The seigneurs consider this habitual recourse to arms as their right, the privilege and the sanction of their nobility. Only the lesser folk and the plebeians content themselves with the law-courts. For the most part these wars are waged with a handful of men on one side and the other, and do not last long—a few weeks or even a few days—but their perpetual renewal brings disorder and insecurity over the whole country, while at the same time it makes the existence of the inhabitants of the open country very precarious. It must not be forgotten that when two seigneurs come to blows all their relatives up to the fourth degree, at least, are automatically involved in the quarrel, if they do not take the precaution to disown the belligerent who is of their own family and to obtain *asseurement* (*assuratio*) from his adversary that is to say, a formal safeguard for their person and their property, which amounts practically to placing themselves in his service.

The feudal château

The seigneurs thus come to turn their dwellings into fortresses. In the earlier part of the feudal age the dwelling would be no more than a house of wood, more or less spacious called a *donjon*,[1] and placed on an artificial or natural elevation called the *moat*. It is surrounded by a space guarded by a ditch and a palisade; this is the *court*, containing the outbuildings, which serves as a camp of refuge for the peasants when the alarm is sounded. This elementary form of castle is not

[1] *Donjon*—in Latin, *dominio*—is the tower which *dominates* and the house of the *dominus* or seigneur.

long in becoming transformed. First stone replaces the wood; then the defensive works are improved and multiplied till they form an imposing assemblage of tall towers, crenelated walls and obstacles of every kind. The military architecture of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries offers us many complete examples. Many ruins of these seigneurial dwellings still remain in France, some well preserved; to us they seem sombre, melancholy and far from comfortable; but when they were well situated, well furnished with provender, and supplied with water, they must have offered a defence very difficult to penetrate. The kingdom bristled with fortresses of this kind, often quite near to one another.

The armament of the seigneur

The feudal seigneur, while he thus protected his home, employing device after device to make it impregnable, tried similarly to make his body invulnerable to blows. In the time of Charles the Bald the warrior wore, as defensive armour, no more than the *brogue*, a kind of leathern cassock reinforced with metal plates, a helmet and a buckler. In the tenth century the *hauberk* comes into use, a sort of shirt made of steel links which ended by becoming a kind of long coat, lined with wool within, which gave most efficient protection. The casque or *helm* was similarly improved, till it completely covered the head and neck; and the buckler became the *shield*, wide at the top, running to a point at the bottom, which covered the body from the eyes to the knees. It should be noted that what is commonly known to us as the *knightly armour*, the carapaces of jointed steel which completely covered the man and partly his horse, does not belong to the feudal epoch proper. It is the result of gradual improvement, begun in the fourteenth century, continued in the fifteenth, and perfected in the sixteenth. Nevertheless even now a man was very efficiently protected against the offensive weapons of the time by no more than a padded *hauberk* and a closed *helm*. It is told how, at the battle of Bouvines, when the king, Philip Augustus, had been thrown

from his horse, the German infantry tried in vain for some little time to pierce his *hauberk* and shatter his *helm*.

The condition of the common folk

We can thus understand that the feudal seigneur, brought up to war and use of the strong hand, found in them his principal occupation and his cherished recreation. The risks he ran were minimised. A very different point of view was that of the lesser folk, to whose interests murderous disturbance and unrestrainable brutality were certainly prejudicial. Naturally, with the disappearance of the State the instruments by which it had functioned disappeared also. Roads, for instance, fell into disrepair and gradually became impracticable. Merchants, discouraged by the difficulties and dangers of travel and in constant dread of despoliation, reduced the extent and number of their transactions. Commerce and industry tended to restrict themselves to the supply of merely local needs. Towns, instead of developing and extending their borders, contract within narrow limits between high walls, because a long wall demands for successful defence resources greater than they can command. The inhabitants of the countryside (*peasants* and *villains*) and of the towns (*burgesses, bourgeois*)[8] lived in daily fear of the morrow, always in discomfort, often in extreme poverty. They never have in store reserves enough to give them real security against a single bad harvest, and at that time plenty in one district could not compensate for want in another, even though they were not very far apart.

Famines and epidemics

Moreover, ignorant or careless of all rules of hygiene, public or private, the people are subject to epidemic diseases and defenceless against them. Their dwellings in the country are elementary in the extreme; in the towns they are crowded together, ill-ventilated, sunless and ill supplied with water. Between the years 970 and 1040 at least forty-eight famines

[8] The *peasant* (*paganus*) is, etymologically, the inhabitant of the *pagus* (pays); the *vilain* (villanus) is the inhabitant of the *villa* (country-house, farm); the *bourgeois* (burgensis), that of the *burgus*. This word in Low Latin designates a fortified place.

or epidemics can be counted in France. Between 970 and 1100 *sixty* harvest seasons fail to yield a sufficient crop and the resulting mortality is terrible. The dead are buried in churchyards of small extent; in the interior of towns they are too often given no more than a coverlet of earth; before long they are exhumed to make room for others, and their bones, not yet dry, are stored in *ossuaries* or *charnel-houses* which become centres of infection. There is no service of scavengers for the removal of filth from the streets where it accumulates, and no care is taken to prevent the pollution of the wells, from which towns, which have no river at hand, habitually draw their water for drinking and cooking. It is difficult for us to imagine the state of one of these towns; the most ill kept of those which have come down to us [9] with some of their mediaeval aspects preserved can give us no more than a faint idea. Some Moorish cities alone might yield adequate illustration in the offences which they present to the eyes and nose of a modern and civilised man, as well as to his good sense and habitudes. The moral condition of the poor folk, those of the country in particular, is worse even than their material condition; they live like brutes and in the most abject degradation.

IV

Forces antagonistic to disorder

The people do not willingly accept a condition so precarious and miserable, and impotent as they are to effect any real improvement, they seek instinctively to remedy it; at the very least they groan and complain. Sometimes, in the excess of their ills, they take courage in their desperation and revolt, but their savage and disordered energies soon become exhausted, having led them no further than to an implacable repression which only augments their distress. Several move-

[9] Some of these little towns remain, especially in the centre and south of France. Salers in the department of Cantal is especially curious.

ments of this character occurred at the beginning of the eleventh century.

At the very time when feudal disorder was at its culminating point in the tenth century, men were found, here and there, so far enlightened as to understand that a state of perpetual war, isolation, anarchy, need not be regarded as necessarily normal in the life of man; that no social life or any effective collaboration of diverse groups for the good of all can be possible without peace and security.

Attitude of the Church

It is natural that these first reactions towards order, discipline and union should arise within the Church, for in these times the Church alone, steeped as she is, too, in the feudal spirit, is capable through her centralisation to see the evil as a whole, through her constituent principles to reprove it, and through her discipline and means of action to combat it.

Her associations with feudalism

The Church is feudal in the sense that her dignitaries, bishops and abbots all hold their place in the hierarchy, that they are vassals or suzerains like the secular seigneurs, and that they participate in the movement of exchange of property which has been seen to lie at the base of all social life for the sake of the goods which they enjoy and which the munificence of the barons, desirous of conciliating the good graces of God and his saints, continually increases.[10]

Her class spirit

But while individually they are most feudal in spirit, while they participate in the violence and brutality of their contemporaries, while they sometimes forget their position as ecclesiastics so far as to go fighting in person, the seigneurs of the Church are in no respect isolated. Bishops, they know themselves to be members of a great body whose head is at Rome, where throughout the Middle Ages the spiritual authority and sovereignty of the *Apostole*—that is, the pope—grows and grows. They continually meet one another in councils where,

[10] Certain abbeys own more than 100,000 hectares of land and some bishops, such as that of Langres, hold a whole county.

most materially, they come in contact and realise their community of interests. Abbots, they are members of a monastic order whose houses are spread over the whole kingdom and some even outside it and whose general chapters afford occasions for periodical meeting. All repeat, with their lips at least, the Christian injunctions touching love of one's neighbour, charity, forgiveness of injuries, and the peace which the brethren should ensure among themselves. All know that it would be well for the Church that the State should be swift and effective to protect, at the Church's side, all those unfortunates whose only hope, in fact, she is. All know well, in their tragic reality, the consequences of anarchy, and all still keep in mind something of the great memories of the unity of Rome and of the empire of Charlemagne.

Her canonical weapons

Depositaries of the spiritual power, indispensable intermediaries between man and God, most respected and most feared even by those who were driven by irresistible appetites or blind angers to attack them most bitterly, they wielded two terrible weapons, *excommunication* against individuals, *interdict* against States. The first makes life practically impossible to those on whom it descends, cutting them off from the society of the living; the second, in arresting all religious life in the lands which it penalises, sows anguish and panic throughout them and throws on the conscience of their seigneur a weight of responsibility great enough to terrify him. Unfortunately these two weapons become blunted if they are used too often. By a bias only too natural, the Church soon inclines to abuse them in a world which so often merits their employment. Recourse must then be had to other measures.

Her attempts to combat feudal anarchy

The Judgment of God

These come to four in number: 1. To reduce the damage done by these irreducible conflicts, the Church invokes the *Judgment of God*, which replaces two armies by two champions. But this method of cutting disputes short is one not wholly acceptable to men who find their greatest exhilaration

and delight in battle, and in all the operations of war their noblest employment. And, moreover, it must be confessed that such experience as is gained of the Judgment of God is not always in favour of justice. The best champion does not always appear for the best cause. It was thus sometimes difficult to recognise the hand of God in the issue of the combat, which might be such as to give no great credit to the institution and make it appear no better than a gamble.

The Truce of God

2. *The Truce of God*, which first appears in the south of France in the last years of the tenth century or the first of the eleventh, attempts to limit feudal wars by interdicting the seigneurs from fighting during certain clearly defined periods. At first, for instance, it is said, from the Saturday evening to the Monday morning, "*in order that every man may render his due service to God during the Lord's day.*" Next we hear of interdict from Wednesday evening to Monday morning, justified by appeal to the memory of the life of Christ, Thursday being the day of his ascension, Friday that of his death, Saturday that of his sojourn in the tomb, Sunday that of his resurrection. Towards the middle of the eleventh century the truce comprises, moreover, all the great festivals of the liturgical year and those of the most venerated saints. The Church thus visibly seeks to reduce more and more the number of days open for battle. Unfortunately, the execution of her decrees depends entirely on the very doubtful good will of the feudatories, and can be reinforced only by excommunication, a weapon, as has been already said, soon worn out.

The Peace of God

3. On every occasion when the bishops met together from the end of the tenth century onwards, they did not fail to proclaim a *Peace of God*, in the first place, as a protection to their servants from secular violence, and also as an ideal which their secular brethren should realise.

The Council of Clermont in 1095, presided over by the pope, Urban II, included the *peace* and the *truce of God* in a

solemn recommendation which it published. It was not long before experience made clear to the Church that moral restrictions gain force, in times of violence, by support from material forces; *Leagues of Peace* accordingly came to be organised in the course of the eleventh century. This institution became regularised during the second half of the century, and, in principle, extended to every diocese. A *pact of peace* (*pactum pacis*) was drawn up, as today we should draw up the articles of an association; all the participants engaged, by their solemn oath, taken on the most venerable relics, honestly to observe it.

The Leagues of Peace

Then a tribunal (*judices pacis*) was constituted, presided over by the bishop of the diocese, which did judgment on those who contravened the pact. Above all, an *army of the peace*, mainly composed of the militia of the parishes, had for its mission and reason for existence the constraint with the strong hand of such seigneurs as proved insensible to moral consideration from molesting its associates. This institution proved to be happily conceived and did material service in regions where ecclesiastical fiefs predominated. Elsewhere the seigneurs, even though themselves members of the league, were often reluctant to serve it, and its little army, difficult to assemble and slow to come into action, was insufficient to command the respect of the powerful and turbulent barons. In the twelfth century, these leagues of peace found more effective employment for their good will and activity by giving aid to the king when he, in his turn, attained the position of universal pacificator and supreme judge. Up to that time it cannot be contested that, excellent as were the intentions of these institutions, the results which they achieved were far from supplying the needs which had called them into being; they alleviated only partially and for short periods the evils which they had aspired to suppress.

Chivalry
Its lay form

4. The heart of the trouble lay in the manners and customs of the seigneurs. This the Church understood, and it was to

reform these dispositions, to make them more gentle, and to bring them under some discipline, that she introduced *chivalry*. Chivalry is not, in origin, an ecclesiastical institution, but a military and lay usage more or less analogous to the ceremonies which, in Greek antiquity, marked the passage of adolescents into the class of warriors, with, however, this difference: that it was not incumbent upon all feudal adolescents necessarily to become knights when they attained the appropriate age. Chivalry thus conferred a distinction, and in some degree a privilege, which had to be won and received from one who himself had formerly won it by his merit. Above all it was necessary to have received, under the patronage of some noble seigneur, a military education appropriate to the duties demanded. These were briefly expressed in two words, "*Soiz preux*." Be brave, loyal, generous. The ceremony of investiture, which was called *adoubement* (dubbing) consisted essentially in the presentation to the recipient of arms and of the golden spurs which were the distinguishing mark of the knight among other warriors. This presentation was accompanied by a military festival more or less elaborate as the case might be.

Its transformation by the Church

The intervention of the Church made chivalry a veritable *sacrament*. It is met with, for the first time, at the extreme end of the eleventh century, but it became general, apparently, only by degrees.[11] It tends to subject the young noble to a religious and moral preparation which refines his ruder instincts and aims to make him a champion of the Faith and of the Church, a protector of the weak and the oppressed. All the acts of the *adoubement* gradually attain symbolic significance, and are added to by a series of rites essentially religious; the confession, purification, benediction and oath. All the old military obligations are naturally sanctioned and sanctified,

[11] It may be remarked that in the *Song of Roland* which, as we have it, belongs to the last third of the eleventh century, chivalry is still exclusively military.

but they are accompanied henceforward by engagements which, if they had been strictly observed, could not have failed to alter feudalism for the better. Unfortunately they had no guarantee, but in the honesty and conscientiousness of the knight, in his desire to do what was pleasing to the Church, and in his fears of drawing down her thunders upon his head. Experience showed these guarantees to be far from efficacious, and in fact the chivalrous ideal was too seldom realised to exercise any very potent influence. The seigneurs often made it their point of honour to be *preux*, but they paid ordinarily but little attention to the moral restrictions which the clerics sought to connect with this fundamental duty; it is only too clear that, far from developing the spirit of peace among men, the desire to make display of their valiance incited them to battle and deeds of violence of every kind. Salvation will come to the weak and poor only by the restoration of effective means of action to some central power; it will be one of the consequences of monarchic centralisation. The Church nevertheless had the great merit of having clearly seen the evil, recognised its causes, and made endeavours to provide a remedy.

Conclusion

The feudal society, then, lives in confusion and violence. Force is its sovereign ruler. It has little stability, and in detail is subject to incessant transformations. Long effort and tenacious patience will be needed to restore all that its mere establishment and continued existence have destroyed. Up to the dawn of the twelfth century its main energies have been dissipated in activities issuing only in sterility or devastation. Only in the province of religion has this troublous epoch shown itself able to build on solid foundations. There only can any principle of unity be discerned by the enquirer.

Religion the principle of unity and civilisation

The common language, split up into a number of dialects, separates men more than it unites them; only Latin brings them together—Latin, the tongue of the Church, and spoken

and written by all who have any culture at all. The teaching, given almost exclusively in the episcopal schools (at Rheims, Chartres, Angers, Paris, Laon) or in the schools of the abbeys (at Cluny and Le Bec in Normandy), is entirely directed to produce men fitted for the priesthood. All that has been retained of the profane knowledge of antiquity is subordinated to theology. The life of the mind, generally miserable, finds no relief but in Latin religious literature; profane literature consists entirely of certain rude ancestors of the *Chansons de Geste*, or of poems which with some crudity express deep religious feeling; thought is confined to questions which concern Christian doctrine, and its supreme effort leads straight to heresy. The times are those which see the spread, through the western world, of that species of ardent neo-Manicheism known as *Catharism*, which became so famous in France, in the twelfth century, under the name of the *doctrine of the Albigenses*. The great man in the domain of the mind, the most learned, the unique and prodigious genius of the time, in the judgment of his contemporaries, is a cleric, Gerbert d'Aurillac (940?-1003) who becomes pope under the name of Sylvester II, slender as his learning may appear to us today.

Finally, it is with a religious motive and under the inspiration of religious faith that the artistic instinct of the time finds realisation and expression. The Norman invasions and in their train the feudal wars of the tenth century have done much damage to very many Carolingian basilicas, which were, moreover, often ill built and of flimsy workmanship. At the beginning of the eleventh century the first buildings in the *Romanesque style* appear, churches in which curved arches strengthen semicircular vaultings and external buttresses reinforce the supporting pillars.

It has been said too often that the feudal epoch was a time of stagnation in barbarism; it may be said with more justice that it was a time of incoherent and unregulated agitation,

and, for that reason, for the most part sterile. In it that which we call civilisation seems to fall very low, but life surges under the shows of decadence, and awaits nothing but an energetic and tenacious leader to resume its ascent towards the culture and organisation whose seeds and principles have been kept alive by the Church.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Chr. Pfister, *Les origines du régime féodal* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. ii) book iii, ch. viii; A. Luchaire, *Les premiers Capétiens* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. ii, 2d part) book i, chs. i, iv, vi; Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation*, vol. i, book ii, chs. vii, viii, ix, xi; A. Luchaire, *Manuel des institutions françaises. Période des Capétiens directs*, 1892, 2d part, books i and ii; third part, book i; Ch. Mortet, articles *Bénéfice*, *Féodalité* and *Fief*, in the *Grande Encyclopédie* of Lamirault; Flach, *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, vol. i: *Le régime seigneurial*, 1886; vol. ii: *Les origines communales; la féodalité et la chevalerie*, 1893; P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions*, vol. ii, 1898.

On Feudal Society: J. Calmette, *La société féodale*, 1923; A. Franklin, *La vie privée au temps des premiers Capétiens*, 1911; Boissonnade, *Le Travail.*

On the Feudal Château: A. de Caumont, *Architecture civile et militaire*,[3] 1869; Enlart, *Manuel d'archéologie française*, vol. ii, 1904.

On Costume and Armament: Demay, *Le costume militaire d'après les sceaux*, 1880; Enlart, *Manuel. Le costume*, 1916.

On the Institutions of Peace: Semichon, *La paix et la trêve de Dieu*, 1869; Huberti, *Gottesfrieden und Landfrieden*, 1892.

On Romance Art: R. Schneider, *L'art français*, 1924, pp. 1-51; A. Michel, *Histoire de l'art*, in course of publication, vol. i, 2d part, 1905.

CHAPTER VIII

THE AGENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE CAPET KING AND THE BOURGEOIS

I

The advent of the Capets

The passage from the second to the third dynasty

FEUDALISM will be gradually destroyed by the king, supported by the Church, whose spirit and aims have just been described, with the help of a new social force, the *bourgeoisie*. The royal family of the Capets starts on its career during the feudal period proper which also sees the first emergence of the bourgeoisie, but it is not till the twelfth century that their coöperation yields its first important results. The passage from the second dynasty, that of the Carolingians, to the third, that of the Capets, was retarded, in spite of the decadence of the former, by the persistence of the prestige attaching to the descendants of Charlemagne; by foreign influences, notably that of the King of Germany, and above all by the prolonged hesitation of the Church. It is hardly worth while to enquire, as has been done formerly, whether the advent of the Capets does not represent a reaction of the Frank or rather Romance element, against the German element and influence; or the triumph of a feudal monarchy over the fundamental anti-feudalism of the Carolingians. These are questions which could not occur to the minds of contemporaries, to whom indeed they would have appeared meaningless.

Origin of the Capets: the Robertinians

The Capet dynasty arose from a feudal family, whose origin is still obscure, but whose advancement is clearly founded on kingly favour. Important and lucrative appointments, advantageous benefices and extensive immunities, obtained from the Carolingians, raise it to fame, wealth and in-

fluence. Its own contribution to the establishment of its renown consists mainly in the energy of its resistance to the Norman freebooters. Its first known chief is one Robert the Strong, believed, perhaps correctly, to have been of Saxon origin. He was loaded with favours by Charles the Bald: he was Count of Anjou, and military chief or duke of the Neustrian lands, lying "between Seine and Loire," on the Breton march, when the ravages of the Normans began to extend over the whole region for whose protection he found himself responsible. He perished in a battle against them at Brissarthe [1] in 866. His son, Eudes, is governor of Anjou, Touraine, Auxerre and Nevers. He holds the great abbeys of Marmoutiers and St. Martin of Tours, and some allods in Champagne and Poitou; he is, moreover, *Count of Paris* and *Duke of France*, a dignity which makes him in some sense head of the feudal noblesse of northern Francia.

Robert the Strong

Eudes

In 886 the Normans had besieged Paris; Eudes defended the city with the greatest courage. His exploits, vividly contrasting with the cowardice of Charles the Fat, led to his election in place of that incapable prince on the latter's deposition by the lieges. Eudes was anointed and crowned at Compiègne on February 29, 888. The change of dynasty was short-lived—the feudal lords found Eudes too strong a man for them. The fact that he was not invariably fortunate against the Normans gave his adversaries a weapon against him, and, above all, the youthful Carolingian, Charles, son of Louis the Stammerer, and grandson of Charles the Bald, was now a grown man and attracted many adherents to his side. Charles, in his turn, was crowned at Rheims in 893, and with the aid of the King of Germany was able to take the field against Eudes. The latter died in 898, having acknowledged his rival as his successor, and made an appeal to his own partisans to support the latter.

He becomes king (888)

The Carolingian Restoration

Charles the Simple

[1] In our department of Maine and Loire, in the arrondissement of Segré.

Spirit of the last Carolingians

The last Carolingians must not be confused with the Sluggard Kings. Several among them, Charles, in the first instance, though bespattered with opprobrious nicknames by his contemporaries and still called by us *the Simple*, had no lack of ability. Unfortunately, their means, always slender and precarious, proved inadequate to their needs. Thus Charles, by his successful conquest of Lorraine, alienated the King of Germany, and put his own liegemen out of humour with him, because, they alleged, he took interest in nothing but his new possession.

Fortunes of the Robertinians in the tenth century

Their discontent, which quickly ripened into revolt, was taken advantage of by a brother of Eudes, named Robert, who possessed himself of the crown in his turn (922), but was removed by death a year later in a battle against Charles. The Robertinians then abandoned their ambition, and were content to add to their domain, and to secure their position with the king by obtaining an appointment; the title *Duke of the Franks* or of France, not unlike that of Mayor of the Palace, was definitely conferred upon the son of Robert, Hugh the White, by Louis IV d'Outremer, son of Charles the Simple.

Hugh, advancing from encroachment to encroachment, ended by laying hands upon the king himself and keeping him prisoner for a year, until the king surrendered the last of his strongholds, Laon. This, however, the intervention of Otto I of Germany compelled Hugh to hand back in 946, while that of the bishops compelled him to become reconciled with Louis in 950.

Accession of Hugh Capet, 987

It was a son of this Hugh, another Hugh nicknamed *Capet*,[2] who finally secured the throne to the family. He joined hands with Adalbéron, Archbishop of Rheims and his council-

[2] The meaning of this surname is lost and has been so since the thirteenth century. It referred to some peculiarity in dress. It has been alleged that Hugh, as lay abbot of St. Martin, wore the *cape* or *chape;* but nothing can be more uncertain than this derivation.

lor Gerbert, whose influence greatly contributed to detach the clergy from the Carolingians. This was effected largely in the interest of the young King of Germany, Otto III, who had much to fear from Lothaire, and who displayed great activity. But in the final event it was Hugh Capet who profited from these intrigues. The death of Lothaire (986) followed by that of Louis V, his son, from a fatal fall when hunting (987), left the crown without a wearer. Adalbéron induced the nobles to confer it upon Hugh (July 3, 987). By this time feudal attrition had made the king appear almost a superfluity. The new organisation, it appeared, might well dispense with him entirely. But the Church desired that kingship should be preserved. In her view kingship perpetuated the enfeebled but still venerable heritage of the Roman monarchy—preserving public order and protecting the clergy; moreover the monarchy according to the Scriptures was the earthly image of the sovereignty of God. The new king had other advantages in their eyes. He belonged to a family which was new, energetic and equipped with ample feudal resources. He appeared to the Church to be much better situated than were the Carolingians, dispossessed of both means and men, to assert successfully in practice the claims to sovereign power, never yet abandoned by the fallen family, and to be more likely to use this power in the future to the advantage of the Church.

The part of the Church in upholding royalty

II

The kingship of the Capets may be considered under two aspects, theoretically distinct. 1. As a *monarchy by divine right* such as was always in principle acceptable to the Frank kingdom. 2. As *a general suzerainty, supreme in the feudal order.* It should be noted that the second aspect is, at the start, much less clear than the first, and that it will not become really fixed—that is, discernible in the actual facts—till the begin-

The royalty of the Capets

A. *In theory*

Its general character

ning of the thirteenth century. At this point therefore we will only attempt to define the individual characteristics of the Capetian monarchy.

The election and coronation of the king

Up to the time of Philip Augustus, who succeeds to the throne in 1180, the royalty is elective. To make a king, three operations are considered necessary: the election (*electio*) which appertains to the great nobles; the anointing (*unctio*) which appertains to the bishops and constitutes the coronation (*coronatio*). In accordance with tradition, this last ceremony takes place in Rheims, and is presided over by the archbishop of that town. In practice the election and the consecration come to be confounded; and thus it is the archbishop who, after having received the oath (*professio*)[3] of the prince, announces his election (*eligebat in regem*), which is approved by the participating assembly in three shouts of acclamation. As with the Carolingians, this consecration, a real sacrament peculiar to the king, confers on the Capetian a religious character, which is not shared by any other feudal seigneur. For this reason, royalty is not a degree in the feudal hierarchy, but a power which possesses its own individual justification; namely, to *rule*, to exercise authority of a *political* nature, a power, which, from this fact, is superior to that of all other suzerains. By the force of circumstances this power is fundamentally hostile to the feudal subdivision of authority: the king, though he may neither know nor desire that this should be so, is a natural enemy to the feudatories, who have reduced his authority to an illusion, or, if it be preferred, to a mere pretension of his own.

Nature of the royal power

The mission of the king

Thus Capetian royalty is still the Frank monarchy, in principle absolute, the sole source of all political and social power, which has adapted to its own uses, as it could, the Roman conception of State unity and centralisation. It is also

[3] By this oath the future king engages to maintain the churches in all their rights, and to govern according to law and justice.

an ecclesiastical monarchy, whose authority, sanctioned by the Church, is founded on and supported by the choice and the will of God. The king fulfils a divine mission; he is the representative of Providence on earth. The diplomas issued by the Capetian chancellory do not fail to emphasise the special grace of God, the creator and guardian of the sovereign. The oath of fealty, exacted by Charlemagne from all free men, is, in principle, always owed to the king. It is equally owed to the queen, who is fully associated with her husband, calls herself queen "by the grace of God," is crowned and consecrated.

Bearing of the king's pretensions on the future

The persistence of the first Capets in these claims to rights and privileges which they do not in reality command, may seem, at first sight, vain and somewhat ridiculous; but a little reflection will change that opinion: it will show that these little kings, reduced as they are to extreme weakness, and impotence as monarchs, do not accept defeat, but trust themselves to the future. Their ambitious formulas admittedly express what is, at the moment, no more than an ideal, but, at the same time, they lay down what is a real programme, clear, precise, easy of comprehension by the least intelligent of princes, in that it formulates the most immediate, constant and pressing of their interests both personal and dynastic.

Essential functions of royalty

Four primordial functions appear to comprise the essentials of the royal power. 1. The king is the *chief of the realm* and its defender against all external foes. 2. He is its *chief officer of police* against all internal foes, disturbers of law and order. 3. He is the *supreme judge*, the fountainhead of justice and of law, the *law alive upon the earth* of the old Roman jurists. He must guarantee to all men their rights (*jus suum cuique custodire*). 4. He is *the secular arm of the Church*, her protector and defender, the executant of the measures which she prescribes in the cause of the faith and of discipline. It is clear that a king who is conscientious in discharging the obligations naturally laid upon him by these four duties, must

act in antagonism to the feudal lords, whose habitual practice it is to do all that he is commissioned to prevent or alternatively to reform.

B. *Its possibilities*

In the tenth and eleventh centuries the possibilities practically open to the king appear narrow; his means of action compared with his theoretical pretensions are weak indeed.

The means of action of the king

1. His domain

He has the resources of his domain. Their whole value is not great. It is even less than in the time of Hugh the Great, since many vassals in former times, simple viscounts or lieutenants of the Robertinians, have since become emancipated and are now counts,[4] while the Duke of France has had to part with various benefices; Hugh Capet himself, some time before his accession, had made grants in fief of the county of Paris and also of that of Melun. Rigorous accuracy as to the

Its composition

composition of the royal domain is hardly possible today. We see, however, clearly enough, that towards 987 it comprises five very unequal territorial groups which, taken in the order of their extent and importance, are as follows: 1. The counties of Orléans and of Étampes. 2. The county of Senlis, with some fiefs on the left bank of the Oise, between the Aisne and the Thève. 3. The castellary of Poissy on the left bank of the Seine, down stream from Saint Germain-en-Laye. 4. The castellary of Montreuil-sur-Mer on the Flanders border. 5. The

Its extent

domain of Attigny, at the extreme east of the kingdom. The whole covers an area of about 6800 square kilometres or approximately a little more than an average department of modern France. It may form a considerable landed estate, and may yield a large return to its possessor, but it does not constitute a State.[5] It should, however, be noted that these groups

[4] It was so for the counties of Anjou, Tours, Blois, Vendôme, etc.

[5] There is no capital. The king usually resides at Orléans or in one of his castles of the first territorial group, which we have just indicated. It is worthy of remark that the town of Paris and its diocese do not belong to him. Some time before 987 Hugh Capet had granted them as a fief to one Bouchard de Vendôme. It was the Archbishop of Paris who, probably about 1016, was to become the high seigneur of most of the Parisian territory and

just enumerated are in a favourable geographical position, and form centres round which French territory north of the Loire will readily gather.

Its extensions

It must not be forgotten, on the other hand, that such abbeys and bishoprics as are in the vicinity of the royal lands in one sense increase their extent, since their holders habitually recognise the direct sovereignty of the king and are eager to do him service. Thus it is with the powerful abbeys of Saint-Riquier and of Corbie, in the diocese of Amiens, with the archbishopric of Rheims and with the bishoprics of Tournai, Noyon, Laon, Chalôns-sur-Marne and Langres. The direct authority of the king thus comes to be acknowledged over an area which is about four times as large as that of the royal domain proper.

2. The king's privilege of *sovereignty*

In the second place the king has the resource of his own sovereignty. It brings him small positive advantage, because the State institutions which once gave it effective force have ceased to exist, and it can be asserted now only under the limitations imposed on it by feudalism. Or, in other words, though *sovereignty* proves in theory quite distinct from *suzerainty* it can be realised in practice only through the latter. The kings themselves are feudatories; they breathe in the feudal spirit as they do the air about them; all their relations with their direct subjects are in terms of the fief; men, for instance, who obtain a post in the royal household tend to look on it as a fief, and all immediate subjects of the king tend to regard him primarily as their suzerain and not as their

the suzerain of the barons within it. Among these barons the Seigneur of Monthléry and the Count of Corbeil were often ill-disposed towards the king and apt to attempt to cut the communications between Orléans, Poissy and Senlis. The two fortresses which commanded the two bridges of Paris, one on the right bank (the *Great Châtelet*), the other on the left bank (the *Little Châtelet*), belonged to separate seigneurs. The former did not fall into the hands of the king till the time of Louis VII (before 1147) and the latter only in that of Philip Augustus. The first Capets possessed a palace in Paris, on the site of the present Palais de Justice, but rarely visited it; it was not a place where they felt at home.

sovereign. Nevertheless these earlier Capets, little as may have been their detachment from their environment, had sufficient sense of their own interest to make the best of their suzerainty however little they were satisfied with it, and to direct their course instinctively towards its ultimate substantiation.

Efforts of the king to extend his domain

They endeavoured, accordingly, to extend their domain by all the methods which feudal usage placed at their disposal; marriage, purchase, confiscation, as opportunity might offer. They took pains to attract to themselves vassals who were dissatisfied with their own suzerain, by the practice of *avouerie* (avowal) of the king.[6] This practice did not become general till the end of the twelfth century, but it did the king much service, particularly by increasing the number of the "king's bourgeoisie" in the "good towns."

3. Importance of his quality of supreme judge

They seek to assert their justice; to encourage appeals which may be brought before them in their quality of over-suzerain, to gain wider and wider jurisdiction for their court (*curia*). The feudatories see clearly how they are imperilled by this claim of the king to override their own jurisdiction and do not accept it with any good will; they often default to a royal summons, the more so as the king lacks the strength to compel their attendance, or they carry their differences before an arbitrator of their own choice rather than submit them to the king; the clergy, however, in their encounters with the seigneurs, willingly accept the judgment of the *curia*, and their example has, in kind, great importance. The feudatories in the end began to follow it, little by little, and the king thereby acquires a unique kind of authority.

4. Efforts to establish the principle of heredity

The Capet kings could undertake nothing continuous and durable until they had made sure of *succession by inheritance*. This, therefore, they endeavoured to effect. Fortune favoured

[6] The vassal considers his suzerain as having failed to observe the terms of his contract. He *disavows* him and *avows* the king as his seigneur. The smaller suzerains had not the power to prevent this.

them in the sense that from 987 to 1328, the date of the death of Charles IV, their line never lacked an heir male. The contest between the two principles of *election* and *heredity* was in the eleventh and twelfth centuries extremely animated. The king, to attain his end, put in operation the procedure long employed by the feudatories to assure their sons of succession to fiefs, theoretically held for life; they demanded transference in their lifetime to the son. In the same way the first Capets had their sons elected and crowned in their own presence, so that on their death the throne would already have an occupant. The barons, indeed, resisted; but the king became accustomed to content himself with the assent of his liegemen; and the failure of certain coalitions to alter the order of the royal succession, under Henry I, Philip I and Louis VI discouraged the opponents of heredity by the force of accomplished fact. Heredity was finally substantiated under Louis VII, whose son, Philip Augustus, was the last Capet elected under these conditions, during his father's lifetime, in 1179.

The victory was most valuable. To appreciate it, it is sufficient to consider the state of affairs in Germany, where the barons succeeded in effectively protecting themselves from enterprise on the part of the king by transferring the crown from one family to another, enlisting the support of one against another in turn.

5. The great feudatories

The Capets were by no means the only great feudal family in France. At Hugh's accession several of his vassals were powerful enough to be formidable to him: in the north the *Count of Flanders;* in the west the Duke of Normandy and the Count of Anjou; in the centre the Count of Blois; in the east the *Duke of Burgundy;* in the south the *Duke of Aquitaine* or of Guyenne, the *Duke of Gascony*, the *Count of Rouergue*, the *Count of Toulouse*, the *Count of Barcelona*, who held the marches of Spain. The seven whose names I have underlined are ancient *marchiones* (margraves), chiefs of a march, en-

trusted by the kings of the ninth century with the defence of a frontier; their position has advanced on parallel lines with that of the Duke of France himself. Brittany was then divided into several counties, but the time is near when, under the hegemony of the Count of Rennes, it will form a feudal estate of considerable size.

Their vassals

Each of these powerful feudatories commands vassals whose resources are not to be despised: such as the Count of Boulogne in Flanders, the Counts of Sens and Nevers in Burgundy, the Counts of Angoulême, of the March, of Auvergne in Guyenne and others. It is important to note that France was at that time practically divided into two countries, separated by profound differences of usage, customs and language; the northern, the country of the language of *oïl*, and the southern, that of the language of *oc*. The latter is better policed, more civilised, more refined, more polished in manners and in mind than the former. The Central Massif separated them, itself, for the most part, attached to the south, which tended visibly to lead a life quite apart from that of the north.

The two Frances: the language of *oïl* and the language of *oc*

There were, in the feudal disintegration, in the strength of the great vassals, in the latent antagonism between the two halves of western Francia (*Francia Occidentalis*) of the treaty of Verdun, such formidable obstacles to the realisation of the monarchic theory of the Capets, that only a supreme simplicity of mind and a perfect lack of grasp of reality could, it appears to us, have dared to formulate and obstinately to put forward as rights pretensions apparently so extravagant.

III

The auxiliaries of the king

The king, indeed, found valuable auxiliaries among the feudatories themselves. Their dissensions, quarrels, rivalries, their perpetual conflicts, were safeguards not exactly against

A. *The feudatories*

the coalitions which they might form against him, but against the persistent and long-continued prosecution of these dangerous enterprises. Internal discord weakened and sometimes wore them out, to the king's advantage, who was enabled by the conflicting ambitions of individuals to set them, as policy might recommend, against one another. He was further and above all well served by their predisposition to adventure. Many of them, and these not the least important, were not long in finding life within the limits of their domains extremely monotonous; they became tired of the perpetual recurrence of the same hunts, and the same wars in the same country; change of place, they imagined, would afford them a welcome relief from an endless tedium. It is a curious fact that, in spite of the difficulties of the roads and the discomforts of travel, men of all ranks travelled extensively in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, far more, at any rate, than would appear superficially probable. Pilgrimages, in particular and above all, seem to have been the reason or the pretext for these journeyings: in principle, pilgrims should find help and protection on all sides; to treat them well was to participate in their pious undertaking. Otherwise, the great lords commonly travelled in company and with escorts large enough to ensure respect.

The spirit of adventure

Their distant expeditions

These journeyings of the feudal barons often amounted to veritable expeditions. They were assuredly of unequal importance; as a whole they are of interest, because they mask an expansion of French feudalism abroad, coincident with its weakening at home and greatly to the advantage of the king.

Wars in Spain

In this way, during the eleventh century, various expeditions against the Saracens in Spain came to be organised, in which the participating French knights, while serving the interests of the Christian faith, did not neglect their own; they carved out, and kept, domains for themselves. One of these was Henry of Burgundy, brother of the dukes, Hugh Borel and

Eudes Borel,[7] who conquered Portugal in 1095 and made himself the founder of a house which ruled that country till 1853.

The conquest of the two Sicilies

We need not be surprised to find the Normans in the van among these adventurers; they remember and delight in the old ways of their race. A pilgrimage revealed the riches of Sicily to some of them, and the tales they told when they came home resulted in the organisation of a force to attempt the conquest both of that enchanting isle and of southern Italy. The work was carried out between 1016 and 1073. It was hard for the inhabitants, whom the fierce brutality and the insatiable greed of the new-comers filled with amazed terror and formidable hatred. When the Normans, however, had succeeded in driving out the Greeks and Arabs, between 1058 and 1090, they established a kingdom in the country. They are seen in alliance with Gregory VII against the Germans, supporting the ecclesiastical reforms of the pontiff, figuring as champions of the Church and defenders of the Holy See. They appear capable of enacting all parts alike.

The conquest of England

The great exploit and master work of the Normans was the conquest of England under Duke William in 1066. This enterprise, encouraged by the Church, and blessed by the pope, attracted many feudatories other than Normans who took up permanent residence in the new realm, thus relieving the king of their presence; though indeed this advantage had its complementary disadvantage in the formidable increase of power which accrued to the Duke of Normandy from his conquest, and made him at first stronger than his suzerain.

The Crusades

Their causes

Account must also be taken of the *Crusades*, in which French feudalism played a prominent part, and by which it was reciprocally much influenced. Detailed study of their causes is outside our subject. It need only be said that the capture by the Seljuk Turks of Jerusalem, in 1076, initiated,

[7] These two persons had both led important Burgundian expeditions into Spain; one in 1078, the other in 1087.

for the numerous pilgrims who resorted to the Holy City, an era of petty annoyance and even of absolute danger, tales of which, more or less dramatically told, did not fail to stir up resentment in the West. When, furthermore, the great defeat of Spanish Christendom at Zalacca, in 1087, reverberated over the world, the Church was apprehensive that the forward march of Islam might be resumed. Had not the Turks, after taking Jerusalem, possessed themselves of Antioch and was it not likely that they intended the destruction of the Greek empire?

The First Crusade

The pope had long contemplated a united effort by the Cross against the Crescent. Urban II believed the time to be ripe and, at the Council of Clermont (November 28, 1095), he who had solemnly proclaimed the peace and the truce of God, became the preacher of a holy war. Enthusiasm, magnificent but unordered, swept over the Christian peoples of the West, and in a short time huge bands of peasants and poor folk started to march eastwards, only to perish on their way by exhaustion or under the blows of the Turk. These, however, do not concern us at this moment, as do the army of feudatories which follow them, in four corps, which, proceeding by different routes, finally joined forces under the walls of Constantinople. They amounted, it is said, to 600,000 men. Ill-equipped for a difficult campaign, in an unfamiliar country and climate, and faced with a most energetic enemy, they sowed the Anatolian plateau with their bones. It is sufficiently surprising that even 40,000 or 50,000 of their number, at most, succeeded in reaching Jerusalem, two and a half years after their departure from Constantinople. It is no less surprising that, exhausted as they were, they were able to capture the city (July 15, 1099).

The advantage to the king: some consequences of the crusade

The king—at that time Philip I—had taken care not to participate in the expedition. He received nevertheless a share in the prestige which the foundation of the kingdom of Jeru-

salem added in the eyes of the world to the name of *Frank*;[8] and he doubtless saw with satisfaction the departure of some of the more restless of his feudatories. From this time onwards, indeed, the feudal world appears to be becoming stabilised: the principle of inheritance of fiefs appears to be gaining strength; the authority of the suzerain over the fief is diminishing; the hierarchy appears more orderly and permanent; the titles which indicate its degrees become more clearly defined.

Otherwise the crusade, its political results proving ephemeral, since, in 1187, Jerusalem was retaken by the Moslems, has economic consequences of much greater interest. Commerce between West and East becomes active and increases, and in consequence economic life revives in the kingdom of France, associations of merchants are formed, trade guilds are organised. We may briefly estimate the importance of this revival. The king is a gainer by it, because it fortifies the interests which call for law and order in the country and because he obtains an ultimate advantage from the feudal regularisation just mentioned, because it defines and simplifies the problems which his policy must solve. The crusade again gives him chances for making some excellent bargains. This or that baron, wishing to settle in the East, would have estates to sell. In this way Philip I acquired, for a price of 60,000 gold sous, the viscounty of Bourges, from its overlord when he was leaving for the Holy Land in 1100. This acquisition, only separated from his own land in the Orléanais by a belt two or three leagues across, gave him direct control in the districts beyond the Loire, where his authority had been hitherto merely nominal.

We have now passed in review the king's helpers, who did

[8] For the Turks the Westerners remained indefinitely the *Franks*. The kingdom of Jerusalem, whose first sovereign was Godfrey, was completed by the county of Tripoli, the principality of Antioch, and the county of Edessa, equally at the hands of the Frankish barons.

him service indirectly and without their own knowledge and desire; there are two which aided him directly and often of set purpose: the Church and the bourgeoisie.

B. *The Church*

What the Church stood for in the feudal epoch proper has been stated in the preceding chapter. She contributed largely to the establishment of the Capet family on the throne; she remained its ally, realising that she and it were united by a community of interests, since she desired, instinctively and in furtherance of her own aspiration, the progress of order and centralisation in the kingdom. Unity was her ideal as it was the king's. On the other hand, the Capet kings, as much as they could and whenever they could, did their utmost to keep the upper hand in the election of dignitaries of the Church, bishops and abbots; and while affecting the utmost zeal in her cause, sought always to make her subservient to their own ends far more than they ever served hers; or, if it is preferred, promoted her interests in furtherance of their own. Churchmen, as a rule, worked hard to extend the prestige and authority of the king. The Church lands, at least in the north and in the centre of the kingdom, willingly reinforced, with money and men, the resources of the royal domains. Above all the moral authority, experience, knowledge of the clergy, collaborated with the policy of him who, by her unction and consecration, had become in some manner a Churchman: the best, the most adroit servants of the king came from the ranks of the clergy. The most numerous and most devoted came from those of the bourgeoisie.

C. *The bourgeoisie*

Disappearance of the Gallo-Roman municipal system

It has been maintained that the Roman municipal system was prolonged, at least in principle, through the whole of the High Middle Age, up to the time which saw the rise of the *communal movement*, which latter, consequently, would be no more than a revival of the former. This is far from probable; at the most we may postulate such a revival in some few towns of the South. Even in these cases it is very difficult to speak

with any assurance. Generally speaking, the truth is that municipal institutions have been extinguished by the power of the seigneurs. Triumphant feudalism, laic or ecclesiastic, has reduced to practical servitude almost all the populations of the countryside, and of the small towns, and very largely those of the other towns. Seigneurial officials have replaced the old elected bodies, and if, on occasion, prominent citizens are needed to collaborate in judicial and administrative business, they are chosen and appointed by the seigneur himself.

Feudal tyranny over the lesser folk

During the ninth and tenth centuries and the greater part of the eleventh, the peasants and almost equally the dwellers in borough and town are subjected, under their feudal masters, to grievous tyranny, to an inordinate, brutal and short-sighted exploitation which fully justifies the judgment passed on it by a contemporary cleric: "*The lords are busy and subtle to shear and devour their folk.*" Justice itself is to them often no more than a convenient tool for extortion. It is to the common folk that the incessant feudal wars are most disastrous; it was justly said of them that they bore the wars on their shoulders. To the barons it was brave sport to burn cottages, devastate crops, cut down fruit trees, massacre and mutilate serfs, pillage towns and hold them to ransom on harsh terms, everywhere to ravage and to burn. And brigand bands, with which the country was overrun, were equally assiduous in similar tasks.

Misery of the country folk: its reactions

The burden of so many miseries soon grows past bearing, particularly for the country folk. From the tenth century onwards the worst treated among the serfs seek relief in a change of masters; they run away, hide, enrol themselves under some distant overlord, or seek their fortune in the train of some troop of pilgrimage or some band of brigands. On other occasions excess of ill drives them to a stroke of desperation. They lay a trap for and slay their tormentor, or break into open revolt throughout their lordship. Their audacity brings other

unfortunates to their side. For a few days they intoxicate themselves with fury and revenge, if they are so fortunate, on the person and property of their lord. The feudatories naturally present a united front to such an upheaval; the first moment of surprise and panic passes; they assemble in force and utterly crush the unfortunate rebels, who, their fury exhausted, know not where to turn next, and whose inferiority in armament, experience, resources and organisation make their prompt defeat inevitable. The end is an outrageous repression. Thus things went, for instance in Brittany and in Normandy, at the beginning of the eleventh century.

Efforts of the peasants to obtain a *contract*

Time in the end brings a modicum of wisdom to the exploited and the exploiters. The former, peasants and dwellers in village and town, grow gradually aware that their adversary in chief is the autocracy of their overlord. They invoke as a remedy the application, in their favour, of the feudal practice of *contract*. They desire that the dues to be exacted from them by their lord should be explicitly regulated, defined and limited. The lords, for their part, allow themselves to be carried along the same road. They have come to understand that the misery of serfs and vilains is no gain to their master, but on the contrary, that a community of rustics or townsmen, well treated, may represent an excellent and reliable revenue.

Influence on this movement of the institutions of peace

The institutions of peace, originated by the Church, from the end of the tenth century onwards, have favoured the growth, among the commonalty, of a sense of solidarity, and a comprehension of the advantages which inevitably arise from union. The *association for peace*, instituted by the clergy in parish or diocese, would not include only the common folk of the village or the town, since nobles and clergy could be members; and it was no part of its object to alleviate the burdens of the poor; it might indeed add to them by others, imposed in the cause of peace. Nevertheless an object of its existence was to control the wrongs done by the seigneurs; and it might serve

as a working model for the framers of other associations directed to other ends. It has, in fact, been shown that, in certain districts, in Flanders, for instance, or Artois, the institutions for peace have clearly paved the way for the establishment of municipal institutions.

Tendencies in the last third of the eleventh century

From the last third of the eleventh century onwards, following an evolution natural in every human society, which is trying for a better balance between its component parts—and because time wears out all things, even abuses—the ideas of contract, manumission for the serf, of franchise for the townsman, have all made progress. Workmen aspire to enroll themselves in *corporations*, as traders in *guilds*, and peasants in *communities*, in order to obtain from the lords guarantees, diverse concessions, which are named *liberties* and *privileges*.

Influence of the crusade

The crusade has precipitated this movement in two ways:

1. Many feudatories departing for the Holy Land have thought it well to so order their affairs as to leave no difficulties behind them for their wives and children who remained on their lands; and have made voluntary agreements with their subjects. Some have sold charters of warranty for money down.

2. The economic revival which has followed the great expedition has given considerable importance to producers—workmen, merchants, agriculturists—and has made more necessary than ever, in the judgment of all men of good sense, the provision of a regular and bearable way of life for men of these classes. For this reason the struggle of the popular classes for emancipation obtains acknowledgment and definition in the first years of the twelfth century.

Manumission of serfs and restrictions on serfage

The number of the serfs falls rapidly; enfranchisement is granted habitually, in one way or another, either as an act of morality and piety, or, more commonly, in the form of a sale by the overlord. In the twelfth century serfage has vanished from Normandy. Elsewhere, when it persists, it is limited by restrictions which determine the dues to be paid and the rights

to be exercised by the subjects linked to the land, and make him a man in the full sense of the word. What is lost to serfage is gained by the class of free peasants which does not forget that association is fruitful in many ways. In the freed parishes veritable syndicates are formed for the cultivation of the communal lands, and for the discharge of obligations to the best common advantage. Sometimes villages even combine in veritable rural federations to further the growth and establishment of their liberties, thus following a course similar to that taken by the bourgeois of the towns.[9]

Results of the rural movement

This effort for emancipation among the lower orders bears its most fruitful results in the towns, though those garnered by the country folk are by no means to be despised. Onwards from the end of the eleventh century the attack on the forests is energetically resumed; the cultivable land is enlarged, agricultural production improves. Unfortunately the safeguards which the peasant succeeds in obtaining against his own overlord do not insure him against brutal aggression from others. They remedy the feudal anarchy and violence only indirectly, by such material support and moral encouragement as they give to the spirit and institutions which are working for peace. Nevertheless the rural communities must have welcomed and sympathised with the king's endeavours to restrict private war and maintain a more efficient police first in his domain and later in his realm.

IV

The towns

Their position towards the end of the eleventh century

In the time with which we are dealing, two interconnected and parallel phenomena appear. 1. *The urban population grows larger*, and *the number of towns increases*. 2. *The inhabitants of the towns*, conscious of their growth in number and in strength, *take courage and attempt to free themselves from the*

[9] It is remarkable that Lorris-en-Gâtinais, the town which obtained a celebrated charter from Louis VI, was a simple rural borough.

despotic control of their overlords. Thus begins a movement of the urban classes towards emancipation. It has received the name of the *communal movement.*

The growth of the urban population

The growth of the urban population, caused in the first place by the insecurity of the countryside, and in the second by the revival of economic activity, first manifests itself in some of the older towns, which expand beyond their old walls into new boroughs and suburbs.[10] Secondly, it is marked by the formation of new urban aggregations about castles that have a good name, abbeys that are popular, places that are resorted to by pilgrims, or are simply markets. It proceeds further to the foundation of all kinds of *new towns:* the geographical nomenclature of France still records the origin of these in innumerable instances: *Neuville, Neubourg, Bourgneuf, Neufchâteau, Châteauneuf, Villeneuve, Villefranche, La Salvetat, La Sauvetat, Sauveterre, La Bastide* and others. In the Middle Ages they were called *villes neuves* (new towns), a term which explains itself, or *sauvetés* (refuges), when they originated from the initiative of an ecclesiastical overlord and gave the right of sanctuary, guaranteeing to every man, who took refuge in one, that he should dwell there safe and sound, whatever might have been his past. They were also called *bastides* (particularly between 1230 and 1350 and in the south): these were foundations due to the initiative of lay overlords; the term *bastide* originally indicating a work of defence, a fortified enclosure.

New boroughs and suburbs

New towns

Franchises and privileges of the new towns

In order that those new towns might be peopled, their founders promised their future inhabitants adequate safeguards and profitable privileges. They themselves, of course,

[10] The importance of these agglomerations is attested by the fact that the name proper to their inhabitants—*burgenses*—"bourgeois"—ended by extending to all inhabitants of non-episcopal towns, only some of whom are to retain it in the thirteenth century. The episcopal towns continued to be called cities (*civitates*); their inhabitants were called citizens (*cives*).

sought merely to create fresh sources of revenue for themselves; but nothing proves better than those foundations how much many feudatories had advanced in understanding of their own true interests and in the art of administering and adding to their resources. The privileges of the new towns were an example and an encouragement to the ancient towns; and they provided a means of putting pressure on such overlords as refused to become reasonable.

The communal movement

The new movement, which gave burgher liberties to the ancient towns, is not well known to us in detail, simply because the *charters*, which remain to us, and which sanction, under form of contract, the definite agreements made between lord and burgher, or, on the other hand, the incidents, more or less violent, whose story has come down to us, usually mark only a conclusion or a consequence, and not a commencement. Most often, the contract sanctions liberties already acquired; it creates none. Modern historians have systematised this movement too much; they have attributed to it a coherence, a unity which it did not really possess; they have concentrated it in a period of time which it really overpassed. In reality it was very slow, having lasted for more than two centuries (twelfth and thirteenth), very dispersed, very diverse in its aspects, and various in its forms. It originated from no theory of rights due to burghers and citizens, but from a poignant feeling, induced by the facts of the case, that the seigneurial exploitation was becoming unbearable and that it should be restricted. Success in obtaining this restriction was not attained in all cases; more than one town failed in its attempt; and success was attained in others by methods differing greatly in different localities; in one place the *Charta*, which embodied the contract, was agreed on and sworn to by common accord; in another it was bought by the inhabitants; in others advantage has been taken of the fact that there are several overlords, as was not by any

Its general characters

Its different forms

means rare, and it has been possible to make them yield, according to their wishes, to the community, by setting one against another; elsewhere again the burghers have finally lost their temper and resorted to violence; this was certainly the most exceptional and most hazardous method; it involved the towns who resorted to it in most troublesome adventures (Cambrai, Sens, Vézelay, Laon, which last had favourable issue).

The charters of enfranchisement; their contents

Although *the charters of enfranchisement* may be classified under a few types, since those which proved to have been well framed are often imitated, there are important differences in the liberties which they confer. Sometimes they are concerned with no more than liberation from serfage, while arbitrary exploitation remains nearly intact (at Paris, Chartres, Blois, Troyes, Nevers, Lyons, Nantes, Rennes, Tours); elsewhere the authority of the overlord is limited and fixed by an agreement, but the general administration of the town and the care of justice remain in his hands (at Rouen, Caen, Nantes, Orléans, Bourges, and in general in all royal towns); a certain number of towns acquire real independence and self-government; these are properly the *Communes jurées* (sworn communes), such as Saint-Quentin, Lille, Beauvais, Noyon, Laon and those of the south, where this type is more common, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Montpellier, Arles, Avignon, Marseilles, Nîmes, Narbonne, Toulouse, whose consuls constitute a *seigneury;* that is to say, a collective seigneur.[11]

Policy of the king

The attitude of the king towards the communal movement was at first one of indecision and, to some degree, of drift; he did not feel disposed to emancipate his own towns and enfranchise his own serfs, any more than to allow his ally the Church to be enfeebled by the loss of her burghers. It must not be for-

[11] Our northern towns took example from the large communes of Flanders such as Gand and Bruges; our southern towns were influenced by the Italian communes.

gotten that the most tragic revolts that occurred were against bishops (Cambrai, Laon) or abbots (Sens, Vézelay). Starting from Louis VI, however, the king came to appreciate the advantage over the feudatories which he could derive from the effort of the popular classes and encouraged it; he gave them help in case of need, outside his own domain, though in his own domain and those of his friends in the Church, he would intervene and punish those who attempted to form *communes* (at Laon under Louis VI, at Sens, and at Orléans under Louis VII and elsewhere). In reality he laid down no general rule for himself, but acted in each particular case according to his interest at the moment. Altogether, he never resigned himself to real communes, fully enfranchised: if it happened—as for instance it did under Philip Augustus—that he allowed their establishment, or even favoured it, for temporary serious political reasons, he subsequently set himself to enfeeble and ruin them. On the other hand, he willingly lent himself, in his own territory, to the organisation of towns, known either as villes de bourgeoisie or communautés (bourgeois or communal towns), which he continued to govern, after selling a charter of guarantee against arbitrary proceedings on the part either of their overlords or of his own officials.

The position of the "king's burghers" was good enough to be envied; great ingenuity was shown in providing that the quality of the king's burgher was personal; that is to say, attached to his person and not to his town. The result was that the inhabitants of towns not belonging to the king solicited this burghership. The king willingly accorded it, and encouraged them to find imitators, who, in fact, became numerous; thus the prestige and authority of the Capetian sovereign becomes strongly entrenched in a number of towns belonging to his vassals and arrière-vassals. From the twelfth century onwards he constitutes himself the protector of towns and communes,

The bourgeoisie of the king

awaiting the time when he will say, which he will not be long in doing, that they belong to him by right.

The Third Estate

The great interest which this communal movement possesses, from our point of view, lies in the fact that it determines the formation of a municipal bourgeoisie, from which will emerge the *Third Estate;* that is, a social class, which inferior in distinction to the clergy and the noblesse, will become, through its spirit of order, its habits of work, its sense of the public good, a class among which the king will find his most valuable auxiliaries, those who will impart body and life to his administration. In it a new force takes its place on the side of Royalty and Church against Feudalism. The bourgeoisie is composed of men who work: tradesmen, traders, merchants, in contact with the peasants,[12] the enforcement of order is a necessity for all, if their business is to be carried on; by instinct, and indeed by reasoning well applied, they are for the king, the source of authority and order, and against the lords who delight in anarchy and live in disorder. It is with their help that the Capets will rebuild the edifice of the State which Feudalism has laid in ruins.

General results of the communal movement

The spirit of the bourgeoisie

Conclusion

Thus, the king, who seems so feeble and devoid of weapons at the accession of Hugh Capet, and who descends to a somewhat greater depth after him, will not long remain in this miserable and humiliating position. The thoughtlessness, the inconsiderate and restless spirit of the feudatories, their dissensions and strifes, will provide an excellent field for his policy, whose methods will be determined and efforts directed by needs as they arise. The interest of the Church, and that of the bourgeoisie—to which may be added the sympathy and aspirations of the rural classes—will combine to support and promote his fortune, until the time when they will be overwhelmed by it, after the ruin of the common foe.

[12] The towns frequently included their rural outskirts in their charter of liberties.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: A. Luchaire, *Les premiers Capétiens* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. ii, second part); Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation*, vol. i, chs. xi and xii.

On the Origin of Capetian Royalty: Favre, *Eudes, comte de Paris et roi de France*, 1893; F. Lot, *Les derniers Carolingiens*, 1891; the same, *Études sur le règne d'Hugues Capet*, 1903.

On the Characters and the Theory of Royal Authority: A. Luchaire, *Manuel des institutions*, fourth part; M. Bloch, *Les rois thaumaturges*, 1924, book i, ch. ii.

On the Royal Domain: A. Longnon, *La formation de l'unité française*, 1922, the four first lessons.

On the Feudal Enterprises: Ramsay, *The Foundation of England*, 1898; Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, 6 vols., 1877-79; H. Prentout, *Histoire d'Angleterre*, 1920; L. Bréhier, *L'Église et l'Orient au Moyen-Age, Les Croisades*, 1921; N. Iorga, *Histoire des croisades*, 1924; Röhricht, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges*, 1901; L. Bréhier, *Histoire anonyme de la première Croisade*, 1924; F. Chalandon, *Histoire de la première Croisade*, 1925.

On the Towns and the Communes: A. Luchaire, *Les communes françaises à l'époque des Capétiens directs*, 1890; Flach, *Histoire des origines*, vol. ii; P. Viollet, *Histoire des institutions politiques*, vol. iii; Boissonnade, *Le Travail*.

CHAPTER IX

THE POLICY OF THE CAPETS UP TO THE DEATH OF PHILIP AUGUSTUS, 987-1223. THE DAWN OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

I

The first Capets

THE first four Capet kings were Hugh (987-996), Robert II, the Pious (996-1031), Henry I (1031-1060), and Philip I (1060-1108). All were petty princes, who had no capital city, but migrated from palace to palace, attended by a train of knights and clerics. We find them sometimes at Orléans, at Melun, or Étampes, sometimes at Nantes, at Pontoise, or at Compiègne, and, very rarely, at Paris. They go hunting, they go on pilgrimage; they make war right and left, and their lives pass away, untroubled by any great adventures, but full of petty business, difficulties and vexations.

Their appearance

Their government

Their servants—the *archichancelier* (high chancellor), who attends to their correspondence and directs their chapel, the *seneschal*, chief officer of their household and especially of their table—whence he is also called *dapifer* i.e. *le bouteiller* [1] (the butler), administrator of their vineyards and their cellar, the *chambrier* (chamberlain), guardian of their chamber and of their treasure, who has charge of their furniture and their wardrobe, the *connétable* (constable), who rules over their stables, and others of lower rank—are officials as well; each, that is to say, is entrusted with some public function. Thus the seneschal is practically a vice-king, in the army, in the law-courts, in the general administration of the domain, as well as in that of the palace. The chancellor has charge of ecclesiastical business,

[1] The proper meaning of this word is *he who carries foods*. He is also called *major regiae domus*, the majordomo of the king.

he has certain judicial powers, and in the twelfth century, the care of what may be called foreign affairs; that is to say, the relations with the feudal vassals of the king and with princes abroad. In the same way each of the other high dignitaries has a share, more or less well defined, in the royal authority.

Danger which the kings incur from their *officials*

It is not surprising that, following the general tendency of the time, each of these officials soon comes to look on his office as a fief, and proceeds to attempt to ensure that it shall be hereditary. These pretensions create serious difficulties for the Capet kings of the twelfth century. Indeed under Philip I and Louis VI, the dapiferate, held by important vassals, becomes so dangerous, upon lines akin to those formerly followed by the Merovingian mayor of the palace, that from 1191 onwards, the king leaves it vacant for an indefinite time. He did nearly the same with the chancellorship, which remained without a holder from 1185 and during nearly all the thirteenth century. A simple *garde du sceau* (keeper of the king's seal) (*custos sigilli regis*) always dismissible and often changed, replaced the chancellor. Thus feudalism endangered the king's authority even in his own domain and domicile.

Their resources

The first Capets lived on their own revenues, helped by voluntary gifts from bishops and abbots. Their expenses indeed were almost confined to those of their maintenance and private necessities, the remainder being defrayed by feudal requisitions. Their administration remained in an embryonic condition. When any particularly serious difficulty arose, they appealed to the "*aid of counsel*" which was owed them by the *barons*,[2] with whom they debated the question at issue, permanent council they had none. In their estates or *castellaries*, they delegated their authority to provosts (*praepositi*) who acted as the king's manager, and otherwise had in their hands all

Administration of their domains

[2] The word *baron*, of Germanic origin, signifies *man;* in the twelfth century it came to be reserved for a man who was brave and noble; thus, in the *Song of Roland*, Charlemagne is called *li ber*, the baron.

political, judicial, financial and military powers. In other words, they were his plenary representatives within the limits of the castellary. Not infrequently they abused their authority, exploiting both peasants and bourgeois with great harshness and doing the king much disservice. The king's power is, on the whole, not contested by the feudal barons, but it is not respected. Orders given by the king to those not his immediate subjects are ordinarily ignored. In particular, after the concentration of the great fiefs which followed the First Crusade, the kings find themselves face to face with strongly entrenched feudal families, whose chiefs have some continuity in their ideas, practise a kind of policy and appear perfectly capable of carrying out in their own lands the work of coördination and unification which the king is undertaking in his domain. Like the Capet himself they seek to acquire and annex fresh territory; like him, too, they seek to systematise the exploitation of their properties, they provide the rudiments of an organisation to that end; a dim instinct for government awakes in them and they endeavour to put bounds to disorder and the ruinous and restless activities of their vassals. It can easily be understood that all this involves anxiety and danger for the king, who, apart from the special character which he owed to his consecration and his title, is, after all and in fact, in his kingdom, no more than a seigneur like the others, and even less powerful than some, for instance his vassal in Normandy.

Their feudal authority

Activities of the great feudatories

Difficulties of the first four Capets

The first four Capets all encountered similar difficulties; they were ill obeyed by their direct vassals, who continually attempted to make themselves completely independent; they lived under the constant threat of revolts, many of which they had actually to meet. Occasionally their own relatives headed these troublesome enterprises: such as the sons of Robert the Pious, incited by their mother, Constance of Arles; such, too, as the brother of Henry I.

These kings, however, devoid though they were of any real

Their policy

olicy or any brilliant abilities, intuitively made some efforts n the right lines. They attempted, though unsuccessfully, o withdraw Lorraine and Burgundy from the German hegemny.[3] They attempted to limit the pope's pretensions to domnation over their own clergy: this was the reason for the oppoition of Philip I to the disciplinary reforms of Gregory VII. They attempted to create difficulties for the Duke of Norandy, particularly after he had become King of England; hough, indeed, these attempts brought them more trouble han success. Finally they began that pursuit of heritages, cquisitions and annexations which at that time seemed to be he best pledge of hope for the future; and they made a firm tand on their own domains against the turbulence of the lesser arons and the plunderers of Church property. These velleiies are of interest, as indicating intentions and tendencies, hough they were rewarded with no more than moderate sucess, and though at the end of the eleventh century the king ad sunk to the lowest point of impotence so far as control of he feudatories was concerned.

The real position of royalty at the beginning of the twelfth century

These first four Capets were, indeed, in themselves men of ttle mark. Philip I, in particular, was no subject for praise. Ie made a somewhat undesirable marriage with Bertrade de Iontfort, a Countess of Anjou, who left her husband for him; e conducted a scandalous traffic in Church appointments and lundered the trading community. It seemed evident, in his me, that the momentum of the Frankish monarchy carried n by the Capets was exhausted, that it had become fruitless r the king to put forward high pretensions embodied in pomous formulas; he must make himself *personally* powerful. On o other terms can the kingdom be successfully restored. But o acquire this power, an effective method must be devised and pplied. It is the merit of Louis VI to have done this.

[3] Robert after fourteen years of struggle possessed himself of Burgundy, t Henry I gave it in fief to one of his brothers.

II

The forerunners

A. *Louis VI the Fat*

His character and activity

Louis VI the Fat (1108-1137) had the energetic temperament of a born soldier; throughout his life his energy was indefatigable. He saw clearly that the first essential for the success of the royal cause was for the king to be master in his own domain, and there at least free from overt feudal opposition. For this reason he made ruthless war on the recalcitrant and turbulent barons who were his vassals or neighbours. He took care to justify these police activities by alleging

Action in his domain

the need of ensuring peace for the Church; the starting-point of most of these campaigns is a complaint from a bishop or an abbot. The task was a hard one; the petty tyrants upon whom he sought to enforce obedience had no difficulty in obtaining allies among the more formidable overlords, such as the Count of Blois or the Duke of Normandy. Louis waged this war for thirty-five years—beginning in 1100 as the associate of his father—in perpetual motion from one end to the other of his domain. This sustained vigour freed him from many insupportable vassals, who had made life hard for his predecessors, and brought him notable profit; above all it had an excellent moral effect upon the whole kingdom. The king attained an established position as a redresser of wrong and a champion of justice for all.

Conflicts with the great feudatories

He did not voluntarily involve himself in the business of the greater feudatories, but they crossed his path on more than one occasion. He was hard pressed, for instance, to hold his own against the Count of Blois, Thibaut IV, the ally of Henry I of England, and against the same Henry allied to Henry V of Germany. In this case he escaped from a bad position by the assistance of the other feudatories and of the bishops. At that time, the barons were incapable of composing the discords among themselves in order to act in concert against the king, who did not as yet seem to them very dangerous.

A few days before his death, thanks to the Aquitanian bishops, he married his son Louis to Eleanor, daughter and heiress of Duke William of Aquitaine, who brought to her husband as dowry [4] Guyenne, Poitou, Saintonge, Gascony, Périgord, Limousin and Auvergne, in all nineteen of our present departments. At a stroke, the royal domain had reached the Pyrenees and was in fact more than doubled. This gain was undoubtedly also a burden and a heavy one for the Capet king whose footing was still far from firm in his own home, but, for the moment, it gave him magnificent prestige; reinstating his authority in a country which had long disowned it, and had kept consistently aloof from Francia. So its assimilation called for both time and tact.

The marriage of his son with *Eleanor of Aquitaine*

Another circumstance raised Louis still higher in the eyes of his contemporaries: the pope, who had thought it advisable to engage his support against the German emperor, gave him the title of "*The eldest son of the Church.*" The king had the energy not to be completely overcome by this distinguished favour. He served the Church well, but was never blindly her slave; he kept a firm hand over his own clergy, and abated nothing of the right which he had assumed to intervene in episcopal elections and to exercise his powers over persons and property by his law-courts.

Louis VI *"eldest son of the Church"*

Among the many fruits of his reign, and one which calls for notice, was the progress made by the towns, a progress which altogether was a gain to the sovereign. He has been called the "*Father of the Communes,*" an appellation apparently somewhat too eulogistic; though he has to his credit the famous "Charter of Lorris," this does not entirely compensate for his hesitation, indecision and, at times, hostility towards urban developments. Nevertheless, it is certain that in his time all who toiled hard or were suffering in Francia began to turn

The *"Father of the Communes"*

[4] Guyenne and Aquitaine are synonyms. The word *Aguyenne* is a vulgar form of the ancient *Aquitania.*

to the king as their natural protector and to look for his inter vention on their behalf.

His councillors

He began by eliminating the more restive barons from hi entourage, his *curia* (court), and by taking advice only fron knights and priests devoted to his service. Among these must b mentioned Suger, Abbot of Saint-Denis, who has left us a panegyric of Louis VI, and was his chief adviser during th last ten years of his reign.

Suger

Work of Louis VI

It was not long before Louis the Fat had his legend. I was told how he had received from Heaven the gift of healing the sick by his touch.[5] This popular belief is an indicatio of the esteem earned by his true excellence. It is with him tha the restoration of the monarchy and the reconstruction of th kingdom really begin. By his discipline and the strengthen ing of his domain he gave his successors the means to in crease it.

B. *Louis VII the Younger*

Unfortunately, his son, Louis VII (1137-1180), was quit unlike him. Weak and irresolute in character, of a timorou piety—which nevertheless did not keep him from coming int conflict with Pope Innocent II—he was ill-fitted to continue th work of his father. At first, by acquiescing in the guidanc of Suger, he did sufficiently well, but he was to make two costl mistakes: his engagement in a crusade and his divorce.

His character

His political shortcomings

(a) The crusade

The Second Crusade (1147-1150) was initiated by him. It was preached by St. Bernard, but the king must be hel responsible for its disastrous results, well as he bore himsel during the actual campaign. Suger had disapproved of th adventure, thinking that Louis had plenty to do without seek

[5] This was in relation to the power of curing scrofula, which will continu to be a *gift* of the King of France. Philip I had possessed it and also Robert I He was even supposed to be able to cure lepers, but Louis VI had a mo extended reputation as a miracle worker than his father and his grea grandfather.

[6] He was haunted with remorse for having burnt the church of Vit during an expedition against the Count of Champagne and having caused th death of a number of people who had taken refuge in it (1142).

ing for more overseas. He held the regency during those ill-spent years while feudal agitation had full play. Louis had taken Eleanor with him; it proved a mistake. She gave him grave cause for dissatisfaction, which he quite possibly exaggerated, but which, nevertheless, after the death of Suger, led him to a fatal decision (1152).

(b) The divorce

Its causes

Eleanor does not seem to have been notably easy to live with, but it does not appear that anything seriously impaired the concord between herself and her husband up to the time of the crusade. Her influence over him was potent enough to be the main cause of his difficulties with the Church. The daughter of William of Aquitaine thus perpetuated her father's life-long hostility to both Innocent II and to St. Bernard. Louis loved her, a contemporary tells us, *with an inordinate love* (*amore immoderato*). It seems doubtful whether this affection was altogether reciprocated. A woman of the South, elegant and refined, accustomed to manners, amusements and even fashions very different from those of the North, could hardly fail to feel more or less of an exile in a Capetian palace, where much would seem coarse, rude, even shocking to her eyes. She had taken with her a small retinue of her compatriots. The coterie thus assembled about her was regarded with little sympathy by the folk of the Ile de France, whom they had for their part beheld with contempt. Eleanor, taken on Crusade by an ill-advised husband, was given opportunities to forgather with lords of her own race and upbringing. Comparisons far from favourable to Louis resulted. She was then about twenty-five, in the full bloom of an exceptional beauty. At Antioch she met her uncle, Raymond of Aquitaine, in whose company she took such delight as to inflame the jealousy of the king. He was perhaps not altogether in the wrong. His suspicions seemed confirmed when, on his deciding to proceed to Jerusalem, Eleanor refused to follow him; she then recollected that she and he were related in a degree prohibited by the

Church. After some hesitation he had her conveyed there by force, a proceeding which put matters upon no better footing

Its realisation

The king, on his return from the crusade, had probably decided upon a divorce. Suger restrained him; but after the death of the sagacious abbot, a council, composed of prelates and some of the higher barons, met and decided on the dissolution of the marriage, on the ground of the relationship between the parties. This was obviously only a pretext. Louis had never been unaware that he was his wife's cousin. The real reasons were the conjugal rancour of the king, the queen's reciprocal animosity, and the fact that, after fifteen years of union, Eleanor had not presented him with an heir to the crown.

The political consequences

Louis found himself set free from her and she from him; but as she resumed her dowry, the royal domain lost, at one blow, the duchy of Guyenne with all its dependencies. Worse was to follow: the divorce was hardly two months old when Eleanor

Second marriage of Eleanor

married Henry Plantagenet, Count of Anjou, Maine and Touraine, and already Duke of Normandy, acquired by his father.[1] He ruled over fourteen of our present departments and Eleanor brought him nineteen more. Louis VII, standing on his

Attitude of Louis VII

right as suzerain, refused his consent to the marriage, cited the Count of Anjou before his court, and, on his default, declared his fiefs confiscated. Vain fury and empty menaces! The king might perhaps have made them effective by lending energetic support to the agitation and revolts prevalent at that time in the domains of the Plantagenet and in pressing his first advantages. But he did nothing but display extreme weakness and irresolution, and ended by accepting the accomplished fact

[1] His father was Geoffrey. He was accustomed during the summer, it is said, to ornament his hat with a sprig of broom (*genista*) whence the name of Plantagenet, which characterised his descendants much later in the fifteenth century. He had obtained possession of Normandy, by availing himself of the struggle between Étienne de Blois and Thibaut de Blois, grandsons of William the Conqueror and heirs of Henry I (+1135). He himself married Matilda, daughter of this same Henry.

1154). Four months later, on the death of Étienne de Blois, Henry of Anjou became King of England!

Henry Plantagenet

He for his part showed no lack of energy. He is soon seen ttempting to attract the feudatories of Auvergne to his side, inning over the Count of Toulouse, attempting expansion n Berry, intriguing as far as Savoy, as though he were not atisfied with being master of almost the whole western half f the realm. It is astonishing that Louis VII should have een able to resist him at all. That he succeeded in doing so undoubtedly owing to the difficulties encountered by his val in his family and on his own estates. Eleanor, much his der—he was only nineteen at the date of their marriage— ad not a very amenable character; he himself did not prove reproachable as a husband. She and he did not make an altoether happy household. They failed to keep the respect of eir children, whom they treated in the main as tools for urposes of policy or revenge. Eleanor did not hesitate to cite them against their father and urge them to revolt; nor d she hesitate to take sides with Louis VII against Henry. hese intrigues and revolts were a constant source of grave and peated difficulties to the Angevin king. At the same time s heavy-handed despotism alienated his own barons; and, ove all, his quarrel with his former chancellor, Thomas ecket, appointed by his favour Archbishop of Canterbury 162), soon to become the irreconcilable antagonist of his saults on the independence of the Church, gave him anxiety d trouble culminating dramatically in the brutal murder the prelate (1170). In all these matters there was profit r Louis VII. He could not overcome his adversary by arms, d was fairly beaten by him (1174); but he escaped the rst which he had reason to dread: he was not absolutely nihilated. At the very moment when Henry I had decided to ake an end of him, in 1177, the pope intervened and obliged enry to lay down his arms and to be reconciled to the Capet.

Angevin Empire

Why Louis VII was enabled to hold his own

Progress of the royal authority under Louis VII

During the reign of Louis VII, ill inspired and maladroi as he often was, the progress of the royal authority was never theless accelerated. Relations were being established, at fre quent intervals, almost in fact daily, between the Capet himsel and large feudatory groups at a distance from his own domai and till then outside his influence. The bishops, in particular from one end of the kingdom to the other, became accustome to turn to him in their necessities, and they led the lesser foll to do likewise. These successful results were not on all occa sions attained by peaceful methods; they involved, indeed campaigns in the Rhône valley, in Auvergne, in Velay. Even tually, Louis succeeded in establishing, with the feudatories o France, the relation established by his father with his direc vassals, a success which he owed in the main to the Church an the solid support which she gave him. While he bequeathed t his son an inheritance encumbered with liabilities likely t prove onerous, the rights of the King of England over hal his realm, he bequeathed to him also means of action unknow to the five previous Capets.

III

The era of decisive progress

The Angevin peril was perhaps more a good than an ev for the King of France, because, demanding attention, beyon all dubiety, it compelled him to act, and that effectively, an

The Angevin peril: its advantages

to work for the coördination and for the increase of his force The Angevin, moreover, attempted to form feudal coalition against his rival even in France itself; the great barons, dis quieted by the rapid growth of the king's power, frequentl compromised themselves in their enterprises and thus gave thei suzerain an opportunity for intervention in their affairs an for profiting by their ill success. It may be said indeed that fo mere survival, he was obliged to reorganise his kingdo throughout, not simply to add to his domain, to restor

monarchical authority but to make his rights as suzerain respected.

The successors of Louis VII, helped by continuity in the line of heirs male, undertook and continued this work with remarkable constancy. Three merit special mention; namely, Philip II Augustus, Louis IX the Saint, Philip IV the Handsome. The first destroyed the Angevin Empire and inaugurated the policy of large annexations; the second, by his private virtues and his profound respect for justice, gave extraordinary prestige to the Capetian monarchy; the third, profiting by the results obtained by his predecessors, after consolidating and developing these, set about the real organisation of government and administration. In his reign we can glimpse the first dawn of modern times. The two princes intercalated in this brilliant series, Louis VIII and Philip III, and the three who succeed it, Louis X, Philip V and Charles IV, were adequate in smaller and more modest parts; any failures for which they may have been responsible had, for the present, no serious prejudicial effects.

The chief assistants in the royal task

Philip Augustus (1180-1223) was a man of shrewd sense and enterprising spirit always tempered with reflection and prudence. He is singular among the barons of his time for one peculiarity: he had no love for war; though this did not prevent him from waging it with great efficiency when it was needed, whether in self-defence or for profit. His education was not elaborate, but nature had given him a sound judgment and a subtle mind. A good and even a devoted Christian, he was yet not inconveniently scrupulous, and his personal integrity did not always hold its own against political expediency.

Philip II Augustus

His character

He gave proof, from the first, of an extraordinary political precocity. He was only fifteen years old when his father died, whose official associate on the throne he had already been for nearly a year, and he had already worked by himself and for his own interest with perfect insight and decision. He had

A. *The first difficulties: the feudal coalition*

swept his mother, Adèle de Champagne, out of his way, as wel as his uncles, who would willingly have dominated him; he had taken a wife of his own choosing (Isabella of Hainault, who was prospective heiress to large properties in northern France) In an interview with Henry II at Gisors, he obtained from the Angevin a neutrality so benevolent as almost to amount to active protection which did him good service and appears a really surprising achievement. Scarcely had he become sole king (September 19, 1180) when a large feudal coalition was formed against him in which the Counts of Flanders, Hainault and Namur, the Duke of Burgundy, the Counts of Blois, Sancerre and Champagne—that is to say, his nearest relations encouraged by his mother—all participated. Philip had his hands full for five years (1181-1185), which included some agonising moments. His eventual emergence with profit was due to the non-intervention against him of the English king and to his adroitness in playing on the divergencies of interest among his adversaries: opposition to him was the only point of agreement between Flanders and Champagne. They failed to act in concert. He beat and brought them one by one to terms. The Count of Flanders was indeed obliged to accept a somewhat onerous treaty, which added the county of Amiens and part of the Vermandois to the royal domain, thus giving the king a foothold in the valleys of the Somme and the Oise.[8]

B. *The great work: the destruction of the Angevin Empire*

The aim of Philip's policy

The coalition vanquished, Philip Augustus devoted his energies to what was to be the great work of his life: the destruction of the Angevin power. His policy was to wait and watch; when opportunities offered he made the most of them. They were numerous, all the more so owing to the insane jealousy and internal discords of the Plantagenet family. Henry II, older than his years and often unwell, had lost much of his energy. He had four sons: Henry, Geoffrey, Richard and

[8] The Vermandois extended over our modern departments of the Aisne, the Oise and the Somme.

John; they alternated revolt against their father with wars waged among themselves; after his death the survivors continued their feuds. Philip, therefore, had a good hand to play.

His understanding with Richard

In 1183 Henry the Younger died. Philip joined forces with the second brother Geoffrey, but an accident carried him off in his turn in 1186. The king applied his intrigues to Richard, who already held the government of Aquitaine. He manoeuvred between father and son, pushing every advantage by arms or artifice against the one or the other, while the pope, deeply moved by the loss of Jerusalem, recaptured by Saladin, attempted to effect the reconciliation of the antagonists and their participation in a crusade. Philip, with Richard's help, had already conquered Maine and Touraine and routed Henry II, when the latter decided to make terms and acknowledged his defeat in the presence of his rival at Azai.[9] This cruel humiliation and the news of the treason of his youngest and best loved son John dealt him a final blow; he died at Chinon two days afterwards on July 16, 1189.

Embroilment with Richard

The Third Crusade

Henry being dead, Richard the Lion Heart became king. His amity with Philip lasted for some time. The two kings indeed started for the crusade in company; though they did not so continue for the whole journey. They found and took more than one occasion for quarrel long before their arrival before the fortress of Saint Jean d'Acre. Their mutual antagonism increased during the siege of the town; on its capture (July, 1191), Philip abandoned the crusade and returned home. The Count of Flanders had died under the walls of Acre and his heritage in Flanders became more interesting to Philip than Jerusalem, his contract of marriage with Isabella of Hainault having given him rights over many lands of the de-

[9] Azai-le-Rideau is today a chief town of a canton of the department of Indre et Loire, in the arrondissement of Chinon. Its present celebrity is not due to the interview between Henry II and Philip Augustus, but to the possession of a magnificent château of the sixteenth century.

ceased count. Richard's fierce absorption in the prosecution of the crusade gave him, he thought, an opportunity not to be missed for the energetic resumption of his activities in France. Yet he did not decline, before his departure, to swear on the Gospels that he would do nothing prejudicial to the interests of the King of England in France!

The intrigue with John Lack-Land

No sooner had he returned than he came to an understanding with John Lack-Land, whom he induced to make an attempt on the crown of England; meanwhile he himself was to recover a large part of Touraine and Normandy. Unfortunately, Richard's councillors and the aged Eleanor opposed John's enterprise and brought it to naught. Richard, returning in his turn from the crusade, fell into the hands of Leopold, Duke of Austria, whom he had humiliated before Acre, was thrown into prison and handed over to the emperor, Henry VI, an ally of Philip's. The last named and John Lack-Land made desperate efforts to induce the emperor to prolong his captivity; they offered him huge sums as compensation for the ransom which he might exact from Richard. They failed and Richard was released. He was fortunate in the knightly part of antagonist to a perjurer and a traitor. For five years, from

Richard's revenge

1194 to 1199, he made war almost without intermission, compelled his brother to implore his forgiveness, gained important military successes against Philip, and raised a new feudal coalition against him which, after several times defeating him severely, compelled him to beg for peace. At one blow Philip had lost nearly all that he had gained since his accession, and had to resign himself to the signature of the treaty of Vernon with Richard and that of Péronne with the coalition of great

His death

barons. Only a few weeks later the King of England perished, on the 6th day of April, 1199, at the siege of Chalus, a small fortified town in Limousin where he had invested a rebellious vassal. Philip, well served by his death, was not long in plucking up heart again.

John Lack-Land, who became King of England, though devoid neither of intelligence nor policy, was a mass of vices of all kinds. His violence and greed soon made him unpopular in his own states. The grave difficulties which his tyranny made for him, the opposition which it aroused among his barons and clerics, were the best auxiliaries of the King of France, who, compared with him, had some resemblance to an honest man.

John Lack-Land king; his character

Philip began by giving protection to John's nephew, Arthur of Brittany, who claimed to be Richard's heir in part or in whole, as representative of his father Geoffrey, who had died in 1186. It was hard to tell on which side the right lay. Philip's interest emphatically declared it to be with Arthur. The Capetian policy was to manoeuvre with Arthur, the young prince against John Lack-Land, as he had manoeuvred with John against Richard, and with Richard and Geoffrey against Henry II. After some hostilities, whose issue was not to his advantage, John thought it advisable to purchase peace; he ceded the county of Évreux to Philip, who forthwith deserted Arthur (March, 1200). At that time he involved himself in a serious dispute with the pope, Innocent III, because, having married Ingeburg of Denmark, he had repudiated her without due cause in order to marry another wife. On his escape, by a somewhat disingenuous capitulation, from this unfortunate adventure, his rival offered him an excellent pretext for resuming hostilities, by exasperating, through reckless violence, several great barons of Aquitaine,[10] who made formal complaint to their over-suzerain, King Philip. Philip summoned John to make explanation before his court (*curia*) composed of *peers*, i.e. the greatest lords in France. John failed to appear, and in default was condemned, as a *felon* vassal, to the confiscation of all his lands in France (April, 1202).

The affair of *Arthur of Brittany*

Policy of Philip

Affair of the barons of Aquitaine

John cited before the king's court

His condemnation

[10] In particular he had carried off the fiancée of one of them to marry her himself.

His faults; by which Philip profits

Philip proceeded to execute the sentence. At first he was not fortunate; but John had made sundry promises which he failed to keep to various barons in Poitou and Anjou, especially to one Guillaume des Roches, and they consequently took the side of his adversary. John, having surprised and captured his nephew Arthur, threw him into prison and quickly had him put to death (1203). It was rumored that he had done the deed with his own hand. The murder roused a storm of reprobation by which Philip profited. He had long been preparing for action, by negotiating with various influential barons in the districts which he proposed to conquer.

The conquest of the Angevin domain

He began by the capture of Château-Gaillard, the stronghold built by Richard the Lion Heart on the right bank of the Seine, above Les Andelys, to guard the approach to Normandy (March, 1204), then, dextrously mingling promises, confirmations of privileges, gifts and displays of force, he conquered all Normandy in two months, and, in like fashion, Anjou, Touraine and Poitou. Troubles accumulating upon John from every side helped his operations. The English themselves deserted their king and showed no disposition to help him to protect or to retake his lands in France. So much so that in 1208 John seemed to accept defeat; he signed a confirmatory treaty. The end of Philip Augustus was attained: the Angevin Empire was destroyed. Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, Poitou, Saintonge came again under the direct suzerainty of the French king. John retained in France only Aquitaine, La Rochelle and its territory and a few islands. In the conquered provinces all the lands which belonged directly to the Plantagenet passed to the Capet and were added to the royal domain. Eleanor, who did not die till 1205, was thus able to see the annihilation of the ambitious empire which owed its existence as much to her machinations as to the chance of succession and the policy of the Angevins. Further, Philip profited by his new strength to make advantageous annexations, some through

The situation in 1208

matrimonial alliances, some by force, to the detriment of feudatories with whom he had cause to be dissatisfied. The most important was that of Auvergne in 1212.

C. *Philip's great design: the conquest of England*

Philip Augustus, however, desired to push his advantage to the utmost; he contemplated nothing less than the dethronement of his rival. John Lack-Land had aroused great discontent among his barons. The King of France did not fail to profit by it; he promised support and friendship to those who would attempt a revolt. Meanwhile, Stephen Langton having been elected Archbishop of Canterbury, John refused to recognise him, on the pretext that the election had been made without his authorisation. This was the starting-point of a conflict with Innocent III, who further was displeased with the Angevin's exactions from his clergy. Philip thought the opportunity favourable. He made common cause with the unsubdued Welsh and with the knights of Ireland, and prepared for a landing in England. He was on the point of departure (1213) when John, excommunicated, menaced with deposition by the pope, in favour of Louis of France, son of the Capetian king, thought it prudent to make submission to the Roman Church, who reconciled him with his clergy and his barons. Nothing was left to Philip but to renounce his enterprise. He was greatly annoyed, and never forgave Innocent III, who, as it turned out, had made use of him both as a scarecrow and as a dupe.

John's difficulties in his kingdom

Philip's policy

Its failure

D. *Reaction of John Lack-Land*

The King of England, for his part, having escaped the danger, had every wish to prevent its recurrence, as well as to revenge himself upon his rival. He found, in his turn, a favourable opportunity. Philip had cause of complaint against his powerful vassal, the Count of Flanders, whom he wished to punish. He was anxious, above all, to extend his effective domination over the wealthy lands of the Flemings, their opulent towns, their magnificent port of Bruges, which were to be, for two centuries, a chief temptation to the Kings of France.

He profits by the embarrassment of the Capetian king

His desires, ill-dissimulated, had long given disquietude to the great communes, who had made approaches to England; Count Ferrand [11] did likewise, as did his neighbour, Renaud de Dam-Martin, Count of Boulogne, who was, moreover, an adventurer of the worst stamp and as a knight utterly *félon*. The two allied themselves with John Lack-Land, one before the other, after the first success which Philip obtained in Flanders, in the spring of 1213. The English had long had an understanding with the emperor, Otto of Brunswick. With Otto were the majority of the seigneurs of Belgium, of Holland and of Lorraine. Thus a formidable coalition was formed, with John Lack-Land as its moving spirit. Having won over the barons of Aquitaine, he counted on taking the Capet between two armies, one, commanded by himself, advancing from the south, and the other, that of his allies, from the north. But the southern army was put to flight, without having even fought, at the Roche-au-Moine, not far from Angers, on July 2, 1214, by Louis of France: John did not dare to make another attempt from this side. And, on the 27th of July, 1214, the northern army was cut to pieces at *Bouvines*, on the south of and not far from Lille, by Philip Augustus himself. The emperor escaped capture; the Count of Flanders did not, nor did Renaud de Boulogne and a number of the great barons. At the news of this victory all Capetian France was transported with joy; and for this reason, and in relation to this battle of Bouvines, we may say that now for the first time something like a national spirit begins to stir obscurely among the king's subjects. Otherwise the battle consummated the defeat of John Lack-Land and consolidated all the conquests of Philip Augustus. His French feudatories dared no further venture. Otto of Brunswick, discredited, deserted by his adherents, died

The coalition of 1213

Its failure

Battle of *Bouvines*

Its consequences

[11] Ferrand had his own reasons for not liking Philip, who had compelled him in 1212 to give up Aire and Saint-Omer, taken from him by a brutal onslaught, not far from treasonable.

in poverty in 1218, and John Lack-Land, most drastically defeated of all, made an inglorious return to England, after signing an onerous treaty of peace, to find himself again at grips with an opposition embittered by his necessary fiscal exigencies, which united against him clerics, nobles and bourgeois alike, and finished by imposing upon him the *Great Charter* of June 15, 1215.

Philip resumes his great plan

This he was naturally not long in violating.[12] Thereupon the English barons called upon Louis of France who came to receive homage in London itself. Philip Augustus feigned to count for nothing in the venture and even to disapprove of it, but stood at his son's back and there can be little doubt that he thought he was near the goal which he had set for himself since the overthrow of the Angevin Empire in France: to lay hands upon England, and substitute himself for the Plantagenet. Such a project, less unreasonable in those days than it would be in ours, had nevertheless elements of excess and abuse which were bound to cause its collapse. The pope became champion and advocate for John, and after his death, October 19, 1216, for his son Henry III. Neither Innocent III, nor his successor, Honorius III, had any interest in allowing the King of France to aggrandise himself disproportionately, and the English barons, freed from John, had no wish to give themselves another master. For this reason, defections from Louis became numerous, and he was finally vanquished by his adversaries and obliged to return to France (September, 1217). This was an ill not unattended by good: Philip Augustus had far too much to do in France for any such ambitious foreign policy to be really profitable to him. It enables us, however, to appreciate how great in power and how brilliant in repute the Capetian monarchy had grown to be in the course of the last thirty-five years.

Expedition of Louis of France to England

Definitive failure

[12] On his complaint the pope had declared it null and void, as a deed of violence and injustice. Innocent III affected to consider the kingdom of England as a property of the Holy See.

E. *Penetration into the south of France*

At the same time events were preparing for its new and decisive advancement in another direction. A heresy, rooted apparently deep in the *Manicheism* of antiquity, and of Oriental origin, had begun to appear in France towards the end of the tenth century. Its disciples called themselves *Cathari* from a Greek word signifying pure. They detested the Catholic Church, which they accused of having betrayed the divine truth and of being nothing less than the "Synagogue of Satan." They rejected her fundamental dogmas, her sacraments, her pious practices; they condemned all pleasures of the flesh and professed a moral code of great austerity. They had met with considerable acceptance in the south of France, probably because there the Catholic faith was less robust than elsewhere and among the seigneurs did not proscribe a fairly wide toleration. Albi, Toulouse, Foix, Béziers were their principal headquarters, and they were known as the *Albigenses*. At the end of the twelfth century, their progress disquieted the pope, who soon saw that they were finding many adherents among the great barons of the country, to begin with, the Count of Toulouse, the Count of Foix, and the Viscount of Béziers. Missions were despatched to all the infected districts, starting from 1178, without appreciable results. The *Bonshommes* [13] by their virtuous and pious life had gained and kept the popular favour and they exercised great ascendancy over the seigneurs. Innocent III determined to employ force, and on three occasions (1204, 1205, 1207) he summoned Philip Augustus to intervene. But the king was occupied with England and declined.

The *Cathari*

Their success in the south

Anxiety of the pope

The Albigensian crusade

Thus it came to pass that the papal legate, Pierre de Castelnau, having excommunicated Raymond VI, Count of Toulouse, was slain by a squire of the last named on the 12th of January, 1208. Innocent III immediately issued a call to crusade

[13] A familiar name given to the *Parfaits* (Perfect) of Albigensianism those who practised the Catharic doctrine in full vigour, and acted as exemplars and guides to the others.

against the count. Raymond made submission and did penance (June, 1209), but the crusade against the heretical South none the less proceeded (July). Philip Augustus took no part in it, deriving from this abstention the advantage of not being compromised in the horrible massacres which marked the savage onslaught of the northern and central feudatories on the envied and detested Southerners, outrages which in the end were to cover Innocent himself with shame and embarrassment. The crusaders conquered Languedoc. After the battle of Muret, which consummated their victory (1213), they considered its partition, and the Lateran Council (1215) adjudged the county of Toulouse to their chief, Simon de Montfort, already Viscount of Béziers and of Carcassonne. The king exacted his homage; he thus vindicated the rights of the Crown over a region of France which, for a long period, had habitually ignored them. Further, after the death of Simon (1218), his son, Amaury, discouraged by the inextricable difficulties which entangled him owing to the bitter hostility of the population, decided to relinquish his titles to the king. It is Louis VIII who will receive them (1224); but it was Philip who had made possible the acquisition of this precious advantage.

Its results for Philip

Philip asserts his rights

IV

When the rough old monarch died, on the 14th of July, 1223, he had more than doubled the royal domain. He had started with thirty-eight provostships and had left ninety. He had likewise extended the range of his suzerainty over a much wider area, particularly in the Rhône valley and in the regions southeast of the Central Massif. Everywhere he had strengthened his authority and made it more definite. Abroad, especially in Germany, he had played a great part. He had not been fortunate in all his ventures, but no failure had ever been fatal to him, and his will had always risen superior to circumstances of every sort and kind.

The government of Philip

A. *Increase of the domain and influence of the king*

B. *Weakening of feudalism*

He had weakened feudality greatly. Not only had he subjected a number of recalcitrant barons to formal deprivation, but he had compelled all others to respect him and strictly to fulfil their obligations towards him. He had made it customary for him to intervene in their affairs to verify and confirm their acts, to impose upon them his judicial and administrative decisions. He even exercised over certain great fiefs, such as Burgundy and Champagne, a kind of protectorate.

C. *Domination over the Church*

Attitude towards the pope

He had determined to be master over his Church, and to do so, had not feared to withstand the pope himself, Innocent III, at that time in the full tide of his mediaeval authority, who exercised sovereign powers over all Christendom. On one question in which he was manifestly wrong, and in which the moral authority of the pope was legitimately exercised—that is, the lamentable affair of Ingeburg of Denmark [14]—he maintained his resistance for twenty years. And when the pope claimed to dispose at his pleasure of the lands of the southern seigneurs on their deprivation as heretics, Philip had known perfectly well how to maintain his rights as over-suzerain in the face of this encroachment. He sustained with much correctitude his rôle as protector of the Church in face of the feudal baronage, and even of the communes, often in conflict with the clergy. On the other hand, his authority, almost amounting in fact to a tyranny, weighed most heavily on the bishops and abbots. Not only did he exact from them, at times by brutal methods, money and men for his wars, but he expected them to support him in his disputes with Rome. He determined, too, that they should submit to his law-courts and he worked hard to confine their own jurisdiction to exclusively ecclesiastical cases. Only

Ecclesiastical policy

[14] Philip, a widower through the death of Isabella of Hainault, had married in 1193 Ingeburg, daughter of the King of Denmark. On the very day after this marriage, he cast her off, and then repudiated her and married Agnès de Méran, a German. The pope intervened on behalf of the cast-off wife, and went so far as to place the king under interdict. Philip submitted only outwardly (1200) and did not yield her rank and her place to Ingeburg till 1213.

those Churchmen who resided in districts outside his domain, or in countries which he sought to conquer, had much reason to praise the manner in which he treated them; he had need of their support, and so continued towards them the old policy of the Capets.

D. *Philip and the bourgeois*

He thoroughly understood the value to his interests of support from the bourgeois. He associated them with his own officials in the administration of their towns, and it may be said that from his reign dates the entry of the urban class into political life. The dynasties of the "*grands bourgeois*" now begin to run their course in the chief towns; and this again is all to the advantage of the king. He signed many charters in favour of urban or rural communities and accorded the *royal protection* to many villages and many towns situated outside his domain. Often he had recourse to what was called a *contrat de pariage* (contract of apportionment), under which he shared the sovereignty of a domain with another seigneur (usually a Churchman) and exercised an effective control over his colleague. He was in truth and in fact the ally of the communes. Finally he laboured for the sanitation and embellishment of his towns. Paris, which during his reign became the real capital of his kingdom, owed to him an enlargement of her borders, of which some remains still survive, some public fountains, her two first paved streets, and the *Louvre*, a fortress which stood on the right bank of the Seine, at the point where it left the city. All these achievements testify to his exceptional activity.

Merchants, artisans and vilains

Paris

E. *The administration of Philip*

This energy was no less exercised in the province of government proper. Philip, in fact, made the first step towards the creation of a royal administration, which largely took the place of the small and entirely feudal organisation with which his predecessors had been satisfied. He retained the principal instruments of which they had made use. The first of these is the *curia regis*, an assembly of the king's lieges, barons and bishops,

1. The old organisation of government

The *curia regis*

which formed at once his tribunal and his council; but he became accustomed to choose from among this court a certain number of confidential adherents who never left him and who practically took the place of the old feudal council, which had grown too numerous and too confused. The second consists of the great officers of the household; but he suppressed the dapifer and the chancellor, who had grown too influential and entrusted the other offices to men of lower estate who were entirely dependent on himself. His determination to allow no one to obtain any hold upon him is evident. Next come the provosts, who have charge of the castellaries of the royal domain. Philip consolidated them, but as these men held their posts as a kind of fief which they looked on as their property, and moreover attempted to perpetuate them by inheritance, in which they occasionally succeeded, Philip felt the need of less feudal subordinates, less attached to domanial properties, and in a word *more royalist*, and he created the *baillis* (bailiffs),[15] whose institution was regularised by an edict which he issued in 1190 at the moment of his departure for the crusade. These *baillis*, taken usually from the *curia regis*, were nominated, paid, moved from one post to another, recalled by the king; no feudal privilege shielded them from his will, whose zealous agents they were throughout his domain. Their authority, superior to that of the provosts, is not originally necessarily exercised within any fixed administrative limits; it rather resembles a kind of delegation of the royal authority which gives the delegate a general right of supervision and immediate decision on all questions relating to government and administration, in a certain number of provostships. Philip frequently transferred his bailiffs to prevent them becoming too deeply rooted in any one district; he frequently summoned them to his court, and he had them kept under supervision at their posts by special inquisitors. These bailiffs, interested in winning the

The great officials

The provosts

2. The new departure: the *baillis'*

Their action

[15] In the south and the west they were called seneschals.

king's approbation, became most useful auxiliaries in his efforts to reconstitute the kingdom and the king's authority in the face of feudal disintegration and anarchy. They must be imagined as perpetually on the watch in their *baillivia*, ready to profit, on their master's behalf, by every opportunity for his aggrandisement, which hazard might bring in their way or which their mother wit might contrive.

3. The results of Philip's efforts

The energy, persistence, decision of Philip Augustus were not always unalloyed by violence, ill faith, perfidy; but they attest his remarkable devotion to the royal cause, his exceptional vigour of mind, and sense of practical realities. He was in fact *the true founder of the Capetian monarchy*. A few considerations will show us the instruments available for increase of their power for which his successors are indebted to him. I have already said that he succeeded in more than doubling the domain; he increased its coherence and augmented its yield to no less an extent. His father, Louis VII, did not dispose of more than 19,000 livres a month; his son Louis VIII had about 36,000. Whenever he had a chance he replaced the feudal services owed him—that is, by the barons or feudal communities—by contributions in money, which he applied as he saw fit. He found this gave him the great advantage of dependence on no one but himself when he needed to initiate any enterprise. Further, to replenish his treasury, he did not hesitate to demand ransom from the Jews, to exploit the clergy, by exactions carried to the point of brutality, and even to debase the currency. Such transgressions, however, were then part of current feudal practice. He avoided, as far as he could, recourse to requisitions upon his vassals for the conduct of war: he had sufficient to pay an army kept well in his own control—composed of paid knights (*milites*), sergeants (*servientes*) on horse or on foot, and troops using missiles: slingers, bowmen and cross-bowmen—an army which was a weapon of precision and power very different from the feudal *ost* (the feudal levy).

Enormous increase in his diverse resources

Philip Augustus, a man not always honest, even according to the standards of his time, habitually transgressing as the powerful are wont to transgress, was a real leader of men, exacting indeed and hard, but wise and resolute, "*Sapiens et prudens*," say the chronicles of his time. He won a place among the high chiefs of Christendom, and no man, certainly, did more than he *to determine what France should become.*

V

The dawn of the thirteenth century

General view of the time of Philip Augustus

The reign of Philip Augustus, though it covers nearly all the first quarter of the thirteenth century, still belongs to the feudal era; but certain signs of a profound transformation of France are already appearing. They may be really obvious only in the field of politics, as we have just described them: but they can also be detected in the social and economic spheres, and in religious and intellectual life.

A. *Persistence of the feudal spirit:* violence and cruelty

The feudal spirit in all its forms still persists: among the nobles, desire for independence, constant agitation, brutality, bad faith, contempt of the powerful for the commonalty, whom they oppress and despoil by all means in their power; a moral barbarity nakedly displayed in war, in the sack of towns and the frequent savage massacres of prisoners and vanquished. The crusade against the Albigenses in itself presents a whole gallery of horrible pictures which show what could follow in the train of the barons and the *ribalds* who accompanied them in their frolics. "*Every step forward of the invading army was marked by some butchery*" (Luchaire).[16] The fanatic exaltation of the Northern crusaders partly, no doubt, explains this maniacal cruelty; but its excesses were no more than accentuations of current practices, from which even kings were not im-

[16] For instance, at Béziers, about 7000 persons perished in a single church and the town was burnt *"From end to end and from side to side"* July, 1209; at Liavaux all the defenders were hanged or had their throats cut. The same happened in a number of other places.

mune. The taste for violence persists, too, in the amusements of the seigneurs, in the insatiable slaughters of the chase, and in the callous and often murderous brutality of the *tourneys*. It is a remarkable and instructive fact, that when Philip Augustus conferred knighthood on his son Louis, in 1209, he exacted from him a written engagement never to take part in a tourney. The wisdom of the politic king, however, found few imitators.

The tourneys

Nevertheless, among some feudatories, an élite of their class, a dawning of new ideas, or rather of new feelings, may be perceived. They are commonly comprehended in the term *courtesy*. Courtesy is born in the South, and it is by the poets of the South, the *troubadours*, that it is sung and propagated. It expresses an ideal of grace and good breeding, of gallantry, respect for women and for love, of sentimental refinement, which forms a complete contrast to the ignorant and stolid barbarity of the authentic feudatories. The crusade against the Albigenses was on one side a kind of revenge taken by the grossness of the North on the irritating cultural superiority of the South. By a just recoil, little anticipated by those whom it affected, the vanquished so worked upon the victors as to begin to shape them in their own image, as did the Orientals after the Crusades in Palestine.

Manifestations of a *new spirit*

Courtesy

These times are marked not only by the persistence of the feudal spirit, but also by the survival of the general manner of living characteristic of feudal life, its many inconveniences, its insecurity, disorder, predominance of tyrannical force and the evils of which they are the sources. Outside the king's lands and those over which his peace extends, the delight of the barons in war and pillage remains unabated. Men are no better protected than in the past from the scourges which wipe out whole populations: *conflagrations*, which only chance can arrest once they have been let loose upon a town; *epidemics*, which ignorance could combat only with lamentations and proces-

B. *Persistence of the forms of feudal life:* insecurity and disorder

The universal scourges

sions;[17] *famines*, which there is no efficient public foresight to forestall. These are, it is true, less frequent than in the eleventh century, yet eleven years during the reign of Philip are still marked by frightful and murderous dearths of corn. And the worst evil of all is *brigandage*, which could be suppressed only by a working agreement between the barons and the institution by them of a police force in common. Not only is the land overrun with bands of evil-doers of every origin, but the great military enterprises of Capet and Plantagenet have attracted adventurers to France, a kind of professional soldiery, whom truce or peace leaves without any employment and without resources. Their grouping and organisation remain, and they live by pillage. Under the names of *routiers* (highwaymen) and *cottereaux* (coterelli) they spread terror and desolation whenever they passed.

The *routiers*

The centre and south of the kingdom especially suffered from these bandits. The exasperation they aroused finally resulted in the formation of a sort of armed brotherhood of peace, promoted in the first instance at Le Puy-en-Velay. The distinctive mark of the brotherhood was a kind of white hood or *capuchin*, whence they were called *Capuchonnés* or *Capuciati*.

The *Capuciati* organised against them

They proceeded vigorously against the *routiers* in the years 1282 and 1283; but by a logical and inevitable development of their will to establish peace they went on to attack the turbulent barons who gave them as much trouble as the highwaymen, and thus promptly incurred the enmity of feudalism. From 1284 the seigneurs united against them and destroyed their association, to the great advantage of the *routiers*, who were enabled to live on the country as before.

The feudal enmity which they provoked in their turn

Nevertheless the towns continue to progress, and the reign

[17] Between 1200 and 1225 six huge conflagrations desolated Rouen. In 119[illegible] a similar disaster destroyed a great part of Chartres. The unhealthiness of the towns favoured epidemics. In the heart of Paris the Cemetery of the Innocents was a focus of pestilence, even after Philip Augustus had enclosed it with a wall.

C. *Signs of social progress*

1. Development of towns and rise of the urban classes

of Philip Augustus marks an important period of commercial expansion. The inhabitants of these towns begin to call for consideration even from the barons themselves, and a clear proof of the social elevation of the urban classes is given by the place which they occupy in the literature of the time, compared with their absence from the older *Chansons de Geste*. The poems composed for the barons most often refer to them only in derision and disparagement, but this tone is a sign of jealousy, such jealousy as attests serious progress by those who incur it, progress in wealth and in influence.

2. Better organisation of the urban workers

This progress is also manifested in a better organisation of the labouring classes. First the hand-worker, the small artisan, the shopkeeper, free themselves in increasing numbers from all personal dependence upon any seigneur; secondly *corporations* are formed. All have not the same origin, but the results which they produce are everywhere much alike: they assure to their members the monopoly of the trade which they represent, and establish among them the regular union and solidarity which give their companionship cohesion and strength. We find even larger associations formed among the merchants of a town, the *hanses*, which aim at the greater security and wider extension of their commerce. Regular relations are established from town to town among these groupings; periodical assemblages or *fairs* are established. The feudatories themselves begin to understand that it is to their interest to attract traders, and not to burden their trade with heavy taxation, rather than to despoil and discourage them. Thus the Count of Champagne came to attract traders from all the kingdom and from neighbouring countries to the fairs of Troyes, Provins, Bar-sur-Aube and Lagni. In the same manner the Counts of Flanders attracted to their larger towns, especially to Bruges, a trade which added greatly to the wealth of the country.

3. Restoration of trade

Fairs of Champagne and of Flanders

To give freer passage to these traders, the roads, bridges

Improvement in means of communication

and ports were improved, once their owners, too, had realised that they could obtain noteworthy profit from the transit of merchandise. And, by a reciprocal action in the logic of facts, these improvements in commercial communications favoured the development of commerce. Commerce was also considerably stimulated by the activities generated on the Mediterranean by the Crusades.

Signs of new times

These developments certainly do not date precisely from the reign of Philip Augustus—that is to say, from the time between 1180 and 1223—but during it they attain a hitherto unexampled amplitude, precision and vigour. It is a noteworthy fact that the earliest *bill of exchange* known is dated the 15th of February, 1200.[18] This one small fact is the herald and the indication of a profound transformation of economic life. The feudatories could see no more in it—they were incapable of seeing more—than an opportunity to enrich themselves; in reality it is undermining their position by building up the power of the class who most dread and detest them.

D. *Conscience and thought*

From another point of view and at first sight the conscience and the thoughts of the contemporaries of Philip Augustus do not much differ in their constituent elements and in their expression from those of the preceding generation, but on a closer examination notable differences are revealed.

Persistence of religious preoccupation

Religious preoccupations evidently dominate, and we may almost say, enslave them, in the sense that all spiritual life whatever begins with and returns to religion. This religion, for an overwhelming majority, is no more than a congeries of superstitions, which culminates in a craze for relics, developed into an absolute mania by the Fourth Crusade.[19] It is always capable of arousing collective popular enthusiasms, analogous

Character of contemporary religion

[18] It is, as we say, *drawn* by Messina on Marseilles.

[19] This expedition, turned aside from its goal, ended in the capture of Constantinople, in 1204, and a prodigious quantity of relics was taken from that town; expeditions were organised with the object of finding and appro-

to those engendered by the first two crusades. The most extraordinary of these, so much so that its reality has sometimes been contested, is that known as the *Children's Crusade*. In 1212 a young shepherd of Cloyes, near Vendôme (in our present department of Loir-et-Cher) believed himself to have been appointed by God to deliver the Holy Sepulchre and drew away in his train some thousands of children, most of whom were not more than twelve or thirteen years old. Opposition of the clergy and the orders of the king recalled many of them; but a large number, driven by the fanaticism of the crowd, persevered in their mad enterprise. They abandoned themselves to the simulated zeal of two shipowners of Marseilles who, having got them on board, proceeded to sell them as slaves—with the exception of those who died at sea—in the slave markets of the African coast.

The Children's Crusade

This is indeed an adventure worthy of the eleventh century. During the same period, hostility towards the Church and her priests is manifested with increasing acerbity among the vilains no less than among the nobles. The former cannot forgive the Church for her enmity to the free communes, and the latter charge her with her attempts to restrict their full feudal freedom. The monks who were the glory of the preceding period, those of the orders of Cluny and of Citeaux, are in decadence and discredited. The *mendicant* orders, *Dominicans* and *Franciscans*, vowed to the instruction and edification of the people, are in process of replacing them.[20] In spite of all, attacks on the faith continually grew more numerous and more extensive. A crusade was needed, we know, and after it, an institution whose whole occupation was the hunting down of

New feelings towards the clergy

Attacks on the faith

priating this precious booty. Contemporary documents are full of the subject and of miraculous stories which prove mainly the credulity of those by whom they are told.

[20] The foundation of the monastery of *Prouille* (in the present department of Aude) by St. Dominic occurred in 1206; the order of *Preaching Friars* was formed there in 1216. The great Franciscan mission to France was in 1219.

heretics, the *Inquisition*, to clear the south of France even superficially of the *Cathari* and the *Valdenses*.[21]

The era of cathedrals; its causes and significance

Nevertheless at the end of the twelfth century and at the beginning of the thirteenth occurs what may be called the *era of the Gothic cathedrals*, the consummated triumph of the art of the pointed arch which filled France from frontier to frontier with its masterpieces. The term *Gothic*, by which it is usually and inappropriately designated, is a discovery of the artists of the sixteenth century, and expresses the contempt which they felt for the Middle Ages. Its contemporaries knowing it to have been born in the Ile de France, called it, more justly, the *opus francigenum* (French architecture.) Several of its masterpieces date from the period under consideration so far as their principal parts are concerned. Notre-Dame de Paris, the cathedrals of Noyon, Blois, Sens, Lisieux, the abbeys of Saint-Denis and others. It must be noted, however, that these admired monuments, so often represented, down to our own day, as evidences of an enthusiastic and generous faith, attest mainly the tenacity of the bishops, to whom their undertaking, execution and completion were due. *Notre-Dame de Paris* is essentially the work of the bishop, Maurice de Sully. A disease of building (*morbus aedificandi*), as it is called by a contemporary, which caused the destruction of many old Roman buildings and their replacement by others in the then fashionable manner, arises, in the first instance, from a competitive spirit among the bishops; each wishing to possess a cathedral as fine as, or finer than, that of his neighbour. The contribution of the people to the work, whether in labour or in money, was not always voluntary; and sometimes quite the reverse.

The beginnings of the *Universities*

Another phenomenon of capital importance appears in the same era: the old episcopal schools tend to give place to a new

[21] This name is given to the spiritual heirs of Pierre Valdo, a rich bourgeois of Lyons who died in 1197, an apostle of poverty. They promptly embraced opinions which to orthodoxy appeared dangerous.

educational organisation. The *Universities* are brought to birth.[22] It was not in the way of the Middle Ages to abolish an institution, root and branch, in order to substitute another as our systematised law does in these days, and for this reason we cannot identify the natal day either of the University of Paris or of that of Montpellier, which are the ancestors of all others in France. But there is little risk of error in stating that it was in the reign of Philip Augustus that they took a decided turn towards the constitution which they were to embody, in fact, during the thirteenth century. For a long time, at Paris, the schools had earned a universal reputation, and illustrious teachers had, in the twelfth century, taught outside the school of Notre-Dame; but the high hand of the bishop's chancellor remained extended over these teachings, over those who gave and those who received them—he claimed to have in the town the sole right to teach (*licentia docendi*). At this time, the masters who taught outside his school sought to withdraw themselves from his authority, and to grant, on their own account, by co-option, the favoured *licentia.* It is certain that they formed, from the beginning of the thirteenth century onwards, an association (*société, consortium, universitas magistrorum*) with a corresponding group of students (*communitas scholarium*). In a document of 1221 the two terms seem to be no more than one: *Universitas magistrorum et scholarium Parisiensium;* from 1200 a charter of Philip Augustus gives important privileges to the scholastic world by placing it entirely under ecclesiastical jurisdiction. In 1215 a pontifical legate makes for the first time a complete code to regulate the courses of study at Paris and the statue of *scholares*, which includes together the masters and the pupils.

The University of Paris

The great new fact is that the pope takes the place of the

Significance of the scholastic movement

[22] The first of the *Colleges* made to receive students was founded in Paris in 1180 by a burgess of London named Josce; it was designed to accommodate eighteen clerical scholars.

bishop in the protection and direction of the schools. The king grants them privileges, but the University will not be his work; it will be an active and powerful ecclesiastical body which will elaborate the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages in its highest form, but it will develop only in directions acceptable to the Roman hegemony and under its supervision.

Conclusion

Thus, with Philip Augustus, we are still in the thick of the feudal world but under one aspect; his reign, nevertheless, appears to prepare and herald the rising of a new organisation of the State and a new equilibrium of society. And, under another aspect, it shows us the dawn of the most brilliant epoch which the French Middle Ages ever knew; we can divine under its surface all the potentialities which the thirteenth century was to realise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: A. Luchaire, *Les premiers Capétiens (987-1137)* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. ii, second part); the same, *Louis VII, Philippe-Auguste, Louis VIII (1137-1226)*. (In Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iii, first part.)

On Philip Augustus: Cartellieri, *Philipp II August*, 3 vols., 1900-1910.

On the Growth of the Royal Domain: A. Longnon, *La formation de l'unité française*, lessons iv to vii inclusive.

On Institutions and Society: A. Luchaire, *Manuel des Institutions*, especially the fourth part; Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation*, vol. i, chs. xii and xiii; A. Luchaire, *La Société française au temps de Philippe-Auguste*, 1909; the same, *Innocent III et la croisade des Albigeois*, 1905.

On Economic Life: Boissonnade, *Le Travail*, book ii; Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France avant 1789*,[2] 2 vols., 1903-1904; Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers*,[3] 1909.

On Civilisation: Rambaud, *op. cit.*; Ch. Guignebert, *Christianity, past and present*, 1927: chs. xv and xvi: *The Opposition to the Church*; R. Schneider, *L'Art français: l'art gothique*, chs. i and ii; L. Maitre, *Les écoles épiscopales et monastiques en Occident avant les Universités (768-1180)*,[2] 1924; Rashdall, *Universities in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., 1895-1897.

CHAPTER X

THE CULMINATION OF THE FEUDAL MONARCHY OF THE CAPETS (1223-1270)

PHILIP AUGUSTUS had endowed French royalty with the prestige of military success and material power, but he left much still to be done by his successors. In the first place his conquests, always contested by the King of England, who continued to call himself "*Duke of Normandy and Count of Anjou*," were still precarious. They were also incomplete, since all Aquitaine and the town of La Rochelle had escaped his grasp. In the countries already annexed, particularly Poitou, the Capet king could not count upon anything like certain loyalty; the barons, desirous of retaining as much independence as possible, deliberately played a game of intrigue between the two kings, sufficiently dangerous to the Conqueror. Certain communes, with similar objects, followed their example. Even in the lifetime of Philip, Niort and Saint Jean d'Angely returned to their English allegiance. On the other side, the French feudatories, though compelled by the facts to obey, had abandoned none of their rights or pretensions, and anything which encouraged them, such as the minority of the king or any failure on his part, might lead them to revolt. The work of the late king needed completion and stabilisation in these respects. In the second place, the administration of the kingdom was no more than sketched out, its working still depended too much upon the personal forcefulness of the reigning prince. It needed much improvement to assure by itself, and irrespective of the king's character, the full exercise of the royal authority in the considerably extended domain. Finally, we know that Philip Augustus had made himself feared rather than esteemed, and

The situation at the death of Philip Augustus; gaps in his work

Possible retaliation by the King of England

The spirit of the feudatories

Gaps in the administrative work of Philip

Insufficiency of his moral prestige

that his reputation had not been equal to his renown. The high theoretical claims complacently set out in the preambles to official documents, and supported by affirmations of the king's justice and virtues, lack the authenticity conferred by an incontrovertible moral foundation. It had become necessary that they should receive it.

I

Louis VIII (1223-1226)

He follows his father

Louis VIII, who succeeded Philip Augustus, was thirty-six years of age. He was a man of unimpressive presence, but he had a wide experience of politics, obtained during the lifetime of his father, whose work he was in an excellent position to continue, a task in which his energy earned an honourable success. First, a well-conducted campaign put an end for a time to the intrigues of the seigneurs and of the towns of Poitou; La Rochelle was taken and the royal domination carried as far as the lower Garonne. The sentence of confiscation formerly pronounced against John Lack-Land by the *curia* of Philip Augustus continued to justify the action of his son. Another campaign, two years later (1226) took ostensibly the form of a crusade against the Albigenses. The orthodox clergy of the South had prepared the ground for its success, and Louis encountered no serious resistance in Languedoc. He established his domination over the whole country, for which he appointed his own seneschals. The clergy received, in return, notable privileges and a free hand with heretics.[1]

A. *His policy*

His government

The king died in Auvergne, on his return from this profitable excursion, on the 8th of November, 1226. His government, less rough and ready than that of Philip Augustus, was inspired by a similar spirit and proceeded on similar lines. He made, however, one mistake, whose consequences he did not foresee, a signal instance which helps us to understand how

[1] An ordinance of Louis VIII, dated April, 1226, first established the punishment of burning for a proven heretic.

hard it was for a Capetian prince to detach himself from and be in advance of his own times. He constituted *apanages* in favour of his three younger sons; that is, he set aside for each of them, out of the royal domain which had been assembled with so much labour, certain large portions of land, intended to provide them with means adequate to their birth,[2] Artois to one, Anjou and Maine to the second and Poitou and Auvergne to the third. The early Capets had not altogether abstained from the practice of apanage, a practice indeed almost imposed upon an epoch in which, as we know, land is the main source of wealth; but they did not apply it over areas individually larger than that of an extensive private estate. In other words, they alienated only small parcels of the domain.[3] But Louis VIII gave up whole provinces to his sons. The reason alleged in his will is that he desires to ensure concord among his children. He doubtless feared that they would be led astray by the seductive and splendid prospects which feudal agitators were always ready to hold out to princes who were near the throne. We know this to have been a common device in contemporary politics. Further, he might well think it seemly that his non-regnant children should have establishments not inferior to those of the great seigneurs, his vassals. Finally it might appear to him politic to establish, in countries recently conquered, and still refractory to direct assimilation, dynasties, issues of his own race, to pave the way for complete annexation within a smaller or a greater time. That this may have been in his mind is shown by the care which he took to specify that these apanages, if the direct line of the grantees should become extinct, should

The *apanages*

Their justification

Their danger for the future

[2] Apanage comes from *apanare* meaning to give bread (*panem dare*); it is thus a sort of grant for subsistence. The practice of apanage is met with from the twelfth century onwards in the regions where the principle of the indivisibility of fiefs was established; thus, in law, apanage is opposed to partition.

[3] The case of Burgundy, yielded by Henry I to his brother in 1032, is exceptional. It was not one of apanage but of feudal cession, of formation of a fief intended to prevent dangerous competition from a pretender to the throne.

forthwith immediately revert to the crown. These considera tions would all have much weight in the thirteenth century, an the objections which could be advanced against them would b weakened by the fact that the monarchic spirit, certainly ver strong in the royal family, would appear to provide a vali guarantee against any tendency to insubordination among th relatives of the king.[4] Nevertheless these grants, theoreticall personal, did not fail to become patrimonial for the families c which each young prince aspired to become the founder; ther was a risk that they would establish, in royal France itself, new feudalism more formidable than the old one. The last gre difficulties which menaced the fortunes of the French monarch originated in the fifteenth century from this *apanaged feuda ism* which the successors of Louis VIII, following his exampl had imprudently created with their own hands and to their ow cost.

B. *Regency of Blanche de Castille*

The king on his death-bed had appointed as regent his wif *Blanche de Castille*;[5] his eldest son, Louis IX, who was onl twelve years old, not yet being competent to rule. The feud barons made no protest against the decision of the king, bu seeing in it a favourable opportunity to retaliate for the seve

The feudal agitation

domination of Philip Augustus, they started without delay a agitation, more noisy than methodical and more ambitious tha formidable, which, nevertheless, kept the kingdom, for mo than five years (1226-1232), in a state of crisis and disqui and was highly prejudicial to the authority of the king and orderly government. The ringleader was probably Pier

[4] It has been justly remarked that the administration of Alphonse Poitiers, brother of St. Louis and master of all Toulousian Languedoc at t death of Raymond VII (1247), had efficaciously paved the way for the assim lation of his outlying southern province to France in full accord with t purpose of the king.

[5] She was a daughter of Alphonse IX, King of Castille, and of Eleanor England (one of the daughters of Henry II Plantagenet and Eleanor Aquitaine). Her marriage with Prince Louis, celebrated on May 23, 12(had been arranged in the preceding January between Philip Augustus an John Lack-Land. Her relationship of niece to the King of England w thus the reason for her entry into the Capet family.

Mauclerc, Count of Brittany, with whom were the King of England, Henry III, Philip Hurepel, Count of Boulogne, son of Philip Augustus and of Agnès de Méran, the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of the March, the Sire of Couci, to name only the principals. A coalition at first sight highly formidable, but disunited in fact by the warring ambitions of its leaders, with no concerted plan, no definite programme, completely haphazard. In face of such a body, Blanche, energetic, tenacious, hard, well endowed with political sagacity, supported by the experience of the ancient councillors of Philip Augustus, and, otherwise naturally capable, adroit and even crafty, occupied an excellent strategic position. She profited, in fact, marvellously.

The position taken by the rebels

The rebels made no attack upon royalty in itself; they did not contest the sovereign authority of the king, a crucial proof of the solidity of Philip Augustus' work, and at the same time of the success of the propaganda in support of the king conducted by the Church and the bourgeois. The seigneurs' attack was directed against the "Spanish woman" who held the king "en bail," (in custody), and had not been elected by them; they accused her of sending the king's money into Spain; they circulated calumnious insinuations against her virtue, at one time they alleged that she listened with too much pleasure to the songs of Thibaut of Champagne, at another they would remark that the papal legate, the Cardinal of Saint-Ange, could not bring himself to depart from her neighbourhood. Their aim was evidently to push Hurepel into the regency, and through him recover their independence and influence in the kingdom.

Policy of Blanche

Blanche negotiated much and had but little fighting to do. She made an adroit use of her real ascendancy over the Count of Champagne, by setting him against the other feudatories, who looked on him as a traitor and tried to win him back, but she knew well how to keep him. Taking advantage of the indecision and discord of the allies, she little by little achieved the disinte-

gration of their faction, so effectively that the King of Eng land, having no prospect of adequate support, could undertak no serious venture, and Mauclerc found himself gradually be coming isolated in northern France. In 1229 the Count of Tou

Submission of the rebels

louse made an unreserved submission. In 1231 the Count o Brittany and the King of England yielded in their turn an concluded peace with the young king. All engaged in the coal tion came over to him one after the other. The firmness of th regent had inflicted an irreparable defeat upon the seigneur Feudalism never recovered from this blow. Not only did th

Results of their attempt

feudal campaign turn to the confusion of its authors, but gave Blanche several advantages: she drew closer the feudal ti which joined Brittany to France; she added to the domain a the western part of the county of Toulouse, called the duch of Narbonne [6] and divers neighbouring territories; she marrie her son Alphonse, who held the apanage of Poitou an Auvergne, to the heiress of Raymond VII; she gained for th king the direct suzerainty of the counties of Blois, Chartre Sancerre and the viscounty of Châteaudun, purchased fro Thibaut of Champagne.

The government of Blanche

Her government bore no impress of feminine mildness, an pious as she was, she came into grave conflict on several occ sions with the episcopate, which, she held, should in all circum stances bend to her will. At the same time by her harsh violen she so exasperated the masters and pupils of the University Paris, that after having first gone on strike, they finished b leaving the town. The intervention of the pope was necessar before they would return. Authoritative to a degree, alwa

Her tyranny over her family

ready to meet resistance of any kind with the strong hand, s governed her family as tyrannically as the kingdom. For ni years, the king, her son and Margaret of Provence, the youn queen, were kept by her in the position of submissive and a prehensive children. Her great work had been the education

[6] It consisted of the two *seneschaleries* of Carcassonne and Beaucaire.

Louis IX, which she had conducted "nobly" as the word then went, moulding him as closely as possible in conformity with the ideal of the time and laying particular stress on religious devotion.

II

St. Louis

We know St. Louis comparatively well. Much testimony of high credibility, touching his person and his private life, is at our disposal: and diligent comparison enables us to reach sure conclusions. We are in the presence of *a personality unique in the history of French royalty*,[7] not because he was eminent for piety—many of his contemporaries were no less so, and some such as Henry III of England even more so—but *because he realised in perfection the ideal type of the Christian knight.*

A. *The man*

His life ruled by his conscience

He scrupulously devoted his life to the exact fulfilment of all that his conscience assured him was his duty. The portrait which the monks combined to draw of him must not be entirely trusted, which represents him as one of themselves seated on a throne. Assuredly his religious preoccupations were never laid aside even for a moment and a rigorous system of devotional exercises regulated his daily life. They did not exclude practices of some severity such as the "discipline," applied to him by his confessors with wire scourges, and not always with the *dead hand*, as he himself would sometimes smilingly remark. He cared, with his own hands, for beggars and the sick, especially for lepers; good works of the highest order, in which the mystic charity of some of the brethren would attain exaltation, and their penitential ardour satisfaction, whatever the repugnance

His religious preoccupations

[7] The place of honour among works on this subject is usually given to the lively and entertaining little book of Jean, Sire de Joinville (1225-1317). But its importance must not be exaggerated. The author lived in familiar intercourse with the king during the Egyptian crusade from 1248 to 1254, but he was never among the number of his councillors, and after his return to France met him only at intervals. His recollections were dictated in 1305 when he was eighty, for the edification of the eldest son of Philip the Handsome, two reasons for not blindly accepting all his statements. He may be said to give us personal impressions and historical anecdotes.

of the flesh. Among his lay followers, these demonstrations wer considered excessive, and scarce seemly in a king; they pro voked criticism not unlike those levelled by the lieges at Lou the Pious. Those who had known the courts of Philip Augustu and Louis VIII, well used to very different ways, did not all stain, among themselves, from jests upon "Brother Louis (*Frater Ludovicus*), as they would nickname the king. Never theless, even after his return from his first crusade, with hi religious exaltation intensified and its monastic tendency accen tuated, his devotion never became either mawkish or morose little as he regarded the opinion of men, free as he was from th least ostentation in his exercises, an unfailing tact always kep him from making himself ridiculous or putting himself in position so humiliating as to be derogatory to the royal cause He was not so wedded to his purposes as never to modify o abandon them, when enlightened opinion showed him their dis advantages. He even arranged that such works as in commo and commonplace opinion might jeopardise his dignity shoul not have too many or too indiscreet witnesses: the poor whos feet he washed were chosen from among the blind. This arden and, if I may so say, all-embracing piety has in it an element o moderation, equilibrium and measure, in virtue of which, whil inspiring St. Louis in his life as a king, it neither sterilise nor even impeded his practical action. It never led him int excessive indulgence for the Church, or induced him to forego any royal right in her favour; no saint was ever less *clerica* or more *laïc*.

Frater Ludovicus

Character of his piety

B. *The king.* Sense of justice; care for charity; respect for law

His piety expresses itself in the social field by a *keen sens of justice*, and *a constant care for charity;* in the political fiel by *a respect for each man's rights*, accompanied, as a corollary by a firm and enlightened determination to compel each ma to keep within the limits of his own duty. It is as a judge tha St. Louis has, above all, remained popular. Tradition, whic is not, in kind, altogether legendary, represents him as seate

under an oak in the wood of Vincennes delivering just awards in homely phrases. No personal consideration would restrain him from severity when he thought severity deserved. His charity, inspired by a deep kindness of heart, no less than by his religion, was shown in the abundance of the alms which he delighted to distribute with his own hands, in his constant care for the poor, and in the many charities which he founded for the alleviation of their ills.

C. *Soldier and politician*

A brave soldier, he was without conspicuous military talents. At the same time, a king, permeated through and through with a sense of his position, anxious to fulfil with exactitude all its obligations to the peak of the high ideal which he entertained of them, he was but a mediocre politician. Moral considerations had greater weight with him than material interests. On more than one occasion the old familiars of Philip Augustus were scandalised at what was, from their point of view, a political blunder. In reality he accepted in full the whole régime, as being by law established; he wished to combat only its abuses, and nothing was further from his intention than to destroy it piecemeal as his predecessors had done.

The character of St. Louis and his turn of mind enable us to understand the principal events of his reign and the results which they produced.

D. *Principal events of the reign*

The new feudal coalition in 1242

Confronted, in 1242, with a new feudal coalition, originating in the regrets of the Count of Toulouse, ill-consoled for the treaty of Meaux, in the hopes of the King of England, and in the discontents of the diverse seigneurs of Poitou, the king acted with vigour. Rapidly and completely victorious, he could impose his own terms; he could, in fact, have taken advantage of the situation to expel Henry III from Guyenne. He was content to restore the rebels to their allegiance, and to sign a truce with the English king. On his return from the crusade in 1254 he found the Plantagenet at grips with the Gascon seigneurs in revolt, and the English seigneurs had combined to restrict

Peace with the Plantagenet

his authority. He made no attempt to take advantage of the situation, though it offered him a most favourable opportunity to complete the work of his father and grandfather. On the contrary, he entered into negotiations with Henry; which ended five years later in the *treaty of Paris* (May 28, 1258). The Plantagenet definitely renounced Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine and Poitou; and did liege homage to the king for his remaining possessions in France; but he recovered all that had been acquired by Philip Augustus and Louis VIII in Périgord, Limousin and Quercy; he would similarly recover a notable part of Saintonge and the district of Agen if Alphonse de Poitiers should die without issue. The councillors of the king and all the politically minded of his entourage openly disapproved of this convention, whose nature they attributed to his conscientious scrupulosity. Louis had considered all that he restored to be property wrongfully reft from its legitimate owner. Perhaps, but he believed that he had assured peace for the future between England and France by a disinterested and generous concession. He saw a considerable gain in the acquisition of homage from Henry III, and he judged the treaty to be, as a whole, a good bargain.[8] Had his adversaries been like him, his reckoning would, doubtless, have been little astray; unfortunately among the princes of the time, he was almost unique in quality, and he obviously violated the common principles of politics, which remain the same in all times.

Treaty of Paris (1258)

The struggle between the emperor, Frederic II, and the pope offered Louis a good opportunity to settle all the territorial questions which the formation of *Francia Media* under the treaty of Verdun and its subsequent disintegration, had

The question of *Francia Media*

[8] It may be, however, not inapposite to remark that in the following century and on two occasions towards the end of the reign of Charles V and in 1393 under Charles VI, the royal government of France proposed to the English king a convention analogous to that which has been made so much a matter of reproach to St. Louis: to offer liege homage to the King of France and to reënter into the possession of territories recently conquered by the latter almost the same as those dealt with in the treaty of Paris.

originated between France and Germany. The empire claimed to possess, under the names of "kingdom of Burgundy" and "kingdom of Arles," considerable territories in the valley of the Saône and the Rhône, notably the town of Lyons, while northwards it held Lorraine. On divers occasions the predecessors of St. Louis had understood that it was their interest to extend their domination eastwards. He did not imitate them. He remained neutral between the two opponents, impartially declined proposals from either side, and even, doubtless in the persuasion that both were necessary to the just equilibrium of Christendom, exerted himself to reconcile them with one another, not hesitating to preach Christian charity to the pope himself. When, in the end, the "*viper's nest of Hohenstaufen*" had been crushed by the pope, and anarchy had been long enthroned in Germany, Louis still abstained from any attempt to take advantage of the position. His sole effort was to prevent the Plantagenet from doing so by establishing a prince of that house on the imperial throne. If he made a noteworthy acquisition on the lower Saône, that of the county of Mâcon, it was by paying down good deniers in return.

Policy of St. Louis on this question

The difficulties which then came thick on the Spanish kingdoms, at war with the Arabs, would have allowed St. Louis to relieve himself from the pretensions of the King of Aragon who, being already Seigneur of Montpellier, laid claim to a part of Provence and of Languedoc; he had participated in the coalition of 1242. On this side as on others, Louis abstained from adventures, and, at the same time, when he came to terms with Henry III, he agreed with Jayme of Aragon. By the *treaty of Corbeil* (May 11, 1258), the Capet renounced his rights over Roussillon and the county of Barcelona, formerly conquered by Charlemagne; Aragon, on his side, abandoned his claims to restitution in France and kept only Montpellier. The arrangement was most wise and advantageous to both parties; its one drawback was that it was incomplete and left

The agreements with Aragon

Treaty of Corbeil (1258)

Jayme master of Montpellier; but men of that epoch were in no way scandalised by such anomalies, common as they were in the feudal confusion of the Middle Ages between ownership and sovereignty.

Results of the policy of St. Louis

In sum, it does not appear that St. Louis had any reason to repent of his honesty and moderation, in spite of his preferring, as he himself said, sometimes to lose something within his right than to encroach on the rights of another. He let pass some good opportunities for sound profits, but he made for himself a reputation for righteous dealing, which had its own value, even in politics. For the rest, he never sought to see beyond his feudal horizon, and he made no attempt to pass outside the usage of a world which he accepted as it was, and which doubtless he saw no reason for changing. He remained a man of his time.

The crusade

His dream had been the reconciliation of all Christendom in face of the Infidel. The chimera of the crusade haunted him throughout his life. His entourage, however, gave him no encouragement to dally with this question and even the papacy seemed to have lost much of its faith in these over-seas expeditions. The king, nevertheless, was not to be deterred from fulfilling the vow which he had made in 1244, during a grave illness. He set out in 1248, and proceeded to Egypt, where he was beaten in battle and taken prisoner; having been ransomed at great cost, he remained in Syria for four years, during which he achieved nothing but the recovery of some fortified places. He returned in 1254, disappointed but not discouraged. Having settled some outstanding questions with England and Aragon, he resumed his design; no opposition could prevent him. Joinville was not alone in thinking its approval "*a mortal sin*"; his health left much to be desired and the kingdom could expect no benefit from the adventure. A meeting of prelates and seigneurs, held in Paris in March, 1267, decreed the crusade for which Louis was making active preparations. He left on the 1st

First expedition (1248-1254)

Second expedition (1270)

of July, 1270, and, being extremely ill-informed as to the Moslem world, saw fit to lay siege to Tunis. He allowed himself to be persuaded that "*the king*" of this town only awaited his arrival to embrace Christianity and he believed that the Sultan of Egypt, deprived of horses from Tunis, would lose all his strength. Unfortunate illusions which involved him in an insane enterprise. Nor were any precautions taken to lessen the risks which were run. In a month sun and plague had worked their worst upon the army and the king himself died of the epidemic on the 25th of August.

The prestige of the king in Christendom

These two crusades, which his ardent desire to serve Christ had imposed on him, depriving him meanwhile of his customary good sense, are politically indefensible; they cost him precious time, much money, and finally his life. It was too much. For the time being the sainted king had placed France in a position of preponderance in the West. He had made himself, by his justice and his virtues, an arbiter respected even by his enemies; so far was he an incarnation of law and justice, so easily did his conscience rise superior to all interests of persons. From all parts, from the confines of his realm, as from all French territory, men in disagreement demanded his arbitration. Henry III and his English barons did likewise in 1264.

His intolerance

In one respect, only, do the doings of St. Louis repel us today. He persecuted the Jews [9] and he pursued blasphemers, as criminals under the common law, with implacable severity, which was thought excessive even by the bishops of the time.

[9] The imposition of the *rouelle* upon Jews in 1269 is often attributed to Louis. The *rouelle* is a wheel or circle of conspicuously coloured cloth which had to be worn on the clothing. In reality he did no more than regulate its use, which in Paris dated from the beginning of the thirteenth century. He declared that the *"layman, when he heard the Christian law aspersed, should defend it only with his sword, which should be delivered into the stomach as far as it would go."* He ordered many Jewish books to be burnt, and on many occasions the fire that received the manuscripts received the men too. This the king believed to be well done. In the Jews he pursued the *usurer* as much as the *enemy of Christ*. For the same reason he harried the lenders and traffickers in money who are known as the *Lombards*. These severities, solaces to his conscience, were not always salutary to commerce.

His intolerance was in perfect logical consistency with his faith: his conscience declared that it was his duty as king to turn his subjects to the ways of eternal salvation, even more than to govern them well according to their earthly interests.

E. *The government*

Its spirit and tendencies

His government was inspired by the same principles as his politics: never to lose sight of any man's rights; never to forget to care for his own and others' eternal salvation. He never attempted to trouble the feudatories about such of their usages as were not prejudicial to peace and just law. Thus, far from intervening in the quarrels of the baronage in order to profit by them, he always endeavoured to prevent or to appease them. Yet he never acquiesced in the commission of an injustice by any of his own defendants, and however high the place of the delinquent he would call him to account and inflict punishment. He forbade private war, judiciary duels and tourneys, as deeds of violence contrary to divine law and canonical prescription.

1. Desire for peace

Institutions of peace

On the other hand he developed and strengthened all practical institutions through which the peaceful or oppressed could obtain protection or redress: the *quarantaine du roi* and the *assurement*. Feudal custom decreed that when two barons came to blows, their relatives up to the fourth degree were willy-nilly, involved in the quarrel: the *quarantaine* guaranteed them against aggression for forty days, which they might utilise for withdrawal from the dispute. The *assurement* allowed a man who was molested or ill protected by his lord to appeal for the protection of one more powerful and, especially since Philip Augustus, for that of the king. Within the same order of ideas, St. Louis gave a greater importance than had hitherto been attached to it, to the *avouerie du roi*, not to make adherents for himself from among his arrière-vassals but in demonstration of his position as the born protector of the weak. He likewise encouraged the practice of *appel au roi*, which affirmed his position as supreme judge, thus increasing the number of *cas royaux* (royal cases)—that is, interventions

of the king's justice in private cases, which came under seigneurial jurisdiction, in every case where the authority or dignity of the king could be engaged or interested. In all this, St. Louis, there is no room for doubt, acted in the right of his responsibility as king, and solely for the public good, with no disposition to enfeeble the authority of his feudatories; nevertheless it provided his successors with a means of action against the seigneurs of which they freely availed themselves. The multiplication of these "royal cases" particularly, will be, in the time of Philip the Handsome and his sons, a thorn in the flesh of the seigneurs, who will vainly endeavour to obtain from the king's jurists a precise definition of "a royal case" such as will afford some protection against the encroachments which, as experience had taught them to fear, might endanger their independence.

Consequences of this policy in regard to justice

St. Louis was not the man to give them willingly similar causes for disquiet. Certainly he never protested against the doctrine which the *royaux* (royal agents) [10] sought to establish throughout the kingdom at that time; that the king is the sole source of all justice, the judicial powers being merely delegated by him to the seigneurs as mere reflections of those of the sovereign judge. Yet he never incited his agents to press his interests to the detriment of those of the seigneurs. He showed himself, on the contrary, always ready to moderate their zeal and to restrain their activity.

2. The king and the barons

The principle which he applied in his relations with seigneurial feudalism "*to each his right and each within his right*" he also applied in his relations with the Church, and, in such measure as depended on himself, with the towns; this last, however, subject to certain reservations.

He protected the Church against all violence; he defended her against all encroachments, even those of the royal agents, but he did not allow her to override him and he never gave

3. The king and the Church

[10] The name given at that time to all the king's agents, civil or military.

up to her any of his rights. His respect for the pope did not diminish his firm determination to resist him when he abused his authority. Neither the temporal claims of the pope nor his fiscal incursions upon the clergy of France obtained his concurrence. Some of the fifteenth century partisans of the temporal independence of the "Gallican Church" have considered him the author of a "Pragmatic Sanction," a formal declaration which affirms the rights of the crown as against the pretensions of Rome. Modern investigations have shown this document to be spurious, a forgery cleverly corresponding to the spirit which really animates the ecclesiastical policy of the sainted king.

The monks

The monks, however, he both loved and favoured, especially the mendicants, Franciscans and Dominicans; his confidential servants were often chosen from among them, and they were allowed to invade the Universities. He favoured as far as he could the organisation and extension of the Dominican Inquisition against heretics.[11] As a matter of fact these intimacies with the regular clergy were not altogether pleasing to his subjects; they elicited from his people in general some sufficiently lively expressions of disapproval. The monks, at that time, were by no means popular. He, however, remained quite unconcerned.

The *Inquisition*

4. The king and the towns

To the towns St. Louis showed less benevolence than has been for some time generally believed. He allowed the communal administrations to continue their regular work without making any open attempts to encroach upon their rights; but he placed the control of their finances under his own agents, undoubtedly not always in their interest, his demands for money being large. Further, by a singular paradox, the considerable increase of influence acquired by the bourgeoisie during his

[11] In principle the seeking out (*inquisitio*) of heretics was in the province of the bishops; but the pope did not succeed, in spite of his reiterated objurgations, in seriously interesting the episcopate of the south of France in the pursuit of the Cathari. He had the idea of establishing a special organisation for research and repression. After numerous experiments and diverse attempts he decided to put the matter in the hands of the Dominicans in 1233. Supported by solid privileges, the *Inquisition* was gradually organised and extended to all France.

reign reacted against communal independence. The king chose many of his councillors from among the bourgeois—judges, bailiffs, seneschals; these men, armed with recognised authority, collaborators with the sovereign in work which concerned the whole kingdom, showed themselves hostile to communal particularism. More royal than royalty, they bettered his instructions in spite of himself. In particular they set themselves to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the municipalities to the profit of that of the king, which meant, in actual fact, to that of their own. In this point at least they went beyond the king's will, and the *enquesteurs royaux*, a kind of *missi dominici*, who at this time were rising into a new importance, could do no more than to compel them not to abuse their power over the lesser folk and to remain in some degree honest.

Action of the king's agents

By a kind of acquired momentum the governmental institutions which we have seen sketched out under Philip Augustus continued under his grandson to become defined and established; they provide the road upon which the monarchy will travel towards its future. The centre of government is always the king's household (the ancient *palatium*), in which clerics and knights (the ancient palatines) follow the king on his many journeys. These, the king's men, compose his councils, hold his offices in the diverse districts of his domain, and act as his inspectors (*enquesteurs*). At first sight there is no change from the ancient practices of Frank royalty. Nevertheless, three specialised departments may be seen arising in the *curia regis:* the *Great Council*, occupied with general governmental business; the *Parliament*, occupied with justice; and the *Court of Accounts* which deals with finance.[12] The same councillors largely participate in all three, but there are, at any rate, per-

5. Development of governmental institutions

The household

Departments of the *curia regis*

[12] In actual fact, I anticipate a little, for clearness, in regard to the three terms employed. These are still uncertain in the thirteenth century. Thus the word *parlamentum*, signifying the place or the occasion of speaking on some subject, is still applied to the meetings of the *curia*, which deal with quite other matters than justice.

manent commissions, to whom definite departments are assigned, and which form an interesting development. It is already seen that the judiciary section tends to sit in Paris and that its members fall into two very different categories; one of the great seigneurs, lay or clerical and the higher crown officials, the other of professional lawyers, the *legists*. The latter more and more take over the really useful and necessary work, so much so that in time the former cease sitting altogether, except on exceptional occasions and when the king himself attends.

The *Parliament* and the *legists*

6. General survey

For its time, the government of St. Louis was a good government. It had real concern for the welfare of the governed.[13] Its finances balanced perfectly; its credit, strengthened by a sound coinage, remained firm even outside France. The king's honesty was a premium everywhere.

Contemporary opinion

The subjects of the saintly king did not commend all his deeds or praise all his intentions. The public and private manifestations of his sainthood often seemed to them excessive, and there can be no doubt that more than one of the priests and knights of his household found him somewhat behind the times in his naïve fanaticism. All, however, understood how exceptional was his goodness and his devotion to the common weal, all appreciated the benefits conferred by a government so resolutely equitable and benevolent.[14] No king was ever more re-

[13] From this point of view, by no means that of the feudal lords in general, special interest attaches to the ordinance of 1254, intended to hinder malversation, exaction and abuse of power on the part of the *baillis*. We have proof that the king took a hand in its application.

[14] The time of St. Louis must not be regarded as wholly idyllic. No one man, however active, could by one effort put down all social abuses, transform inveterate evil instincts and evil habits, abolish all causes of poverty. In 1251, when the news of the disastrous failure of the king in Egypt was spread abroad, a singular movement caused a rising of the country folk in the northern portion of the kingdom. Bands of shepherds, herdsmen (*pastoureaux, pâtres*) responding to the appeal of a visionary, called the *Master of Hungary*, assembled with the intention of going to the rescue of the Crusaders. They began by roughly handling the priests throughout the State. The inevitable excesses of these *pastoureaux* provoked a reaction against them, directed by the government of the regent, Blanche. The *Master of Hungary* perished in a

gretted; his death threw the whole kingdom into mourning. A lament, entitled "*Les Regrès du roy Looïs*," gives charming expression to the depth of this feeling:

Je dis que droit est mort et loyauté éteinte,
Quand le bon roi est mort, la créature sainte,
A qui se pourront (désor) mais les pauvres gens clamer,
Quand le bon roi est mort, qui tant les sut aimer.[15]

Conclusion

Under him Capetian royalty had lost nothing of the strength which it owed to Philip Augustus and to Louis VIII, and had gained in addition an incomparable moral authority throughout all France and a prestige which covered all Christendom.

skirmish and his bands dispersed. It has been suspected that this movement attests the misery of the shepherds as much as it does their faith. It still remains obscure for us.

[15] Right I say is dead, and loyalty has fled,
Now the good king is dead who was a holy saint,
Who now will harken to the poor man's plaint,
When he who loved the poor so, the good king, is dead.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography and General Survey: Ch. V. Langlois, *Saint Louis* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iii, second part), chs. i to iv inclusive, book iii entirely.

On Blanche de Castille: E. Berger, *Histoire de Blanche de Castille*, 1895.

On Joinville: G. Paris, in *Histoire littéraire de la France*, book xxxii, 1898.

On the Growth of the Domain: Longnon, *La formation de l'unité*, lessons viii and ix.

CHAPTER XI

THE NEW ORIENTATION OF THE CAPETIAN MONARCHY. PHILIP THE BOLD. PHILIP THE HANDSOME AND HIS SONS (1270-1328). THE EXPANSION OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

I

Philip III the Bold (1270-1285)

The man: his character, his entourage

PHILIP III, called *the Bold*, kept aside and under tutelage during the reign of his father, was in fact wanting in both insight and energy. Fortunately his reign was not long (1270-1285). Besieged on one side by his mother, Margaret of Provence, eager to play a part always forbidden her by the late king, and on others by his wife, Mary of Brabant, his uncle, Charles of Anjou, and his favourite, Pierre de la Broce, the plaything of intrigues whose threads escaped his grasp, he could neither make a decision nor insist on its execution. The ancient councillors of St. Louis, however, who still held their posts, did their best to limit as far as possible the harm done by the rivalry of the two queens and the incapacity of the king. It was they who, by prompt action, secured possession of the heritage of Alphonse de Poitiers,

Territorial dispositions

who died without issue, in 1271; Poitou, Auvergne, Agenais, Quercy, Albigeois, the county of Toulouse, and part of Provence reverted to the Crown. The *comtat Venaissin*,[1] formerly ceded to the Holy See by Raymond VII under the treaty of 1229, which had settled the Albigensian question, and retained by the count as a fief of the Church, was returned to the pope in 1274. In the same way the King of England recovered some of the fiefs secured to him under the treaty of 1258.

[1] The *Comitatus Vendescimus* takes its name from the borough of Vindasca, thirteen kilometres from Carpentras; today it is called Venasque.

General policy

At the instigation of Charles of Anjou Philip made an attempt to become emperor, but his candidature, weakly supported, did not succeed, Rudolph of Hapsburg being chosen in 1272. This failure is not to be regretted; it saved France from a hazardous adventure. A more happy political thought was to pave the way for the annexation of Navarre, on which the Kings of England, Aragon and Castille all had their eyes. In 1275 Philip III succeeded in engaging his second son—the future Philip the Handsome—to the heiress of the little Pyrenean kingdom. Unfortunately Spanish policy was a hornet's nest with which it was not wise to meddle, the more so since it was complicated by a host of questions interesting to Italy, Sicily and the Byzantine Orient, in which the uncle of the king, Charles of Anjou, already King of the Two Sicilies [2] and full moreover of Oriental ambitions, thought himself entitled to a voice. Philip allowed himself to be led by the Angevin party, aided by the pope, Martin IV, into an expedition against the King of Aragon. It was represented as a crusade, the pope having pronounced the forfeiture of Peter of Aragon; in reality it was a campaign for conquest; the vacant crown would fall to one of the "Children of France." Charles of Anjou and Martin IV had both recently died (January and March, 1285) when the army set out (May). It suffered a severe defeat and Philip lost his life during the retreat at Perpignan (October). This attempt at expansion, thoroughly feudal in spirit, had proved as impolitic as it was unscrupulous. It was a discreditable end to a reign both inglorious and unprofitable for the monarchy.

The campaign of Aragon

Death of the king

II

Philip IV the Handsome (1285-1314)

Philip IV the Handsome is undoubtedly one of the celebrated princes of the Middle Ages; his reign is commonly considered a turning-point in the development of the French

A. *The man*

[2] The name given to the territories of Naples, southern Italy and Sicily.

monarchy; yet of his personality we know little. Was he a man of high courage, active and enterprising, or an incapable sluggard? Was he the author of such achievements as distinguish his reign, or did he leave all to his entourage? We have no means of knowing with any certainty. Only this is certain, that his contemporaries had a general impression that he lacked personality and authority, and was led by councillors who had possessed themselves of his confidence. A bishop of his time said of him, "*Our king is like the Great Owl,*[3] *the most handsome of birds and good for nothing. He is the best looking of all men, but all he can do is to look and look and say nothing.*" He added that the king was a statue rather than something alive. Historians, in the absence of trustworthy and circumstantial evidence, have ordinarily judged him by the results of his reign, a not wholly judicious procedure: its work may have been none of his own doing, and he may have neither anticipated nor intended the most notable of the achievements for which credit is given him.

His entourage

We are no better informed as to his entourage. The only one of his familiars whose physiognomy is shown to us at all distinctly is his brother, Charles of Valois, an enterprising prince, but needy and burdened with a large family (he had four sons and ten daughters). Near to the throne as he was he never seemed in the least aggrieved at not being king himself, but served his brother and after him his nephews with constant fidelity. Of Philip's other councillors their contemporaries have spoken much evil; they are mentioned as men of no account, little lawyers raised to an unhoped-for preeminence, nobles of recent creation; and above all as men without morality. These aspersions, perhaps deserved, do not compensate us for the details which we lack. Pierre Flote, Guil-

[3] The owl in question is the *Great Owl* (*Bubo maximus* or *ignavus*), the largest of our nocturnal raptores. Its eyes are of a magnificent golden hue, but in daylight they remain motionless and are devoid of expression.

laume de Nogaret, Enguerrand de Marigni, are the best known of these confidential servants of the king and we know almost nothing of their careers. We know only that the two former are *legists*, masters in the law, Southerners, one from Auvergne, the other from Toulouse, who have studied Roman law at Montpellier, and that the third is a Norman, who became, we do not know by what paths, Philip's minister of finance, and, towards the end of his reign, almost his coadjutor. Nothing but their names is known of several other familiars of the king.

The spirit of the legists

On the other hand, we see distinctly that these legists hold, on the principles of Roman law, a high conception of the nature of both kingship and king, that they are steadfast in their efforts to apply it in practice, and that they are not much encumbered with scruples. They act accordingly in a spirit quite opposite to that of St. Louis, they seek the king's profit, not justice; the advantage of the royal authority, not the interest of the people. They are fanatics who do not hesitate at violence, and they are inaccessible to pity.

Our view of the reign

When we say of Philip the Handsome that he did this or that, we must be understood to mean what was done, during his reign, by himself or by those who acted in his name; for us all initiatives and decisions remain indivisible between them. It is difficult, too, to know whether they pursued a policy in which foresight was accompanied by wise adaptation of means to ends, or whether they merely followed events and took advantage of opportunities. We can only conclude that certain episodes occurred and were treated under Philip the Handsome in a certain spirit. Nevertheless a close examination of them will probably give us a sufficiently accurate idea of the general aspect of the reign.

B. *Foreign policy*

Its general character

The student of the reign of Philip IV cannot fail to be struck, in the first place, with the activity of his foreign policy, its extent and its complexity. It seems to concern itself with all Christendom and always with profit in view. If it is occa-

sionally diverted for a moment to some indiscretion, such as the project to acquire the imperial crown, it never pursues it for long. Thus it was with the project of the crusade. Twice the king showed an inclination to take part in it; he had seemed determined to set his hand to the sacred work in 1307 and in 1311; but then came his desire to provide justification beforehand for a design that he had formed for laying hands on the wealth of the *Templars* (October, 1307), or again he desired to levy *tithes* upon the clergy. At no moment, as far as can be seen, had he the least intention of embarking for Jerusalem. This practical and realistic policy was followed whenever opportunity offered a prospect of gain or conquest.

(a) Settlement of the question of Aragon

His first concern was to liquidate the expedition of Aragon so unhappily handled by Philip III. Parleys and negotiations took up nearly ten years; in the end a treaty was signed (1295) which was not very promptly put in force but which wiped out the unfortunate "crusade of Aragon." Philip entered into diplomatic relations with the Spanish kingdoms; he no longer allowed himself to be personally involved in their disputes. He did similarly in Italy, where his brother, Charles of Valois, conducted a great agitation for equal shares with the pope, without conspicuous success.

(b) The question of Guyenne

Of greater interest to the French king was the acquisition of English Guyenne and its dependencies. The occasion was not unfavourable; Edward I, at grips with the Scottish and Welsh, far from certain of the English nobility and still less so of the Aquitanian barons, could not in any case long hold out against Philip. Well aware of this, he made efforts to keep the peace. Some obscure skirmishes between seamen of the two allegiances frustrated his good intentions. After negotiations in which each side accused the other of bad faith, Philip seized Guyenne (1294-96) and Edward started to organise a huge coalition against him. This was disintegrated by the gold and

the diplomacy of France before it had well got to work. Only the Count of Flanders moved, and he was vanquished before Edward landed at *l'Écluse*. Philip, for his part, found himself incapable, for want of money, of pushing his advantage. A truce was signed (1297) which after long and complicated negotiations became the *treaty of Paris* of the 30th of May, 1303, and restored the position of 1293, the Capet giving up Guyenne, which, incidentally, had not found him an easy master and had already embarked on serious agitation against his rule.

(c) The question of Flanders

Before the development of his quarrel with Edward I had led Philip to make war in Flanders, he had already contemplated action in that country, which had been the great temptation for the politicians of his house from Philip Augustus onward. Flanders had become the chief centre of "international" commerce for northern Christendom, and at the same time the centre of the weaving industry; much wealth had accumulated; opulent towns had sprung up, Ypres, Douai, Lille, Gand and above all Bruges, the great market for the Hanseatic towns in that region, the most frequented port, and the most active industrial city of the West. In each town a powerful patriarchate of burghers had become established, which, having wrested from their count—often a foreigner through the chances of feudal succession—far-reaching communal concessions, oppressed the weaker community of artisans. At the time now reached, the count and the small folk gladly combined forces against these great burghers, who on their side retorted by seeking the friendship and support of the French king, high suzerain of their count. For this reason they were called *Leliaerts*, men of the lily, the lily being the heraldic flower of the Capets.

Wealth of Flanders

Interests and parties concerned

The count—at that time Guy de Dampierre—naturally bringing in the King of England to counterbalance the King of France, had arranged in 1294 for a marriage between his

The policy of the count

Trouble with the king

daughter and the son of Edward I. For this reason Philip the Handsome, having enticed him to Paris, imprisoned him in the tower of the Louvre—a vassal could not legally marry his heirs without the assent of his sovereign. Quickly released by the intervention of the pope, the count made an alliance with Edward, who promised him the assistance of a large army. Philip did not give him time for its arrival. Charles of Valois promptly conquered Flanders in 1297, and in 1300 the king visited the country, convinced, no doubt, that it was definitely in his possession. It was imperative that no step should be taken without the greatest circumspection and tact. The French treasury, however, showed no discretion in its demands. discontent rapidly assumed among the not overpatient Flemings the attributes of a popular agitation. A leader was found: a certain *Peter Coninck* (Pierre le Roy), a man of low position and unimpressive appearance, but active and enthusiastic. On the 18th of May, 1302, the French, taken unawares, were massacred at Bruges, an occurrence known as the *Matins of Bruges*, a pendant to the famous *Sicilian Vespers* of March, 1282. All Flanders except the commune of Gand rose in revolt. A great French army, raised for its subjection, foolishly contrived its own defeat by the Flemish foot soldiers at Courtray (July 11, 1302). This costly disaster, which a little tactical caution would have avoided, shows the military incapacity of a chivalry too prone to temerity and too accustomed to rely on individual prowess in war. Two years later, Philip in person took a partial revenge at Mons-en-Pévèle (August 18, 1304).

Conquest of Flanders

Exploitation of the country and revolt

Peter Coninck

Battle of Courtray

Mons-en-Pévèle

Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge

Flanders was none the less lost. By the treaty of Athis-sur-Orge (June, 1305) the king restored the country to the heirs of Guy de Dampierre in consideration of a large war indemnity, various compensations for the Matins of Bruges and for the revolt, and the placing *en garde* (in custody) of the castellaries of Lille, Douai and Orchies, corresponding to our

Settlement of the question

French-speaking Flanders. This was a small return for a great effort.[4]

(d) The effort of Philip eastwards

By his marriage with Joan of Navarre, heiress to Champagne, Philip the Handsome had entered into possession of the domain of Champagne, then very extensive and most complicated. For one part of its fifty-four castellaries and provostships, that outlying on the east, the Count of Champagne was vassal to the emperor. This was one reason for the attention given by the king to this region of *Francia Media*, which, though it had in the end fallen into German hands, might well be recovered by the heir of Charles the Bald. His diplomacy was indeed most diligent. It won a number of small successes which extended his suzerainty as far as the Meuse and the Saône. The latter river was even crossed, and the king established his second son in Franche-Comté. He also acquired Lyons and the Vivarais.

The question of the imperial crown

His contemporaries thought that he had visions of the imperial crown. This is not altogether certain, though at that time such a pretension would not appear unnatural. In any case he supported the candidature of Charles of Valois in 1308, and that of his son Philip in 1313 without any success. If, as was said, he wished to recover at least all the kingdom of Arles and Burgundy, he did not succeed; but he turned Capetian policy to acquisitions indispensable for the territorial unity of the kingdom, which was to be most unfortunately neglected through the short-sighted foolhardiness of the Valois.

(e) The acquisitions of Philip

Philip added to his domain the county of Chartres (1286), the counties of the Marche and of Angoulême (after 1303), the county of Bigorre (1292), besides the episcopal counties of Cahors, Mende and Le Puy, by contracts of *pariage* (sharing) with their respective bishops—to mention only the prin-

[4] It must be noted that the three castellaries acquired did not remain long attached to the crown. Charles V gave them to his brother, Philip of Burgundy, on the occasion of his marriage with the heiress of Flanders in 1369.

cipal instances. These are considerable gains. Altogether, admitting that he did not attain all his aims, he may undoubtedly be considered to have by no means wasted his time, and to have contributed effectively to the territorial constitution of France.

(f) Conflict with the pope

It was elsewhere, however, that he won his greatest victory. He did what the Emperors of Germany and the Kings of England had failed to do; he subjugated the pope and even made him move to Avignon and there held him in practical servitude.

1. Its origins

The starting-point of this conflict was a vulgar question of money. The king had become accustomed to count upon taxes levied upon the clergy under the pretext of a crusade. In principle the clergy were under no obligation to pay; in actual

The question of money

fact their provincial synods voted tenths (*décimes*) with more or less good grace, and the pope kept his eyes shut. It was only because Philip the Handsome somewhat abused this lenity by raising a claim for subsidies in view of an imminent war with England in 1294 that he provoked certain recriminations which were carried to Rome, and since the pope was then

The question of character

Boniface VIII obtained a hearing there. It is incontestable that the headstrong and authoritative character of the pope, with his claims to both temporal and spiritual supremacy over all Christendom, largely contributed to turn a difference into a quarrel; the main points at issue were by no means new, and could with a little good will on both sides have been perfectly adjusted. To say the truth, the king for all his piety was in no way inclined to bow before the Roman claims, and he was surrounded by men no less obstinate in their principles than Boniface himself, not less violent, and shrinking at nothing to get their own way.

2. The first phase

The question of the tenths (1296-1298)

The pope having, then, received complaints from various French clerics, set forth the Roman doctrine in the bull *Clericis laicos* (February 24, 1296): the princes must not exact, the clergy must not pay, any tax without the authorisation of the Holy See. Philip retorted by forbidding the export of gold

and silver from the realm (August 17), thus cutting off at one blow the revenues drawn by Rome from the French churches. Boniface commented on this decision in angry and menacing terms in the bull *Ineffabilis amor* (September 20); he exceeded all measure. Royalist indignation found vent in violent pamphlets, developing the thesis that it was just that the clerics who lived in the realm should contribute to the realm's defense. For this occasion, and against all expectations, the dispute came to an abrupt end: the pope gave way; he allowed the king to raise the tenths without further authorisation "*in case of pressing necessity*," leaving the king to decide when necessity arose. This obvious retreat, of a kind to encourage Philip, was explained by the fact that Boniface found himself at grips with the Sicilian Aragons and with the powerful Roman barons, the Colonnas, an alliance of whom with the French he dreaded. Moreover he lacked money. Inwardly he cherished a resentment for his failure which the King of France appears to have made no effort to appease (1298).

Settlement of the dispute; the pope gives way

Next Boniface, with the defeat of the Colonnas and with the extraordinarily enthusiastic celebration of the Jubilee[5] in 1300, was seized by something like a delirious megalomania which robbed him of all prudence and sense of reality. Although he had once seen the court of France with his own eyes and had but received as visitors Pierre Flote and Guillaume de Nogaret, he does not seem to have appreciated the danger he ran; on the contrary he gave way to an ill-considered exaltation which led him to proclaim his right to supremacy over all kings and kingdoms, and the bounden duty of the faithful, whatever their station, to "*bend the neck to his yoke*"

3. The second phase (1300-1305)

Exaltation of Boniface VIII

[5] The Jubilee was a Jewish usage under which every fifty years recurred a feast of pardon, restitution and reconciliation (cf. *Leviticus* 25, 10). Boniface VIII, by the bull *Antiquorum*, conferred plenary indulgence on all persons who should attend the churches of the Apostles in 1300, and determined that this should recur every hundred years. This indulgence is known as *the Jubilee*.

(*colla submittere*). If he had felt no need of Charles of Valois in Italy he would not have refrained so long from applying to his brother the great principles which he had now professed. His only difficulty was to choose among the many openings offered him by the policy of Philip and by his unabashed disregard of the claims of the Church to her own property.

The affair of Bernard Saisset

It happened that in 1301 the king's men arrested and carried to court the Bishop of Pamiers, Bernard Saisset, accused of injurious designs and of conspiring against the sovereign. To obtain his punishment by the pope, a memorandum—actually completely devoid of truth—was laid before the *curia;* but Boniface, seeing that the accused had not confessed to his guilt, ordered that he should be set free and sent to Rome, where his case would be investigated (December 5, 1301). In this the pontiff was within right and justice; but he put himself in the wrong by taking advantage of the circumstances to balance his account of grievances against Philip and once again to proclaim his sovereign power over all the princes in the world and his determination to exercise it. He announced that, by his own mouth and with the assistance of a council, God would declare what was needed for the peace, salvation and prosperity of the realm. Injurious expressions were not lacking in this manifesto, but its principal defect was its anachronism. To treat the powerful Capet king like a mere child whom a threat of the rod would subdue showed singular want of perception. The king's lawyers could ask for nothing better; they extracted from this bull, *Ausculta fili*, everything that suited their interests. One of them summarised it in an abstract, distilling, so to speak, its whole pontifical arrogance into a few drops; and this was published in the exact likeness of an authentic bull (*Scire te volumus*). We possess what purports to be an answer from the king, written in the same vein, dry and cutting, which possibly was also published. Its object, to raise throughout the kingdom a storm of opinion

Attitude of Boniface VIII

The bull *Ausculta fili*

The king's legists exploit it

against the pope, was perfectly attained. An assembly of barons, clerics and bourgeois, in which historians identify *the first States-General*, met in Paris, and on April 10, 1302, after a speech from Pierre Flote, pronounced the king in the right.

Appeal to public opinion

The first States-General

Boniface was wildly angry, and as during these events Pierre Flote had been slain at Courtrai (July 11, 1302), he summoned the council which he had announced and thence fulminated the bull *Unam Sanctam*, which, without mentioning the King of France by name, developed the celebrated doctrine of the *two swords*, spiritual and temporal, one wielded by the Church, the other entrusted to princes, solely for her service, with the consent and according to the will of the pope; the conclusion being that every human being, to attain salvation, must humbly submit himself to the Roman pontiff. These pretensions were not new, but they had never taken so aggressive a form and they had never appeared so inopportune. Further they were accompanied by a veritable *ultimatum*, despatched to France by a legate appointed for the purpose, which demanded satisfaction for all pontifical grievances (November, 1302).

The bull *Unam Sanctam*

Boniface appeared so resolute to proceed to extremities that Philip for a moment hesitated. He started to discuss the reproaches of the pope point by point and replied to him in a respectful and conciliatory tone. Did Boniface think that he had no longer need to be prudent? It seems probable. In any case he declared the explanations and amends of the king frivolous and insufficient and demanded an immediate submission under pain of excommunication. Unfortunately for him Guillaume de Nogaret was entrusted with the conduct of the matter. The aged pope lacked the strength to combat so redoubtable an opponent, whose audacity quailed before no obstacle and knew no scruple. At an assembly convened at the Louvre (March, 1303) Nogaret presented a violent memo-

Appearance of Guillaume de Nogaret on the scene

randum against Boniface; then, while an astute propaganda prepared French opinion for what he was about to do and exasperated it against the diverse horrible crimes of the pontiff, he appeared in Italy escorted by acolytes ready to do anything that might be asked of them, among them Sciarra Colonna, the worst enemy of Boniface. The band entered Anagni (September 7, 1304), surprising the old man, unaware from anything that had occurred that he need be on his guard, insulted him, ill-treated him, and, in a harangue which was addressed to him by Nogaret, told him he was a prisoner and was to be taken, as a heretic, begofe the General Council which he was compelled to summon. Two days later the people of Anagni, recovering from their stupor, set him free; but the shock had been such that he died in a month, having lost his reason (October 11).

The outrage of Anagni

Benedict XI

His successor, Benedict XI, commenced proceedings against Nogaret and his accomplices, keeping the King of France, however, by a prudent fiction, outside the case. Unfortunately he died unexpectedly on July 7, having eaten some figs offered him by a nun who was devoted to him. Nogaret praised God for this miraculous mercy, with which there can be little doubt he himself had some connection.

Clement V

Victory of Philip

After a year's interregnum the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand de Got, was elected and became Clement V under pressure exerted by Nogaret himself (June 5, 1305). The new pope, yielding to a threat of a suit which would have been scandalous to the memory of the dead Boniface VIII, gave absolution to the authors of the outrage of Anagni; he had the audacity to pronounce the zeal of Philip throughout as *good* and *just* (*nos bonum pronunciamus atque justum*). Yet how could he do otherwise? He had consented to make his abode *in Avignon*, and it was from that town that he issued his amazing declaration. The victory of the king was complete and authenticated by the pontiff himself. What more overwhelming

proof of the power of the Capet king on the threshold of the fourteenth century could be asked for?

C. *The government of Philip the Handsome*

Its general characteristics

Scrutiny of the governmental instruments employed by Philip the Handsome reveals nothing which did not exist in fact or in germ in the usage of his predecessors; the institutions are those which had become established or developed under St. Louis. But what is new, at least in relation to the government of the king whose canonisation Pierre Flote had obtained from the pope, is its *spirit*. We are assisting at the restoration of "stateism" (State supremacy) by men steeped in the principles of Roman law. The feudal world could not encounter worse enemies. They seem to belong to their time only in the bitter violence which they bring to the execution of their designs; nothing counts with them but the end to be attained. No lie, no calumny, no stroke of tyrannous force, no scandal, appears to them excessive if it leads to success.

(a) The centre of government

The king's *household*

The centre of government is always the palace of the king, his *hôtel* or household, as it was then called, since the old confusion between the private service of the prince and the public service of the realm, between the domain and the State, is not yet cleared up. Thus the household still comprises all the domestics, functionaries, familiars, knights and councillors of the king. Almost all of these take part in the *curia*, which is, however, wider than the household, and consists of all the clerics, seigneurs and notable personages of every order whom the king thinks it well to summon to assist him in the conduct of business, whatever that may be. This confusion, tolerable though it might be when there was no question of anything larger than the elementary administration of a petty feudal realm, became very inconvenient in the thirteenth century and still more so at the beginning of the fourteenth in the France of Philip the Handsome. We see clearly, at that time, an intensification of the tendencies, already visible in the time of St. Louis, towards organisation, distinction between services,

The *curia regis*

(b) Personal service of the king

specialisation of departments in the *household* and in the *curia* alike. The personal and private service of the king tends to become differentiated from that of the State and to be regularised in *offices*, that is to say according to the particular functions performed (the chamber, the table, the chase, the chapel, etc.). The ancient high officials, head of the great services of the palace in the epoch of the first Capets, who owed their political importance to their proximity to the king and to the idea that their charge was a kind of fief, have lost all influence. They keep their honorific titles, but no longer fulfil any function, except the constable, whose military importance tends, on the contrary, to increase. The service of the State on the king's side, becomes organised in the Chancellory, a collection of bureaus and functionaries whose head is the *keeper of the seal* (*custos sigilli*), since there is no longer a chancellor ("*vacante cancellaria*") say the royal documents. For all that relates to current business the king consults the *curia* less and less as a whole, though some of its members are selected to form a sort of permanent council, the *curia in consilio*, called also the *majus consilium* or *Great Council*, which becomes definitive in the time of Philip the Handsome.

The offices

The State services

The great officials

The service of the State

Divisions of the curia

1. The Great Council

2. The Parliament

Clearer still is the evolution of what may be called the judicial department of the *curia*, the *Parliament* properly so called (*curia in parlamento*). At first, apparently, these are merely temporary delegations of the whole authority of the *curia regis* to a certain number of legal specialists, but in fact the same men sit in every session. This Parliament has already its record of decisions, called the *olim*, and its archives of jurisprudence which attest its real continuity. The *courts* are seen appearing the *Court of Pleas*, before which causes are pleaded; the *Court of Requests*, which receives the cases; the *Court of Inquests*, which makes inquiry. This Parliament is permanently housed at the royal palace of the city, built by St. Louis, where Philip the Handsome provided accommodation appropriate to the

The courts

ceds of this court of justice. We are not far from a regu-arised and complete institution, effectually embodying the judicial competence and authority of the king. Further, Philip as in the habit of despatching to Normandy, Champagne, anguedoc, temporary commissions of the high justice, also ffshoots of the *curia*, and forerunners of the future provincial arliaments.

The provincial commissions

The royal domain now included thirty-five baillies or seneschalries—about fifty-nine of our departments—representing considerable revenue, the more so as Philip's men showed much ingenuity in increasing it.[6] On another side all the taxes or *aids*, which feudal custom authorised the suzerain to levy in exceptional circumstances and urgent cases, multiplied exceedingly under a king of such great and costly activity. If we add the *tenths* levied on the clergy, under pretext of a crusade, or some undeniable public interest, and also the taxes imposed upon the towns, in the guise of loans, we can well understand that money circulated about the king to an extent which called for adequate control and specialised administration. For this reason the delegations to *accounts* of the *curia*, the *curia in compotis*, became established, stabilised and defined; and at the same time the *royal treasury* was organised.

3. The Court of Accounts

A government so given to enterprise and conquest needed an army more ready to its hand than that provided by the feudal *ost*. For this reason Philip tends to replace the *ost* by the *aid*—that is, compelled personal attendance by vassals in response to his call to arms by a pecuniary contribution; this measure extends equally to towns bound to furnish contingents. At the time this is no more than the *optional* replacement of obligation by a tax; but its implications clearly foreshadow changed times. The establishment of a *paid* royal army, composed of cavalry and infantry, will definitely free the king

(c) The army

[6] It was by dispositions made in 1291 and 1303 that the administration and exploitation of the royal forests were first undertaken.

Paid troops

from restraint by the ill will of the feudatories and give h policy an independence and promptitude in action highly co ducive to success. At present we are only at the beginnir of this crucially important transformation, which will n be complete till the middle of the fifteenth century.

(d) Slowness of this governmental evolution

Thus a modern régime emerges slowly, empirically ar entirely by the nature of things from the feudal matrix f the service of Capet monarchy, which has nearly realised, the end of the thirteenth century, the essentials of those the retical pretensions which appeared at the end of the tenth ce tury so immoderate and excessive. Nevertheless it would wrong to think that the feudal forces are definitely broke We shall soon be convinced that this was far from the fac But the king acquires more and more dexterity in availir himself of his feudal rights and in exploiting them in a sen that is far from being that of the feudal spirit. The be example which I can give of this method is that afforded l the first convocations of the *States-General.*

An apparently new departure: the States-General

The Capet kings, at all times, following the example their Carolingian and Merovingian predecessors, had co voked, on extraordinary occasions or in grave circumstanc large assemblies of their vassals (*curiae generales*), on t principle that every vassal owed the *aid of counsel* to his so ereign. When Philip the Handsome found himself confront with problems of foreign or home politics so particular difficult or delicate that he judged it best not to act witho the complete concurrence of his people, he convoked the gre

Occasions of their meeting

assemblies of 1302, 1308, 1312 and 1314, together with ma others of which these are the chief, so that they are treated the first meetings of the States-General. In 1302 the object w to obtain an expression of opinion hostile to Boniface VII in 1308 to obtain acceptance and approval for proceedin undertaken against the Templars; in 1312 to bring influen to bear on the decisions of the council held at Vienna to deci

the fate of the order of the Temple;[7] in 1314 to prepare for a new war in Flanders for which the king demanded from the assembly an extraordinary subvention. A bold precedent and a perilous one to the purses of his subjects!

In what way an innovation?

The novelty presented by these *curiae generales* is less in the number of their members than in the presence of deputies or *procureurs* of the towns and the countryside, specially summoned by the king and elected in the towns endowed with municipal franchises like ordinary magistrates, and in other towns by a universal suffrage. It was, of course, natural that the prince should give a large place, in these extraordinary councils, to his best allies, the burghers and the men of small estate. At the same time it is not a favour which he accords them or a right which he concedes them; it is a duty which he imposes on them, and penalties are provided for cases of evasion.

The States in relation to the king

It is otherwise remarkable that these first States-General, summoned expressly to "*do and agree to all and each of such things as the king ordains*," as he said in the convocation relating to the towns in 1302, should have conformed to his wishes quite quietly and without opposition. In 1302 they sat only once; the same was the case in 1314; as soon as they had declared that they were ready to *give aid* to the king they were bowed out, and the royal financiers proceeded, at their own discretion, to give effect to this benevolent resolution. Yet it went no farther than to establish a new principle in taxation, a matter in those times of grave import. Circumstances, no doubt, might permit a States-General to acquire independence enough to lead to attempts at limitation of the kingly power; originally the States were no more than an expedient used by the sovereign to relieve himself from embarrassment.

What they represented under Philip the Handsome

Continual need for money on the part of a government

[7] In this case the meeting was not held; its announcement had the desired effect and there was no sequel to its summons.

(e) Philip's finance

whose activity and inevitable outgoings are no longer pro portionate to the resources of the royal domain—increased though this is by the end of the thirteenth century—led Philip the Handsome into unfortunate courses. Not only did he shear the clergy as close as he could, and multiply, on every possible pretext, taxes and aids, but he sought to procure large sums by despoiling, under the pretext that they were usurers, the Jews and the Lombards, by alterations in the coinage, and above all by bringing a scandalous action against the Templars.[8]

The affair of the Templars

This order no longer fought in the Holy Land (which had been definitely lost at the end of the thirteenth century; the knights of the West, however, had long ceased to be able to do anything useful in the country)—it had engaged in finance and banking and had become greatly enriched. Stories were current about its members, inconsistent with one another, incriminating their morals and their faith, which proved only that they had become unpopular; common accusations which spring into being, always on the same lines, whenever popular opinion becomes exacerbated against a more or less close sect or corporation. Tempted by the prospect of gain the king's men collected these futilities and forged them into a terrible indictment. Templars were arrested throughout the realm (1307), and their prosecution was conducted according to the procedure of the time; that is to say, with the able assistance of torturers. The pope desired to put a stop to the deplorable business; but lacked the courage, and doubtless the strength, since the king held him in his hands, and Nogaret conducted matters with his customary brutal and cynical resolution. The pope had to accept the position, abolish the order (1312), shut his eyes to the injustice and cruelty of the execu

[8] An order of knight-monks founded in 1119 to ensure protection to pilgrims in the Holy Land. Their name comes from their first residence in Jerusalem close to the old Temple said to be that of Solomon.

ions by which numbers of innocent Templars perished and, vithout protest, leave Philip to sequestrate all the money of iis victims, whose immovable property in principle devolved ıpon the Hospitallers. The king with diabolical dexterity had howered his blows upon these unfortunates whom public reprobation abandoned to his mercy; he sheltered himself ehind the will, conformable to his own, expressed by the great ssembly of 1308, and finally obtained the approbation of the oope. Thus, though no reflecting man believed in the guilt of he Templars, no voice was raised in all the kingdom on behalf f men unjustly condemned from the lowest of all motives, heer cupidity.

III

The end of the Capets in the direct line

This voracious, pitiless and dishonest government, most alling to its subjects, made Philip extremely unpopular. The udatories, disquieted by the growing audacity of the royal gents, finally protested in such sort that the king had to romise, by an ordinance of March, 1303, not to encroach ny further on their judiciary rights, not to govern directly ieir vassals, and to seize no lands under their suzerainty ithout their assent; but the ordinance loaded these concessions incontestable feudal right with so many restrictions as to duce them to nothing. Towards the end of the reign the arons of the domain, exasperated by Philip's pecuniary exi- ncies, resolved upon resistance. Leagues of seigneurs were rmed in several provinces, Burgundy, Champagne, Forez, rtois, Normandy and elsewhere, and came to an agreement hose object was to oblige Philip to renounce his fiscal pre- nsions, not to contest his authority as king. For the moment gave way, revoking an ordinance which had just established new contribution and promising to confirm the ordinance of 303, already renewed in 1309. An illusory amend!

A. *Opposing forces*

The feudal leagues

Philip died on November 29, 1314, and made a most edify-

B. *Death of Philip*

ing end. He left no fine reputation behind him; his successo it appears, had some difficulty in arranging for the "chan ing"; that is to say, in having the usual public prayers recite for the repose of his soul. His good repute had not equalle his power, but the Capetian monarchy owed to him the ver foundation of its governmental organisation.

C. *The sons of Philip IV the Handsome*

The three sons of Philip the Handsome reigned successivel after him from 1314 to 1328; Louis X from 1314 to 131 Philip V from 1316 to 1322, and Charles IV from 1322 t 1328. None left a male heir. John I, posthumous son o Louis X, lived only a few days, and daughters were exclude from the throne. The policy and government of these thr

Their policy

princes perpetuated those of their father. They, too, had di ficulties with England and with Flanders, and were moved b imperial ambitions. Charles IV conquered Guyenne in 132 and restored the greater part of it in 1327. In Flanders ma ters dragged on as they were until 1323, when a certain Zann kin revived the enterprise of Coninck against the partisans o the king; Charles IV expressed an intention to chastise hir but did no more than his two predecessors, who could neve make up their minds about settling the Flemish problem b force. As regards Germany, Charles IV was solicited by th pope, John XXII, to take action against the emperor, Lou of Bavaria, whom the pontiff detested; the hope of the imperi crown might well form an inducement. He may have bee tempted to proceed—he probably was; but he did so with n ardour whatever, and his designs did not reach the first stag of practical execution.

Increase of the domain

We still remain, therefore, with the three sons of Philip i the political course laid down by the late king. The domai received certain additions under their rule; it acquired, fo instance, the county of the Marche (in 1327) and the Agena (in 1324). So that, at the death of Charles IV, there remaine no more than four vassals still in a position to cause anxiet

to the king: the Duke of Brittany,[9] the Duke of Burgundy, the Count of Flanders, and the Duke of Guyenne because he was King of England. It was, however, the latter who for the very reason of his standing as a foreign king seemed likely to be the first to disappear.

Feudal reaction

Its failure

On the death of Philip IV a double reaction took place in the kingdom; one against the councillors, which culminated in the execution of Enguerrand de Marigni, a victim to the hate of Charles of Valois; the other against the spirit and trend of his government, which continued the agitation already begun by the feudal leagues during his reign. The king appeared to yield to the objurgations of the malcontents, and made replies which were in reality equivocal and worth no more than those made by Philip himself. At bottom the leagues lacked courage, and above all they had no backing from the bourgeois, who feared the disorder and excesses of the barons concerned in the agitation. The leagues came to an end under Philip V. The three brothers had not forgotten the formula and the method devised by their father; they appealed to the States-General, for instance Philip V in 1317, to obtain approval of his elevation to the throne, against the partisans of his niece; in 1318 to obtain money, and so on. The States might possibly thenceforward have been able to acquire some authority and to bar the road to the despotism which was now well on its way; but unfortunately the *three orders* that composed it were far more alive to the divergences between their own interests than to the need for combined action against the king. Nobles detested clerics, who loved them no better than they were loved. Nobles both despised and dreaded the commonalty, while the bourgeois held the baronage in defiance. This disunion profited the king; in its absence he could not with impunity have run this risk of doing anything which would make his subjects realise their own strength as against himself. Finally the Capet king, on the

States-General (1317)

Why they remained the king's instruments

[9] Philip the Handsome had made the Count of Brittany a duke.

threshold of the fourteenth century, is *essentially master of his domain; he plays the part of sovereign ruler over the whole kingdom, and he holds the first place among the princes of the West.*

IV

The expansion of the thirteenth century

The thirteenth century, developing under St. Louis, Philip III and Philip the Handsome, was to realise all the hopes that attended its dawn. A form of civilisation had been evolved to which France had been a principal contributor, and in which mediaeval culture attains its zenith. Its development follows that of the king's authority and of the order which it little by little enforces on the kingdom.

A. *Economic life*

As feudal wars become fewer, so life becomes easier. In the thirteenth century, for instance, there are six fewer famines than in the eleventh. The countryside is repeopled; villages, boroughs, hamlets, farms, are so multiplied that for five centuries their number will not be exceeded. The dwelling of the peasant, indeed, becomes no better, but on the other hand his movable property and his clothing are greatly improved. He begins to wear body linen. He is better fed and attends better to his person and to all that we now call hygiene. The use of tubs—that is, hot baths—spreads even in the village where it has long been forgotten, and still in our own days is not even a memory. In fact the rural villein is now born into humanity; he emerges from his apathetic brutalisation and his true qualities begin to be visible, his fluent and witty speech, his sardonic humour, his sound sense. Ideas find a home in his brain and he discovers the value of knowledge. His social position undergoes a parallel and profitable modification. Serfage largely disappears, and where it survives becomes alleviated. A class of salaried agriculturalists grows up, and different forms of cultivation of land become implanted in France, such as farming rented land (*fermage*) and farming

Improvement of the conditions of material life in the countryside

Alteration in the social condition of the peasant

for a half-share in the profits (*métayage*), which still survive and which fix by contract the respective rights of the landowner and of the cultivator. In other words, country life is restored and reorganised, a certain sign of social stabilisation.

Commerce expands. Together with the fairs of Flanders and of Champagne,[10] those of *Lendit* in the plain of Saint-Denis, those of Rouen, Caen, Guingamp in Brittany, Dijon, Carcassonne, above all those of Toulouse and Beaucaire which handle the great Mediterranean traffic, assume noteworthy importance. Rouen, Rheims, Orléans, Toulouse and Paris are, all the year round, centres of exchange whose activity grows greater and greater. Jean de Jandun, writing in 1323 an *Éloge de Paris* (a *Praise of Paris*), proclaims with admiration the wealth of its *Halles*. At the end of the thirteenth century (1292) it was reckoned that sixteen Italian trade associations were regularly represented in that town. Commerce

Industry progressed, though at a slower pace, by the same roads as commerce. It succeeded in devising a mechanism by which it could work, appropriate to the needs of the time, in the form of the *Corporation*. Already quarrels between trade and trade bore witness to the activity of the corporate spirit and illustrated the rivalries between diverse interests which, with reduction in competition, were the great drawbacks to this system of trade organisation. Fullers, cloth workers and dyers, for instance, or *lormiers* (dealers in horse furniture), saddlers and harness makers were in perpetual dispute as to their respective rights and monopolies. Industry

The greatest trouble encountered by commerce and industry was the ecclesiastic interdiction upon the taking of interest on money. In the thirteenth century much ingenuity was exercised in evading it. Jews, Lombards and even authentic Frenchmen worked hard in doing so, and with such success that usury Obstacles to economic progress

[10] In Champagne there were six fairs a year, each lasting forty-eight days, so that they nearly covered the year from end to end.

became even then a current abuse. It happened only too often that men of the Church were compromised in such matters, which did not add to the good repute of the clergy. It served as a pretext for the exactions of princes from the money-lenders. If we take into account, too, the instability of coinage and its too frequent alterations, we understand how this economic effort of the thirteenth century, interesting though it be, still remains on too many sides insufficient and precarious.

Persistence of the feudal troubles

The incertitude, no less, and some at least of the formidable hazards which weighed on the social life of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, still menace the existence of men of the thirteenth. The arbitrary violence of the feudatories, controlled in the royal domain, often survives elsewhere; in the royal domain itself the tyranny of the king's agents causes continual complaint from the beginning to the end of the century. Brigandage is not yet suppressed. The townsmen do not yet feel themselves secure enough to venture outside their fortified precincts. There they dwell crowded together, defenceless against fires, and under deplorable hygienic conditions which make the smallest epidemic a grave danger.

The towns

B. *Moral life*

Study of the moral life of the time intensifies the impression of incompleteness and uncertainty derived from that of social life, with the addition that in this domain progress appears smaller than in the others. Religion, still the main preoccupation of man, is sunk in superstition, often of the grossest kind, has a passion for the all too material cult of relics, terrifies itself with puerile and degraded diabolism, delights in stories of miracles which grow more and more extravagant. The clergy, often too ignorant to correct, as they should, these distortions of the Christian faith, are generally regarded as deficient in zeal, conscience and morality. Their unpopularity is one of the commonest themes employed in the literature of the time. Religious reflection leads to heresy with a facility at first sight surprising, explained, in reality, by this

Religion

clerical incompetence. There is scarcely any undertaking of any importance into which the devil, sorcery, magic arts do not enter from one side or another. It is a virtual obsession from which men of the thirteenth century cannot set themselves free, and which seems to enslave them in a servitude worse even than that of their ancestors of the twelfth century, since the Church, which before the thirteenth century did not take the "magic art" seriously, now begins to regard it as a grave reality. These evidences all suggest a low standard of morality, and are confirmed by innumerable other facts, without mentioning the case of the Templars, itself sufficiently weighty. The court of Philip the Handsome was the scene, at the end of the reign, of frightful scandals; the three daughters-in-law of the king were accused of adultery and imprisoned; when Louis X and soon after his son, the infant John, died, an accusation of murder, in the one case by witchcraft, in the other by a pin thrust into the head, was brought against the Countess Mahaut of Artois, mother-in-law of Philip V, who profited by the two accidents. The royal family, however, had no monopoly of these sordid tales. Poisonings, casting of spells, criminal attacks on persons and property, or accusations absolutely insane and thus the more to be feared, brought many men of high station to judgment. Something was out of joint in the mental and moral constitution of these peoples; it is the weak spot in the civilisation of their century.

Witchcraft

Scandals and irregularities

On the other hand the activity of their intellectual life merits high admiration, ill ordered and ill directed as it is, so that its fruits are commonly of poor quality. If we regard no more than its desire to know and its effort to learn, the period offers great interest.

C. *Intellectual life*

Schools are multiplied; they are found even in the villages. What they teach doubtless is not itself of great value; but there is real progress in the dissemination among the people of the idea that there is such a thing as education and that

1. Schools

it is to be respected. The functions of a university are extended, formulated and more and more definitely expressed in

University of Paris

scholastic institutions. It is in the time of St. Louis that this work is accomplished at Paris, after the promulgation of the bull *Parens scientiarum* by Gregory IX in 1231, which establishes the juridical status of the corporate university.

Faculties and nations

The four *Faculties* (Arts, Law, Medicine and Theology) are determined, and according to the origin of students the four *nations* are established (French, Picards, Normans and English). Each nation has its own organisation and its own elected chiefs; towards 1245 they give themselves a common

Colleges

chief, the *Rector*. Simultaneously the institution of the *colleges*, or houses in which a certain number of scholars are grouped and live together, is extended and perfected. The most celebrated of these, the *College of the Sorbonne*, originally intended to afford subsistence to sixteen poor students, was founded by Robert of Sorbon, chaplain of the king, about 1257; the best known of the others (Colleges of *Harcourt*, of *Navarre*, of *Montaigu*, of *Plessis*, and others) date from the end of the century or the commencement of the next. Their whole pile of huge scholastic buildings covers the mount of Sainte-Geneviève, which has become the "Latin land."

University life

An agitated and tumultuous world in itself, it is enthusiastic in all that it undertakes, and its intellectual influence irradiates the whole Western world. In the words of a contemporary, France is now "*the oven which bakes the intellectual bread of the whole world.*" Outside Paris, Montpellier, Orléans and Toulouse also possess crowded schools, and these too, little by little, organise themselves into universities in the

Spread of the French language

course of the thirteenth century. French thus becomes almost an international language "*common to all men*," says Brunetto Latini; "*more delectable to read and to hear than any other*," declares another Italian, Martino de Canale. It is in French that the books are written which men most desire to read, such

as the *Trésor* of Latini himself or the *Livre de Marc Pol*, an account of the journeyings of Marco Polo, the Venetian, in Asia.

2. Intellectual trends

The great literary movement of the twelfth century, prolific in vast epic and aristocratic poems, gradually fades away in the thirteenth; it is the more and more ascendant middle classes who provide its most interesting compositions: The *Roman du Renard*, the second part of the *Roman de la Rose* by Jean de Meung, and the works of Adam de la Halle. Intellectual fashion is for reasoning, deduction, dialectical construction. The reign of Aristotle has begun. First made known by Arab and later by infidel Latin translations of the Arabic translations, he is rendered more accurately into Latin direct from the Greek by William of Meerbecke, about the middle of the century, and the most eminent exponents of the scholastic philosophy do their best either for or against him, either to incorporate him in Christian thought or to exclude him from it.

Philosophy: Aristotle

The great scholars of Paris

Then shine the lights of Alexander of Halès, the *irrefutable doctor;* St. Thomas Aquinas, the *angelic doctor;* St. Bonaventura, the *seraphic doctor;* Albertus Magnus, the *universal doctor;* Duns Scotus, the *subtle doctor.* All were foreigners, but all studied and taught in Paris. After Aristotle came his Arabian commentators, above all *Averroës*, whose Aristotelianism pushed to its extreme logical consequences became terribly dangerous to the Christian dogma. It was at Paris, too, that the great battle was joined about the theses of the Arabian philosopher, much extolled by Siger of Brabant.

Averroës

The tide of mysticism

Side by side with this powerful effort of reason which seeks to embrace God and the universe, a great stream of mysticism begins to flow. It is at Paris that appeared, in 1254, the famous *Eternal Gospel*, which gives expression to the reveries of the *Spiritual*, and forms one of the poles upon which thirteenth century thought turns, and the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, which is at the other extreme. Between the two

lies, if one may say so, the vast encyclopaedic compilation of Vincent de Beauvais, the *Three Mirrors* (*Speculum triplex* or *majus*), in which is set out, without criticism, by a Dominican not in any sense free from theological preoccupations, all that the contemporaries of St. Louis believed themselves to know upon nature, science, letters and history.

Science

Science properly so called is held in high honour. That is it becomes the subject of much discussion and of sincere aspiration. But the scientific spirit is entirely lacking; no one knows how release can be won from the rule of time-consecrated error by direct positive experiment; the prejudices and absurdities handed on by one author after another of the "popular wisdom"; that is to say, all the incongruities of folklore, are perpetuated in all the *Bestiaries*, *Lapidaries*, *Computations* and *Books concerning the Properties of Things* which claim to describe nature.[11]

Roger Bacon

The exception, which really commands our admiration, is afforded by Roger Bacon (1214-1294), an English Franciscan who had a genuine sense for science and experiment and could appreciate the futility of the dialectic of the scholastic philosophers and the emptiness of their knowledge, has interest mainly as a curiosity. There was, however, in Paris, at the time when it was visited by Bacon, a small group of men who worked in the same vein and in the same spirit as himself, but they had no means of asserting themselves over the mighty virtuosos of speculation whom Bacon himself had the irreverent courage to declare *idiots* and *asses*, and who were in fact incapable of understanding him. The greater part of this intellectual activity of the thirteenth century is undoubtedly exhausted in steril-

General impression

[11] On this point see especially Ch. V. Langlois, *La connaissance de la nature et du monde au Moyen Age*, Paris, 1911. It is also to be noted that in spite of the lack of all scientific sense and the attachment to much error, for want of an adequate method, the men of the time were not entirely devoid of technical knowledge. We often stand astonished at the ability and boldness of their architects in the solution of the innumerable and difficult problems set them in the construction of the cathedrals.

disputations about words and in the arbitrary combination of inconsistent concepts, but it seethes with life and energy. It needs for full fructification nothing but a better method.

Artistic life has no less intensity than intellectual life. D. *Artistic life*
Art, *par excellence*, is architecture. The *opus francigenum* 1. Architecture
achieves the conquest of the Christian world from Sweden to the farthest limits of Christian Spain, and extends its sovereignty to the farthest limits of the Latin East, into Cyprus, often in the shape of a direct imitation of some one of the French churches. The twelfth century began many churches which it was not able to finish; the thirteenth century acquits itself of the task. But it is not content to follow tamely after its masters of Philip Augustus' time; it adds innovations to their work though it follows in their wake.

There is a general and dominating tendency which, more- General tendency
over, follows a course perfectly corresponding to that of monarchic unification in the political realm. The regional schools gradually lose importance; the original characteristics of their different provincial styles become less accentuated; unity, to a more or less degree, of the arrangement and aspect of buildings becomes prevalent from one end of the kingdom to the other, though not to such a degree as to extinguish the personality of the artist.

In the evolution proper of the art of building, two different The new styles
periods are discernible. During the middle of the century the *lanceolate style* triumphs, at its end the *radiating style*. Naturally no definite date can be assigned for their demarcation. The former carried boldness and science in construction to its supreme point; its vaults make one giddy. Consider that while that of Notre-Dame de Paris attains a height of thirty-two metres, that of St. Peter of Beauvais rises as high as forty-seven metres! The materials are not always of the best, yet the whole has proved perfectly stable. The latter style carried security in technique still further, but in that stage with an

attendant peril; formula and method take charge and begin to rob it of spirit, to withdraw it from life, and to taint it with mere virtuosity.

The monuments

Altogether the thirteenth century has left us the most wonderful monuments of Gothic art in existence: the cathedrals of Chartres, Rheims, Amiens, Beauvais, Bourges; the Sainte Chapelle of the Palace at Paris; the abbey churches of Saint-Denis and among civil buildings the episcopal palace of Laon, the *Merveille* of Mont-Saint-Michel, the *house of the Musicians* at Rheims, and others.

2. The other arts

Side by side with architecture, the other major arts, sculpture and painting, still essentially decorative, made also a magnificent advance, sequent to that of the twelfth century. The representation of the human form attained, under the chisel of the *imagiers* (image-makers), a truth and expressiveness hardly to be surpassed. In painting, stained glass takes the first place. It must not be forgotten that its system of coloring (vivid blues and reds enhanced with gold) is also applied to the statuary, which is polychrome. We have some difficulty in picturing to ourselves the appearance in the freshness of its resplendent youth of one of these cathedrals, which have now fallen into greyness and gloom by the lapse of time and the negligence of man.

Conclusion

The thirteenth century marks the full expansion of the civilisation of the Middle Ages under the twin aspects of art and intellect; or rather the Middle Ages have come, in the thirteenth century, to realise in perfection an original form of civilisation, essentially French in origin, and bearing convincing witness against the legend of mediaeval barbarism. This remarkable progress, developed side by side with that made in the reconstruction of the realm, the restoration of central authority, the reëstablishment of political order, the amelioration of social economy, is exclusively the result of the struggle

carried through in France by all the elements of stabilisation and union against feudal anarchy and disruption.

The constancy and the good fortune of the Capet kings, with the support of the Church and the middle class, thus find their reward. Assuredly the work of reconstruction, patiently carried on for two centuries, retarded as it has been by only a minimum of political mistakes, is far from being completed. Its imperfection is manifest mainly in the ordering of government and in the social field. But the road is laid out, the methods of progress are established and tested; two or three generations of kings like those which the thirteenth century has known were needed to reach the end of the stage now entered upon. By ill fortune the extinction, with Charles IV, of Capets in the direct line, interrupts this long tradition of wisdom and throws France into a welter of calamities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Ch. V. Langlois, *Philippe le Bel. Les derniers Capétiens directs* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iii, second part), books ii and iii; A. Coville, *La royauté française sous les derniers Capétiens directs* (in Lavisse and Rambaud, *H. G.*, vol. iii, ch. i).

On Institutions: Luchaire, *Manuel* (consult the Index).

On the Domain: Longnon, *Formation de l'unité*, lessons x, xi, and xii.

On the Templars: G. Lizerand, *Le dossier de l'affaire des Templiers*, 1923.

On Society and Civilisation: Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation*, vol. i, chs. xii-xiii; consult the table. The books already mentioned of Boissonnade and Levasseur (work and economic life); R. Schneider, Enlart, A. Michel (art), Rashdall (universities), Ch. V. Langlois, *La vie en France au Moyen-âge d'après quelques moralistes du temps*, 1908, *and La société française au XIII siècle*,[2] 1927; L. Delisle, *Études sur la condition de la classe agricole —Normandie au Moyen-âge*, 1851; Dorothy J. Mackay, *Les hôpitaux et la charité à Paris au XIII siècle*, 1923.

On Thought and Religion: E. Gilson, *La philosophie du Moyen-âge*, 2 vols., 1922; Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*, 1924; Ch. Guignebert, *Christianity, past and present*, 1927, chs. xiv to xvii inclusive.

CHAPTER XII

THE DISASTROUS STROKE OF FATE: THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR. THE DESOLATION OF THE KINGDOM UNDER PHILIP VI (1328-1350) AND JOHN II (1350-1364)

I

The advent of the Valois

A. *The situation at the death of Charles IV*

WHEN Charles IV died (February 13, 1328) he left only a daughter behind him, but the queen, his wife, was with child. He had nominated as regent, pending the birth of this child, Philip, Count of Valois, Anjou, Maine, Chartres and Alençon, brother of Philip the Handsome, whom we have already met with on various occasions. But the posthumous infant, born on the 1st of April, proved to be another daughter. At the time of the death of John I the exclusion of the female line had encountered vigorous opposition and Philip V had attained the throne only at the cost of a civil war; but since in the end the recalcitrants had resigned themselves to the principle, so that a new precedent had confirmed the first one of 1322, to the benefit of Charles IV, there was no question of deviation from what now seemed an established precedent. The barons acquiesced in its application the more willingly since the nearest male heir in the female line chanced to be the King of England, Edward III, whose mother, Isabel, was a daughter of Philip the Handsome. They agreed that daughters could not transmit rights which they did not possess, and, in virtue of the baronial privilege, recognised by the late king himself, they decided that Philip of Valois should receive the crown. His coronation took place at Rheims, on May 29. Some pressure and some threats were needed to induce Edward III to accept the accomplished fact, which he did only after a lapse of time

Election of Philip VI

and with a bad grace; but in the end he proffered *liege homage* to Philip VI for Guyenne and Ponthieu [1] (March, 1331).

The man and the king. His character

The barons' choice proved unfortunate. The new king, though a man of polished wit, pleasing manners and personal charm, was deficient in power of sustained thought and practical sense. He adopted an extravagant ideal, based on that of theatrical chivalry which his romantic imagination sought continually to realise in expensive entertainment and absurd enterprises. Rarely has a king been more giddy, light-headed, imprudent and spendthrift. Most of the princes of his family were to prove deplorably like him. They contributed, indeed, to the establishment of French supremacy in matters of fashion and taste; from the time of Philip onwards the court of Valois becomes the most brilliant social centre of the Christian world; three or four kings, those of Bohemia, Navarre, Majorca, Scotland and a crowd of seigneurs, almost foreigners, make it their ordinary place of abode; as such it was delightful. Philip and John his son seemed to contemporary eyes true "*kings of the Chansons de Geste*"; but on the other hand they unfortunately completely deserve the severe censure passed upon the French princes of the end of the fourteenth century by the chronicles ascribed to the *Religieux of Saint-Denis:* "*similes sunt gallis campanilium a cunctis ventis volvendis*" (*they are like cocks on steeples which turn to every wind*) mere weathercocks, in fact. Their political incapacity did infinite harm to France.

His entourage

B. *Before the English war*

The ten years between the coronation of Philip VI and the rupture with Edward III are marked by diverse events which exhibit the chivalrous spirit of the king: particularly an expedition into Flanders and a projected crusade. The expedition originated in an appeal from the Count of Flanders, who was not in a position to suppress a revolt of Bruges, Ypres and

(a) Expedition into Flanders

[1] *Liege homage* was the strictest form of homage: it engaged the vassal to serve his suzerain against any person whatever, except his own father. Ponthieu was the lower part of Picardy, the district round Abbeville.

Cassel (1328)

Cassel; it ended in a battle which took place under the walls of the last-named town, on the 23d of April, 1328, and was a great victory for the chivalry of France.

(b) The projected Crusade

As to the projected crusade, Philip actually assumed the cross on the 25th of July, 1332—an act quite in the tradition of the *Chansons de Geste*. Preparations, diplomatic, financial, military and even naval, were in progress till 1336, when the whole attention of the king had to be given to the English problem. Edward III was visibly negotiating with Hainault and the empire, in a manner which meant no good. In reality, he was preparing to denounce his homage and lay claim to the French crown. The Hundred Years' War was about to begin.

II

The Hundred Years' War

A. *Its causes*

Characters of the two kings

Contemporaries seem to have considered this conflict as mainly due to the character of the two kings concerned, both highly important and equally enamoured of *apertises d'armes* (feats of arms). We who have a view from a greater distance and from a greater height, can see reasons for the conflict between the two kingdoms which go far beyond the personality of their kings.

Memories of the Angevin Empire

First, we recall that the King of England, obliged to consent under treaty to the loss of the Norman, Angevin and Poitevin domains of the old Plantagenets, had never whole-heartedly resigned himself to the loss and had indeed been long awaiting an opportunity to recoup it, while the King of France, on his side, was watching for a chance to deprive England of Guyenne. In the second place, Flanders lay, like an apple of discord, between the two kingdoms. We know that, from the time of Philip Augustus, the Capets had cast envious eyes upon this wealthy land, and the prospective advantages which its possession would confer on the north of the kingdom and to the western part of the old *Francia Media*. But the Planta-

The question of Flanders

genet, naturally unwilling to allow the French king to achieve so great an addition to his power, was to a great extent bound to Flanders by economic considerations, which, in themselves, were sufficient to determine his line of action. England was at that time essentially a country of agriculturists and stock-breeders; she exported her wool, proclaimed as "*the sovereign treasure of her land*," principally to Flanders, where it was converted into cloth; a portion being returned to her across the water. This exchange established a real and close solidarity between the English wool growers and the Flemish weavers. The victory of Cassel had restored in Flanders at once the authority of her count and the influence of the French king. Edward, therefore, was considering ways and means for the establishment of a home industry of weaving adequate to his needs; this would have meant the industrial ruin of the Flemish towns, which without wool could weave no longer; but time would be needed to effect such a transformation and it seemed simpler to involve Flanders, thus menaced with ruin, in a war with France.

Its economic aspect

English wool and Flemish weavers

The two questions, much alike, created dangerous tension between the two kings. Edward III had imperative need to make certain of Scotland which had long stood out against English arms. Philip abetted and aided the Scots, at first secretly, afterwards openly, and accordingly in 1336, having received at his court the Scottish king, David Bruce, he made ready for an expedition to assist him. This was evidently a *casus belli* for the English. Their king might in some sort retaliate, by favouring the policy of balance of the Duke of Brittany, who was anxious for support which would protect his own independence from the enterprise of his suzerain. In 1340, the death of the duke, Jean III, who left no son, led to a quarrel between his niece, who was to be supported by Philip VI, and his brother, assisted by Edward III, each supporting in Brittany the very principle of succession, which he had

The question of Scotland

The question of Brittany

repudiated as applicable to himself in regard to the crown of France. Philip supported the rights of Jeanne de Penthièvre and Edward those of Jean de Montfort.

Broils of seamen

It should be added that the seamen of the two kingdoms often came to blows in the ports and on the coasts of the Channel and that these petty skirmishes came in the end to engender, on both sides, an irritation which might at any moment break out into general conflict. Such were the real causes of the war which was to begin in 1337. Contemporaries attached particular importance to the action, towards Edward III, of a certain Robert d'Artois. This personage was reputed to have played an important part in the election of Philip VI, and he imagined that Philip's favour would not fail him in any event whatever, the more so as he had married his sister. He alleged that he had been despoiled of Artois in favour of his aunt Mahaut. The Court of Peers had non-suited him in 1308 and in 1316; he returned to the charge in 1329, and proceeded, in furtherance of his claim, to lay before Parliament various forged documents, fabricated for him by an adventuress. The proceedings had hardly begun when Mahaut died, rather suddenly; followed a few weeks later by Jeanne, her daughter and her heiress. Poison was naturally suspected. The titles laid before the court having been shown to be false, the woman who confessed to forging them was burnt alive, Robert himself fled, first to Brabant, where he was reported to have attempted to revenge himself upon the king by magic; later to England, where Edward III gave him a good reception. The exile, galled by the confiscation of his property, professed repentance for having favoured the accession of the Valois to the crown of France, which rightfully belonged to the grandson of Philip the Handsome, whom he encouraged to reclaim it. Perseverance obtained him a hearing. It is possible, in fact, that it was he who determined the King of England to pretend the now inevitable war was undertaken to assert his legiti-

Robert d'Artois

His influence on Edward III

mate hereditary rights. In any case, Edward III made solemn affirmation of his claim before his Parliament on the 21st of September, 1336. A year was spent in preparation and in quests for alliances, in which both sides were active and energetic and in negotiations which only precipitated the war they were intended to prevent. On the 24th of May, 1337, Philip VI announced the seizure of Guyenne, and on the following Toussaint (All Saints' Day, November 1), the Bishop of Lincoln conveyed to him the defiance of Edward III, calling himself *King of France*. Hostilities had already started in Guyenne.

Edward III claims the French crown

The rupture

This war, known as that of the *Hundred Years*, was to last, with intermissions, till 1453. It falls naturally into four periods. 1. From 1337 to 1364, the English are victors and impose an extremely onerous treaty on the King of France; 2. From 1364 to 1380, Charles V recovers nearly all that they have gained and prepares for their expulsion; 3. From 1380 to 1429, helped by the civil war which had broken out in France, the English regain the advantage and seem to need no more than a small additional effort to become masters of the whole country; 4. From 1429 to 1453 they are reduced to abandon it completely, having definitely lost the game.

B. *Divisions of the Hundred Years' War*

At first sight the superiority in power and resources lay with the King of France. He wielded a monarchical authority, now contested by none. His realm was well peopled and highly prosperous. But, as a matter of fact, the means at his disposal for applying these twin superiorities to practical action, when necessity arose, were still uncertain and precarious. Except for the revenues from his domain, the sums derived from the law courts, and sundry taxes, he could count upon no fixed income. *Aids* and *tenths* are not to be confounded with regular taxes. Wherever he desired to raise either he must go cautiously, plead exceptional circumstances, represent that it was for this time only, and even so he could not be sure of overcoming all difficulties. The old Roman principle of public contribution

C. *The resources of two sides*

(a) The King of France

His finances

of an impost due from all citizens to the State had not yet become an accepted usage to Frenchmen. Every new tax was regarded as an injustice; it would be referred to as the *maltôte* (*male tolta*, the evilly exacted). The king's military resources were no better assured. We know that since Philip Augustus every king had sought to make himself independent of the feudal *ost* and its disadvantages by engaging mercenaries; but money had to be found for their pay, and from this point of view, the military problem was no more than a particular facet of the financial one. Further, if a war were prolonged, and additional levies became necessary, these would consist of adventurers from all parts of the kingdom and its neighbours, attracted by the proffered pay, who could only with difficulty be welded into a coherent and active army. The best among them are mounted; these are the most numerous and are known as *hommes d'armes* (men-at-arms). The inferior commonly became infantry: the *piétaille*, the foot soldiers, and those who use missiles: archers and cross-bowmen. The towns, well able to furnish dependable footmen, as far as possible evaded their obligations, and took advantage of the king's lack of money to buy themselves off as cheaply as possible. In sum when any great effort was called for, a Valois would find himself compelled to appeal to the *feudal chivalry*, habitually and supremely brave, but arrogant, undisciplined, avid of individual distinction, above all things rash, and hopelessly incapable of any manoeuvres but a headlong and reckless charge upon the foe. Even the rough lesson of Courtray had taught them nothing, and the victory of Cassel, though it had been so near to turning against them—the battle began with an unexpected attack by the Flemings—had only made them more arrogant than ever.

His army

The feudal chivalry

(b) The King of England

Edward III was not notably superior to his adversary. He was no less enamoured of chivalry, derring-do, unrest and conquest; but he was a sounder thinker and a better dissimu-

lator. His kingdom was smaller than that of France, but united by stronger bonds and more in the hands of the sovereign, whose authority had been restored by Edward I. The English nation was organizing and growing conscious of itself, while France was still confusedly attempting to find herself. It is at the start of the Hundred Years' War that the Parliament first becomes divided into two chambers and is stabilised. It is not yet an obstacle to the king but rather an auxiliary, an instrument by which he can keep in touch with his people. The nation lives easily upon the products of its soil, and, as the caste of nobles becomes gradually enfeebled and worn out, a vigorous class of free country men arises and becomes its real strength. The financial organisation of England was indeed little superior to that of France; the regular revenues of the king were no less insufficient for the needs of a long war, but Parliament, as well as special assemblies of the clergy, had been, since Edward I, accustomed to vote subsidies; and to contribute to the expenses of the State had thus become a part of English custom. Further, the system of recruiting was infinitely better than in France. All free men owed military service from their sixteenth to their sixtieth year; their armament and obligations were regulated with precision according to their means. Nobles could buy themselves off. The mass of the army, raised from among those rude peasants whose acquaintance we make in the poems of Chaucer, consisted of good infantry and superlative archers. The English bow, studied with care and perfected by experience, discharging its arrows three times as rapidly as the cross-bow, was a weapon without a peer. Finally Edward III had strictly forbidden the chivalrous sports, tourneys and jousts, which produced habits harmful in war, and had instituted serious military training in their place. For this reason he had at his disposal, at the start of hostilities, troops less numerous indeed than those of Philip, but of more cohesion, stability, better controlled by their general,

The English nation

Finance

The army

altogether much superior in military value. This English army was indeed not long in a condition to bear alone the whole brunt of the interminable war, and mercenary bands had to be added, from the same sources as those of the French king, capable of passing from one camp to the other, from one army to another, with consciences unperturbed. Yet the army of invasion always kept a sound kernel of real English soldiers.

D. *Strategy of the Hundred Years' War*

From a strategic point of view the Hundred Years' War is of little interest. It consists of multitudinous small and separate affairs, surprises, sieges of strong places, ambuscades, sudden descents and of *raids:* expeditions with comparatively small effectives which commonly passed into mere pillage and ravage and only rarely gave rise to a decisive engagement. For instance a small English force would set out from Calais with Bordeaux as its objective, or from Bordeaux to ravage Languedoc or Limousin. If no French army threw itself across its course and risked a battle the raid would have no military result. On the other hand, this method of making war was calamitous for the lowland country off which the opposing armies had to live and which they ravaged. Every strategic combination became subordinate to the problem of subsistence. Since nothing eatable would be left in a region which had been traversed by troops, it was almost impossible to campaign for two years running in the same district. Operations were transferred to districts which had not yet been exploited. During the winter, hordes of soldiers, disbanded in autumn, would go, on their own account, to seek sustenance in the provinces which the war had spared. It was in these ways that this deplorable adventure brought the prosperity of the realm so low and so completely ruined the countryside.

The raids

The ruination to the lowland country

III

The first period (1337-1364)

Hostilities at first took place only outside France. The French ships, in 1338 and 1339, pillaged the coasts of Eng-

land and Guyenne, while grave contingencies arising in Flanders attracted to that country all the attention and activity of the two kings. The weavers of Gand, exasperated at the stoppage of their trade by the prohibition by Edward III in February, 1337, of export of English wools and import of foreign cloths, rose against their count. At the instigation of a wealthy cloth merchant, Jacques van Artevelde, they entered into direct relations with the English king, with whom they concluded a veritable commercial treaty and obtained supplies of their cherished wools (June, 1338); they then received him into their country and in the end induced him to take the step of acting specifically as King of France by promising them annexations and privileges; finally concluding a complete alliance with him (January, 1340). A French army, in the preceding year, had achieved nothing. Philip's fleet showed less discretion; it gave battle before the port of l'Écluse to that which was conveying Edward himself to the country of his allies, by which it was destroyed (June 24, 1340).

A. *First hostilities*

Insurrection in Flanders

Artevelde

Battle of *l'Écluse*

A truce was concluded; but the Breton succession became open (1341) and offered to the two kings an opportunity to injure one another indirectly. For twenty years this confused question was to be disputed, and to serve as a pretext, always at hand, for the many disputes by which the great war was to be protracted. On the other side the dominion of Van Artevelde was short-lived. It had been rough and not free from insolence. The weaving population soon found it unbearable. The *Leliaerts* again took heart; the count and King Philip made seductive promises; the Emperor Louis of Bavaria, at first strongly English, had just been induced by French diplomacy to change sides (1341). Artevelde perished in a popular riot on the 17th of July, 1345, and the King of England could do nothing but evacuate Flanders in hot haste.

The Breton succession

Fall of Artevelde

For this reason he determined to attack Philip directly. He proceeded to disembark at the end of the Cotentin (July,

Edward III in France

1346), and encountering only slight resistance—an attack in this quarter having been unexpected—he started on a raid across Normandy, took and pillaged Caen, and advanced to the Seine, which he crossed, having repaired the bridge of Poissy. He had as a matter of fact committed a grave imprudence in venturing so far within the kingdom; well aware of this, and dreading a meeting with the army assembled by Philip, he fought his way northwards on a retreat so rapid as much to resemble a flight. With his foe at his heels, he succeeded in crossing the Somme, but was obliged to halt not far from Crécy,[2] where he found a fortified and strong position (August 25). The French were upon him the next day. Battle was joined almost in despite of the king and against the opinion of his wisest councillors, with troops exhausted by a long march, on ground soaked by a rainstorm, against an enemy thoroughly rested and strongly entrenched. The insane and hare-brained arrogance of the high-born knights was irresistible; there was nothing for it but to attack. The English archers won the day; Edward himself did not even have to don his helmet.

Battle of *Crécy*

Capture of Calais

Marching in short stages, and ravaging the country within reach, he proceeded to lay siege to Calais (September 4). The town, defended by a notable warrior, Jean de Vienne, held out for nearly a year and yielded only to famine and to despair on seeing Philip VI arrive under its walls and yet not dare to attack the English lines. It surrendered on the 4th of August, 1347, two days after the retreat of the royal army. The inhabitants were transported to England or expelled and replaced by Englishmen. Calais became the great *étaple* (warehouse) for English commerce on the Continent.

The pope's legate, taking advantage of the fatigue of the two opponents, induced them to sign a truce (September)

[2] Crécy was in Ponthieu; it is now a chief town of a canton in the arrondissement of Abbeville in the department of the Somme.

which, several times renewed, lasted longer than Philip's reign. The terrible epidemic of bubonic plague (the *black death*), which devastated first France, then Flanders and England in 1347, and above all in 1348 gave the two sovereigns other things to think of than the resumption of their quarrel. The Count of Flanders took advantage of this to reëstablish his authority over his subjects to the great injury of Edward III.

The *black death*

When Philip VI died, on the 22d of August, 1350, nothing was yet lost. The kingdom appeared weakened, but not to such a degree that its strength could not be rapidly restored; to balance the loss of Calais, there was the gain of the sovereignty of Montpellier bought from the King of Majorca, and that of the Dauphiné, imperial territory also bought from its seigneur the dauphin, Humbert II.[3]

The situation at the death of Philip VI

But to effect the full recovery of France, another man was needed than John II the Good; that is to say, the *Brave*. His character was that of his father exaggerated; his politic incapacity, linked with complete ignorance of all that pertains to government and war, made his natural obstinacy practically irremediable. He was furthermore unfortunate in his entourage and in the advice of men, greedy, much concerned with their personal affairs, and little with those of the kingdom. John himself thought more of amusement for himself, scattering money on this side and on that, than of retaliation upon Edward III. In politics he was a man of violent and blind decisions; his conduct was a medley of brutality and weakness, two vices which go perfectly in harness together.

B. *John II the Good* (1350-1364)

His character

His entourage

From the first he found himself at grips with new difficulties in relation to the King of Navarre, Charles the Bad, an ambitious and able intriguer, and further an eventual pretender

Embroilment with the King of Navarre, Charles the Bad

[3] From 1349 onwards, in order to avoid the appearance of annexing a territory of the empire, the eldest son of the king will bear the title of *dauphin*. It is not exactly known what is the signification of this name from which that of *Dauphiné* is taken.

to the crown,[4] whose possession of the county of Évreux placed him almost at the gates of Paris. At first the relations between the two princes were excellent; then they fell out on questions of their respective interests, and also because the Navarrais, having quarrelled with the king's great favourite, the constable, Charles of Spain, had the latter assassinated and entered into relations with the King of England, proposing a partition of France between them. Thus began the game which was to be played for a century by all enemies and rebels against the King of France: they were to appeal to the Englishman for help, hoping to profit by his intervention. On two occasions John and Charles had affected a semblance of reconciliation (1354-1355); but thenceforward they hated one another beyond all remedy.

Resumption of the war

The truces concluded by Philip VI having expired in 1351 the two kingdoms found themselves in a state of war with one another, but hostilities, retarded by the efforts of Innocent IV, who endeavoured to reëstablish peace, did not begin till 1355. The Prince of Wales, known as the *Black Prince*, from the colour of his armour, set out to ravage Languedoc. King John had long been reduced to financial straits and had not wherewith even to pay his officers. He obtained a lavish subsidy from the States-General and raised a large army; he then by a trick laid hands on the King of Navarre (April, 1356), whom he imprisoned, thinking thus to rid himself of a redoubtable foe, but effectively throwing all the partisans of Navarre into the arms of the English, whom they summoned to Normandy. Pending the commencement of the war in this region, the Black Prince, starting from Bordeaux, advanced towards the Loire, pillaging Périgord, Limousin and Berry. He had reached Am-

The raids of the Black Prince

[4] His father, Philippe d'Évreux, was grandson of Philip III, and his mother, Jeanne, daughter of Louis X; he represented thus the nearest male issue of the direct Capets. Navarre, reunited to France by Philip IV, had been reseparated in principle at the death of Louis X, to the benefit of his daughter, the mother of Charles.

boise, when the great French army came up and threatened to turn his flank; he retreated as rapidly as possible, desirous above all things of covering Guyenne. He failed to get a sufficient start and had to accept battle. He chose a good position, on a little hill, called the Plains of Maupertuis, not far from Poictiers. There John, very rashly, attacked him. The end was that of Crécy but even worse, the king being not only vanquished but also taken prisoner.

Battle of Poictiers, 1356

IV

Charles, Duke of Normandy, and dauphin, now ruled the kingdom, a heavy task for a youth of twenty. He had to face a veritable insurrection of the bourgeoisie, indignant at the blundering of the king, and the incapacity—it was added the cowardice—of the nobility responsible for the disaster of Poictiers.[5] Among the older co-workers with the king for order and good government, who realised his deplorable shortcomings, there were thoughts—among the bolder spirits, at least—of taking his place and assuming control of public affairs. That it would ever occur to the States-General to play this part was never anticipated by Philip the Handsome. They had already in 1355, out of all patience with the mad extravagance of John, attempted to subject him to supervision in financial questions; in 1356 they adopted wider aims under the leadership of two men: Étienne Marcel and Robert Le Coq.

The government of Charles the dauphin

[5] An anonymous poem, found in the cartulary of Notre-Dame de Paris, and the work of some cathedral canon, accuses the seigneurs of having purposely lost the battle in order to prolong the war by which they profited.

Quant virent que notre ost pooit ben disconfire	When they saw that our host had the English at bay,
L'ost des Anglois, se disdrent: Se alons les occire,	And could beat them, they said: if the English we slay,
Guerres seront faillies, si sera pour nous pire,	Then wars will be ended, for us an ill day,
Car nous perdrons chevanche; miex est de nous enfuire.	When we foray no more, we had best run away.

Étienne Marcel

Étienne Marcel was a wealthy cloth merchant of Paris. His family, itself of some standing, belonged to the upper bourgeoisie of the city, a class which, for more than a century, had gained, in the king's service, a practical experience of public business. Paris, as a royal fief, the king being Count of Paris, possessed neither a municipality nor a communal charter, and was administered by a provost appointed by the prince; but her *marchandise* (merchantry), that is to say, all her associated guilds and traders, had acquired exceptional privileges from the king, particularly that of electing a sort of commercial council consisting of *prudhommes* (experts), a committee of five administrators, namely four *eschevins* (aldermen) and a *prévôt* (provost), charged with the duty of seeing that the said privileges were maintained, and exercising a commercial jurisdiction. The provost of the merchants, in the middle of the fourteenth century, had in his hands the commerce, maintenance and even the police of the town. Sitting with his eschevins, his clerk and his prudhommes, at the *parloir aux bourgeois* (parley house of burghers), a sort of generalised board of trade, at once an exchange, a chamber and tribunal of commerce,[6] he came to play the part of Mayor of Paris. He acted in all circumstances as the chief representative of the privileged bourgeoisie, and of the tradesmen in face of the provost of the king. Marcel then, since 1355, had been provost of the merchants.

The provost of the merchants

Our uncertainties about Marcel

We are ill informed as to his person, education and antecedents, and are largely in the dark as to what he had in mind.

[6] This *"parlouer"* was at first a very modest dwelling in the Rue St. Lenfroy, adjacent to the Grand Châtelet, then it had been transferred to Mount St. Geneviève, near the convent of the Jacobins; a marble plaque shows its position, at the corner of the streets Soufflot and Cujas. It was Marcel who, in 1357, acquired the Maison aux Piliers (House with Pillars), a handsome building in the Place de Grève (actually place of the Hôtel de Ville); it was called *"la Meson de Ville,"* and became the centre of activities which extended far outside the domain of commerce.

We only know that his business brought him into relations with the great weavers of Flanders; it is possible that their example in some measure inspired his plans and their applications; there is something in him of Van Artevelde.

Robert Le Coq

Robert came also from a family which was bourgeois—indeed provincial: he was born at Montdidier—much less well-to-do than that of Marcel, but already raised from obscurity by Philip VI, in whose employment Robert's father had been. After study in the schools of Orléans he had gone to Paris and set up as an advocate, and then, in his turn, had entered the king's service. His career had been brilliant and rapid, in Parliament as in the Council and in diplomacy. He had also received an abundance of favours and benefices. In 1351 he had been granted the bishopric of Laon which made him duke and peer. He had then taken, towards 1354, a great dislike to John II, possibly because his ambition had worn out the benevolence of the king and had subjected him to some disconcerting reprisals—it is said, that of the chancellorship—possibly merely because Charles the Bad had found means to win him over. He possessed a wide and practical experience of politics and recognised with remarkable insight the vices and defects of the royal government. Moreover it is probable that he did not long harbour many illusions as to the probable success of the attempt in which he and Marcel participated. Conspicuous at the beginning for his energy and violence, he is to be seen, from the end of 1357 onwards, obviously hanging back from the venture; he withdraws to his bishopric, from which he can hardly be induced to return. This attitude, while not perhaps doing great honour to his courage, at any rate attests his perspicacity. One gathers that he counted for the reform of abuses more on persons than on institutions, that his aim was rather to rid the realm of the familiars of King John, than to endow it with a Great Charter, and that—rightly or wrongly—

he had more hopes in the King of Navarre than in the States-General. As far as can be seen Marcel had greater faith, greater perseverance and was probably more disinterested.

Attitude of the States in 1355

The States, as early as 1355, when Marcel had acted as spokesman for the "good towns," had obtained important concessions from the king in return for a subsidy which they had consented to vote him: they had not only determined to organise the collection and supervise the applications of the *aid* which they had granted, but they had claimed the right to deliberate and decide upon every impost which might be necessary in the future; they had secured recognition of the right to resist—in case of need, by force and by coalition among those concerned—violence and abuses of power on the part of the king's agents; they had even attempted to lay down a principle safeguarding individual liberty, which recalls the English *Habeas Corpus;* above all they had formulated vigorous and timely criticisms of the government of John II, his detestable methods and his tyrannical agents. The States of 1356, meeting on the 17th of October at Paris, showed themselves bolder still. They appointed a commission of enquiry, which, in fifteen days, drew up a formidable indictment against the king's advisers and the diverse shortcomings of his administration: an imposing series of suggestions for better government followed their list of grievances. The dauphin had to endure the reading aloud of the whole and found that it called for the establishment of two councils, both composed of members of the States, one for government and the other for war.

The States of 1356; their commission of enquiry

The *Great Ordinance* of March, 1357

Charles sought to gain time; he adjourned his reply, manoeuvred this way and that, then betook himself to Metz, in quest of help from his uncle, the emperor, Charles IV, who gave him none. Marcel took advantage of his absence to obtain control of Paris and to arm the population of the town. Thus, the dauphin on his return (January 14, 1357) could not refuse to convoke the States for the month of March. The assembly,

composed almost entirely of bourgeois, was not numerous, but under the driving power of Marcel and Le Coq, was decisive; the dauphin gave way and was compelled to sanction the *Great Ordinance* (March). This is a document of great interest and altogether highly honourable to its authors. The principal points which it asserted were as follows: the personnel of the government shall be purged, and the States shall see to the replacement of evil councillors; the States shall meet on their own initiative, and without convocation by the king, as often as may be necessary; a commission for general reform shall be instituted; its members, appointed by the States, shall work under their control; every impost shall be voted by the States, and shall be collected by their *elected* representatives; the application of the public funds shall be supervised by the States; a sound coinage shall be struck and shall remain inviolable; the troops shall be paid by the States, which shall proceed by *monstres* (musters) or reviews to verify the number of effectives; it is laid down as a principle that all the king's subjects owe him their service for the defence of the realm; and for this reason no noble shall leave the country, and all private war is strictly prohibited as long as the English war shall continue. The ordinance further surveyed the whole royal administration in all its aspects; it recounted abuses, and indicated remedies, in a vigorous effort to secure from officials of every order and degree exactitude, zeal, competence and honesty.

Its contents

It is evident that the men who drafted this document were talking in the air; they were themselves exemplars of the virtues which they demanded of the king's advisers and agents. Through their vigorous phrases may be felt their earnest care for the common weal, and their sincere desire to relieve the poor. The free air of democracy blows strong upon them and animates their work. Had they succeeded in reducing their theory to practice, in transferring it from paper into life, they might have changed the destinies of France and advanced

Spirit and significance of the ordinance

by some four centuries her political evolution, by endowing her from the fourteenth century onwards, with a monarchy controlled by the nation. Unfortunately they did not succeed, and very little reflection will show that there was never any chance of their succeeding.

Why it remained a dead letter

(a) No national unity

At that time, France had not achieved political unity; a still stronger reason was that her political education was still in an embryonic stage; there was not yet, properly speaking, any *French nation.* It must not be forgotten that, ordinarily, the Northern States (*Langue d'Oïl*) and the Southern (*Langue d'Oc*) sat in two separate assemblies and made no attempt to establish a common line of action. In fact, it was the States of Langue d'Oïl alone which made the attempt here mentioned; those of Langue d'Oc gave them no real support. In the whole country only an infinitesimal number of men were capable of understanding and approving the real bearing of the ordinance, and a still more infinitesimal number were either able or inclined to make any effort to realise its proposals.

(b) No patriotism distinct from royalism

Patriotism in the abstract, love of country for itself, did not yet exist. France was the kingdom; its bond of union was the authority of the king; its reason for existence was the king; its centre was the royal person, which men were accustomed to believe divinely instituted for their good. They were certainly able to understand that the king's agents did their duties badly, they could even recognise that the prince himself committed errors, but they were not, for the most part, capable of rising to the conception of a State in which the king's authority should be limited and directed by their own representatives; they still pictured the States as the servants and auxiliaries of the king, not as his censors and controllers. The pretensions of the ordinance, not so great perhaps as those of the memorial of 1355, since it had dropped the proposals to impose a council of government and one of war upon the king, still

appeared excessive invasions of the dignity of the crown; they smacked of insurrection and felony. The dauphin and the captive king were not unaware that these were the sentiments of the many, and they exploited them not without dexterity. About April, 1357, John despatched from England letters which asserted his sovereign rights in face of the usurpations of the States.

(c) Incoherence and real weakness of the States

The States themselves lacked both cohesion and status. First of all the clergy and nobility took no interest in the movement; they allowed the bourgeois to act, but gave them no support, their deputies even appeared more and more infrequently at the successive meetings of the assembly. Secondly the bourgeois grew tired. The towns soon found the despatch and the maintenance of the delegates in Paris a burden: the sessions, two or three yearly, came round too often and lasted too long. From one session to another the number of deputies attending dwindled, to such an extent that the impression might well be given that the matter really interested none but Marcel and the Parisians, with the friends of the King of Navarre; it thus soon assumed the aspect of a mere party manoeuvre and this did it no good. As a matter of fact the whole strength of the party of reform lay in the Parisian militia organised by the provost of the merchants. Above all the States, whose opposition, in the first instance, started from the indignation aroused by the financial extortions of the king and the abuses of his fiscal staff, were themselves obliged to vote and levy imposts. The people did not see why this was necessary; it seemed to them that if the demands for money by the prince were unjustified the subsidies claimed by the States could be no more legitimate. The *elected* of the assembly encountered much difficulty and even vigorous resistance in the execution of their duty as collectors; the prince was quick to seek credit for doing the handsome thing by prohibiting payment of the States' impost (April, 1356). In fine, the

(d) Apparent limited scope of the enterprise

(e) Their fiscal demands make the States unpopular

deputies ended by becoming highly unpopular: they exacted money even when the king had ceased to demand it!

How violence was thrust upon the reformers

Thus, and by the force of events, the reforms, being too advanced for the political education of the country, were given the aspect of mere opposition to the King of France by a handful of revolutionaries, themselves suspected of merely playing the game of the King of Navarre. For this reason, for lack of the moral strength derived from the will of the people, which alone could have given them effective support, Marcel and Le Coq were soon impelled to resort to violence and to compromising alliances, in order to defend their work and to keep it going. In this venture they soon found themselves all at sea while the dauphin knew only too well how to take advantage of their inevitable mistakes.

Marcel and the dauphin. In 1357-1358

Since the end of 1357 two parties had faced one another in Paris, that of Marcel and Le Coq resting on Navarre (who had been set free in November) and that of the dauphin, who, feigning to see nothing, waited for his opportunity which was now approaching. On the 22d of February, Marcel, thinking to checkmate him once and for all, had two of his confidential councillors murdered under his eyes; he succeeded only in exasperating him, and, not daring to prevent him from leaving Paris, finally lost the game. The young prince assembled his adherents, assumed authority, convoked the States to meet at Compiègne, reduced the provost to the standing of a rebel, and prepared to retake the capital by force. Marcel sought desperately for allies.

The *Jacquerie*

At that time (May, 1358), a vast popular insurrection starting in the region of Beauvais, and spreading in a few days to about fourteen of our present departments, in the north of the realm, created panic among the nobles and clerics: it is known as the *Jacquerie* because, in the first instance, it had been set in motion by peasants exasperated by the perpet-

ual ravages of the soldiery and the indulgence of the nobles towards the bandits. *Jacques Bonhomme* was then the nickname of the peasant. In reality the insurgent bands were not composed of peasants alone; they included the poor and miserable from all sources. Their chief, Guillaume Karle, seems to have lacked neither education nor military experience. In the whole region covered by the Jacquerie, châteaux and houses of the nobles were pillaged and destroyed and excesses more or less grave were committed on their persons. These outrages seem to have been greatly exaggerated after the event in order to justify the horrors of the repression, but they were sufficient to surround the name of the Jacques with something like a legendary aura of terror.

Alliance between Marcel and the Jacques

Marcel saw them as a popular force, which he might perhaps discipline and direct. However that may be, he entered into relation with them and even sent them a small troop of men-at-arms. Unfortunately the nobles soon regained courage: Charles of Navarre placed himself at their head, and the Jacques, deprived of their chief, taken in treason, were crushed, dispersed and horribly massacred. All was over by the end of June. The provost of the merchants, in a letter to the communes of Flanders, expressed in suitable terms the feeling with which any commonly humane man must regard this unmeasured and barbarous chastisement which had *surpassed in evil, cruelly and inhumanely inflicted, any feat of the Saracen or the Vandal.*[1] He himself was irremediably compromised by his understanding with these unfortunates, whom orderly folk regarded as wild animals; compromised, weakened and deceived.

Failure and repression of the movement

He had now no hope but in Charles the Bad, a doubtful and double-faced ally. Finding him uncertain, and with the dauphin beginning to besiege Paris (June 29), he resigned

Marcel's last effort

[1] *"Fait plus de maux plus cruellement et plus inhumainement que onques ne firent les Vandales ni les Sarrasins."*

himself to the worst; he gathered together in the town some bands of *Anglo-Navarrois*, and made offers of alliance to the Flemings, who returned no answer, and who, further, had enough to do with their own affairs without meddling with his. I say his advisedly, since, visibly, he would soon have no more to defend than his own person. Every day the royal party grew stronger in Paris; the presence of English soldiers provoked brawls of which it took advantage. In his exertions to protect these foreigners and further their escape from the town without injury, so far as that was possible, Marcel lost what was left of his popularity. On the 31st of July, 1358, he was murdered at the instigation of one Jean Maillart, in the course of a riot

His death

which still remains obscure to us. He was about to hand over Paris, it is alleged, to Charles the Bad, who had decided to proclaim himself King of France therein, and Maillart alone had prevented him from carrying his treason to its end. It is possible that despair had, in fact, pushed the provost to this deplorable extreme, and that the *Navarrism* of Le Coq had seduced him in the end; but it appears certain that he did not go to this extreme by his own will or original intent; in the last words he uttered, he affirmed that he had done nothing but for the common weal and the maintenance of the ordinances of the States.

Le Coq, who at the same time had attempted to open the gates of Laon to the King of Navarre but had failed, at least escaped a violent death. He took refuge in Spain, where he

End of Le Coq

died, in 1368, at the episcopal see of Calahorra. He had been excluded from the various amnesties which were proclaimed after the reëntry of the dauphin into Paris (August 2, 1358)

Liquidation of the whole bourgeois enterprise

and the complete restoration of the royal authority. The failure of the bourgeois was cōmplete; the only result they had achieved was the creation of a fiscal instrument, *Les Élus* (the Elected), which the king found convenient and retained for his own use.

V

Desolation of the kingdom

The realm was in a piteous state. English and Navarrese bands ravaged it, companies of adventurers of all nations made a business of plundering it. The dauphin lacked the money needed for any military effort strong enough to free his subjects from these scourges. Only here and there, local resistances, little more than hasty improvisations, put some bounds to ill doing.

The treaty of London

Peace appeared a necessity, and John himself became convinced that it was so. On the 24th of March, 1359, he signed with Edward III, in London, a treaty which yielded to the English all the western half of the kingdom,[8] from the Pyrenees to Calais, and promised him the enormous ransom of 4,000,000 gold écus.[9] The States-General, called together by the dauphin in Paris, rejected this disastrous agreement.

The raid of Edward III

Edward III thought that he could impose his own terms and prepared a raid of the first rank, but he sent it on its way too late, at the end of October, in atrocious weather. The dauphin's commanders made the country a desert before him and refused him battle. He was confined to perambulations about fortified posts, well defended, which he dared not attack; after wintering in Burgundy, he proceeded to threaten Paris, but without success; and as he was advancing towards Chartres, increasingly bad weather completed his discouragement. At the same time he learnt that there was unrest among the Scottish allies of the dauphin, and that Norman and Picard bands were ravaging the English coasts. He lent an ear accordingly to suggestions made by the legate of the pope, who made every effort

[8] That is to say Guyenne, Gascony, Saintonge, Angoumois, Poitou, Quercy, Agenais, Touraine, Anjou, Maine, Normandy, Ponthieu, Calais, the counties of Guines and of Boulogne. Edward III also received *"the entire sovereignty of the duchy of Brittany and all its appurtenances and dependencies whatsoever."*

[9] About 46,500,000 gold francs in our money.

Treaty of Brétigny, 1360

to bring him to an agreement. Conferences took place at Brétigny, not far from Chartres, which ended in a new treaty (May 8, 1360) which was ratified at Calais in October. Edward renounced Normandy, Touraine, Anjou and Maine, and consented to reduce King John's ransom by a million crowns. He abandoned also his claim to the crown of France.

Its good reception

So weary of this interminable war was the whole population of France that this most onerous settlement was received with demonstrations of joy, somewhat surprising in their heartiness, and John was welcomed almost with enthusiasm by the bourgeois of Paris when he returned to that town on the 13th of December. The execution, however, of the treaty was no easy matter; in many places, especially in Poitou and Saintonge, the inhabitants were by no means resigned to "go English," and ultimately yielded only to threats, protesting at the same time that they might consent with their lips, but with their hearts, never. The princes were still accustomed to share out their provinces like private estates and their men like flocks and herds, but by now the misery caused by the war had bred a new feeling in the hearts of the lesser folk of France, the first stirrings of patriotism, the feeling that each man had his proper place—Englishmen in England and Frenchmen in France.

Difficulties in its execution. The first gleams of patriotism

Persistence of trouble

The Navarrese and the *Companies*

The treaty of Brétigny was far from bringing peace to the kingdom. King John thought it well to become reconciled to the King of Navarre; he could not put an end to the pillage of the Navarrese. Adventurers, thrown out of employment by the treaties, did not on that account leave the country; they organised themselves into *Great Companies* for methodical pillage and lived at its expense. In the phrase of Froissart, France became the "*Chambre des brigands*," conducting a business that soon proved sufficiently lucrative, especially in regions spared by the war, to merit the attention of the most eminent bandits. Several bad harvests and a severe onslaught of the

plague, from 1361 to 1363, increased the general misery still further.

The end of John II

King John vainly struggled among inextricable difficulties; he could not get together the sum needed to pay his ransom; he could find no way to free himself from the Companies who even put his troops to flight at Brignais [10] (April 6, 1362). He had possibly some satisfaction in learning that his eldest son, Louis of Anjou, one of the hostages whom he had given to Edward III, as a pledge for the execution of the treaty of Brétigny, had escaped from Calais; he made it a point of honour to take his place in person, and resumed in London the life of pleasure and idleness which he had led there before the treaty. Three months later he died in the English capital (April 8, 1364).

Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy

In the preceding year (September, 1363) he had constituted the duchy of Burgundy, which had reverted to the crown, in 1361, on the death of the last member of the family of Robert of France, Philippe de Rouvres, in apanage for his youngest son, Philip the Bold, a last act of unwisdom by a prince of small parts who did much ill service to France.

Conclusion

All evidence shows that the treaty of Brétigny did not mend the rupture made in 1337. It could only be regarded as a truce by the King of France who had incontestedly lost in the first encounter; scarcely a trace now remained of the prosperity established in his kingdom by the thirteenth century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: A. Coville, *Les premiers Valois et la guerre de Cent Ans* (1328-1422) (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iv, first part), books i and ii; Longman, *The life and the times of Edward III*, 1869; Mackinnon, *The history of Edward III*, 1900.

On the War and the Protagonists: Froissart, *Chroniques*, Editions of Kervyn de Lettenhove, 1867 and seq. and of S. Luce, 1869 and seq.; the

[10] Brignais is now a commune of the department of the Rhône, ten kilometres from Lyons.

introductions and the notes of these two publications are full of precious information; S. Luce, *La France pendant la guerre de Cent Ans,* 1890 and seq.; the same, *La jeunesse de Bertrand du Guesclin,* 1876; Denifle, *La guerre de Cent Ans et la désolation des églises, monastères et hôpitaux de France,* 1899 and seq.

On Flanders and Artevelde: Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique,* vol. ii, 1902.

On the Parisian Movement: S. Luce, *La France pendant la guerre de Cent Ans,* vol. i; Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V,* vol. i, 1909.

On the Jacquerie: S. Luce, *Histoire de la Jacquerie,*[2] 1895.

On the Treaties: E. Cosneau, *Les grands traités de la guerre de Cent Ans,* 1889.

CHAPTER XIII

RECOVERY AND RELAPSE—THE REIGNS OF CHARLES V (1364-1380) AND CHARLES VI (1380-1422)

I

Second Period of the Hundred Years' War
Charles V (1364-1380)

A. *His person*

JOHN'S successor was fortunately quite unlike him. He was the same Charles of Normandy who had ruled the realm *en bail* (in custody) during the king's captivity, and when John died, he was still in charge. He had been through many difficulties of all kinds and so did not lack experience. Fortune had ruled that ill health should unfit him for the toils of war. It was rumoured that in his youth he had been poisoned by the King of Navarre. However that might be, he became a lifelong invalid: "*his right hand was so swollen that he could handle no heavy thing.*" [1] He devoted the time spent by most other princes of his time in sports, feasting and war to reflection and the acquisition of knowledge. His model, it was said, was St. Louis, but while he may have been no less devout than his ancestor, he had less charity, simplicity, rectitude and was also less thrifty. But his piety was both more temperate and far more tolerant, not only towards heretics, whom he frequently defended against the Inquisition, but towards the Jews, whom he protected.

His manner of life

He lived in great magnificence and at large expense, regarding this as essential to the dignity of the crown; if he received a visit from any foreign prince his display was redoubled. Dreading the fatigue of long journeys, he abstained

[1] "*Si enflée que pesante chose lui était non possible à manier.*"

from travel and spent his life in Paris and its neighbourhood. He did not live in the palace of St. Louis and accordingly converted the old Louvre into a sumptuous mansion, but the somewhat repellent and melancholy aspect of the ancient fortress seemed beyond cure and so he built himself a house after his own heart on the right bank of the Seine where the river first enters the town, and on the east flank of the old city boundary of Philip Augustus: this was the *Hôtel St. Paul*, an elegant and harmonious group of buildings and gardens. The château of Vincennes and a fine house which he built at Beauté-sur-Marne were his favourite resorts in summer. He delighted in the society of the learned, university teachers, doctors and "*philosophers versed in the mathematical and speculative sciences*" [2]—astrologers to wit. He respected and admired knowledge and loved books, of which he assembled a fine collection in his library. Nor did he love them merely to look at: he read or had them read to him. To be a bibliophile was a sure passport to his favour, and he believed that he did his subjects good service by the translations which he caused to be made into French of such ancient or modern works as seemed to him the best and most useful. A serious man and a sad one, an *intellectual*, as little *chivalric* as well could be, he had nothing of the Valois about him but their liking for luxury and their carelessness of its cost.

His political ideas

It is not surprising that, being accustomed to think, he had thought on political questions and had worked out a coherent theory of royalty and government for himself. He discussed it in interviews with various men, Raoul de Presles, Philippe de Mézières, and above all Nicolas Oresme—a scholar of the university—who had compiled a collection of the doctrines and opinions of the ancients on the life of States and had set them in order for his use. The essence of this theory is that the king exercises his office for the common good, not for his own

[2] "*Philosophes solennels fondez ès sciences mathématiques et spéculatives.*"

pleasure or for his personal interest, which would be tyranny; nothing should be left by him unordered and irregulated; nothing must stand in the way of his fulfilment of his duty, and his subjects, who owe him their obedience, owe him also the aid of their persons and property in case of necessity, of which he is sole judge.

B. *His government*

The government in which Charles V embodied his ideas was moderate and prudent but at the same time most resolute and persevering. He innovated hardly anywhere, he organised everywhere. The clergy, whose privileges he accounted excessive, especially in matters of justice, were kept rigorously within the bounds of their rights. The nobles were obliged to endure the king's intervention in their disputes and quarrels; the right of private war, restored to them in 1367, was hedged about with conditions that made it illusory; the justice of the king more and more imposed itself as the supreme resource against their justice; finally with precaution and prudence but with tenacity, the king did his best to secure their admission that *aids*, established in case of necessity for the common good of the kingdom, should be levied upon the lands of vassals as on those of the royal domain. The towns, well treated and much considered by the prince, confirmed in their privileges, saving in cases of flagrant disobedience, gradually allowed themselves to be invaded by the king's agents, under whose more or less openly avowed direction they fell by imperceptible degrees.

The finances

Finances were kept in good order. Charles never laid down as a principle that any taxation was either compulsory or permanent; he would, on the contrary, protest his "chagrin" at being compelled to maintain taxes which he hoped, indeed, soon to abolish, but he contrived to levy them for the duration of his reign. When need was imperative, he even increased them. Duration thus established a precedent which insensibly developed into a right. He had a costly administration, he desired an army of the best, and a navy well in his own hands, as pre-

requisites to the design of which he never lost sight for a moment: to wipe out the treaty of Brétigny.

Army and navy

He got his army; at the same time he put all fortified places and castles into a thorough state of defence, granting, in case of need, large subsidies to their owners. Shipyards and a marine arsenal were established at *Clos des Galées*, on the Seine, near Rouen.

Significance and spirit of his government

When we pass in review the mandates and ordinances of Charles V they impress us as the work of a reforming and constructive spirit, singularly strong, precise and practical. It is

The king's councillors

clear that the king reinforced his own experience by that of competent advisers. In all cases of difficulty, he convoked a special council, an assembly which numbered perhaps one hundred and fifty to two hundred men of experience. In normal times, he governed in conjunction with certain well-proved councillors: a noble, his confidant and friend, Bureau de la Rivière, some bourgeois, Jean and Guillaume de Dormans, Pierre d'Argemont, Hugues Aubriot, provost of Paris. He had the luck to light on two exceptionally valuable helpers to take his place in war: Bertrand du Guesclin and Jean de Vienne.

Du Guesclin

Du Guesclin was a Breton knight, who had long waged partisan war in Brittany and had entered the king's service about 1350. There he so distinguished himself as to become Charles' confidential man; he became Constable, chief of the whole army in 1370. Without possessing the gifts of a great strategist, he was a soldier through and through, essentially a realist and quite alien in spirit to the spirit of chivalry which had cost France the disasters of Crécy and Poictiers. He was the very warrior needed for the occasion.

Jean de Vienne

Jean de Vienne came from the Franche-Comté; he was born near Besançon. He had sailed the seas, having taken part in a crusade against the Turks in 1366; and so became the seaman and admiral of the king. He, too, was a practical man

and had the gift of drawing able colleagues to his side. He created an excellent navy, which, on the resumption of the war with England, conducted energetic and most useful diversions on the coasts of that island.

II

Preparations for revenge

A. War on the King of Navarre

Before preparing to realise on the future, it was necessary to assure the liquidation of the past. The king undertook this task with great energy. He first got rid of his dangerous neighbour, Charles the Bad. The property of the Navarrese on the north of the Loire was subject to a writ of attachment even before John II had died. The successes of the king's captains were not decisive, even after the battle of Cocherel (May 16, 1364) where Du Guesclin destroyed the best Navarrese army, but were sufficient to induce Charles the Bad to come to terms (March, 1365): he ceded Nantes, Meulan and the county of Longueville in exchange for Montpellier, where he was not dangerous. He remained quiet for several years.

B. Settlement of the Breton succession (1365)

At the same time Charles V put an end to the war of the Breton succession, a constant source of irritation and of interminable difficulties. One of the two claimants, Charles de Blois, having been killed in a battle at Aurai (September 29, 1364) the king negotiated the *treaty of Guérande* (April 12, 1365) which reconciled all concerned and deprived Edward III of a base of operations, which he had thought definitely secured.

C. The Great Companies

The Great Companies continued to plague the land. There was no chance of destroying them by force; they were too well able to resist. The best plan seemed to be to offer them a chance of good profit outside France in the hope that they might never return. A first attempt made to get them away to Hungary, on the pretext of a crusade, was unsuccessful. Du Guesclin led them into Spain, to the number of about 30,000.

Du Guesclin in Spain

A contest for the throne of Castille was then in progress between two brothers, Pedro called the Cruel and Don Henry of Transtamare. The former, suspected of having put to death his wife, Blanche de Bourbon, sister-in-law of Charles V, had sought and obtained alliances with England and Navarre. The latter had agreed with the French, and it was on his side that Du Guesclin took the field. Thus the English-French war, having ended in Brittany, was resumed in Castille. A good beginning, Pedro being defeated and Don Henry crowned (April 1366), was promptly followed by an unpropitious end; most of the freebooters made their way back to France, the Black Prince, intervening in his turn, entered Castille, fought Du Guesclin, and took him prisoner, drove Don Henry out and brought Pedro back in April, 1367. But Du Guesclin was ransomed and lost no time in returning to Spain, took Pedro by surprise, made short work of his army, made him prisoner, and left him to be stabbed by his brother, in March, 1369, who remained King of Castille, thus fulfilling the proud boast made by the rough Breton to the Black Prince. The Companies still overran the country, but they had lost many of their number in Spain and the remainder were gradually worn down. The towns organised against them, the king's men took heart again, started to hunt them down and executed many. Immediately before the rupture of the truce of Brétigny, there is a general impression that they have at last ceased to be dangerous and would soon be completely eliminated: unfortunately, for this to have been so, peace must have continued, whereas war was now to take its place again.

Intervention of the Black Prince

Decline of the Companies

D. *Rupture of the treaty of Brétigny*

This war was the work of Charles V. He hoped by its means to restore the kingdom and made ready for it accordingly, waiting his opportunity; this actually came in 1368 before the affair of Castille was concluded. The seigneurs of Gascony, hard pressed by the demands of the Black Prince for money to recoup him for the heavy cost of the Spanish campaign,

Appeal of the Gascon nobles

appealed to the King of France (April). While the treaty of Brétigny had theoretically transferred the sovereignty of the ceded territories to the King of England, it had been agreed at Calais that the actual transfer of rights and territories should become operative, under a special provision, only after the diverse countries and towns had passed into the possession of their new seigneurs. This surrender had been long in doing, the reciprocal renunciation had not been achieved by 1368, when the date originally fixed for the formality, the 30th of November, 1361, had been long overpassed. Charles, therefore, holding himself to be meanwhile sovereign of Gascony, decided to entertain the appeal (November) and cited the Black Prince to appear before his Parliament. The Englishman, for the moment taken aback, stood up and declared that he would come to Paris with pleasure but with helmet on head and sixty thousand soldiers at his back.

The alliances of Charles V

But this was easier to say than to do. Charles V had secured himself by excellent alliances with the Kings of Castille and Portugal, and with the Emperor as well; he had neutralised the ill will of the Count of Flanders by returning to him the acquisitions of Philip the Handsome, Lille, Douai and Orchies and paying him 200,000 deniers in gold; obtaining in return the marriage of his daughter and heiress, Margaret, to Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy. Edward III had designed the daughter and the dower for his own son, Aymon, Count of Cambridge, but Pope Urban V, seeing the position with the same eyes as Charles V, had objected to the marriage, on the pretext of near kinship; and obstinately refused the dispensation which it was in his province to grant. Another good base of operations and another important reinforcement was thus lost to the English. Finally the King of France, who had throughout taken care to have on his side the advice, approbation and encouragement of his own most eminent clerics and lawyers, had not neglected to form ties with lands and towns still under

English rule; for which they were ripe and ready. His position was a good one.

The French tactics

The open rupture took place in May, 1369. The king's generals at once commenced active and energetic operations on the whole front of the English possessions in the west and south, conducting them on a method which proved highly successful; no great army and no grand battles, but well-disciplined detachments, striking with great rapidity and incessant small operations, skirmishes, or sieges, which soon laid low the best defences devised by the enemy. The secret understandings which Charles V arranged in the countries which were to be reconquered proved particularly useful and effective. The English resorted to the methods which had previously brought them success: they organised *raids*, which, ravaging all about them in their course, should normally have brought the majority of the royal forces down on them and paved the way for a goodly battle of the sort which French chivalry knew so well how to lose. But Charles was like neither his father nor his grandfather; he ordered that the land should be laid waste before the English forces, that fortified places should be vigorously defended, and that battle in open country should be declined, until the time when at last the need for subsistence should compel the English to divide their forces in order to cover a wider range of country and the detachments could be attacked one after another. Such were the tactics which neutralised all the efforts of the Duke of Lancaster in 1369, of Robert Knolles in 1370, of the same Lancaster in 1373, and of others. They pillaged and burnt the villages, but all the smoke sent up by Knolles even close to the walls of Paris under the eyes of the king, gained them no solid advantage. In 1369 Lancaster, starting from Calais, stopped short of the Seine; Knolles who had to do with Du Guesclin, recalled from Spain and made Constable (October 2, 1370), had infinite difficulty in reaching Poitou—starting also from Calais—with the

The English rebels

Their unsuccess

remnants of his army, half of which, cut off by the Constable, had fallen at Pontvallain [3] (December 4). In 1373 Lancaster lost 24,000 horses out of 30,000.

Between raids the patient and fruitful work of demolition along the English front was resumed. Sundry outbreaks of violence, like the sack of Limoges by the Black Prince, whose last exploit it was (September, 1370), formed horrible episodes in the struggle but did nothing to reëstablish the position of Edward III. Nor did his alliance with the Duke of Brittany, who threw himself into his arms (July, 1373), bring him any great advantage. An English garrison occupied Brest, but Du Guesclin conquered the country. The old king died on the 21st of June, 1377, a year after the Black Prince, as his work upon the Continent was falling into complete ruin. At the same time the admiral, Jean de Vienne, ravaged and spread panic along the English coasts.

Sack of Limoges (1370)

The Duke of Brittany passes over to the English

Death of Edward III (June 21, 1377)

Charles V was victor; at the end of his reign the English retained only five towns in France: Calais, Cherbourg, Brest, Bordeaux and Bayonne. One last effort might have driven them to the sea. But this the king could not make. He was obliged to take Charles the Bad in hand once more and for all, and to deal with difficulties arising from a political miscalculation of his own.

Victory of Charles V

E. *Why it was incomplete: New complications*

The King of Navarre, ambitious, acute and disappointed, had never been able to resign himself to his failures. In 1370 he had attempted in England to negotiate with King Edward a treaty for the partition of France, which shows how deep seated his illusions must have been; next he plunged headlong into a series of enterprises, intrigues, indeed crimes, whose crowning effort was to be the poisoning of Charles V. The

1. End of Charles the Bad

[3] At present chief town of canton of the department of the Sarthe, in the arrondissement of La Flèche. Du Guesclin, in the worst of weather and in a country cut up by hedges and copses, had made a forced night march to surprise the English, a revival of his old methods in the days when he was a partisan soldier in Brittany.

arrest and confession of two of his agents put the king in full possession of these promising plans (spring of 1378). The Norman domains of the Navarrese were immediately seized and Navarre was invaded by the King of Castille. English help either in Normandy or the Pyrenees, could no longer save the Navarrese from disaster; the price which he had to pay completed his ruin. He died in poverty in 1378. His punishment had nevertheless taken some time and afforded a respite to the English.

2. The affair of Brittany

Breton affairs gave them a still better advantage. Duke John IV by deserting to their side had undisputably become traitor and felon. Charles V thought the occasion a good one for the reunion of the duchy with France and on the 18th of December, 1378, a parliamentary decree pronounced its confiscation. This was imprudent, for the Bretons cherished their independence; though for the most part friendly to France and ready to help her, they held themselves in no wise Frenchmen. They regarded the attempt of the king as an unbearable usurpation and made their dispositions for opposing it. A resistance, to further which the worst of enemies made friends, was organised throughout the country; Duke John was recalled. Charles' best Breton adherents deserted him. Du Guesclin himself, too good a Breton not to be heart and soul with his own people, and too attached to the king to go their road, found himself in a lamentable and painful position. He thought, it appeared, of returning to Spain. Brittany almost without a struggle, eluded the king's grasp, and he lost, through his premature and ill-advised action in the matter, precious time which his destiny did not allow him to recover.

3. The Companies recover

The resumption of war had flooded the kingdom anew with adventurers, the plague of brigandage had broken out with fresh vigour. Bandits gathered together as before and the Constable set out to hunt them down, but fell at *Châteauneuf de*

Randon [4] where he held some of them in siege (July 13, 1380). Charles V gave royal honours to his body; he had lost a servant whose experience, devotion and authority would have been of inestimable value to the kingdom in years to come. Nor was he long in following him to the grave. A succession of bereavements during the past two years had saddened and broken his spirit; the queen, his daughter Isabel; some men whom he loved: Pope Gregory XI, the Emperor Charles IV, who had visited him in Paris in 1378, the King of Castille, and the Constable, had died one after another. He felt his own life ebbing away. The schism which had divided the Church since September of 1378 gave him much disquiet; he had hoped to establish peace in Brittany and bring the English war to an end, scruples assailed and troubled him. He died in his house of Beauté, on the 16th of September, 1380, at the early age of forty-three years.

Death of Du Guesclin (July 13, 1380)

The end of the king September 16

His reign ended too soon: it should have lasted a few years longer when England would have become involved in the troubles incidental to the minority of Richard II; then he might have repaired the Breton mistake, completed the expulsion of the English, and finally discouraged their interest in an enterprise so fraught with disaster. In the kingdom itself much indeed remained in ruin and much needed repair, but the king, with his prestige and power now firmly established, would not have been inadequate to the task. Unfortunately Charles V the Wise, by his very unlikeness to the princes and lords of his time and race, had small chance of being followed by one like himself.

Conclusion

III

Third period Charles VI (1380-1422)

The new king, born on December 3, 1368, was not yet twelve years old. His father had taken great pains with his

[4] A chief town of canton in the department of Lozère, in the arrondissement of Mende.

A. *The situation*

education, but the excellent teachers provided for him had found in him neither much intelligence nor much taste for study. Furthermore, he was still too young for his character to be yet formed; the direction in which it would ultimately develop must depend, for the most part, on the influences brought to bear on it. Charles V realised the dangers which threatened

Precautions taken by Charles V

his child and took what measures he could for his protection. First he had decided, about 1374, that he should attain his majority at fourteen, not because he thought a youth of this age capable of governing by himself, but because he wished to avoid the indefinite prolongation of a regency with all the risks and troubles ordinarily incidental to such a period of transition. In the second place, Charles had expressly entrusted the government of the kingdom, till the majority of the king, to his own brother, the Duke of Anjou, but he had separated the guardianship of the young prince from the regency and entrusted the care of his person to the Dukes of Burgundy and of Bourbon, assisted by a council composed of all the confidential advisers which he had collected about himself.

The king's uncles

But the wisdom of these dispositions could hardly avail for long in the face of the rival ambitions and appetites of the princes of the blood: the three brothers of the late king, the

Their individual interests

Dukes of Anjou, Berry and Burgundy, and his brother-in-law, the Duke of Bourbon. The best and most reasonable of these was the last named. The others had interests in the kingdom which made them formidable. *Louis of Anjou*, acknowledged by Queen Joan of Naples as her heir, had thoughts for nothing but the conquest of his kingdom. *Philip of Burgundy*, intent upon the consolidation and extension of Flanders, to which he was heir, dreamt of engaging the assistance of France in the execution of his designs. *John of Berry*, greedy, a voluptuary and a dilettante, desired money above all else, and was on the watch for opportunities to make as much as possible. The violent passions and vices of the Valois were reborn in all three.

Their first deeds

From the first days after the death of Charles it could be seen that their only common object was the ruthless exploitation of France and from the beginning they quarrelled openly and unashamedly among themselves. They straightway freed their hands by dismissing the councillors of the late king: the Provost Aubriot, delivered up to the vengeance of the University, whose excessive independence he had drastically curtailed, was thrown into prison; others lost their posts and had to go into hiding. Anjou remained regent, Burgundy and Bourbon guardians—Berry was disposed of by the gift of the government of Languedoc and Guyenne, where his crotchets could have free play. Nevertheless, from January, 1381, it was found necessary to form a government council and to tolerate some of the old officials of Charles V among its members; their experience was found indispensable in view of the inextricable difficulties which ensued.

B. *Difficulties encountered*

The flux of the purse

These difficulties all spring from a single source: *the morbus humericus* (the flux of the purse); a universal trouble of the time. Princes were attacked by it, one and all led a life so lavish as to be insatiable in their need for money, people suffered more cruelly, and resented it the more, as they found themselves compelled not only to endure heavier and heavier impositions, arbitrarily demanded, but because they had not yet come to be convinced that it was certainly and strictly their duty to contribute their deniers to the maintenance of the State. Every tax, not justifiable by an imperative and obvious public necessity, seemed to them an unjust and tyrannical abuse. During the first years of Charles VI's reign many grave disturbances occurred in Flanders, Languedoc and in many towns and districts. All had the same character: the brutal reflex of a distress exasperated beyond endurance, they are marked by outbreaks of violence whose victims are tax collectors or Jews, who lend money on usury and sometimes, in making loans, ruthlessly exploit the embarrassments of towns or of individuals.

The troubles

The late king, by an ordinance dated the day of his death and for the repose of his soul, had withdrawn the *fouages* [5] (hearth tax) the collection of which was then about to begin; the good people logically inferred that thenceforward no taxes of any kind would be imposed. Their disillusionment was rapid, the princes having promptly swallowed the reserves left by Charles V, found themselves compelled to set the fiscal machine at work again. Meanwhile a revolt, starting from Gand, against the exactions of the count, Louis of Male, spread throughout Flanders; various disturbances, more or less grave, occurred in the years 1380, 1381 and 1382 in Paris, Rouen, Amiens, Saint Quentin, Orléans, Rheims, Laon, Soissons and in Languedoc which, for years close-shorn by the Duke of Anjou under Charles V, stood aghast at the demands of the Duke of Berry. In this district, once so prosperous and now so poor, bands of the unemployed, the *Tuchins*, organised themselves to live on the lowland by brigandage. At Rouen and Paris, in particular, disturbance became open revolt, and the *Maillotins* [6] (Mace men) gave the king's men a fright which, though short, was sharp while it lasted.

Revolt of Gand

Outbreaks of the "good towns" of France

The Maillotins in Paris

The princes temporise

At first the princes temporised; they even consented to enact the abolition of all impositions in November, 1380. But they understood those to mean only taxes imposed in the past; in March, 1381, they introduced fresh ones and established them in 1382. This deception of the people bore fruit in some serious uprisings, notably the revolt at Rouen, and that of the *Maillotins*. But in reality these unordered and incoherent ebullitions were not very dangerous; the mutineers, feeling themselves isolated and alarmed by their own audacity, were not long in asking for mercy and making submission. Up to the end

[5] The *fouage* (*focagium*) is a tax imposed in principle on every hearth (*focus*), but the number of hearths in every unit may by a legal fiction be diminished by the sale of a privilege to diminish the total sum payable.

[6] A name given to the Parisian insurgents from the *maces* or *mallets* of lead once kept in the cellars of the Town Hall from which they took them.

of 1382 the princes were contented with somewhat superficial repressions: the execution of some of the ringleaders and the exaction of heavy indemnities; but they had seen that it was necessary to discourage as completely as possible any resumption of similar agitation in the future. They waited their hour and it soon arrived. The Duke of Anjou having departed for Italy in 1382, the Duke of Burgundy took on himself the direction of the king's business, and, as it was in his own interest to break down the Flemish revolt, which had gained strength under the leadership of Philip van Artevelde,[7] he conducted Charles VI with a large royal army to attack the vilains of Flanders, who were discomfited at the battle of Roosebeck (November 27, 1382). Artevelde, killed in the fight, had counted on English support which arrived too late, and the Flemings, after two or three years of hesitation and deception, sustained by the tenacity of Gand, came to terms with their new sovereign, Philip of Burgundy, in 1385.

Charles VI. Campaign in Flanders

Battle of Roosebeck (November 27, 1382)

Meanwhile the princes utilised the victorious army, now at their command, to wreak their rancour upon Paris, Rouen and the towns of Languedoc. The king made entry into his capital as into a conquered city, having had the gates thrown down. More than three hundred bourgeois were arrested, and numerous executions followed; the provostship of the merchants was abolished and the privileges of the town were taken away. Rouen underwent similar treatment, and the towns of Languedoc were condemned to pay huge fines. From that time forward, to protest against the abuses of the royal exchequer and its agents, to rebel against the orders of the king, whatever they might be, when he was in a position to make them respected, passed for sacrilege to be forgiven only by the benevolence and the paternal indulgence of the sovereign. The

Punishment of the rebels in the "good towns"

[7] The son of that Jacques van Artevelde, who had perished in a riot in 1345 after having been for some years the virtual *podestat* (ruler) of Gand, and the enemy of the French king.

bourgeois of Paris and of the other "good towns" thus chastised would know henceforward the real value of these princely attributes.

IV

The madness of the king

A. *The English war*

Meanwhile the English war dragged on; interrupted by truces and reduced to a succession of reciprocal threats and petty operations, it resembled a fire which smoulders in the ashes and only awaits fuel to burst into fresh flame. Most fortunately, Richard II, who met with even worse difficulties in his own kingdom than those which Charles VI encountered, was in no condition to undertake anything serious. The English army and navy, too, were passing through a period of decline. The opportunity was obviously so favourable to France for the liquidation of the ancient quarrel that the royal council elaborated a vast scheme for the invasion of England. The Duke of Burgundy, anxious to secure Flanders against a renewed invasion by the Plantagenet, was energetic in furtherance of the plan. Much talk took place and some important preparations actually proceeded in the years 1384, 1385, 1386 and 1387. Various considerations postponed the departure—at one time the ill will of the Duke of Berry; at another that of the Duke of Brittany; at another still the preoccupation of Philip the Bold with his interests in Germany, and with the espousals of the king whom he married to a Bavarian princess, *Isabeau* (July, 1395). Finally the overseas expedition was abandoned and a truce was concluded on the 18th of August, 1389. After several renewals, it was consolidated by a convention on the 9th of March, 1396, which provided for the marriage of Richard II to a daughter of Charles VI, and is known as the *Truce of twenty-eight years*. A truce indeed and not a treaty of peace since it settled none of the differences in principle and in fact which divided the two kings.

Projected invasion of England

Why it was not carried out

Truces

The Duke of Burgundy, who had quietly employed the

king's resources for the attainment of his own ends, at last passed all bounds with an imprudence whose consequences had been quite unforeseen by himself. To gratify the Duchess of Brabant, whose heir he hoped to be, he picked a quarrel with the Duke of Guelders, a petty prince dwelling on the lower Meuse. The affair, starting in 1385, came to a head when the German, advised by the English, insolently defied the duke and even Charles VI himself, who had been induced by Philip to take part in the debate. A campaign was decided upon in the summer of 1388. Ill conducted, it wrung with difficulty an outward submission from the princeling and ended in an inglorious retreat. The king was deeply mortified to have been thus compromised in a discreditable adventure, and those men, who hitherto obscure and silent, had awaited an opportunity to free the kingdom from the government of the dukes, the old councillors of Charles V, the king's younger brother Louis, Duke of Touraine, the Duke of Bourbon, won over to the party of the malcontents, prevailed on Charles to take drastic action. He held a great council at Rheims, in October of this year, 1388; there he announced that the time had come for him to govern in person; he dismissed his astounded uncles, with thanks, possibly not devoid of irony, for the services they had done him and for all their devotion. Their disgrace brought into power not the king himself, who lacked both experience and ability, but the council in which the confidential adherents of Charles V preponderated, Bureau de la Rivière and Jean Le Mercier, small nobles, clerics and bourgeois, closely united by a common spirit and a common policy. The dukes contemptuously nicknamed them the *Marmosets* (Gargoyles), the name given to the grotesque images employed in the architectural ornament of the time. The Marmosets set energetically to work to restore order, strengthen and give precision to the administration and place it in good hands; with these objects in view they drafted a remarkable series of ordinances. Unfortunately,

The campaign of Guelders

It turns out badly

The Council of Rheims: dismissal of the dukes (1388)

The *Marmosets;* return to the government of Charles V

Feeble support given by the king to his councillors

inspired as they were by the spirit of Charles V, they fel lamentably the lack of his personal presence. All their author ity depended on the confidence and will of a young prince, i educated for affairs, from which it had been the interest of hi uncles to exclude him, volatile, madly enamoured of festival and pleasure, incapable of serious application to anythin but the search of distractions from his duties. At his side wa his younger brother, Louis, Duke of Touraine, whom he madl Duke of Orléans in 1392, and who obtained an ascendancy ove him. More intelligent than the king, cultivated, brilliant, witty but dissipated and debauched, "*the elegant vice*" was his ap propriate contemporary nickname, his character boded n better for the kingdom than that of the disgraced dukes. N less avid and insatiable than the dukes, he, like the Burgundian cherished personal ambitions of his own to which he en deavoured to subordinate the royal policy. Married in 1387 t *Valentine Visconti*, daughter of the Duke of Milan, he sav visions of a kingdom in Italy and counted on his brother's hel to conquer one. He obtained encouragement for his plans fron the pope of Avignon who hoped that French arms might re move from his path his rival of Rome.

Influence of the Duke of Touraine

Unpopularity and impotence of, the *Marmosets*

The Marmosets themselves were not popular. They ap peared too rich, too little disinterested, and besides too boast ful and too preoccupied with establishing the royal authority which they somewhat confounded with their own. They could have removed this bad impression by putting bounds to the ex penditure of the king, and by repressing with exemplary rigour the excesses from which the people suffered owing to the gov ernment of the dukes. To carry justice so far was beyond their power, and the most serious attempt that they made to satisfy popular sentiment served only to demonstrate their impotence

The journey to Languedoc

They conducted the king into Languedoc to enquire into the scandalous exactions of the Duke of Berry. Complaints imme diately poured in, and revealed a system of appalling tyranny.

rapacity and cynical organisation of sheer theft. All evidence showed the culprit to be the duke himself, who effectively screened his agents. He was deprived of his government, but no further penalty was imposed upon him and he kept the product of his frauds. His treasurer, Bétizac, indeed was hanged and burnt, but only because he had imprudently given ear to perfidious advice and feigned heresy in order to escape from the king's judges. The secular arm rearrested him with the complicity of the tribunal of the Church. No one would have dared to touch him for the crimes which he had committed in his master's name and to his master's order. But what most interested Charles VI on his excursion to Languedoc (winter of 1389-90) were the opportunities for pleasure afforded in every town. Even in Avignon, under the eyes of the pope, he had not ceased to feast, dance, sing and enjoy himself (*caroler*) to absolute exhaustion. He returned, in fact, from his judicial perambulation quite worn out.

Projected invasion of Italy

The principal business in hand at that time seems to have been the Italian campaign, for which there was a great bustle of preparation; it was postponed by negotiations for peace opened with England, and afterwards abandoned in 1392. An

Madness of the king

event then occurred which changed the course of events for France; the *king became insane*. He had given cause for anxiety in the spring of 1392, but had apparently recovered. In June of that year, one Pierre de Craon, enemy of the Constable de Clisson, attempted to assassinate him. He failed and took refuge with the Duke of Brittany, who refused to give him up. The king decided to go and compel him to do so, and it was in the course of this expedition that his madness suddenly broke out (August, 1392). His uncles were with him, and by their own authority resumed the position they had lost four years before. The Marmosets, whom none upheld, fled or were imprisoned: none lost their lives, but the kingdom was again entangled in the evils from which they attempted to set it free.

Expulsion of the *Marmosets* and return of the dukes (1392)

B. *Rivalries round the mad king*

The Duke of Orléans claims the regency

His rivalry with the Duke of Burgundy

It was to know another and new one: the Duke of Orléan claimed, not without reason, that, during the "absence" of hi brother, the regency should be in his hands. The Duke of Berr who was rather greedy than ambitious, would doubtless hav made no objection, but it was otherwise with the Duke of Bur gundy, whose political designs were too opposed to those of hi nephew for him to accept capitulation. The king, in the lucid intervals of his malady, supported his brother, but Philip th Bold had the advantage during the periods of crisis. His ag and authority, and his personal power as well, overbore Loui of Orléans, who dared not push matters to a definite rupture The two princes disagreed in principle and, as much as wa possible, in practice on all current political questions, but di their best to preserve an outward appearance of mutual con ciliation and concord.

Dynastic revolution in England: Henry of Lancaster appears on the scene

The two rivals, it now seemed, were free to exploit the king dom at their pleasure in promotion of their respective claims t the throne; after the truce of 1396 and the marriage whic made Richard II the son-in-law of Charles VI all fear of an resumption by the English of activity in France appeared t have vanished for the present. The most pressing question o the time had become the Great Schism, which continued t divide Christendom between the two pontifical allegiances an to agitate the Church. But it so happened that, in 1399, Henr of Lancaster,[8] at that time a refugee in France, there hatche a plot, which was to prove successful, against Richard II, ther occupied with the suppression of a revolt in Ireland. He ac cused the young prince of abandoning English interests i France, secured thus a number of adherents, dethroned him and took his place under the name of Henry IV (September) This usurpation, justified by and implying a continental polic

[8] Son of John of Gand, fourth son of Edward III and Blanche o Lancaster.

of a new kind, was highly disquieting to Charles VI. The need of consolidating his position on the throne and recuperating the strength of his kingdom decided Henry to postpone the execution of his plans; these, however, he left as a legacy to his son.

His policy towards France

Not dreaming of the storm which was brewing, Philip and Louis appear to have seen in the elevation of Henry IV no more than a chance of obtaining an ally whose adherence to either would be decisive; both set themselves to engage his good graces. From his point of view nothing could be more encouraging. The Duke of Burgundy died on the 26th of August, 1404; his son John the Fearless immediately gave a new turn to the open quarrel with the Duke of Orléans. Born in 1371, he was but a year older than his rival. Less magnificent in his life than the latter, his intelligence was lively, his energy indomitable, and his ambition impeded by no scruple. He cultivated popularity by pleasant and familiar intercourse with the common folk, and still further by earning a reputation for hostility to the exactions of the royal exchequer, to the greed of Louis of Orléans and his pillage of the public purse, and to the perpetual orgies which were the delight of the king's entourage.

Development of the quarrel between the two dukes

Death of Philip the Bold. John the Fearless (1404)

For three years the two dukes stood face to face, ready to come to blows and restrained only by the Duke of Berry who several times reconciled them at the last moment. On the 23d of November, 1407, John after long hesitation took action and had his rival killed in the open streets of Paris at the door of the queen's house, as he was coming out at about nine o'clock at night. A contemporary assures us that the man who struck the blow, a certain Raoulet d'Anguetonville, had first been engaged by Louis to direct it upon John. We know nothing further, but it is not impossible. However that might be and horrible as the crime appeared, there was no mourning for the victim. Popular rumour accused Orléans of manipulating the

Murder of Louis of Orléans (November 23, 1407)

king's indispositions at his discretion,[9] alleged him to be the lover of Isabel the queen, and above all regarded him as responsible for all the disorder of the kingdom.

C. *Armagnacs and Burgundians*

Yet John the Fearless and his assassin had given no death blow to the discord. A party gathered about Valentine Visconti and the young Duke of Orléans (born in 1391), directed from 1410 onwards, by Count Bernard of Armagnac, whose daughter Charles had married. Thus started the civil war, interrupted by insincere reconciliations, known as *the quarrel of the Armagnacs and the Burgundians*. Each faction had the same object: to get possession of the king, to govern in his name, and to turn his authority into coin of the realm.

The Parisian movement of 1413

The government was falling rapidly from bad to worse and a new agitation for reform sprang up in Paris. At its head was the powerful corporation of the butchers: the provostship of the merchants and the *échevinage* [10] were restored, the militia and the town defences were reorganised. John the Fearless encouraged the work and enheartened the workers with sundry casks of wine of Beaune. The States-General met in 1413; but could do no more than emphasise the distress of the realm and the danger which it would incur, if the King of England should choose to lend an attentive ear to the interested appeal of either party and attempt any serious venture. The University drew up a kind of indictment of the king's agents, and a commission of reform was appointed. The procedure of the malcontents was always the same.

[9] Pierre Cochon in his *Chronique normande* inclines to the opinion that Louis desired to get rid of his brother in January, 1393; during some marriage festivities the king and five courtiers disguised themselves as *savages* as a surprise to the ladies. They were wrapped in cloth covered with tow to represent fur. The Duke of Orléans having held a torch too close to one of the savages, the tow took fire and the king was saved only by the presence of mind of the Duchess of Berry who wrapped him in her dress. His five companions perished in the flames. This was probably no more than an indiscretion on the part of the duke, Cochon adds, *"the people said the king was never well when the Duke of Orléans wished either."*

[10] The Marmosets had already partly restored the provostship, making the provost a royal functionary, but the aldermen had remained in abeyance.

The *Cabochians*

This time a popular rising reinforced the commission of reform and helped to push forward its work. It, too, was promoted by the butchers, whose head was *Caboche the flayer*. Men of this class were naturally advocates of simple and short solutions; their claims, as usual with men of the people, centred on men rather than measures. A profound instinct warned them that the efficiency of laws and institutions depends on the men who apply them. The dauphin lived under their eyes a life whose dissipation aroused their abhorrence. Terror, they thought, might reform him and they committed acts of violence upon his friends for some months. From April to August Paris lived under a revolutionary régime, not unlike that of 1357, but with more "*days*" marked by disturbance and conflict. It is, however, no longer the greater bourgeoisie who dominate her: it is the more popular and more brutal elements who think that John the Fearless desires to redress abuses and that they are working with John. The *Cabochian ordinance* for reform published on the 27th of May, 1413, is improperly so called. It was drawn up not by the Cabochians but by the Commission of Enquiry already mentioned. This celebrated document nevertheless reflects their preoccupations and ideas and its promulgation was hastened by their pressure.

The *Cabochian ordinance*

Its contents

The ordinance was in tenour not remarkably original: its authors were content with reproducing, or nearly so, the best provisions, not yet carried into effect, of anterior ordinances. It was nevertheless designed to cover the whole ground of royal administration. If we ask upon what particular ideas it is based, we may answer that it seeks throughout to establish the principle of *collective deliberation* before any decision and that of appointment by *election* of all officials. The detail and composition of these deliberative and elective bodies are regulated with great care; another characteristic is its obvious solicitude to be *practical*. We do not receive any impression that the lawyers who were its authors had made any attempt, in the manner

Its spirit and intention

of Marcel and Le Coq, to delimit the king's authority or eve to control its exercise. They intended no more than to substi tute order for disorder and conscientious competence for disas trous incapacity. The monarchy is in no sense subordinated t the States-General; it is to be kept from excess by its ow enlightened agents held strictly to their own duties.

Failure and impotence of the reformers

This document, in fact, composed in the flowing tide of rev olution, is in no sense revolutionary; the king would have don wisely to accept its suggestions readily. Unfortunately, fro the fact that its provisions were the *desiderata* of the Cabo chians, the ordinance became bound up with their fortunes, a though it had been their work. Their agitations and outrage on persons soon wearied the upper bourgeois and the Univer sity; a natural reaction set in to the benefit of the dauphi whom they had so mishandled; John the Fearless, careful n to compromise himself too far, withdrew his support and th

The *Armagnacs* abolish the ordinance

Armagnacs returned to Paris. Huntings-down, executions, im prisonments and expulsions rewarded the zeal of the Cabochian and the ordinance was withdrawn in September, 1413.

V

The English victory

Accession of Henry V of England (1413)

Henry IV of England had died on the 20th of March, 141 His son, who at the age of twenty-seven succeeded him und the name of Henry V, was haunted by the memory of Edwar III's victories, and well understood, moreover, that the best wa to security of his house upon the throne was to give the Eng lish an opportunity for a striking success. Distracted Franc seemed an easy prey, and there was in England a large part who were urgent for a campaign on the largest scale. Henry carried out a plan of his own while seeming to yield to the wis of his subjects. He thought himself assured of alliance wit Burgundy, who did in fact give him encouragement, but hope to make use of him for the attainment of his own political end

Henry accordingly formally reasserted in August, 1414, the rights of Edward III to the crown of France, rejected the offers made him by Charles VI in June, 1415 (the hand of Catherine of France, a liberal dowry, and a portion of Aquitaine), demanding at least the concessions made in the treaty of Brétigny, and on the 13th of April landed with his army at the promontory of La Hêve.

Negotiations and expeditions in France

Occasions on which history repeats itself are not common. This, however, is one of them. The English king, having taken Harfleur (September 22) and rested there for twenty days, in view of the time of year started for Calais to winter there. He then learnt that a French army, an army of knights like those of Philip VI and John II, which had been slowly collected and organised, was on his track and anxious to bring him to battle. In some disquiet, he proceeded by forced marches till he found his road barred. The battle of *Agincourt* [11] which took place on the 25th of October against the advice of the Duke of Berry, proceeded on the same lines as those of Crécy and Poictiers and had a similar issue. The French nobility were subjected to fearful slaughter; the Duke of Orléans and the Duke of Bourbon fell captives. The Englishman spared only the highest placed among the prisoners, causing the others to be massacred in cold blood after the battle.

Capture of Harfleur

Battle of Agincourt (October 25, 1415)

John the Fearless had sent no contingent to the French army of Agincourt.[12] After the battle he lost no time in entering into negotiations with the victor with whom he concluded an alliance, by a secret agreement in October, 1416. While Henry V was occupied with the conquest of Normandy (1417) John employed himself in getting possession of Paris and the King. Treason opened the town to him on May 29, 1418, and

John the Fearless makes an alliance with Henry V

[11] Agincourt is a commune in the department of the Pas-de-Calais in the arrondissement of Saint-Pol.

[12] Two of his brothers had nevertheless lost their lives in the battle, but they had joined the army of their own free will. The duke made an empty demonstration of exacting vengeance for them from Henry V, but there is reason to think that he was merely acting a comedy.

He enters Paris but the dauphin escapes him

put the king and queen in his hands, but the provost, Tanguy du Chastel, had carried off the dauphin, whose capture would have been far more important than that of the unhappy Charles VI; it would have made his future secure and would have prevented the establishment in the provinces of a formidable centre of resistance.

Massacre of the *Armagnacs*

The Armagnacs had made for themselves a host of revengeful enemies in Paris, first owing to the measures of repression which they had instigated or permitted against the Cabochians and thereafter owing to the severity shown by Bernard of Armagnac, in the government of the town, after Agincourt, induced by fear of the intrigues of John the Fearless. The entry of the Burgundians was the signal for a popular rising, headed by the butchers, and for a horrible massacre which cost sixteen hundred prominent Armagnacs their lives, among them Bernard himself. The Duke of Burgundy, swept off his feet by these inconvenient allies, obliged to endure the familiarities of the executioner Capeluche, who had been recognised as chief by the murderers, recovered his position in Paris only by a stroke of force: putting Capeluche and some of the principal rioters to death.

Henry V conquers Normandy

His ally, Henry V, who had also gained the support of the Emperor Sigismund, then on a visit to France and England, under colour of restoring peace, had proceeded to invest Rouen which held out for six months and then only yielded to starvation (January 19, 1419). He then conquered Normandy except for Mont-Saint-Michel which he failed to take. He conducted himself in all things as King of France and claimed to have reëntered into his heritage.

The situation at the beginning of 1419

At the beginning of the year 1419 the situation was as follows: the king is mad, the queen and her familiars are in the hands of the Duke of Burgundy, though this is of small advantage to him, with Henry V on one side determined to make him

self by force master of France, and the dauphin on the other fortified by a formal and regular commission, given him by his father in 1417, and making him lieutenant-general of the kingdom, organising in the centre of the country, at Bourges and at Poictiers, a government recognised as uniquely legitimate by many of the provinces and by the Armagnacs in all parts. John the Fearless looked only to his own interest and was far from clear on which side it lay: whether in a definitive agreement with the English pretender, whom he regarded as imperious, hard, boastful and exacting; or in a reconciliation with the dauphin, far less formidable, but surrounded with Armagnacs who bore him deadly hatred. Negotiations were initiated with Henry V on the basis of a restoration of the ancient Angevin Empire, but had no result (May, 1419). In the council of Charles VI were many resolute advocates of the union of all Frenchmen against the English, and the dauphin's men urged this project upon the council. Some men of good intention laid their heads together; John the Fearless and the young prince met twice and became reconciled; Charles VI ratified their concurrence with his own.

Hesitating policy of John the Fearless

At bottom, the dauphin could not but feel that the duke might still be facing both ways, and preparing one of his usual betrayals. The latter, in fact, continued "conversations" with Henry V and held on to his hostages, the king and the queen. The Englishman coming somewhat too near to Paris with his capture of Pontoise (July), he carried off the royal pair to Troyes. It is probable that he was proposing to get hold of the dauphin as well, dead or alive. But it was he who fell. In the course of a fresh interview on the bridge of Montereau, the two princes came to violent words and mutual threats. John may have made an ill-advised gesture, as was afterwards alleged by Charles, such as putting his hand to his sword. However that may have been, the dauphin's men threw themselves upon him

The murder of Montereau (September 10, 1419)

and killed him while Tanguy du Chastel removed the young prince. His suite, about ten in number, took flight, but his men-at-arms stationed at the end of the bridge did not budge. "*cuidans*," Jouvenel des Ursins tells us,[13] "*que ce fust Monseigneur le Dauphin qu'on eust tué.*" It is no calumny, I think, upon John the Fearless to say that he was quite ready to do as he was done by. It appears quite possible that the murder of Montereau was unpremeditated; its effects were none the less lamentable. The new Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, might possibly, giving policy precedence over revenge, have consented to negotiate with the murderers of his father, but his mother, and Queen Isabel, the University of Paris, and the bourgeoisie of the capital drove him irresistibly to an alliance with the English. Charles VI declared his son "*parricide, crimineur de lèze-Majesté, destruiseur et ennemy de la chose publique, ennemy de Dieu et de justice*," [14] and proclaimed, or was believed to have proclaimed, his intentions to come to terms with Henry V. Negotiations were immediately opened and ended in the treaty of Troyes, concluded on the 20th of May 1420, and promulgated on the following day as an ordinance of Charles VI.

Its consequences

Treaty of *Troyes* (May 21, 1420)

Its contents

The English king is referred to by Charles as "*our well beloved son Henry, King of England, heir to France.*" He is to marry Catherine of France, and on the death of the king the crown is to revert "*in perpetuity*" to him and to his heirs. Meanwhile he is to administer the kingdom and to "*labour to the extent of his power*" to reduce to submission all "*rebels taking the part, or being of the party vulgarly called that of the dauphin and of Armagnac.*" No peace is to be made with the "*so-called Dauphin of Viennois*," except with the consent of

[13] "Thinking that it was Monseigneur the Dauphin who had been killed."
[14] "Parricide, guilty of lèse-majesty, destroyer of and enemy to the public cause, enemy of God and of justice."

Charles VI, of Henry V, of the Duke of Burgundy, and of the three Estates of the two realms, France and England, henceforward united.

This extraordinary agreement, ratified by the University of Paris and a small assembly of the States-General (December) was favourably received in France by the many who were weary of disorder and bad government and counted on the energy of the new heir to put a stop to them. No one believed that England could ever absorb France. The projected marriage took place on the 2d of June. On the following day Henry resumed hostilities with success. It seemed clear that the dauphin could not hold out for long, nor did he appear the man to compel Fortune to change her face. He was saved by pure chance: Henry V died unexpectedly on the 31st of August, 1422. He was only thirty-five years old, and the little prince born of his marriage with Catherine was no more than ten months old. Less than two months later, on the 21st of October, Charles VI, abandoned and reduced to a state of misery, disappeared in his turn.

Its reception

The dauphin saved by the death of Henry V (August 31, 1422)

Death of Charles VI (October 21, 1422)

The victor of Agincourt, on his death-bed, had a presentiment that his work might prove frail. Well realising that all depended on the continuance of his agreement with the Duke of Burgundy, he had insisted to the Duke of Bedford, to whom he entrusted his son, upon the necessity of maintaining this understanding, an understanding which he foresaw would become still more necessary after his own departure from the scene. He had even foreseen that a day might come when the dauphin would regain the advantage and he had urgently recommended that no peace should be made unless Normandy at the least were obtained in return. Not yet having won the game outright he recognised that it might still be lost. Yet the English found so many accomplices in France, their adversary made so small

Conclusion

a personal showing against them, that they had good reason to be more confident than their king, and to count on realising in the near future, and in its entirety, the profit which they had come to seek on the Continent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: A. Coville, *Les premiers Valois et la guerre de Cent Ans* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iv, first book), book iii: *Charles V;* book iv: *Charles VI;* S. Luce, *La France pendant la guerre de Cent Ans;* Denifle, *La guerre de Cent Ans et la désolation des églises.*

On Charles V: Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V,* 1909-1916, vol. ii; L. Delisle, *Mandements et actes divers de Charles V,* 1874; Noël Valois, *La France et le grand Schisme d'Occident,* vol. i, 1896.

On Charles VI: H. Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique,* vol. ii; Jarry, *La vie politique de Louis d'Orléans,* 1889; Coville, *Les Cabochiens et l'ordonnance de 1413,* 1888; the same, *L'ordonnance cabochienne,* 1890; Wylie, *History of England under Henry IV,* 1884-1898; the same, *The reign of Henry the Fifth,* 1914-1919; Cosneau, *Les grand traités de la guerre de Cent Ans.*

CHAPTER XIV

VICTORY OF THE KING OF FRANCE (1422-1453)

I

THE last act of the great drama was now to be played and to lead to a conclusion which appeared little likely to arise from the situation of 1422. I say appeared because upon a close examination, the position of the *King of Bourges* was really not so bad as his enemies doubtless believed it to be, and there was in fact nothing miraculous in his final victory. The situation in 1422

A. *Accession of Charles VII*

The Dauphin Charles, when he learnt of his father's death, was at the castle of Mehun-sur-Yèvre in Berry. He immediately assumed the title of King of France; the name given him in derision by his enemies and employed above, i.e., *King of Bourges*, shows approximately their estimate of his importance. It does not, however, accurately represent his real resources. Undoubtedly, the capital, the Parliament, the University, all the Burgundian party had accepted the little Henry VI as their "*Sovereign Seigneur*" "*by the grace of God King of France and England*," but a large part of the kingdom recognised Charles VII. Touraine, Berry, Poitou, Aunis, Saintonge, Limousin, Auvergne, Agenais, Quercy, Rouergue, Dauphiné and Lyons; that is to say, almost all the country south of the Loire remained faithful to him. He had at his disposal for organisation and administration many of his father's old officials dismissed and thrown out of their employments by John the Fearless in 1418, and attached by their own interests to his fortune. His central administration was conducted at Bourges, and his Parliament met at Poictiers. In addition, several great feudatories, for instance the Duke of Brittany, John V, and the Count of Foix and Viscount of Béarn, Jean de Grailly, while

His resources

Districts which declared for him

Attitude of the great feudatories

outwardly favourable to the English, were in reality holding back and waiting upon events before deciding which party to join. Several important domains, such as the duchy of Bourbon and the county of Nevers, deprived of their chiefs by the battle of Agincourt, were in the hands of women solicitous to preserve their neutrality. Their abstention was, in fact, an advantage to Charles. Finally, even in the provinces north of the Loire, in the districts which the invader thought safe in his hands, the young king had many adherents; among them all the *Armagnacs;* in many places where they were in the majority they said openly that Charles was their seigneur, elsewhere prudence kept them silent, but their zeal only waited a first genuine success of the royal party for their loyalty to be openly avowed.

His partisans north of the Loire

Opinion at Paris

Paris seemed to have been definitely won for Henry VI; she had evil memories of the Armagnacs and she had not yet lost the illusions which she had cherished as to the good will of John the Fearless towards her, yet Paris had not become English. Many politicians had seen in the provisions of the treaty of Troyes no more than a change of dynasty which might give France a king, firm, just, and a friend to order and discipline, in exchange for a maniac ruled by fierce and mischievous factions. Between these feelings and such as would be implied in a pure and simple acceptance of English hegemony there was a deep gulf fixed. Henry V well understood this when, on his death-bed, he advised the Duke of Bedford, his brother, to offer the regency, during the minority of Henry VI, to the Duke of Burgundy, and, if Philip should withdraw—as he actually did—to become Regent of France himself, thus completely separating her government from that of England.

Advice of Henry

Sentiments of the "good towns"

The other "good towns," unaffected by the sinister memories which influenced the capital, regarded the English domination with more repugnance than resignation. Much patience,

time and tact would be needed before it would be accepted by them as it had now been accepted by Guyenne. Charles could have good hopes of them, even outside the districts which owed him direct allegiance.

B. *The English aims in France*

The English established in France made indeed no attempt to Anglicise her, to assimilate the French nation, as we should say. To do so was impossible, had they wished, but they had no desire to try. Their only object was to enrich themselves, to "*make something out of*" the country which victory would leave prostrate for their exploitation. The Duke of Bedford was alone, or almost alone, in believing that the Lancastrian monarchy could have a future in France, and in dreaming of a durable settlement in the country. Naturally he would realise that this plan could be carried out only on the condition that he took French interests under his care, restored the political and economic life of the kingdom, restrained the inordinate greed of his countrymen, and above all reconstituted national unity around the person of the little Henry VI. His enterprise met with innumerable difficulties, all of which were advantages to Charles VII.

Intentions of Bedford

Obstacles to their realisation

At first, the excesses of the English exploitation which he could oppose only at the cost of turning his own countrymen against him, provoked in France the birth or rebirth of feelings of almost indiscriminate hostility. The French, in fact, shorn bare by the greed of the English, began to hate all Englishmen without distinction and to long for their expulsion, thus nourishing feelings quite opposite to those which the duke desired to foster. Secondly, in order to accomplish his plan for the reconstitution of France, he needed support from England and collaboration from the French, but the Regent of England, the Duke of Gloucester,[1] his brother,

1. Hostile sentiments of the French

2. Difficulty of obtaining effective help from England

[1] Bedford indeed was placed by the English Parliament in control of the government of England with the title of *Protector of the realm*, but his brother exercised his prerogative when, as *Regent of France*, Bedford was on the Continent; that is, habitually.

having his own interests and his own policy, had no intention whatever of subordinating them to those of the French Regent, and the English had not yet come to understand that the "great bargain" would call for continual expenditure and effort, where they expected quick profit and large returns. On the other side, the poverty of France was at that time too great for taxation, in any degree heavy, not to arouse inevitable discontent, all the more dangerous in that it would be directed against a foreigner. The Duke of Bedford had the best intentions, but he was a believer in the strong hand and would tolerate no opposition; his administration bore very hardly upon the country from all points of view. So in two or three years symptoms of irritation and hostility became manifest in Normandy, Picardy, Champagne, Maine, even in Paris. Plots were fomented, and their severe repression only increased the dumb anger of the malcontents. In Normandy, for instance, small bands, difficult to capture, started to overrun the country "*for King Charles*," doing as much damage as possible to the English and their adherents. Bedford had enemies even in Burgundian territory and the entourage of Duke Philip.

3. Impossibility of demanding much from France

Grave symptoms of animosity and opposition

Politicians, above all, were disappointed; they had hoped that peace would be promptly restored, but strife still continued. They had trusted that Bedford would be on good terms with Burgundy, whose sister he had married in 1423, but they found that painful recriminations had already passed between the two princes, neither of whom proposed to be the tool of the other; Bedford, stiff and austere, had little liking for the Valois, volatile, presumptuous, dissipated and more popular in France than was convenient. The Duke of Gloucester, too, had seen fit to embark on a scheme which crossed the path of Philip's ambition by his wish for a marriage with Jacqueline, heiress of Hainault, of Holland, and Zeeland, then unhappily married to the Duke of Brabant. The marriage

4. Necessity for Bedford of an understanding with Philip the Good and difficulty of attaining it

actually took place in March, 1423, after the annulment, by the pope, of Jacqueline's first union. It was followed by war between the Burgundians and Gloucester. There was every probability that Bedford would be involved in the quarrel; he kept out of it thanks only to its short duration. Gloucester deserted Jacqueline, had his marriage annulled, and made another (1425). These brief skirmishes between Bedford and Philip were to be followed by other occasions for misunderstandings between them, and would, it was abundantly clear, be made the most of by the "King of Bourges." The Duke of Burgundy thus found himself practically master of the situation, and if Bedford's ill-temper sometimes made him forget this, there were those among Charles' entourage and counsellors who remembered it well.

C. *Character of Charles VII:* Principal obstacle to his success

The young king was his own worst enemy. He lacked almost every quality which the occasion demanded. Son of a maniac and a deserted woman, he was physically ill-favoured, sickly, ugly, unequal to the fatigues of war, for which, too, he had not the least inclination—without spontaneity or spirit, without confidence in himself or in anyone else, subject to a sort of restless return upon himself, a horror of action, and a universal mistrust, without energy or will, but with a fatalism which drifted with any tide, an incapacity for any effort, and a habitual and crying need to be ruled and led, he was apt to be hypnotised by habit to an extent that was even pathological. He was a typical *psychasthenic*, and his undoubted qualities of good sense and judgment, his best intentions, when he dared to have any, his benevolence and affability, the refinement of his mind, were all powerless before his incurable weaknesses of character. *He was thus the plaything of favourites*, who imposed themselves upon him, rather than were chosen by him, whose faults he was doubtless not incapable of seeing, and whose unworthiness he quite well understood, but to whom he became attached by habit and

He is dominated by favourites

from whom, in the course of time, he became powerless to deliver himself.

The *Armagnacs*

His first masters were the *Armagnacs*, who had rescued him from the clutches of John the Fearless in 1418, Tanguy du Chastel and those who had struck the blow of Montereau, Tanguy himself and with him Pierre Frotier, "*first squire of the body and master of the horse*," insolent and of a greed so inordinate as to provoke complaints from Parliament. Side by side with these was Louvet, whose "*importunity*" won him power and set him "*practically in the place of the king*," a position which he shamelessly abused for his own enrichment. "*By these three men, all renowned for their shameless and dishonest lives*," wrote the chronicler, Cousinot, "*were the king and his treasury now controlled, whence he and his subjects suffered many oppressions.*" All three were thieves in grain and to the best of their ability, and all, well knowing that they would pay dearly in case of any reconciliation of their master with Philip of Burgundy, who would hold them responsible for the murder of his father, were sedulous to prevent it by all the means in their power. They had, nevertheless, some opponents in the king's household, notably his mother-in-law, Yolande of Aragon,[2] a woman of ability and insight, who saw clearly that the only hope for Charles was to place him under the influence of some man of action and determination. She chose an energetic and experienced soldier, the Count of Richemont, brother of the Duke of Brittany and brother-in-law of the Duke of Burgundy, and persuaded Charles to offer him the sword of Constable (1424). This arrangement was excellent policy. Its advantages to the king were obvious, but the favourites, who saw its danger for themselves, did their best to oppose it, until Richemont had sworn "*upon the Holy Gospels of God,*

Louvet

Yolande of Aragon

Count of Richemont, Constable

[2] She was daughter of John I of Aragon and widow of Louis II of Anjou, King of Naples. Charles VII had married her daughter, Mary of Anjou, in 1422. The young queen was timid and incapable of any domination over her husband.

by the Baptism which he had received from the holy Fonts, by his part in Paradise and on his honour" to "*love, sustain and protect them*" and "*on no pretext whatever to consent to their dismissal*" (March, 1425).

Expulsion of the *Armagnacs*

Three months later, the Constable, supported by Yolande, and upheld by the opinion of the "good towns," to whom he had submitted the question, encouraged by his brother, Duke John V, who was ready to support him with some vigour, compelled Tanguy du Chastel, Frotier and diverse other Armagnacs—who were otherwise well provided with lucrative posts and pensions—to leave the court, and succeeded in "*removing that evil traitor the President of Provence,*[3] *from the company and conversation of the king.*" Louvet had the audacity to raise mercenaries and to try to resist disgrace by force.

Pierre de Giac

Charles VII acknowledged "*the bad advice which he had received in the past*" and promised to comport himself in all things according to the opinion of his "*loyal brother,*" the Constable, but it was not long before he lapsed into the hands of Pierre de Giac, a man of no reputation and capable of any crime. It was only by an elaborate plot, devised by the Constable with the connivance of Yolande of Aragon, that he could finally be got rid of. He was surprised one morning in his bed at Issoudun, summarily tried by the Bailiff of Bourges, and thrown into the river (February, 1427). Charles VII, unable to save him, was at first furious, then calmed down by his mother-in-law, declared himself perfectly delighted. He put himself without delay under the domination of Le Camus de Beaulieu, a simple squire who kept him under stricter control and exploited him with greater cynicism than even Giac himself. Five or six men, posted in a convenient place by a familiar of Richemont, put an end, under the eyes of Charles VII him-

Le Camus de Beaulieu

[3] Louvet was so called because he had begun his career in the service of the house of Anjou-Provence and there became president of the Chamber of Accounts at Aix.

self, to the brief good fortune and to the life of the new favourite (June, 1427).

The reign of La Trémoille

The Constable, who had never understood the service of the king as meaning that he was perpetually to keep him company, thought it wise to choose Le Camus' successor himself; and introduced a certain Georges de la Trémoille, a great seigneur, who had helped him to dispose of Giac. The event was unfortunate for Richemont. The man in whom he had trusted had no sooner made himself master of the king's will than he set himself to undermine his own protector and obtain his banishment from the court (November, 1427).

Disgrace of Richemont

Six years of effort on the part of Richemont and his allies were needed before they could circumvent the precautions taken by La Trémoille, who had learnt wisdom from the fate of his predecessors, and kept the king closer in hand than ever. Neither the support of Yolande of Aragon, nor the express request of the States-General of Chinon (1428), nor that of the Count of Alençon or of Joan of Arc (1429) were sufficient to persuade Charles to a reconciliation opposed by his favourite. A second plot, instigated by Yolande, was needed to settle the question; one night La Trémoille was carried off from Chinon and imprisoned in a fortress. He obtained his life only by a promise never to show himself again at court. His place at the king's side was taken by the youngest son of Yolande, Charles of Anjou (June, 1433), who was kept well under his mother's eye.

Expulsion of La Trémoille

D. *The relative positions of the two adversaries*

The harm done by those favourites, egoistic, greedy and incapable as they were, to the cause of Charles VII was so great that it may be said without exaggeration that the king's favourites were the Englishmen's best assistants. Bedford, as a man, certainly was personally the superior of the "King of Bourges." He had eminent talents for politics and administration. Only through mischance could he have lost the game as he did. And he would have lost it sooner if his adversary had

been worthy of him or had allowed devoted servants, well able to take his place, to act at their discretion without his interference. The essential idea of Yolande and of Richemont was to reconcile the king and the Duke of Burgundy. No attempt to this end could succeed till La Trémoille had fallen and in consequence France had to undergo ten years of misery in addition to those which she had experienced, far too many already.

II

Joan of Arc

A. *War of 1422-1428*

In the first years after his accession, Charles VII placed his hopes in negotiations and did nothing to maintain his cause by arms. Some of the bolder spirits among his adherents, such as Étienne de Vignolles, whom the English named "*la sainte ire de Dieu*" (the holy Wrath of God), hence his nickname *La Hire*, Ambroise de Loré, the hero of the defence of Maine from 1422 to 1428, the Bastard of Orléans,[4] who became Count of Dunois in 1439, conducted its defence without his assistance. Their operations were small, but sometimes brilliant; surprises of fortified places, skirmishes and raids about the borderlands of Maine, Champagne or Orléanais. The advantage on the whole remained with the English; the two largest engagements, that of Cravant [5] (July 31, 1424) and that of Verneuil (August 17, 1424), gave them victories of some importance. The former cut the communications between Charles' domain and Champagne, the latter, which in some degree recalls Agincourt, put an end to the king's passing impulse to action, destroyed the hopes he had, with small reason, founded on the

Battles of *Cravant* and *Verneuil* (1424)

[4] He was the illegitimate son of Louis, Duke of Orléans, and the wife of one of his chamberlains. He was brought up with the other children of the duke, and Valentine Visconti, who loved him greatly, lamented, regretting that she was not his mother, that he had been *emblé* (denied) to her. He was about twenty years of age in 1422.

[5] Cravant, on the Yonne, in the department of the Yonne, arrondissement of Auxerre; Verneuil a chief town of canton in the department of the Eure, arrondissement of Évreux.

army and which he was to lose, causing his relapse into h usual apathy.

Decisive operation: the siege of Orléans

The English, however, contemplated a decisive campaign which, driving Charles VII from his "*kingdom of Bourges*," would place him at their mercy; but they could not agree upo the place where the Loire should be crossed. Bedford wa strong for Angers, the council of the regency pronounce for Orléans (summer of 1428). The regent, taking umbrage left the conduct of the enterprise to the Count of Salisbury who proceeded to lay siege to the town in October. His army was small, about 3000 men with some Burgundian contingents and the town was strong. It made an excellent defence unde the Bastard of Orléans, but could not hold out indefinitely against the blockade gradually organised by the English; they enclosed it on the two banks of the river with five strong *bastilles* (guard-towers) linked together by bulwarks. Deputations of bourgeois escaped and asked help from the "good towns"; and help was despatched: food, munitions and volunteers, but he who should have been most interested of all, the king—in reality La Trémoille—did nothing whatever. He would not even consent to a reconciliation with Richemont who himself was ready to take action. He was expecting, no one knows what, or he was resigning himself beforehand to the worst. His entourage talked of retirement to Dauphiné or to Castille, or even to Scotland! The blockade became stricter, food ran short, capitulation seemed to be a matter of only a few weeks, when Joan of Arc appeared and completely altered the position.

Inertia of the king

B. *Joan of Arc*

Her infancy and upbringing

Joan of Arc was a young peasant, about eighteen years old, born on the borders of Champagne and Lorraine at Domrémy, a small village which had remained on the side of Charles VII. She could neither read nor write, but nature had given her unusually keen sensibilities and beyond doubt an unusually active imagination. She had been profoundly influ-

enced by the religious emotions and suggestions in which she had been steeped from her early infancy. Her spiritual and intellectual life was, in fact, inextricably bound up with the doctrines of contemporary popular religion, which were largely composed of legends of saints and stories of decisive miracles. Her parents and herself lived a life both arduous and continually subject to "*alarms*" and sudden panics. On the approach of Burgundian or English troops they would run into the woods and hide, or hasten into Neufchâteau or Vaucouleurs, fortified places which had remained French, and there await the passing of the peril. From time to time news reached them, telling of the desolation of the French kingdom and the distress of its king. With the simplicity of the peasant they referred the whole of these deplorable ills to a single cause, the presence of foreigners in the country. God had created England for the English: why should they not stay comfortably at home, instead of attacking and injuring France which belonged to the French? Let the English return over-sea and all things would be restored to their natural order. But how to make them do this, or how "*les bouter hors du royaume*" (to expel them from the realm)? To God alone was such a miracle possible, since man appeared impotent—God and his saints.

The historical origins of her mission

Brooding over this simple presentation of the case, while she sewed and spun, Joan was gradually thrown into a state of religious exaltation. She saw visions. St. Michael appeared to her saying the very things which she was always repeating to herself of "*la grande pitié*" (the most piteous state) of France and her king, and gradually fostered in her mind the idea that she herself might have a part to play, one of devotion and of self-sacrifice, in the great drama which Heaven was preparing. From the beginning of the year 1428 onwards her visions multiplied. St. Catherine and St. Margaret, for whom Joan had always felt particular devotion, added their

Psychological aspects of her mission

warnings and their incitements to those of St. Michael, in order that the young shepherdess might be induced, by being made fully aware of her mission, to leave her village and her parents and become *the saviour of France*. The power of God would provide earthly means. The voices revealed what the first step should be: to seek an interview with the officer in command at Vaucouleurs and ask him for an escort to conduct her to the king. It seems probable that it was the new danger which was now threatening the town of Orléans which overcame her last feelings of reluctance at the beginning of the year 1429.

Her decision

Joan at *Vaucouleurs*

Robert de Baudricourt, who was in command at Vaucouleurs, asked himself at first whether she was not either mad or possessed; but after he had had her exorcised, and had come to understand that neither jest nor vituperation would affect her resolution, he had her equipped as a young squire and gave her six men-at-arms as an escort (February 13). Ten days later she was at Chinon, at the court where Charles VII then was. At first all did not go either so quickly or so well as she had expected. No man was surprised that God should have sent miraculous aid to the king, or thought for a moment that Joan was of too low estate to be really inspired, but all knew well and the king first of all, that man must be always on the watch for the artifices of the Evil One, seeking to lure man to disaster. Joan, therefore, was subjected to suspicious observation for two days before being presented to Charles, whom she startled by recognising him in the middle of a group of courtiers among whom he had concealed himself, and by speaking a few words to him in secret—we do not know what they were—which amazed him, and were taken by him for a "sign" worthy of respect. She was then handed over to the theologians, who racked her with questions for fifteen days and insisted on the proof of her virginity, to make certain that she was not an emissary of Satan. She grew impatient, know-

At *Chinon*

Suspicion and precautions against Joan



ing well how rapidly the danger for Orléans was increasing. But the time which was lost nevertheless did her service; it allowed her renown to grow and to spread. A miracle, in fact, seemed, to all who had not given up all hope for France, the single and logical remedy for evils, too great to be dealt with by man's will and man's strength. As soon as Charles VII consented to allow "*la Pucelle*" (the Maid) to proceed, the roughest soldiers hastened to stand by her side: La Hire, Ambroise de Loré, Jean de Bueil, Saintrailles, and various courtiers, till then totally engrossed by their pleasures, such as the Count of Alençon. Formally summoning the besiegers "*in the name of God*" to retire, she marched on the 28th of April. On the night of the next day she entered Orléans, by surprise, with two hundred lancers. Her arrival aroused irresistible enthusiasm among the defenders and among the English an anger which expressed itself in the grossest insults. On the 4th of May, the little army of Blois forced a passage between two of the bastilles and Joan immediately led an attack upon the English redoubts. She was grievously wounded before the strongest, but in four days she had carried three; on the 8th of May the English, discouraged, evacuated the position and retreated.

Enthusiasm and confidence outside the court

The army of Blois and the march to Orléans

Relief of the town, 8th of May, 1429

This victory, won against all hope, raised throughout all France an enthusiasm which was reflected on the side of the invader by an uneasiness, amounting almost to panic. If the king could but have made up his mind promptly and followed up the delivery of Orléans, he might have obtained a decisive advantage. Unfortunately La Trémoille did not think it in his own interest to drive the thrust home, and continued to keep Charles under his thumb, in idleness and inaction. He was nevertheless obliged to consent to the "*voyage de Reims*" (journey to Rheims) as Joan continued to insist that coronation would render the king unconquerable and public opinion was strong on her side.

Divergent sentiments aroused by this victory

Its eff

The journey to Rheims decided upon

It was, at first sight, a singularly rash undertaking to ven ture so far from the centre of the country controlled by th "King of Bourges," in between the Burgundian and Parisia territories, but the real risk was not great. The presence o a royal army actually on the march revived many dorman enthusiasms and gave courage to more than one waverer. A this moment, too, Philip the Good, dissatisfied with the sarcasti and insulting manner in which Bedford had dismissed his clain to take Orléans under his protection, in the name of the young duke, Charles, who had been prisoner since Agincourt, was ou of temper with his ally, and disposed to be not ill-pleased i Bedford should learn from a brilliant success of the other sid how mistaken he had been in giving cause for dissatisfaction Finally Joan and the Count of Alençon cleared the road b

Battle of *Patay*

dispersing at Patay [6] (June 18, 1429), the only English arm which was then in a position to oppose the journey. Thu Charles VII started on the 29th of June with an escort o twelve thousand soldiers.

Coronation of Charles VII (July 17, 1429)

The coronation took place on the 17th of July. Its effec was not long in making itself felt: Laon, Soissons, Senlis Beauvais and a number of castles in their neighbourhood re verted to the king's allegiance. The Burgundian sent him a embassy, and the agitation in the country under the domina tion of the English, already considerable, was greatly in creased. Instead of taking advantage of all this, as good sens recommended, the pitiful sovereign could think of nothin but of a return to the south of the Loire and a resumptio of the kind of life which he loved; he believed, or wished t believe, that the armies had done enough and that negotiation could complete at their leisure the work that had been begun He allowed himself, nevertheless, to be enticed as far as Paris which Joan attempted to capture under his eyes. The firs sault having failed (September 8) he refused to sanctio

[6] Patay in the department of the Loiret, arrondissement of Orléans.

a second and retreated, while Bedford and Philip made ready for their revenge. It was almost in spite of the king that the Maid, reduced to play the part long played by La Hire and Saintrailles, was resolute in continuing to fight on the north of Paris. On the 23d of May, 1430, she threw herself into Compiègne, which the Burgundians were besieging, and that same evening was taken prisoner in a sortie. The commander of the town, Guillaume de Flavy, made no attempt to rescue her. It is unfortunate for the memories of the Archbishop of Rheims, Regnault de Chartres, a great friend of La Trémoille, and for that of the favourite himself, that this Flavy was a relative of the former and the secret agent of the latter. Regnault announced the capture of Joan to his flock of Rheims as the natural consequence of her infatuation "*in insisting on having her own way.*" He consoled them by assuring them that a little shepherd of Gevaudan had received from God the same gifts as those of the Maid, and was about to take her place! Charles VII, no doubt, thought the same; he did nothing for the poor girl who had saved him. For six months she was in the hands of a somewhat needy seigneur, who would have willingly allowed her to be ransomed. Receiving no offer from Bourges, he sold her to the English for the sum of 10,000 *livres tournois* [1] and a commission payable to the knight who had taken her prisoner.

Joan taken prisoner before Compiègne

Indifference of the king and his familiars

Joan sold to the English

It is difficult for us in these days to understand the trial and execution of Joan of Arc; from our point of view, the English would deserve severe reprobation, but it is from the point of view of the fifteenth century that the men and the events of that time must be considered. In the opinion of ordinary Englishmen, the Maid was a sorceress who had invoked against them all the artifices of Hell. They could never admit that a position so favourable as theirs had been at the begin-

The character of Joan's trial

[1] This was a unit for reckoning money of very variable value. Joan's price would represent forty to fifty thousand gold francs.

ning of 1429 could have been so promptly and completely altered by human means alone. Without going as far as this, the more cultivated and the University doctors thought that Joan, in declaring that she had been sent by God, had at the very least lied, blasphemed and fallen into heresy. For this reason she was tried as was customary with sorcerers and heretics, before an ecclesiastical tribunal, presided over by Pierre Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais, in whose diocese she had been captured, and composed of a hundred clerics arbitrarily chosen. The majority were Normans, a few belonged to the staff of the University of Paris, two or three only were of English origin, but all were neck-or-nothing partisans of Burgundy or of England. Never were judges more partial or more predetermined to condemn the accused. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the procedure followed was similar to that employed in most trials for heresy and sorcery of that epoch, and that the more odious features which the bad faith of Cauchon and his acolytes make so conspicuous in the trial, the interrogatory, the judgment, the sentences and their execution, must not be considered as absolutely exceptional. They show irreconcilable hatred and prejudice, so much is certain, but other unfortunates, accused of crimes analogous to those of which Joan was convicted, had in the fifteenth century the same cruel experience as she of the attitude of doctors and theologians. Her defence was singularly stout and vigorous. At no single moment, while the trial proceeded, was she dominated by the judges; only the sight of the stake coming at the end of all the exhausting hardships of her captivity made her courage flinch. Haggard, almost unconscious, a poor waif in a whirlwind of terror, she confessed all that was demanded, abjured her "*errors*"; that is to say, denied her mission, and heard herself condemned to perpetual imprisonment (May 24, 1431).

The tribunal

Its spirit

The defence of Joan

The scene of *abjuration*

The English view

The English desired her death as an example, and this all

the more stubbornly as their affairs continued to go from bad to worse and the fidelity of their ally Philip the Good began to give them more and more anxiety. Nothing was easier than to satisfy them. On the 28th of May the judges were informed that Joan had resumed her male clothing—her woman's attire had been treacherously removed. They went on to attest that she had reverted to her sins, and she gave them the satisfaction of renouncing her abjuration of the 24th. As a confessed "relapsed" she was handed over to the secular arm, and went bravely to the stake on the 30th of May, sure of herself and of her mission. She had been, indeed, the purest and fairest incarnation of the French patriotism of her time. She had brought France the self-confidence needful for salvation. This gives "*Jehanne la bonne Lorraine*" her immortal title to glory and still more to the grateful love of those whose forebears she raised from the depths of despair.[8]

The relapse of Joan

Her execution (May 30, 1431)

III

For the rest, the movement of enthusiasm and of faith which she had originated ran great risk of subsiding into impotence, if the wretched favourite who held the king in tutelage and whose help in the war of deliverance was merely *hindrance* and sterilisation of all effort, should continue to be interested in nothing but his own affairs, to let anarchy invade province after province. Men had simply reverted to the kind of war waged at the beginning of the reign. The same bold partisans, the same surprises, the same escalades and skirmishes filled the occupied territory, but these exertions,

Reconciliation with the Burgundian

The situation in 1430

[8] At the moment, the familiars of Charles VII abstained from speaking about this death, seeing that it did them anything but honour. Much later, in 1450, the king commanded that the case should be reviewed. An enquiry to which we owe the best of our information upon the subject of Joan was made and extended to all places which she had visited and among all those with whom she had come in contact. The pope consented to the revision of the trial, and it was in his name that a verdict, which rehabilitated Joan, was pronounced (July 7, 1456). More recently the Church has carried the reparation to the point of canonising the victim of Pierre Cauchon as a saint.

governed by no comprehensive plan, successful as they often were, could never produce much result. Evidently nothing of importance could be undertaken as long as Charles VII remained under the tyranny of La Trémoille and as long as he had not made peace with Philip the Good.

Fall of La Trémoille and resumption of reconciliation with Philip the Good

Richemont in power

As has already been related, in 1433 Richemont got the favourite out of the way and took control of affairs. Immediately afterwards, in concert with Yolande of Aragon, he planned the indispensable reconciliation. The opportunity was favourable. The Duchess of Bedford, sister of Philip, had died in 1432, breaking the family tie between the two dukes. The Burgundian was ill-satisfied with the result of his English alliance. His domains had suffered severely from the ravages of the French troops; he feared that worse might befall, for Charles VII had made an alliance with the Emperor Sigismund. His subjects clamoured on all sides for peace, those who had continued to side with the French grew bolder; in the northern districts, particularly at Liège, his difficulties had become acute, and above all he saw clearly that the English venture had failed from having been allowed to drag on too long and that he could gain great advantage by going over to the French king; thus he willingly lent himself to the parleys which took place in Nevers in January, 1435, and which led to the *Congress of Arras* (August).

Congress of Arras (1435)

A general peace was the subject of discussion in the capital of Artois, where a formal congress met under the presidency of the papal legate, composed of envoys sent by Charles VII, Henry VI, the University and several "good towns," of the Council of Basel, then discussing a reform of the Church, and of diverse foreign princes. The English took a line so unreasonable as to show that they were far from appreciating the realities of the case. They could have succeeded in securing their retention of Normandy and Guyenne in fief; they put forward as their lowest terms their abandonment to King

Failure of negotiations for general peace

Charles of the territories of which he was in effective occupation, on the condition that he hold them in fief under Henry VI and renounce the French crown. The legate, when he became convinced that he could not induce them to give way, took no further trouble about them, and as they themselves knew that the Burgundian was about to desert them, they withdrew from the Congress (6th of September). Eight days later Bedford died (14th of September).

Treaty of Arras, 21st of September, 1435

It was no easy matter, however, to induce Philip to come to terms. When all seemed settled, scruples or resentment would prove too strong for him. Casuists laid siege to his conscience, perhaps he himself made some play with it for the sake of better terms. During this time, Richemont, well provided with money, made friends with the ducal councillors. As a matter of fact the Burgundian had long made clear what his essential conditions would be.[9] The king's men were resigned to their acceptance. They were severe and far from glorious for Charles VII. He was to disavow the murderers of John the Fearless, to excuse himself for having made no effort to prevent their crime in that "*he had been very young, and had too little experience and too little wisdom to be able to do so.*"[10] The guilty, particularly Tanguy du Chastel, Louvet and Frotier, were to be punished "*in person and property.*" Diverse pious foundations at Montereau and at Dijon to be supported at the king's cost —which was to be great—were to perpetuate the memory of the crime and attest its reparation. The king was to cede to the duke the county of Mâcon, the county of Auxerre, Bar-sur-Seine, Péronne, Mondidier, Roye, Saint-Quentin, Corbie, Amiens[11] and diverse smaller compensations.

Conditions of the pact

[9] He had already produced them in negotiations conducted at Bourg-en-Bresse, in January, 1423, and at Arras in August, 1429. Cf. Cosneau, *Les grands traités de la guerre de Cent Ans*, page 180, and seq.

[10] "*Il étoit bien jeune et avoit pour lors petite connoissance et ne fut point si avisé que d'y pourvoir.*"

[11] These three last-mentioned towns might be ransomed on paying down 400,000 gold écus, *i.e.*, about 5,200,000 gold francs.

The duke, while Charles lived, was to owe him no homage of any kind and his subjects were neither to contribute aid nor take arms at command of the king. The king, on the contrary, was to defend Philip with "*all his power*" if the English make war on him, and was to abstain from any alliance which might be prejudicial to his cause, especially "*to the alliance which he has made with the emperor against the said seigneur of Burgundy.*" [12]

Charles VII and his entourage in face of the treaty

This treaty, concluded on the 21st of September, was certainly "*at the cost and charges*" of Charles VII, who never forgave Philip for it. It was vigorously criticised not only by the *Armagnacs*, who thought themselves ill repaid for their devotion to the royal cause, but still more so by Frenchmen of good sense, who thought the compensation high for the murder of John the Fearless and low for that of Louis of Orléans. The king, however, ratified it and did well to do so, since he derived from it the decisive advantage which made him victorious in the end; namely, a breach between the English and the Burgundians. He left to the future and to the astuteness of his lawyers the task of correcting any disproportion in the concessions which for the moment was unavoidable.

IV

The end of the war

Awakening of the king

Resumption of methodical war

Richemont recaptures Ile de France and Paris

The treaty of Arras exasperated the English, particularly against the "traitor" of Burgundy, but their anger spent itself in verbal insults and in sterile ravage. In France they felt the ground sinking under their feet—all Normandy was in agitation. Charles VII, pushed on by the men of action who surrounded him, Richemont, Dunois, Charles of Anjou and his councillors, "*men not of high lineage*" but competent and devoted, appeared to awake from his torpor. The English were

[12] "*A l'alliance qu'il a faite avec l'empereur contre mondit seigneur de Bourgoyne.*"

still strong enough to keep the Norman insurrection in hand, but they were unable to prevent the recapture of the Ile de France. Richemont entered Paris on the 13th of April, 1436; the town had risen against the English and opened its gates to him. But the Constable well knew that he had no such army in hand as was needed to attack Normandy and Guyenne with any hope of success. He wished to find time to make one. Further, various great seigneurs, the Duke of Bourbon, the Duke of Alençon, disgusted at being no longer at the head of the king's councils, disquieted by the royal encroachments which threatened their independence and encouraged by the double-dealing of the Duke of Brittany, carried on in the kingdom an agitation which was to continue from 1437 to 1442 and to go the length of an insurrection in arms.[13]

Need of a truce

It appeared necessary to suppress this before making the last effort. For this reason, assisted by the exhaustion of the English and the fatigue of the Burgundians, and, above all, by the miseries of the interminable war and the ravages of the *Écorcheurs* (Flayers),[14] the truce was concluded in 1444 and lasted till 1449.

Reconstitution of the army and suppression of the Flayers

The Constable availed himself of the truce to free the country from the Flayers and organise the army which he needed; the two operations went hand in hand with one another. A choice was made among the freebooters. Some of their chiefs, deeply compromised, who had the ill-luck to fall into the hands of Richemont, were executed without trial. The majority, thanks to the weakness of Charles VII, obtained *letters of remission* which pardoned their misdemeanours; the

[13] This was called the *Praguerie* (1440) in remembrance of the uprising of the Hussites (1419) of Bohemia. The Emperor Sigismund had just recaptured from them the town of Prague (1436).

[14] This was the name given to freebooters with unemployment who pillaged the country, in formidable bands like the *Compagnies* of Charles V's time. Their chiefs sometimes acquired considerable reputation and large fortunes, such as Rodrigue of Villandrando, Chabannes, La Hire, Saintrailles, Blanchefort, the Bastard of Armagnac, etc.

best of them were taken for the king's service. As to the others, they took care to remain in the background or left France. It was the same with their men. Some entered the *compagnies d'ordonnance* (unattached companies) instituted in 1445, and were garrisoned in selected towns; the others, broken up into small bodies, were conducted to the frontier and expelled, or if Frenchmen, compelled to return to their own districts and remain there in quiet.

The new army

The *compagnies d'ordonnance* were more than a regular and well-disciplined cavalry. They served to frame, as staff, the ranks of the auxiliary troops which had to be raised with the resumption of the war. Infantry were obtained mainly by a selection made from the communal militias. In this way the *Francs-Archers* (Free Archers) were put on foot in 1448. These, in the future, proved somewhat disillusioning. To complete the work of the Constable and his auxiliaries, Dunois, Pierre de Brézé and others, the brothers Bureau cast for the king the best cannon then in existence. At the same time England began to draw near to civil war. The French venture having turned out ill, malcontents sought to throw the responsibility on the House of Lancaster and remembered that Henry IV had obtained the throne by usurpation. Henry VI was pacific and had none of his father's vigour; failure made him unpopular to a brutal aristocracy and an encroaching Parliament. He had none of the qualities needed to control these disruptive forces with the strong hand, and to hold his own with Charles VII. He had lost all faith in the fortune of his arms, and his people, in their hearts, had done likewise. He still had certain good commanders capable of making a strong resistance, but nothing more. When the truces were broken in July, 1449, after English hostilities against Francis I, Duke of Brittany, since 1422, operations quickly became lively. In a single year Richemont and Dunois recovered Normandy. Rouen, in open revolt, compelled the garrison to capitulate

England during the truce

War resumed, 1449

Conquest of Normandy (1449-1450)

(October 29, 1449). The battle of Formigny [15] (April 15, 1450), followed by the capture of Caen (June) and Cherbourg (August), put an end to English rule north of the Loire.

Battle of *Formigny*

The retaking of Guyenne was more difficult; the country had become accustomed to the occupation, now three centuries old, which had, on the whole, been benevolent, light and, above all, profitable. The Gascons had in no sense become English, but they had no liking whatever for French rule; they cherished their own autonomy which was almost complete, and their economic interests attached them to England, which was a large buyer of their wines. In the spring of 1451 Dunois began the conquest. The Bordelais, to save their vineyards, yielded, on condition that all their franchises should be respected (June). Bayonne fell on the 20th of August, and all seemed over, but their first experience of French administration proved unfortunate. The Gascons could not well adapt themselves to the ways of their new masters. They intrigued with the English. The victors, becoming aware of this, increased the vigour of their rule. Finally the Bordelais revolted on the approach of an English fleet which was bringing Talbot and a small army to the country (October, 1452). The enterprise was a desperate one and its duration was short. Charles VII encircled the province with four large columns. One of them received Talbot's attack at Castillon [16] (17th of July, 1453). The aged general was defeated and killed. Bordeaux capitulated on the 19th of October and Guyenne was punished by the loss of its autonomy and since it lost at the same time the principal source of its economic prosperity some time elapsed before it became resigned to its fate.

The spirit of Guyenne

First conquest (1451)

Discontent and revolt

Second conquest (1453)

Battle of *Castillon*

[15] Formigny is a commune of the department of the Calvados, arrondissement of Bayeux.

[16] Castillon-sur-Dordogne is in the department of the Gironde and the arrondissement of Libourne. Talbot behaved as rashly and unwisely as the French had behaved at Crécy, Poictiers and Agincourt. He made an attack upon entrenchments defended by a number of cannon. The flower of English chivalry perished at his side.

The end of the Hundred Years' War

At length the Hundred Years' War came to an end. The English did not accept their defeat; Charles VII was unwilling to leave them Calais, which they still held; there was accordingly no treaty, and the state of war continued. The King of France, much occupied with the growing power of the Duke of Burgundy, and the English now in the thick of the *Wars of the Roses*, had neither leisure nor much desire to continue serious hostilities and these became confined to reciprocal raids on the respective coasts of the opponents. Towards the end of the reign of Charles VII the unhappy Henry VI developed the weakness which he had inherited from his grandfather, Charles VI, and became insane; Richard of York attempted to lay hands upon the crown and while the wife of the maniac appealed to the King of France, Richard negotiated with Philip the Good. Thus their respective rôles had become reversed!

Conclusion

France in ruins

The king exalted and strengthened

France, depopulated, ravaged and ruined, had fallen into a state of almost incredible misery in comparison with her condition at the beginning of the fourteenth century; her general morality had been strangely lowered as is shown by the increase of crime; but *misfortune had made her a nation.* Patriotism born from the sufferings of the war among the poor upon whom they had pressed most severely, was now firmly rooted in the people in the form in which Joan of Arc had embodied it, that of a profound attachment to a legitimate king. Charles VII did not in the least deserve to be the object of this new-born feeling, which, indeed, he had done nothing to bring to birth. Nevertheless, he profited by it; it had been the essential factor in his victory. And after his victory it singularly strengthened his authority, and the king became —for a long time—the nation personified.

Almost all obstacles to the complete authority of the sovereign had been overthrown or destroyed during the war. The

feudal nobility had wasted away. They had been the chief sufferers from the great military disasters; the *apanaged* nobility alone remained formidable. The "good towns," heavily in debt, were incapable of defending their privileges against the king's agents, and soon lost them altogether. The upper bourgeoisie, abandoning their unsuccessful opposition, endeavoured to push their individual fortunes in the service and through the favour of the king. Their great ambition was to receive *letters of ennoblement* from him in return for devotion to his service. All established means for the expression of public opinion and feeling, *States-General* and *States-Provincial*, all deliberative assemblies which the war had seemed about to transform into instruments for control of the royal government, found themselves, by this victory of the king, reduced to complete dependence upon him.

It was thus the country and its people who were the chief sufferers from the lamentable consequence of the cataclysm which came to an end in 1453, and they were to continue for several centuries to labour under considerable disadvantages. But the king, on emerging from the crisis, found circumstances exceptionally favourable to the establishment of his absolutism. The councillors of Charles VII, the "*well served*," were zealous to ensure that the king should profit thereby.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Ch. Petit-Dutaillis, *Charles VII* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iv, second part) book i; Vallet de Vireville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 3 vols., 1862-1865; Dufresne de Beaucourt, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 6 vols., 1881-1891.

On Richemont: E. Cosneau, *Le connétable Arthur de Richemont*, 1886.

On Joan of Arc: S. Luce, *Jeanne d'Arc à Domrémy*, 1886; Lowell, *Joan of Arc*, Boston, 1896; Wallon, *Jeanne d'Arc*,[3] 2 vols., 1875; Anatole France, *Histoire de Jeanne d'Arc*, 2 vols., 1908; Michelet, *Histoire de France*, vol. v, book x, ch. iii.

On the Flayers: Tuetey, *Les Écorcheurs sous Charles VII*, 2 vols., 1874.

CHAPTER XV

FRANCE AND HER KING AT THE END OF THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

I

Influence of the war on political and social life

Tendencies in France at the beginning of the fourteenth century

WHEN the fourteenth century opens, France is not yet wholly freed from her feudal fetters, political, social and economic; but the direction and the aim of her national evolution begin to be more clearly revealed. Her territorial unity, centring on the royal domain, is growing closer and indeed almost complete; her administrative centralisation is being outlined as her governmental institutions are developed in detail; her economic prosperity is rapidly progressing and a reasonable equilibrium in her system of land tenure begins to be established, through the development in the cultivation of the seigneurial lands, of *fermage* and *métayage* (cultivation of rented land or on a profit-sharing system). The English war has been a rude check to this movement. In the middle of the fifteenth century, after the expulsion of the invader, the conditions which govern French life, from whatever point of view they may be considered, are so different from those encountered by the Valois at the time of their accession that it may well be thought that the catastrophe has diverted all things from their normal course, and turned the country in unforeseen directions.

A. *The king: obstacles to his authority*

(a) *The seigneurs*

At the beginning of the war, political activity was mainly in the province of the king, but not entirely; his initiative was hampered by restrictions which he had to take into account. The vassals, emerging from feudalism, were naturally attached to its principles and usages, safeguards of their in-

dependence. Their numbers were great enough still and their resources sufficiently extensive to compel the prince, for some time to come, to be satisfied with keeping them within the limits of their feudal obligations, and guiding them step by step towards full recognition of his sovereignty, while he exercised himself only in his own domain and over his own direct subjects. Compelled, in fact, to remain quiet, they parted, in theory, with none of their diverse prerogatives, and the smallest opportunity was to find them ready to rise for the assertion and restoration of their rights; the spirit of anarchy was not yet cast out of them. The war and its disorder brought them profit at first, the king's authority being relaxed; since necessity often made him dependent on their good will. From Robert of Artois to Philip the Good, many, indeed, were the vassals, great and small, who derived benefit from the chaffering thus imposed by circumstances upon the crown. The seigneurs saw themselves free to return to their habits of violence, agitation and private war, above all of autonomy. In other words, the Hundred Years' War favoured a feudal reaction which might have become most dangerous.

Advantages given them by the war

It did not do so for several reasons. First the barons, with all their capacity for egoistic intrigue, were as thoughtless as they were brutal in its application. Neither the fourteenth nor the fifteenth century taught them any real political sense. Wrapped up in the present, for the most part, and in their immediate interests, they were capable neither of foresight, nor of disciplined action, nor of perseverance to an end which they had willed. Above all, they were incapable of laying aside their respective jealousies and habits for the sake of union and execution by a common effort of a concerted plan. These deficiencies, fatal to the revolts of nobles which had occurred under the Capets of the direct line, were equally so to those which called for suppression by Charles VII. Dissension doomed the *Praguerie* of 1440 to failure from the first.

Why it did not leave them in a better position

Secondly, the war had decimated the nobility. Crécy, Poictiers, Agincourt had dealt successive death-strokes to the highest ranks of the world of chivalry, and thus it followed that the feudatories were numerically much weakened at the end of hostilities. Those families which survived, of those that had owned but small or comparatively small estates at the start, only reached the end at the cost of much enfeeblement and impoverishment. Their properties had suffered hugely from interminable pillage, and partition on inheritance had cut them to pieces, for it was only to the great fiefs that the principle of leaving all or at least the main part of the domain to the first-born was applied. Finally the seigneurs had gradually altered their ideal of life and their manner of living. Becoming more civilised and following their prince's example, they cultivated refinements in taste and ostentation in display which were costly in the extreme. Some thus ruined themselves and all tended, more or less, habitually to frequent the courts of princes who alone were now rich enough to provide entertainments and distractions on the sumptuous scale which use had made essential to their existence.

The small barons

Some, faithful to the ways of their grandfathers, *barons* of the old mark, acted, in their own neighbourhoods, as bandits pure and simple, rivalling the Flayers in brutality, from father to son as long as hostilities continued. Now that *lettres de rémission* (letters of pardon) have made their exploits forgotten they vegetate monotonously in their sombre castles. If an opportunity for adventure should come their way, there is little chance that it will spring from their initiative or that they will use it effectively. These survivals of a former age are already developing into the country squire (*hobereau*).

The great feudatories

Except for the Duke of Brittany and the Count of Armagnac, who are now the most notable of the old feudatories only the apanaged, originating from the king's family, and

from the unwise generosity of the king, own lands extensive enough to make them politically important. Such are the Dukes of Orléans, Anjou, Bourbon, Alençon and, most powerful of all, the Duke of Burgundy, aggrandised and strengthened by the treaty of Arras. But any effective action on their own part is dependent on uninterrupted concord among themselves, and this concord is hard to assure. Their rivalries and their egotism give to the royal policy many excellent openings for advantage.

Real position of the feudatories at the end of the war

Altogether, the feudatories, even with the aid of the apanaged, were now in no position to effect more than an occasional disturbance of public order or a momentary anxiety to the king. There was little prospect that they would ever regain the upper hand in France or succeed in checking the advance of the royal power. The immediate and well-assured advantages presented by the king's service to those who undertook and devoted themselves to it were to prove the most effective solvent of feudatory coalitions except perhaps the ever mounting personal prestige of the kingly office which made opposition to his will seem a species of sacrilege. For this reason, it is permissible to say that the Hundred Years' War, far from having profited feudalism, effectively contributed to its downfall.

(b) *The bourgeois*

Their successive failures

The insufficiencies of a John II or a Charles VI, in face of the urgent perils incidental to the invasion, might well have favoured the rise of institutions conferring powers of control upon the bourgeoisie. We have already recounted the reasons for the complete failure of all the attempts made on these lines during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. At the end of the war the functions of the States-General have evidently become restricted to those originally assigned them by the king; they *confirm*, it may be said, *on behalf of the nation*, crucial decisions made by the crown they *help to finance* the

king in times of difficulty. An opportunity of obtaining a Great Charter for France has occurred but has been missed; because the three *orders*, clergy, nobility and bourgeoisie, have failed either to see or to seize it with unanimity. In due course the bourgeoisie resume their position as servants and supporters of royalty. The fifteenth century sees their establishment as a class in the social hierarchy, ranking below the clergy and nobles, and above the common folk. It is by the acquisition and possession of *money* that the bourgeois attained and retained their ultimate importance. Their money comes from commerce properly so called and from transaction in money itself, in capital, which the Jews and the Lombards could now no longer invest in large undertakings, since they lived in continual insecurity and were liable from one moment to another to be instantly ruined by violence if they were too venturesome. The capital was much more mobile and more active in the hands of the bourgeois whose position was comparatively one of security. Their gains, if large enough, were invested as their successors invest theirs today, in the purchase of landed property, and they differed from the nobility only in their non-possession of *titles* and *coats-of-arms*. These were conferrable by the king alone, and, being greatly coveted, were sought for by zeal in his service. For this reason, bourgeois experience and knowledge of commercial business was easily adaptable to the transaction of public affairs, in which otherwise they were not above attention to their own material profit and advantage. The best councillors, the most *realistic* administrators of Charles V and Charles VII, came from among those bourgeois who had withdrawn from opposition to the prince and applied themselves to, and so ordered, his service as to bring profit both to the State and to themselves. Public order was good for business, and princely favour determined the weight of a man in the realm

Their position about 1453

Money; its new power

The bourgeois and the king

The enfeeblement of the central power, through these long

years of war and anarchy, the abeyance of public authority while English and Navarrese bands, the Great Companies or the Flayers, overran the lowlands, had conferred importance upon the small municipal governments in the hands of the bourgeois of the towns. They had been obliged to take steps, on their own initiative, to protect their townsmen and provide for their essential needs. They had been obliged to manoeuvre between the opponent parties, declare on which side they stood, to accept responsibility and make decisions. In the most difficult period, that which succeeded the madness of Charles VI, the "good towns" acquired great power; they represented the most fundamental and most permanent element in the kingdom. King and princes alike wrote to them individually, kept them informed as to current occurrences, and solicited their approbation or their collaboration. They are represented at the conferences which deal with peace or have this or that other important object. No decision of principle, no State law has raised them to this eminence, their influence is derived simply from the facts of the situation; institutions of much interest might possibly have evolved in this way, and, by this side path, the bourgeois might have gained that direct authority in the State which they had failed to win, under cover of the States-General, through Marcel and Le Coq.

c. *The good towns.* Their rôle during the war

All came to nothing; victory had given the king too great an increase of power, both material and moral, and the "good towns" themselves were worn out by the excessive length of the struggle. They had had to meet heavy expenses—their own, already considerable, and those of the king—which, in the form either of taxes or of loans, had demanded exhausting financial efforts. The bad state of their finances as a whole both diminished their authority and gave the "king's agents" more frequent opportunity to intervene in their affairs. During the war the royal agents were suitors to the municipalities for their council and collaboration and were in the position of the

Why their influence was transitory

party obliged. After the expulsion of the English, the rôles are reversed: the king's officials resume their former habits of superintendence, intrusion and encroachment on authority in the towns where they are posted and the municipalities which are united against them by no common bond, and each of which, a small and isolated unit, is incapable of holding its own in face of the prince's will.

The advantage to the king of their decline

They are soon overwhelmed, and only so much of their communal franchises remains operative as the king's men think worth preserving for the good of his service and for their own convenience. The "good towns" are becoming nurseries for the production of royal officials from their well-to-do classes, short-lived as had otherwise been their course in general politics.

B. *The people*

1. *The peasants*

This class of bourgeois had suffered infinitely less from the war and its effects than had the common people, particularly the countryside. There, in the middle of the fifteenth century, the conditions were so disastrous as to appear almost beyond remedy, when the enormous quantity of wealth of all kinds destroyed by the war was considered and the social dislocation arising from so many years of misfortune bearing with special weight upon the peasants. Many, discouraged and exasperated, joined the brigands, choosing to be pillagers rather than pillaged, and these, when the war was over, continued their lucrative pursuit. Their bands, recruited from the ranks of the idle and the wretched, continue to cause much disturbance in the latter years of Charles VII. They live in sympathy with the beggars, who swarm everywhere, especially where crowds collect, at fairs and markets, at the resorts of pilgrims and, normally, in all large towns. They are an enormous corporation, a kingdom: *le royaume des Gueux* (the kingdom of Rascality) which has its own king, chiefs, assemblies, quarters set apart for it, known as the *cours des miracles* (court of miracles), even its own language, curious specimens of which have been preserved for us in the poems of François

Brigands

Mendicants

Villon.[1] They ended by obtaining a quasi-recognition of their right to live in their own fashion on the borders of law-abiding society. They enjoyed an actual toleration, whose continuance depended on their own self-restraint, but was liable to be infringed by the police if they were so rash as to try it far. On the countryside, the most obvious result of the war was the shrinkage in the population, with the desertion of much cultivated land, the misery of the poor who had persevered in attempting to live by agriculture, and subsequently, when security began to return, towards 1444, the lack of labour. A terrible *shortage of labour* supervened—in no way surprising, seeing what sufferings the peasantry had endured—at the very moment when a great effort was called for to recover the ground, so quickly and cruelly lost, since the good times for the rural parishes of the early fourteenth century. Those, indeed, who were able and willing to resume work on the land had every chance of meeting with favourable conditions of life: the shortage of labour caused *a rise in wages* and a modification, in the peasant's favour, of all agricultural contracts. At this time, the serfs in great numbers broke away from hereditary bonds; landowners who wished to keep them on their lands had no choice—they could keep them only by considerable concessions, the first being *enfranchisement;* otherwise they would abscond, sure to find a refuge and remunerative work somewhere or other.

Depopulation

Good out of evil

It is true that these advantages in themselves did not recover for the tenants of the ruined lands the large and regular production which would have made them well-to-do. They were far from the attainment of this position by the end of the reign of Charles VII, and, indeed, the deplorable conditions in which they found the land which gave them their bread

Situation at the end of the war

[1] These are the ballads written in *jobelin* or slang; they are, in detail, almost incomprehensible nowadays. It may be remembered that Victor Hugo, in his romance, *Notre-Dame de Paris,* has attempted to revive this truculent and sinister world of tramps and rogues (*truands et gueux*).

were a sore burden for several generations; but the war, *economically* disastrous as it was, *socially* did them good service: it accelerated, for those who survived its miseries, the movement towards emancipation begun before it broke out.

2. The craftsmen

The urban toilers, workmen attached to a *corporation*, or *métier juré* (trade guild) and *free workmen*, making their living individually and at their own risk and peril, under the two forms of industrial activity still existing side by side and to some extent overlapping in the fourteenth century, also suffered severely from the tribulations arising from the war. At the end of the ordeal, the system of corporations had come to be preferred to the other, doubtless because the solidarity it gave to a group was found to abate evils against which an isolated worker was helpless during those years of misery. Industrial reorganisation therefore tended to achieve its ends by corporate methods. But the workmen found little advantage beyond a slight increase of security in the earnings of their daily bread. The ranks of the corporation became more and more rigidly exclusive, the rules stricter and stricter, and under the coercion of the organised group, the *individual worker gradually lost all independence and all initiative*. The close, jealous and tyrannical aristocracy of the *masters*, to which so much harm has been attributed—and with justice—in relation to labour organisation before the French Revolution, derives from the time with which we are dealing. The master and the workman, profuse in reciprocal recrimination, form, in the industrial world, two separate classes, with no liking for each other, incapable of fruitful coöperation with one another; the class of *masters* which is sedentary, and that of workmen, purposely *itinerant*.[2] In the background, and unknown to those who have sown its seeds, *the social question has germinated.*

Progress of *corporations*

Drawbacks of the system for the manual labourer

[2] This time saw the establishment of the practice of the *tour de France* (tour of France) and the rules of *compagnonnage* (association), of which some of our traders, carpenters, for instance, have partly maintained the tradition.

The ruin of *commerce*

It may naturally be supposed that the Hundred Years' War had ruined commerce even more rapidly than agriculture. Traders had no security against outrage; they could do nothing but stay at home. The production of commercial goods became scanty and indeed how could they be conveyed over broken roads, bridges ill repaired or unrepaired, in danger of brigands and of exorbitant tolls? The great French fairs, those of Champagne and Beaucaire, the *Lendit* of Paris, disappeared one after another. Foreign vessels, those of the Hansa on the Baltic, those of the Italian towns on the Mediterranean, gradually ceased to call at French ports where they no longer found opportunities for profitable traffic, and commercial life became reduced, with few exceptions, to little more than petty exchanges between neighboring towns. All the activity and high promise of the early fourteenth century had been replaced by sheer stagnation.

Her people the best resource of France

At bottom, there was no irretrievable loss. France had her best resource still left to her, an active, enterprising and industrious people, whose confidence and energy were extolled even by foreigners; but these great qualities of the race were opposed by an obstacle hard to surmount, the huge accumulation of ruin piled up in every department of French activity for more than a hundred years, almost without intermission.

II

Influence of the war on moral and intellectual life

We know that the moral and intellectual bases of society in the Middle Ages rested upon religion and that religion expressed itself through the Church. For the Church the Hundred Years' War had been a time of tribulation and trial which shook her to her foundations; and the troubles of the Church reacted severely upon religion itself.

A. *Church and religion;* her impoverishment

In the first place, Church property had suffered gravely from the ravages on all sides; in many places, the clergy,

deprived of their regular means of subsistence, fell into a state of uncertainty as to ways and means which had a singularly cooling effect upon their sacerdotal zeal. In the second place, the difference which divided Christendom in 1378 and continued till 1417, the *Great Schism*, fundamentally ruined the discipline of the clergy, whose whole body fell into extreme disorder. In many places the parish priest disappeared and could not be replaced. In others, reduced to live by any means which he could devise, he was not particular in his choice, and did not abstain from the worst possible, such as trade, more or less honest, or money-lending. The morals of the clergy, already much discredited in the preceding period, became an almost permanent scandal; from the top to bottom ecclesiastical hierarchy and the multifarious misdeeds of disorderly priests are the subject, in a lamentable litany, of large numbers of *lettres de rémission*. The habit of violence, the appetite for the pleasure of the moment, the loss of moral sense and charity, which are natural symptoms of the insecurity and misery of the times, have reduced the clergy to the same moral level as that of the commonalty who are still in a position to harbour a wish and to give it free play. The regular priests, in particular, largely ruined and dispersed, have fallen into the lowest stage of disrepute. The downfall is complete; it seems unlikely that the monasticism of the Middle Ages can ever raise its head again in France.

Relaxation of discipline

The life of the clergy

The religious sentiment

The persistence of the religious sentiment is shown by the ardent desire which fills the souls of such priests as have remained in intent faithful to their vocation, and of the best of the laity, to reunite the Church now divided by schism and restore her to all her former splendour by a thorough reform of her institutions, morals and spirit.

Desire for reform

The University of Paris is, at the end of the fourteenth and during the fifteenth century, the great centre of this *reformist movement;* her most illustrious doctors, a Pierre

d'Ailly, a Jean Gerson, a Nicolas Clemengis, are indefatigable in the cause. Their attack is directed in particular against the pontifical exchequer, the abuses attached to the court and chancellery of Avignon and afterwards of Rome, against the excessive centralisation of Church government in the hands of the pope, as the primary causes of the evils and vice which are so hurtful to Christianity.

Devotion

The poverty and constant menace of misfortune in which all men lived developed an ardent and apprehensive piety, not, however, for the most part of a truly Christian spirit. Confidence in the direct intervention of celestial powers in an epoch when men had grown to despair of human wisdom, placed such saints as were specialised in this or that useful function, and the Holy Virgin, our Lady of Pity, in the forefront of religious life.

Pilgrimages

Incessant pilgrimages to the great *Notre-Dames*—regarded by popular simplicity as so many different Virgins—and to the churches of saints reputed the most powerful, were undertaken in spite of difficulties of all kinds and were the outstanding religious manifestation, the chief means of ensuring the good will of the higher powers. The most meritorious pilgrimage is that to the Holy Land, and the idea that a crusade is called for continually haunts the mind of many a Christian of the time. Some of the wealthy do more than dream. They take the cross and ship. Thus did, for instance, the Duke of Bourbon in 1390, the Marshal of Boucicaut in 1397, 1399 and 1403, and above all that long train of knights and lords of high degree led by that same Boucicaut and the Count of Nevers—the future John the Fearless—who were crushed by the Turks at *Nicopoli* on the 25th of September, 1396.

The Crusade

Preoccupation with the other world

Their religion, for obvious reasons, is one of terrible gloom, though it lives on hopes of paradise, which is to grant to unfortunate mortals a happy requital for the miseries of life upon earth; it is, above all, filled throughout with fear of the

The Devil and sorcery

Devil. It sees him prowling the world and dominating it, drawing man into his den, no matter what his earthly rank may be. It imagines that a man may strike a bargain with the Prince of Darkness, and become his familiar to his material and temporal gain and his eternal spiritual loss. *Never was such an outbreak of sorcery in every shape and form.* Sorcery is the religious malady of the century, and a deadly one, for even the Church takes it seriously; the laity go in terror of it, and no measure directed to its prevention or repression appears too severe. This mania, humiliating to human reason, but countenanced by the popes themselves, was still far from having exhausted its powers for ill. It wrought havoc in many minds; it fathered monstrosities of thought which found no corrective in a science at that time destitute alike of value or method.

The haunting fear of death

All men were obsessed with the thought of death, implacable and personified imaginatively in the famous *Dance of Death*[3] (*Danse Macabre*) as a skeleton laying its clutches on one after another in the dance of human life, king and beggar, bishop and monk, high-born lady and harlot, all in their turn. These obsessions did not merely fill men's hearts with thoughts of repentance, but they had other results—a thirst for immediate enjoyment, a mania for distraction and revelry, an irresistible call for the brutal satisfaction of the animal instincts.

Passions and disordered appetites

We possess a large number of *lettres de rémission*, in which the king passes the sponge over the crimes and delinquencies of this or that person. These letters have to do with men and women of all ranks, and form a shocking catalogue of horrors which gives us a most melancholy impression of the morality of a period, in which indulgence for such misdeeds appeared

[3] There is reason to believe that the right form is *la danse du Macabre* (the dance of Macabré) the latter being a proper name, though we do not know whom it designates. Paintings and sculptures, representing this dance, in which Death leads all men, were very numerous in the cemeteries and churches of France, possibly in the fourteenth and certainly in the fifteenth century. Most of them have disappeared.

advisable. The fear of secular justice has become enfeebled to the point of extinction, that of ecclesiastic justice has followed the same course and for the same reasons. The Devil alone is not enough to foster a sense of duty and a respect for virtue, the less so, in that, great as are the advantages which he has over us in life, a due confession, *in articulo mortis*, reinforced by judicious offerings to the saints of most renown, can repulse him for ever in a moment. Most of the worst transgressors make an edifying end, and may appropriately recite the words of Villon, one of their number:

Immorality of the time

> Premier, je donne ma pauvre âme,
> A la benoiste Trinité,
> Et la commande à Notre-Dame,
> Chambre de la divinité;
> Priant toute la charité,
> Des dignes neuf Ordres des cieulx,
> Que par eulx soit ce don porté
> Devant le Trosne précieux.[4]

The Marshal of Rais, executed on October 26, 1440, after a trial whose details are like a nightmare, on his way to punishment, expressed such excellent sentiments and such pious repentance, that the large number of persons present, even the relatives of his victims, come to see his punishment, prayed fervently with him for the salvation of his soul, and the confusion of the Evil One whom he had served so long.

As was natural, these men, prompt to look beyond the hori-

[4] *Grand Testament* lxxv.

> Firstly, my poor soul I give,
> Unto the blessed Trinity,
> And her command to Notre-Dame,
> The Chamber of divinity;
> Praying of their charities,
> The nine good Orders of the skies,
> That my gift be carried thus,
> Before the Throne most precious.

zons of this world for aid in extremity, saw in the evils that encompassed their time a *celestial chastisement* and sought to reconcile themselves with God or, at least, to find a refuge from his wrath. Their ardent search for relics, their gifts to churches, their journeyings to the most revered sanctuaries, and, otherwise, their practice of magic, are all designed to win them these precious boons. At times, a shock more violent than others, such as the *Black Death* in 1347, brings about a collective outburst of penitence, which expresses itself in strange observances. Bands of *Flagellants* appear, who go in long files through town and country, chanting canticles and lacerating each other's backs with whip and scourge. This penance continues for thirty-three days and a half and is ordinarily enlivened by massacres of Jews and pillage of church property. Pope Clement VI took severe measure against these energumens from 1347 onwards. At this point of the Hundred Years' War they could still be effective, as they indeed were, but the spirit of the Flagellants lived on and was still manifest in the first quarter of the fifteenth century. These unhappy men awaited and cried out for the *Great Miracle:* the destruction of this perverse world, and the establishment, on a regenerate earth, of the reign of God according to the law of the *Eternal Gospel.*[5]

The rage for relics

The *Flagellants*

B. *Intellectual culture*

The Hundred Years' War was thus an epoch of far-reaching moral disturbance, which threw multitudes of men out of all normality or stability. This painful and perilous condition grew worse as the cause which produced them continued to set France in confusion. Analogous troubles arose in the domains of intellect and art. It would be surprising if they had not. There, however, the damage was sensibly less; the evils of the times did not destroy the love of beauty in men of high station.

Persistence of *amateurs* of things of the mind

[5] These mystical divagations descended from the thirteenth century: the theory of the *Eternal Gospel* was published in Paris in 1254. It was connected with the speculations of Joachim of Flora, a Calabrian monk, who died in 1202, and father of the long line of *Spirituals.*

able to encourage artists, and culture, already well rooted at the start of the fourteenth century, could not be uprooted or even greatly arrested in growth by the return of the grossness and brutality which descended upon the whole kingdom. It was impeded, slackened, to some extent dispersed, but it endured. Charles V and his brothers of Berry and Burgundy, in the thick of the war, Charles VII, Philip the Good, René of Anjou, Charles of Orléans in its latter part, and, side by side with these great personages, many *amateurs*, less exalted but not less enthusiastic, collected writers and artists about them. No sooner was the war at an end than a veritable outburst of intellectual activity attested how far from extinction the life of the mind had been.

The great *patrons*

For the rest, it is interesting to note that from 1336 to 1453, in spite of the difficulties encountered by scholars in moving from one seat of learning to another, as they were accustomed to do in the thirteenth century, the number of Universities in France had increased. That of Caen, founded in 1432, was organised between 1437 and 1448; that of Bordeaux dates from 1441; that of Poictiers and that of Angers from 1432; that of Valence from 1452; that of Nantes from 1460. But this prosperity is merely apparent and external. In reality, the old conception of study to which the Middle Ages had become attached, seems henceforth worn out and grown sterile. The scholastic philosophy, though partly revived by William of Occam (+ 1343) marks time, or returns upon itself, becoming more and more lost in the mazes of a bewildering and delusive dialectic. Positive science in these universities remained non-existent, and was little more than what was called by Nicolas of Cusa "*learned ignorance*," fortified, moreover, by a ludicrous vanity and an odious intolerance. Schools are multiplied far more from a desire to lessen the difficulties, just mentioned, attendant on the travel of scholars, and to give them access near by to facilities for study which

The Universities

Their number increases

Their real decadence

The University of Paris

The Universities of the Middle Ages have not kept pace with the times. Movement outside them

they can no longer go to seek at a distance, than from any progress in studies or any increase in students. It is easy to see that, in the thick of the war, even the illustrious University of Paris is no more than the shadow of its thirteenth century self. It was reformed in 1452 by the Cardinal of Estouteville, legate of the pope's, but the reëstablishment of discipline and the regulation of its system of examination did not restore it to real life. New times demanded new studies; which the Universities could have, and might have, encouraged, but which, on the contrary, they opposed. They were to continue obstinately in the mind of the Middle Ages and when the Middle Ages were over their reactionary spirit was little by little to destroy their influence. During the war they may be said to have vegetated rather than lived. Nor could they well have done otherwise, when the clergy who formerly filled them and replenished them with masters and with pupils had been so profoundly weakened by the general shock, both in the numbers who joined their ranks and in their means of subsistence and in their moral character.

Intellectual movement outside the Universities

Science

Outside the Universities, arises, at least in the fifteenth century, an intellectual movement with a trend which might be called *scientific*, if this term too rigorously applied were not in some degree equivocal; the science of that time bore little resemblance to ours—it had never grasped the essential notion of scientific experiment. We may say, then, that it tended towards the acquisition of new knowledge, especially in the domain of alchemy and in that of geography, in which the authority of travellers begins to surpass that of ancient authors. There is also a literary movement, which, from beginning to end of the Hundred Years' War, yielded works of great

Letters

interest, some in prose, in the line of the chroniclers, of which Froissart (1337-1404?) remains the most pleasing, or in that of the romancers; some in verse, under the double aspects of *court poetry*, such as that of Eustache Deschamps, Alain Char-

tier, or Charles of Orléans, and of *popular poetry*, in which François Villon [6] produced masterpieces towards the end of the period under consideration. Mention must also be made of the theatre whose religious dramas, or *mysteries*, and lay compositions, *moralités*, *sotties* and *farces*, the people took extreme delight in and which found a place in one or other of these forms in all public rejoicings.

C. *Art*

At first sight, it is in the domain of art that disaster appears to have been appalling. A quantity of monuments, religious and civil, have been destroyed or badly injured. Others, unfinished before the troubles, or left unrepaired for many years, have fallen into a state of ruin which necessitates repair from top to bottom. Of the precious or remarkable objects which they contained, many have been broken in the course of the pillages to which they have been subjected, or stolen and lost forever.

Losses incurred

Persistence of artistic activity

Where, too, in a time so severely and constantly affected with the "deficiency disease" of *no money*, were to be found the resources necessary for the execution of great works of art? On looking more closely we are surprised to find that artistic life has not, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, been arrested for a moment and that it has, indeed, been very far from unproductive. The chief cause of this happy survival is to be found in the taste for luxury and refinement common to all princes of the time. Art is the greatest, as it is the most indispensable, need in the life of men who pursue luxury and have acquired any fineness of taste. Every Valois was an *amateur* of objects of art; not only of jewels, of which they were all passionately fond, but of fine furniture and richly illuminated manuscripts; all, too, had a passion for grand buildings. The popes of Avignon are, for the most part, of like disposition. No lord of great name, no well-to-do burgher,

Influence of *amateur*

[6] Villon was born in Paris in 1431 and died at some unknown date after 1463. He had a literary reputation as early as 1456.

Buildings erected

but is fain to follow such eminent examples. Paris in particular adorns herself in the fourteenth century, not only with the Louvre of Charles V and the buildings of the Hôtel Saint Paul, but with a large number of luxurious houses, some remains of which survive to this day. None, indeed, now venture to undertake the building of those endless cathedrals which are the glory of the thirteenth century. Yet it was in the course of the Hundred Years' War, whose rude reverberations often interrupted the work, that the magnificent church of Saint-Ouen, at Rouen, was built, and the cathedrals of Rheims, Bourges and Rouen were slowly completed. Almost everywhere we see the towns exerting themselves to repair, strengthen, complete or simply embellish their churches, a form of contemporary piety encouraged by pontifical *indulgences*.

The *flamboyant style*

It is at this time that the Gothic style known as *flamboyant* gradually evolves, somewhat obscurely as far as we can see. There was no lack of vitality in the architecture which produced the palace of the Dukes of Burgundy at Dijon,[7] and designed the house of Jacques Coeur at Bourges, or the hospital at Beaune.

The plastic arts have also remained alive, but in their case, with a difference which should be noted. While architecture, as it evolves, remains exclusively French, these other arts

Foreign influence on the plastic arts

begin to be affected by foreign influences: those of the northern countries, principally Flanders and the adjacent countries, which are brought into intimate relation with France both by current politics and by the *dominance* of the Duke of Burgundy; Italian influences, too, enter by way of Avignon and affect especially the art of painting.

The work by which Dijon is still adorned: the remains of the *Chartreuse de Champmol*, intended by Philip the Bold to

[7] Unfortunately nothing now is left to us of this magnificent monument but a tower, the kitchens and a few rooms. The rest was demolished in the seventeenth century to make room for a huge set of buildings in the taste of that period.

be the place of sepulture for his family; the "Well of Moses," the porch in the chapel, the tomb of Philip, that of John the Fearless, all belong to the Burgundian school, in which the great image-makers (*imagiers*) Claus Sluter and his nephew Claus de Werve, are Germans.[8] Northern painters again, those who work on illuminated manuscripts for Charles V and his brother, the Duke of Berry, and the decoration of Burgundian buildings. In Flanders the school of which the brothers Van Eyck,[9] Van der Weyden, among other admirable *masters*, were the most shining lights, burst into the full blaze of splendour. And in the work of the most famous painter of Charles VII's time, Jean Fouquet of Touraine, Flemish and Italian elements are mingled with those derived from his own soil.

Burgundian sculpture

The Flemish painters

Finally, from Flanders and Burgundy came the musicians of a period which loved music as the crowning grace and luxury of a princely and fastidious life, side by side with the arts of the pencil and the chisel. The most illustrious composer of the time, John van Ockeghem, who became about 1452 choir-master to Charles VII, was a Fleming.

Music

It is relevant to remark that these eastern and northern districts, finally united under the Duke of Burgundy, while they were not entirely spared by the ravages of the war, suffered considerably less than the rest of the kingdom. They derived, indeed, some profit from the decadence of the French centres of industry and commerce, which had been most busy in the thirteenth century, and their wealth had still remained great. The towns of Gand, Bruges, Ypres, Liège had experienced bad times, but they were gainers in the end. There is reason to believe that their artistic brilliance is not unconnected with this economic prosperity. Yet it must not be overlooked that their eminence in art, however incontestable, is not exclusive;

Reasons for the artistic prosperity of the Burgundian state

Other centres

[8] Sluter worked at Dijon between 1389 and 1405 or nearly so.

[9] The celebrated "Adoration of the Mystic Lamb," which the cathedral of Gand has preserved, was painted between 1420 and 1432.

it is shared by various smaller schools, or by individual artists of note fostered by the *patrons* of the period.

D. *General survey*

The general impression given by this brief survey, necessarily incomplete, of French life during the Hundred Years' War, is far from being so simple and uniform as might be expected. The material damage is enormous and appalling; it will take years to repair it. The country has been stirred to its depths, its economy is disordered, its moral equilibrium destroyed, the evolution of its culture retarded, its internal politics have taken new roads. In these points, the evils may be deplorable. But the historian, on the other hand, is impressed by the vital vigour and tenacity manifested through cataclysm after cataclysm; by the energy, often ill regulated and ill directed, but prompt and confident, with which the people of France react to each fresh shock.

In the darkest hours, even when all seemed lost, the humblest of the people were ready to cling to the smallest hope and to work for its realisation. It was well indeed for the men of that time that they had perforce adopted the habit of living from day to day, to make the best, without taking much thought, of every opportunity of diversion and of not looking too far in advance. Thus they kept unimpaired their zest for life and their power for reorganisation when normal conditions returned. It was true that the gains of great past good fortune, whose richness was far from exhausted, had partly been lost during these hundred and seventeen years, but there had been some compensation. The lines of advance for the future had been laid down, vague as they still might be.

III

The exploitation of the victory

It has already been said that at the end of the ordeal the chief profit had come to the king. It might have been believed, while the struggle was proceeding—or surmised—that the result would have been quite otherwise and that the royal

authority would be obliged to surrender a number of the advantages which it had captured in the time of Philip the Handsome. But the sovereign, at first assisted by the inexperience and very inconsistency of his adversaries, to whose objects the majority of the king's subjects remained indifferent or antipathetic, had actually profited by the upshot and by the general misery from which the sentiment, which we know as *patriotism*, was born.

A. *The king.* How he is the principal gainer of the war

Men of the fifteenth century were as yet unable to rise to the conception of France as an abstract idea. They stopped short at that of the *kingdom* as the personal property and the inalienable patrimony of the king. This devotion to the reigning prince, as formulated by Joan of Arc, becomes the outward and visible sign of love for the native land. Patriotism is absorbed in loyalty. For this reason, at the end of the war the king is master, not only because he is in fact the high suzerain and as such able to make himself respected throughout France, or is her most richly endowed seigneur, or even because, by ecclesiastical doctrine, he is the temporal delegate of God. He is this because he personifies and expresses the nation, which is only now waking up to a knowledge of itself.

Patriotism and loyalty

The strength of the prince is still further increased by all that the conscious or unconscious adversaries of the sovereign power of the crown have lost during the war. While the feudatories have diminished in number and in strength the States-General have failed in their attempt to obtain any control in the State and the "good towns" have lost the means by which they might have stood firm in their communal semi-independence; all this, we know, was to the benefit of the king. Generally speaking, the misery and disorder, the disarray of France when the English leave the field, are necessarily favourable to him who appears the one rallying-point for recovery, reconstruction and victory.

Enfeeblement of the king's adversaries

Charles VII knew well how to profit by these exceptionally

B. *Government of Charles VII*

General character

favourable circumstances. He abstained from innovations in matters of government, but he consolidated the gains with which the war had strengthened his royal authority; he consolidated and extended them.

His bourgeois councillors

In due imitation of the best advised of his ancestors *he chose most of his councillors from the bourgeois.* The bourgeois, disillusioned by the results of their opposition to royalty, have abandoned it and are inclined to be zealous in the royal service, which will give them consideration and wealth under its shelter and by its favour. Their energetic ingenuity and their solid competence will be of the greatest advantage to their master. They undoubtedly did not overlook their own interests, small and great, in their devotion to the royal service, but they put their hearts into it and conducted it with tenacity and discernment. Many, puffed up by self-importance, were visibly anxious that their humble origin should be forgotten and that they should be treated as great lords. The Bureau brothers, for in-

The Bureau brothers

stance, made themselves somewhat ridiculous in this way, but their vanity, which the king in no way discouraged, gave further impetus to their loyalty. Others, as is usual in a period of financial and economic recovery, were possibly not too scrupulous or over-discreet in the amounts which they pocketed from the profits of the prince or made in subsidiary undertakings on their own account. Thus did, it appears, Jacques Coeur,

Jacques Coeur

whose high spirit is attested by his proud motto.[10] Having become too exuberantly opulent by methods which it is difficult to believe wholly innocent or correct, he had the unwisdom, imprudence and lack of self-restraint to flaunt his insolent luxury before the needy nobility who frequented the court of Charles. Rancour, hate, jealousy and calumny were concentrated against him and he succumbed to their attacks. The king aban-

[10] This motto, *"A vaillans cuers rien impossible"* (To valiant hearts nothing is impossible) runs along the walls of the magnificent dwelling which the king's *argentier* (treasurer) built for himself at Bourges and which still stands today.

doned him to the law, which condemned him to the confiscation of his property and to perpetual banishment. He had paid the price not only for his own misdeeds but for those of many others who still held their places (May, 1453).

The Councillors of the "Well Served" directed their principal attention to those points which are the foundation of every powerful State: justice, finance and the army.

1. *Justice*

Two great ordinances, one in 1446, the other in 1454, reorganised the law-courts. The Parliament of Paris was restored between 1437 and 1454. As its business with the extension of its jurisdiction had become enormous and complaints were made and with truth of delay in decisions, so another Parliament was established at Toulouse in 1443, for the countries of the south, Languedoc, Guyenne and Gascogne. The court of Paris was unwilling to consent to this curtailment of its jurisdiction. It desired to remain unique in its kind and to constitute mere delegations, judicial commissions nominated by itself, in some of the greater provincial towns. The king's will overcame this opposition.

The Parliament of Paris

Its political importance

The Parliament of Paris is almost self-electing; it has the right of presenting three candidates to the choice of the king for every vacant seat in its assembly. It is armed with very extensive judicial authority. It is recognised as competent to *enregistrer* (register), which means to examine and criticise all royal ordinances. It is therefore a considerable power in the State. While not indeed in a position completely to counterbalance princely absolutism, it can, within limits, exercise not ineffective independent control. In other respects, it is far from representing ideal justice; its contemporaries are constant in recrimination against the abuses of every kind which it fosters, not forgetting that of the *épices*, *dons corrompables* (gifts which may corrupt).[11] Above all, the

[11] At first the *épices* were small presents in the shape of sweets or confectionery of different kinds offered by suitors to judges, in principle, *after*

smallest piece of business involves excessive expenditure. Nevertheless, the king has men in his staff of magistrates who are both experienced and determined that his *justice* (jurisdiction) shall prevail over all others. One of the mainsprings of royal action in the past is beginning again to do its work.

2 *Finance*

It goes without saying that the personal revenues of the king, increased as they were, were insufficient for the expenses of government, and that, in fact, for a long time, public necessities had been met by the money of his subjects contributed under form of *aids;* that is to say, in matter of fact, of taxes.

Taxation

Though the contrary has long been asserted, *Charles VII did not institute permanent taxation,* he never departed from the principle that every tax should be *provisional,* and earmarked for a particular occasion and a definite purpose. What is really new is that the decline of the *States,* both *Provincial* and *General,* leaves the king free to decide at his own discretion what cases necessitate an "aid"; to settle its amount and the territory which it is to cover, to assess and collect it. At the same time the powers thus usurped remain subject to some restriction: thus the States of Languedoc retain the right, delusive though it be, to vote on subsidies demanded by the prince. By the unkind irony of events, the royal treasury takes

The *Élus*

advantage, for its own convenience, of the organisation of the *Élus,* originally founded by the States-General of the fourteenth century in order to facilitate collection and to take it out of the hands of the royal agents. At the end of the reign the king's exchequer has an annual income of 1,800,000 livres at its command, including the resources of the private domain, amounting only to 50,000 livres! The pretext under which these annual taxes are regularly and legally raised by Charles

the trial of the case. Little by little it became customary to offer them *before.* In the fourteenth century they have become practically obligatory and are altered to money. At the beginning of the fifteenth century they have become a veritable tax which is imposed on all suitors before their case is called and are a source of innumerable abuses.

upon both landed property and business transactions, while they are always stated to be provisional, is the need of maintaining his army. This army, reorganised by Richemont, is *no more admittedly permanent than are the taxes*, though it is not till after 1453 that it is partially disbanded. Important contingents of unattached troops are maintained at the king's expense in different towns as a provision for emergencies, and a regular revenue is needed to maintain them. Thus one usurpation leads to another; as to the French mind of that time a *miles perpetuus* (a standing army) is no more legitimate than a *fiscus perpetuus* (a permanent tax); but the former necessitates the latter, and both are to become so deeply rooted by custom in the polity of the State as to be accepted as essential and indisputable conditions of its existence.

3. The *army* is bound up in the fiscal system

The two together led to immediate and important consequences. They were justified on the ground that they were for the public advantage, and, in particular, assured public security. Could it not be said, therefore, with justice that they concerned all Frenchmen? On this ground, the king claimed to apply the energies of his collectors to the domains of the barons as well as to his own: for the support and sustenance of soldiers who did service for all his subjects. Protests were made and promptly emphasised by revolt; but the king being definitely the stronger, this usurpation, like others, soon became merged in custom, with, it is true, some limitations upon the arbitrary power of the king. Charles had already begun to attempt the subjection of the entire baronage, in a similar way, to the royal jurisdiction. The success of his arms accelerated this new crucial transmutation by giving him—as his privileges and contractual rights as feudal suzerain disappeared—the absolute and universal authority of a sovereign according to the doctrine of the Church and the tradition of Roman law.

4. New claims of the king over rights of the feudatories

This is of great importance as a political phenomenon,

C. *The administration of the domain*

since *the immediate domain of Charles VII does not cover more than half the kingdom*, and to exercise the essential kingly rights over the other half is a great advantage to him. The territories which directly belong to him form, indeed, a compact whole, whose cohesion is assured by the twenty-seven bailiffs, the fifty seneschals (to which are to be added the provost of Paris and the governor of La Rochelle). But the great vassals have not yet resigned their rights. On their own lands they consider themselves masters; they have their own administration, taxes, policy and courts. Anything which lessens their autonomy, favours French unity and helps towards the ultimate realisation of the still vaguely grasped conception of nationality.

Bailiffs and seneschalships

The fiscal revenues

Only partial success attained

The reasons why

For the rest, the king's councillors attempted to introduce order and regularity into his finances; at any rate they were not sparing in highly circumstantial ordinances. Their results were not always proportionate to their exertions for two main reasons: the *first* is that the staff at their disposal was not invariably devoted or honest; habits of violence and rapine are lost less rapidly than they are acquired. There are still untrustworthy agents, abuses which fill the taxpayers with discontent, and make institutions miscarry. The *second* reason is that the reformers are incapable or unable to abolish the different personal privileges which already swarm in the field of public taxation, and to reorganise contributions on the basis that all men are equal in relation to the tax. The whole financial future of the French monarchy is to feel the effect of these shortcomings.

D. *The Church*

These privileges were mainly shared by the nobility and clergy, and of these two *states* the latter was in the better position to assure the perpetuation of the advantages which it had acquired, seeing that it could defend them as justified by the will of God and conducive to his service. On the other hand, the French Church had never wavered from the al-

liance which she had made with the King in the early stages of the Capetian monarchy, and it would have been black ingratitude to deprive her of privileges which she had now come to regard as established rights. But, since the troubles which had encumbered the path of the Church in the fourteenth and at the beginning of the fifteenth century had recoiled upon the kingdom itself, the king had become accustomed to intervene more freely than ever before in the affairs of his ancient ally; and since neither these troubles nor the tribulations which she had experienced, owing to the war, had left her in a favourable position to resist him, it was natural for him to take advantage of the situation. The question had, if it may be so said, two faces, the one Roman or Pontifical, the other French or Clerical.

The liberties of the Gallican Church

At all times, the king had resisted the domination of the Roman curia over the French clergy, and had, in conjunction with the latter, elaborated a complete theory of the temporal independence of the Church of France in relation to the pope. This is known as the *Liberties of the Gallican Church*. But these liberties as he conceived them—and in this his clergy naturally took a different view—had, so to say, only one aspect: that which opposed any enterprises of the Holy See. They must never infringe the omnipotence of the king. This was the view adopted by Charles VII in the adjustment of his relations with his Church.

The programme of the reformers and the ecclesiastical policy of Charles VII

At that time, the party of reform, whose leading spirits were Frenchmen, desired to compel the pope to make very great alterations in Church discipline; practically it wished to limit both the pontifical authority and the centralisation of its government, to which it attributed the chief evils from which Christendom was suffering. Such proposals could not fail to be acceptable to the king, and he thus gave his support to the Council of Basel, which, from 1431, led the attack upon papal omnipotence. He declared, in 1438, that the decrees of the Council

The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438)

should be applied in France, and, on the 7th of July, 1438, he promulgated a formal decision, which is known as the *Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges.* The first part of this document was an indictment of the wrongs committed by the pontifical exchequer in France; it proceeded to authenticate the thesis of Basel; namely, that the Council was above the pope in matters which concerned faith and discipline. It then ordered that sundry practices and usages, recognised as undesirable, should be corrected (for instance, the *Feast of Fools,* indecent ceremonies tolerated in churches, or the incontinence of the clergy) and, above all, it imposed a rule for the collation of ecclesiastical benefices which took them out of the hands of Rome. Henceforward, abbots and bishops would be elected by chapters, and by methods strictly canonical, without regard to promises given or *graces expectatives* (anticipated rewards), the profitable distribution of which the Holy See had retained for itself. Similarly the pontiff would no longer have the recognised right to bring an action in his own courts until it had been examined under the ordinary jurisdiction.

Intentions and policy of the king

In other respects the Pragmatic Sanction authorised "*benignant and benevolent solicitations*" on the part of the king and princes "*in favour of meritorious persons zealous for the good of the State and the kingdom.*" Which means that the influence of the king took the place of that of the pope. Records abound, which exhibit the king's recommendation in action, sometimes as an undisguised threat, in favour of his own candidates. All evidence leads to the conclusion that the king, not without certain adjustments demanded by circumstances, had promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction simply in order to obtain control of ecclesiastical elections and to decide the composition of the higher French clergy according to his will.

Justifiable protests made

And this intention, imperfectly realised, but highly characteristic of the policy of *monarchic restoration* of Charles VII which attacks all authority that hampers it, was not

accepted without some protest either by the pope or by the University. The University understood that the tutelage of the king's men would be no better for the Church than had been that of the Roman curia. It perceived that the sovereign was not really interested in reform, that he was playing for his own hand, and that he would be as ready to act with the pope as against him, if circumstances seemed to him to show that the former policy would help better than the latter to make him master over the Church of France. It need hardly be said that he compelled the clerics, as far as he considered it advisable, to bear their share of the common fiscal charges, and subjected them to the jurisdiction of the royal courts, in disregard of their most incontestable privileges. In this the conduct of the most pious Charles VII is a model of egoism and unscrupulous infringement of rights.

E. *Opposition of the seigneurs*

The Church had no weapons but those of the spirit for its defence against the enterprise of the king. Not so the seigneurs, who on several occasions resorted to arms to safeguard their independence, or to restore their influence. Their principal revolt, the *Praguerie* in 1440, ill-organised, and doomed to failure beforehand by the petty greed of the majority of the coalitionists, tainted with felony by the participation of Duke John V of Brittany, who had joined forces with the English, collapsed before the superiority of the royal artillery and the energy of Richemont. The Count of Armagnac and the Duke of Alençon were dispossessed of their domains, and the others, considering that it was definitely more profitable to be on the prince's side than against him, sought to extort from him favours and presents to the best of their ability. Charles VII lent himself readily to this new policy, which confirmed his triumph. Only the Duke of Burgundy, fortified in his independence by the treaty of Arras, appeared in a position to make head effectively against him. Their relations became more and more embittered from 1453 to 1461. The king did

The *Praguerie*: reasons for its failure

The Duke of Burgundy

not accept with much patience the autonomy, not too discreetly wielded, of the man who had exploited his distress, and whom he accused of active sympathy with the revolting feudatories: the duke was uneasy over a growing ill-will which seemed to him disloyal and complained of incursions by royal soldiers on his lands. War could not have been far distant when Charles died.

IV

The material recovery

In justice to the men who governed in his name it must be admitted that they thoroughly grasped the need of an immense effort to raise the kingdom from its abasement and that they undertook the task seriously.

A. Country life

Rural landed property was restored by revision of boundaries and verification or restitution of titles to ownership. The repeoplement of the countryside, the necessary clearing of much good land which had reverted to waste and brushwood, the renaissance of agriculture, were encouraged and promoted. Progress must evidently be slow, owing to scarcity of labour, but it was real and the excellence of the soil could not fail to accelerate it as soon as sufficient hands were available. Industrial work in the same way gradually became reorganised under the shelter of the corporations which in those poverty-stricken times still offered labourers more security than the system of free labour. Commerce, above all, recovered activity and courage. The whole merit of this renaissance has been attributed to Jacques Coeur, but not quite justly; to do so is manifestly an exaggeration. Nevertheless it is certain that this man, bold, enterprising, the king's friend, and fortunate in business, gave a great example and encouragement to the men of business of his time. His disgrace was naturally no deterrent. The fairs of Lyons, established from 1420 to 1444, attempted to emulate the popularity of the ancient fairs of Champagne. The repair of roads and bridges, various works

B. Industry and commerce

to improve navigation on water-courses, the diminution in number of tolls, the almost complete reëstablishment of security for travellers, effective encouragement of traffic by river and sea, commercial agreements ratified with diverse princes, and the establishment of a sound coinage were all measures whose value was well appreciated by merchants. Communications facilitated

Altogether, it was in the field of business that the economic recovery of the realm proceeded with most rapidity, a matter for little surprise since it was there that the difficulties were the least. In other fields the results of the efforts made developed but slowly and for a long time appeared largely superficial; the wound was too deep to yield immediately to treatment. Nevertheless the people of France were full of confidence; foreigners who observed them at that time bear witness to the ardour which they brought to the formidable task which confronted them. Results of effort

Diverse other signs attest the strength of this vital impulse and the desire for greater well-being, which are the best guarantees for recovery. First there is a violent and disorderly reaction against the irksome existence, which alone was possible during the war. A similar phenomenon always arises at the end of epochs in which men have suffered greatly. Pleasure reigns supreme, and those who demand it take it in all its forms without taking much trouble to choose between them. This brutal and somewhat repellent rush for enjoyment is nevertheless at bottom a symptom of salutary reaction. Secondly, the court life, elegant, gracious, courteous, becomes organised, in the courts of the king and the Duke of Burgundy, and, in a less degree but in a similar spirit, round the principal heads of seigneurial houses. Politeness, gallantry, peaceable occupations and distractions have certainly not abolished the violence, savagery of manners, overruling lusts and the taste for jousts and tourneys which still perpetuate the worst ways of the first Valois, all chivalry and plumes, but they little by little allay

C. *Signs of vitality in France*

1. Appetite for pleasure

2. Court life and courtesy

3. Return to normal intellectual activity

or expel them. Above all, intellectual and artistic activity returns to its regular course. The princes have already been shown as interested in things of the mind, as attracting and protecting writers and artists. The time which possesses poets like Martin Lefranc and François Villon, artists like those under whose hands the flamboyant Gothic attains its culmination and those who establish the glory of Burgundian-Flemish art, and like Jean Fouquet; the time which has had the making of Michel Colombe and has sowed the seed for the harvest of works of art of all kinds which is to ripen in the last third of the fifteenth century, this time has vindicated itself as preëminent in man's life.

The part of the king and his councillors in this recovery

Undoubtedly neither Charles VII nor even his councillors were the prime authors of the vast movement which raised and revivified France so cruelly wounded by the Hundred Years' War, but at any rate, they did not impede it, and they may, it seems, have recognised that they were at the end of one epoch and on the threshold of another, an epoch in which the nightmare of the past might be put to flight and forgotten and the evolution resumed which had been so unfortunately interrupted for more than a century.

D. *New foreign policy.* The policy of frontiers

Foreign policy takes a direction which indicates a return to the Capetian preoccupation with extension towards the boundaries of Caesar's Gaul across the ancient *Francia Media* of the treaty of Verdun. Charles VII, desirous also to counterbalance Burgundian power, paid much attention to the affairs of Germany and Switzerland, and in 1444-1445 attempted to lay hands on the "Three Bishoprics" of Metz, Toul and Verdun. A favourable future might well have been possible on that side; unfortunately, the king at the same time turned his attention in another direction, which involved France in the risk of much dangerous adventure; namely, towards Italy, that Italy in which the house of Orléans has its claims and its interests as has also the house of Anjou. From 1450 onwards Italian

Attention turned to Italy

intrigues occupied a larger and larger place in French politics and the *occupation of Genoa* (May 11, 1458) is possibly a prelude to more extensive and to more imprudent enterprises in the Peninsula. There was little sense in plunging recklessly into the Italian hornet's nest at a time when the inevitable question of Burgundy still remained for settlement, and when France had but weak frontiers in the east. But Charles VII had not yet lost his taste for dynastic adventures so dear to the feudatories and so neglectful of the most decisive geographical considerations. His grandson, Charles VIII, is to continue before long the plans which death in 1461 prevented him from prosecuting himself.

Conclusion

The Hundred Years' War is momentous in the history of France. It exercised a profound effect upon the destinies of that country. Materially it had been a disaster. It would have been difficult or impossible to avoid a violent conflict between the two kingdoms which so many questions set at variance in the fourteenth century, but the incapacity of the men whom chance had placed on the throne of France, is the real reason for the undue duration of the conflict, its undue extension, and its unnecessary scope; its own confusion lamentably prolonged it. It is for this reason that the material prosperity of the country, so brilliant at the beginning of the fourteenth century, has completely disappeared well before the middle of the fifteenth century, and that the conditions of life have become so painful for the common folk. Long years will be needed for escape from this misery.

From another point of view, the crisis had been no less deadly in that it had weakened all political organisms, all groups which might have been able to confront the authority of the king, regulate and eventually control it. Thus a turning was definitely taken towards uncontrolled absolutism, far from beneficial to the kingdom and in no sense an imperative

necessity for the normal development of its evolution. The king might have become master—it can be seen in the time of Philip the Handsome that he was becoming so—without becoming master completely.

On the other hand, the tribulations of invasion have welded into one the men of France, hitherto inchoate and unconscious of their own unity. They *have made them a people.* The process started by the menace of John the Fearless' coalition under Philip Augustus, has been, by now, if not completed, defined and extended by the havoc long wrought by the English. France issues from the ordeal more united and stronger in soul than she has ever been before. The idea of herself as a nation is born and will never die now. It is among the people that this conception is dominant, in the formidable form of a supreme devotion to the king, of a loyalty which fails to discriminate between crown and country. The seigneurs have not yet similarly grasped this conception, but, as will be shortly seen, the notion of the *common weal* will henceforward override their individualistic pretensions. The Hundred Years' War has thus indirectly, but none the less effectively, helped to give France an individuality. It has, above all, proved how strong is the life which animates this mighty frame, which has kept it from dissolution during the long ordeal, and has enabled it to make so robust a recovery with the return of peace. The evil days should soon be forgotten if the king will accept a programme of prudent and temperate policy and patient and pacific restoration. Unfortunately it is but seldom that such modest ideals will long remain dominant with princes, only too well aware that they can design and do as they please. The Italian designs of Charles VII give us an ominous impression.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Ch. Petit-Dutaillis, *Charles VII* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. vi, second part), book ii; the general books on the history

of Charles VII indicated in the preceding chapter, and Rambaud, *Histoire de la civilisation,* vol. i: the matter dispersed there in several chapters; consult the table.

On Economic Life: Boissonnade, *Le travail dans l'Europe chrétienne du Moyen âge,* book iii; Hauser, *Ouvriers du temps passé (XV-XVI siècles),* 1899; Fagniez, *Documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie et du commerce en France,* vol. ii, 1900; P. Clément, *Jacques Coeur et Charles VII,* 1863.

On the Reconstitution of the Domain and the Feudal Houses: Longnon, *La formation de l'unité,* lesson xvi.

On the Intellectual and Artistic Movement: The general histories of literature (Bédier and Hazard; Lanson) and of art (A. Michel); Schneider, *L'art français; l'art gothique,* ch. iii.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RUIN OF APANAGED FEUDALISM (1461-1491)

I

The feudatories about 1461

AT the death of Charles VII the king's authority, while practically supreme in his own domain, is still in actual fact indirect and limited by law in the lands of his great vassals, where it is also precarious, since whenever it exceeds the limits imposed by feudal contracts it begins to look like an usurpation. From this point of view no distinction is any longer to be drawn between the holders of the old fiefs and the apanaged: the latter no less than the former desire to restrain encroachments upon their rights by the sovereign and, if a chance occurs, to increase their independence to the detriment of his power. It was Louis XI (1461-1483) and his daughter, Anne of Beaujeu, acting in the name of Charles VIII, whose government she directed from 1483 to 1491, who removed this last obstacle to complete royal absolutism.

A. *The authority of the king at the death of Charles VII: its limits*

The advantage of the king in his struggle against the apanaged

It must first be noted that, in the struggle with these relics and survivals of feudalism, the central power was advantaged first by the superiority of its administrative centralisation and military organisation; next by the dissensions and divergent interests of its adversaries; and finally by the strength of *loyalty* developed during the Hundred Years' War and by the prestige which *the idea of the State* now commanded. Firmly established, it opposed a reality of union and collective life for the common good to the hazardous attempts at separation fostered by the individualistic egotism of the seigneurial party. From now onwards this feeling becomes so considerable and so comprehensible by all that under Louis XI

rebels against the king find themselves obliged to pose as defenders of the common weal and under Charles VIII pretend to act in the name of the king, held, they say, *en bail*—that is to say in disguised captivity—by the queen regent, and to act entirely in the king's interests. They can no longer venture openly to declare their real reasons for discontent; nothing could be, in kind, more instructive.

B. *What the apanaged are in 1461*

On the accession of Louis XI the apanaged of the kingdom amounted to about twenty. The most considerable were, with the Duke of Burgundy, by far the most powerful of all, the Dukes of Orléans, Anjou, Bourbon and Alençon; all were recent offshoots from the royal stock. *Philip of Burgundy*, grandson of Philip the Bold, founder of the house, was thus a great-grandson of King John II; *Charles of Orléans*, son of Louis, who had acquired the duchy under Charles VI, was grandson of Charles V; *René of Anjou* was a son of Louis, himself son of John II. *John of Alençon* went back to Charles of Valois, brother of Philip the Handsome, and *John of Bourbon* to the youngest son of St. Louis. Thus none of these diverse princely houses had been in existence for more than two centuries, and the majority were much younger.

Feudatories of the old stock

Three seigneurs of the old type of feudatories still represented an appreciable power, and would usually join hands with the apanaged against the king. These were the *Duke of Brittany*, descended from Pierre Mauclerc, Count of Dreux, himself descended from a son of Louis VI, who had obtained Brittany by marriage in 1212; the *Count of Armagnac*, who belonged to a very old feudal family of the south; the *Count of Foix*, an offspring of the house of Grailly, also southern, who acquired the county of Foix at the end of the fourteenth century. Charles VII, at the beginning of his reign, desiring to attach the Count Jean de Grailly to his interests, made him some large grants; among others he gave up to him the county of Bigorre in 1425 and made him governor of Guyenne and of Languedoc.

The Duke of Burgundy; his domain

The Duke of Burgundy calls for separate consideration. He alone, through his possessions, was in a position to outweigh the king. Philip the Bold had received the duchy in apanage on the 6th of September, 1363; next, by marriage with the heiress of Flanders, he had acquired Flanders, Artois, Brabant, the counties of Rethel and of Nevers. John the Fearless and Philip the Good had added to these estates, partly by marriage, partly by purchase, partly by conquest, the Franche-Comté, a Germanic fief, the whole of the remainder of what is now modern Belgium, Holland, Zeeland and Frisia, the counties of Bar-sur-Seine, Mâcon, Auxerre and finally the towns of the Somme: Abbeville, Amiens and Saint-Quentin, a precious acquisition from the treaty of Arras. The whole was a rich and extensive domain; it unfortunately failed to form a powerful and coherent state because it was not single and self-contained. Alsace, Lorraine and Champagne split it into two parts; for this reason, the policy of the dukes necessarily will be to lay hands upon one of these three countries, to establish a bridge which shall assure and free from interference the communication from end to end of their possessions and give them a unity which will double their value.

Wealth of this domain

(1) Burgundy

Burgundy properly so called possessed considerable agricultural resources. Dijon, its capital, much embellished by the first three of its dukes, passed already at that time for one of the wealthiest towns in France, but the real sources of the magnificence of its lord were to be found outside its bounds in the other territorial group of Flanders and Brabant. Their capitals, both opulent, were Bruges and Brussels. The textile industry, commerce on the great scale and banking had accumulated abundance of portable and productive wealth in the country and continued to attract more. The duke resided now in one and now in another of his capitals. Philip the Good, volatile, somewhat vain, a devotee of pleasure and a lover of beauty of all kinds, is magnificent among princes; his court is consid-

(2) Flanders and Brabant

Philip the Good and his court

ered the most sumptuous in Europe. It was there that *étiquette* had its real birth. An *étiquette* always punctilious, sometimes puerile in its gravity, applied to the minutest details, regulates the life of the sovereign and determines the position of every courtier. It is sometimes believed that Spain, in the time of Philip II, was the birthplace of these tyrannical precepts which imposed themselves, little by little, and more or less, on the diverse European courts of the seventeenth century, but this is not the case. It was from Flanders that Philip[1] the Handsome imported them to the court of Ferdinand and Isabella, when he came thither to marry their daughter Joan in 1490. A numerous company of artists, architects, sculptors and painters, the masters of the Flemish and Burgundian school of art, was in the service of Philip the Good and laboured without intermission for the pleasure of his eyes. To their works is due the artistic fame of Dijon and Bruges, Brussels, Gand, Louvain and other places.

The Burgundian policy

The Burgundian, whom Article 28 of the treaty of Arras had made independent of the king during the lifetime of Charles VII and who ventured so far as to call himself "*Duke by the Grace of God*," dreamed of extending the benefit of this personal privilege to all his posterity. He hoped that by boldly manoeuvring between France and Germany he would succeed in this object and possibly even realise his supreme ambition of gaining the royal crown. Was there not here, open before him, a vast domain, its future still undecided, which had attracted the energies of Charles VII, but where the German emperor still maintained all his pretensions, the domain of ancient Lotharingia, the whole central portion of *Francia Media*? There he believed he could make his fortune, by annexations which should both bring him profit and make his state an undivided whole. His interest being to distract the

[1] Son of Maximilian of Austria and Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, thus great-grandson of Philip the Good.

attention of the French king from this venture and himself, well aware of the king's desire to subject him to his former feudal allegiance, he took care to lend support more or less avowedly to every uprising which occurred of the seigneurs against the king.

II

Louis XI (1461-1483)

Unfortunately for him Louis XI was a resourceful adversary, little likely to be overcome by such loose coalitions as the nobles could bring against him. At the time of his accession,

A. *His appearance*

the son of Charles VII was thirty-eight years of age. No comelier in carriage or person than his father, plain in his dress to an extent which his contemporaries thought derogatory to his position, his appearance was very far from impressive. By the side of his great vassals, especially Philip the Good, all point device and reckless of cost in their accoutrements, he made but a sorry figure. His reputation was far from good, his conduct to his father had been reprehensible. He had

His conduct as dauphin

not hesitated to show, with native cynicism, that he thought his father's reign too long. He had taken part in the Praguerie, a treason which, though pardoned by the king, had resulted in his exclusion from public affairs, in which his father had previously allowed him considerable scope. This filled him with vexation and resentment, feelings which he was quick to entertain, persistent to cherish, and which affected him deeply. They inspired him with the idea of a plot by which he was to get rid of the confidential servants of Charles VII whose place he proposed to take himself; its failure cost him his exile to Dauphiné (1447).

His government in Dauphiné

In this province, still strongly feudal, he asserted his direct and complete authority from the first, an operation which was far from conducting itself and so may be said to have given him valuable experience in dealing with seigneurial resistance. He increased the well-being of the country by diverse excel-

lent measures; he even founded a university at Valence. He already showed remarkable qualities, intelligence, decision, energy and practical good sense of the first order; but, as he never ceased for a moment to intrigue in contravention of his father, both at home and abroad, and, above all, married the daughter of the Duke of Savoy in spite of his father's opposition (1451), Charles VII at last decided that he must be punished. On the approach of a small royal army Louis fled and took refuge with Philip the Good, who granted him asylum in Brabant at *Génappe* (1456). It was reported that on receipt of the news the old king was content with saying, "*My cousin of Burgundy is feeding a fox, who will eat his chickens,*" a true prophecy if there ever was one! The dauphin beguiled his impatience, while he waited for nearly five years, outwardly occupying himself with hunting parties, with much bustling about, with investigating and summing up the weak points of Burgundian rule. Nevertheless, he followed with close attention, step by step, all his father's political enterprises in order to hinder and bring them to naught as far as he could; he also worked hard to secure adherents for himself among the king's entourage. As soon as he learnt, from these, that Charles was dead he set out to take possession of his crown, escorted by an army given him by his host, who was delighted with playing the protector to such a guest. He soon came to understand, however, that he need anticipate no difficulty in France, and accepted no more than an escort; and if he allowed his "*good uncle of Burgundy*" to parade at his coronation, which took place at Rheims on the 15th of August, 1461, and there scintillate to his heart's content, it was the uncle who would pay the bill. If he put no impediment in the way of the duke's magnificent entry into Paris and looked on while he revived the manners which had made his father popular with the Parisians, he took good care to grant nothing to the protégés whom his embarrassing ally

His flight to Philip the Good

His life at Génappe

His accession

urged him to appoint to sundry employments. He did so well that Philip went home extremely dissatisfied.

B. *Manner of life of Louis XI*

No contrast between two princes could be more complete, and the differences were in many things other than apparel and outward show. The daily life of Louis XI was in keeping with his outward appearance. It was devoid of show and looked entirely to practical results. He avoided luxurious lodging; he had a horror of ostentatious entertainments and in his perpetual journeyings about his State he would have no greater a train than that of a well-to-do bourgeois on pilgrimage. In Paris, his habitation was the ordinary house of a private person; more commonly he resided in Touraine in a château, that of Amboise, or that of Plessis-les-Tours, so arranged as to give him security and such comforts as he desired. He found the usual amusements of a court tedious beyond words, and avoided them, but he had a passion for the chase and delighted in dinner parties with substantial food and amusing conversation, at the tables of the bourgeois or petty nobles among whom he chose his advisers and made his particular friends. He resembled the Valois in no single respect, and would have been repudiated, in all probability, by any of his ancestors, even Charles V. His inclinations were doubtless due to his education which, inspired by the teaching of Gerson and directed by a canon, Jean Majoris, and the pious Bernard d'Armagnac, was of a kind peculiarly calculated to deprive him of the prejudices of his caste. It may also be supposed that the society of his allies of the Praguerie and of Philip the Good himself made upon a mind singularly clear and positive impressions far from favourable to the school of plume and panoply.

His disposition and tendencies

France in the Middle Ages had never known a less feudal king. Nothing which interested the feudatories had any attraction for him except hunting, already mentioned, and religion, in which his devotion had little that was spiritual, being based mainly on the fear of hell, and the hope of obtaining material

advantages by generosity to the Virgin and the saints; though it was nevertheless both strong and confident. He had no love for war, in which he knew how little cunning and adroitness of mind can do to counterbalance mere material force. Nevertheless he was brave at need, but he preferred diplomacy to arms and by diplomacy he understood intrigue, stratagem, dissimulation, corruption and combinations of these in which he was unencumbered by scruples of any kind.

His character

Revengeful, vindictive, irascible, impatient, his character was not in the least that of the frigid calculator which is often imputed to him; it is quite clear that he attracted little sympathy, but it is equally certain that he had a high conception of his rights and duties as king, that he displayed indefatigable energy in the pursuit of his plans, and that, exacting as he was to those who served him, he never spared himself. It is true, too, that his inclination and his nature no less than his realistic ambition kept him perpetually in a state of feverish activity. It is clear that he whole-heartedly identified himself with the kingdom, but he took a constant interest in its greatness, advancement and profit. Even his own family, wife, children, brother and sisters, were to him mere tools, as it seems, for the furtherance of his political designs. His brother Charles, however, who neither resembled nor understood him, by consenting to give his help to the feudal coalitions and to play the part of a would-be pretender to the throne, none the less caused him long-continued embarrassment.

His first proceedings

First of all, in a fit of anger with his father's councillors and servants whom he held responsible for his past misfortunes, he dismissed, imprisoned and disgraced them without discrimination; but with him the first thought was not always the best. On further consideration he made a selection from among his victims and took back into his service all whom he thought experienced and useful, placing them in important employments. Those of his servants whom he chose himself were not

always unexceptionable in their morals; it was enough for him if they were competent and zealous. His inexhaustible favour rewarded them if they did well, while he punished them with ruthless severity if they failed to come up to his expectations. He never hesitated to pay the necessary price if he wished to win over a foreigner to his side or, in case of need, any confidential servant of an enemy. In this way, in 1472, he inveigled Philippe de Commynes, one of the familiars of Charles the Bold, who became promptly one of his own and whom he overwhelmed with favours.

III

Louis XI in opposition to the feudatories

A. How for three years he makes enemies

It must be said that Louis XI, during the first three years of his reign, made malcontents among his subjects, of every condition, as though of set purpose, by his indiscriminate interference with their habits and private concerns. In particular he misled and exasperated the seigneurs. At first he encouraged their hopes, by appearing favourably disposed—as was natural in their former accomplice—to several whom Charles VII had been compelled to chastise most severely; such seigneurs as the Duke of Alençon and the Count of Armagnac, who were released from prison and recovered their property. He pleased them, too, by his severity to the familiars of the late king, who had caused their disgrace, while his disposition to domineer was soon to be displayed and to exasperate, apparently deliberately, the feudatories whom his father had attempted to conciliate. He began by claiming to impose ecclesiastical beneficiaries of his own choice upon Francis II, Duke of Brittany, and attempting to control his administration by his own officials. Next he invoked against the Duke of Burgundy that article of the treaty of Arras which authorised the king to ransom the Somme towns, and disquieted him by lending support to the agitation of the Liégeois against their bishop. He could not, therefore, have been surprised when, in 1463, the

malcontents among the nobility, who alone had the means to take action, prepared to combine and resist him by force. Assuredly their emotions at these machinations of Louis were largely egoistic; but they could quite well believe themselves provoked, threatened in their rights and privileges, and conducting a legitimate defence.

Charles the Bold

The leader of this feudal movement was to be the son of Philip the Good, Charles, whom we call *le Téméraire* (the Bold), and who bore the title of Count of Charolais. He was twenty-seven years of age in 1461. He was gloomy, obstinate, self-centred, violent, capable of any trickery or cruelty, destitute of good sense and ability, and inordinately and excessively ambitious. He detested Louis, who had overwhelmed him with testimonials of friendship during his stay at Génappe, but whose underhand adroitness and complex intrigues struck him as absolutely diabolical. Entangled in these cunning or perfidious combinations, he was perpetually tempted to use force, in the hope that in a moment he might rend apart the whole elaborate web. His father, who was to die in 1467, did not always agree with him, but resigned himself, and let things go their way. The result was, for thirteen years, amid all the diverse complications of the interior and exterior politics of France, a personal feud without quarter between Charles and Louis. This gives to the period such unity as it presents and is to some degree its real significance. The support lent by the Duke of Burgundy to seigneurial discontent is only one of the means employed by him to attain his ends, which are, firstly, to free himself definitely from the authority of the French king and secondly, if possible, to eject Louis from his throne.

B. *The leagues of the public good*

Three coalitions were successfully formed against the "*universal spider*" as Charles the Bold one day nicknamed his enemy. The first in 1465, the second in 1467, the third in 1472. They are alike in that "*each sought his own advantage*" as a

contemporary tells us and that the words spoken by Commynes of the first apply equally justly to all three: "*This war was thenceforward called the 'Public Good' in that it was undertaken under colour of the allegation it was for the public good of the realm.*" Much was made of the tyranny of the king towards the clergy, of his contempt of the rights of the nobles, the iniquities and burdens from which the "*poor people*" suffered, but there was mention, too, of the "*great pensions*" which the seigneurs hoped to obtain from the prince for their maintenance. The indiscreet haste of Louis XI to pursue by all means possible the execution of his designs for absolute supremacy and the greed of the nobles were the two causes of the insurrections organised under the auspices of "*Monsieur Charles,*" the king's brother, Duke of Berry and heir-presumptive,[2] a youth eighteen years old, incapable of volition on his own account, who was merely an instrument in the hands of the factious.

Monsieur Charles

The partisans and the adversaries of the Leaguers

The latter, whatever their words might be, were unable to disguise their real motives or intentions; and they failed, too, in interesting the mass of Frenchmen in their enterprise. The smaller nobles, well understanding that the great seigneurs were not working for their sake and that they had nothing to gain by their victory, either did not follow them or did so with ill grace. Some bishops allowed themselves to be drawn in, but the clergy, as a whole, abstained from taking either side. The officials of the law-courts hazarded some verbal expressions of sympathy for the Leaguers, but went no further. The bourgeois, naturally hostile to disorder and in no way sympathetic to the feudatories, kept to themselves, malevolent and taciturn. As for the people, they were under no illusion as to the worth of the solicitude on their account, which the nobles so suddenly affected, and they remained loyal to the king. The great lords were not unanimous even among themselves. Thus in the

[2] The future Charles VIII was not born till 1470.

first coalition the Count of Foix took the side of Louis, and René of Anjou manoeuvred noncommittally between the two sides. In the others, if the Duke of Bourbon could have been believed, the king had no better friend than himself. The coalition did not feel such perfect community of interest among themselves as to go forward hand in hand spontaneously and without effort, and, in fact, they were far from remaining always in agreement.

Louis XI in the struggle

The conditions under which the two forces engaged offered more than one favourable opportunity to a man so active and shrewd as Louis XI. He did not fail to take advantage of them, and his diplomatic address, his quick perception of an opportunity, his readiness to face either way, and, above all, his intrepid bad faith did him more service than his arms. He experienced some difficult moments and had to deal with some dangerous occasions. He emerged from all, if not always with honour, at any rate always with profit.

The bad moments

Thus in August, 1465, he was on the point of losing Paris, a loss which would have been disastrous; but the loyalty of the bourgeois enabled him to come up in time to prevent it. He was compelled, two months later, to sign the treaties of Conflans and Saint-Maur, in which "*the princes*," as Commynes related, "*made booty the monarch and put him to pillage*." In particular, he was obliged to yield Normandy to his brother, in apanage, thus putting the Dukes of Brittany and Burgundy again in possession of the Somme towns and bringing them together. He, however, kept only a small part of his promises. He convoked the States-General in order that they might appear to have demanded the policy on which he had already decided; their demand, in fact, being due to his compulsion. He retook Normandy from his brother and made examples of such of the traitors as he could reach. When his ill-faith had provoked a new armed coalition, supported by Edward IV of England, he worked, negotiated and intrigued for its disloca-

The treaties of Conflans and Saint-Maur

The second coalition and the treaty of Péronne

tion. One of his efforts to this end was unfortunate indeed. He went to Péronne to confer with Charles the Bold at the very moment when the Liégeois rose in revolt, for which the duke held him responsible, not without some show of reason (October, 1468). Threatened with detention and imprisonment, he escaped the consequences of his indiscretion only by signing a treaty which satisfied Burgundy upon all the points then at issue, and by promising Champagne in apanage to *Monsieur Charles;* that is, by putting the link, essential for the union of two Burgundian states, into the hands of Charles the Bold. But no sooner was he free than Louis set himself to evade every promise that he had made. To the great disgust of Burgundy, he handed over Guyenne to his brother in place of Champagne. An assembly of notables, which met at Tours, did not refuse their approval (1470). A fresh coalition was formed in 1471, when the allies made no secret of their intention to carve and divide the kingdom; "*For the one king we have,*" said the Duke of Burgundy, "*I would rather have six.*" Simultaneously the English king announced his intention of recovering the domains of the Plantagenets. But *Monsieur Charles* died opportunely (May 24, 1472). Sinister rumours, unbased, however, on any evidence, were current as to an accident so suspiciously convenient to the king. A serious repulse in the valley of the Oise discouraged Charles the Bold. The King of England did nothing and the coalition definitely broke up in 1473.

The third coalition and the death of Monsieur Charles

C. *The struggle against Charles the Bold*

The plans of the Duke of Burgundy

From that time onward, Louis XI had only to put his cunning and his gold to the work of making enemies for the Duke of Burgundy, or of aiding those he made for himself. Charles the Bold desired to reorganise and unify his state; to succeed he needed the possession of Alsace or of Lorraine or, if opportunity allowed, of both. He desired, at the same time, to make himself independent of France and exchange his ducal coronet for a royal crown. It appeared to him that only the German

emperor could help him to satisfy these ambitions, and he accordingly did his best to convert the Hapsburg to his views.

Their first realisation

He bought, or rather borrowed, upper Alsace from its owner, the needy Sigismund of Austria (treaty of Saint-Omer of 1469) and compelled the Duke of Lorraine to consent to a treaty which gave his troops a right-of-way across Lorraine territory guaranteed by the occupation of several fortresses. Then he arranged a meeting at Treves with the Emperor Frederick III, in order to obtain from him the title of king in exchange for his daughter and heiress, Mary, who was to be engaged to Maximilian, son of the Emperor. Was not his goal almost reached and his edifice all but complete? Yet all was to come to nothing. The king's agents aroused distrust in the Emperor, who left Treves surreptitiously, leaving Charles the Bold discomfited and furious; Alsace, exasperated by the tyranny of Charles's confidential servant, Peter of Hagenbach, rose in revolt and expelled the Burgundians. The king, having brought Sigismund and the Swiss to terms by bribes, instigated the new allies to proffer Charles compensation for Alsace as the treaty of Saint-Omer had provided. Burgundy, in exasperation, decided to punish the Alsatians, from which he gained nothing but a declaration of war from the Swiss, set on by Louis, while the Emperor also took arms against him. Still he did not give way; he joined hands with Edward IV of England, the Duke of Brittany, several feudatories, and with the Count of Saint-Pol, one of the king's familiars. Chance betrayed him along the whole line. Edward IV consented to sell peace in an interview with Louis XI at Picquigny on the Somme; the Duke of Brittany and the Duke of Anjou were compelled to submit to the king by force, the Duke of Nemours and the Count of Saint-Pol were captured and executed. Charles, indeed, conquered Lorraine (1475), but rashly insisted on taking revenge on the Swiss. Two reverses sustained by him at Granson

The interview of Treves

The failures of Charles the Bold

1. At Treves
2. In Alsace

3. In Switzerland War with the Swiss and the Emperor

Useless efforts of Charles

4. In Lorraine
His death (January 5, 1477)

(March 2, 1476) and at Morat (June 22) [3] gave the Lorrainers courage to rise. The "*great duke of the West*" perished miserably under the walls of Nancy, which he was attempting to retake and which were defended by an army mainly raised by the gold of the king (January 5, 1477).

D. *The Burgundian succession*

The Burgundian dream was now done with, and Louis XI freed from his most redoubtable enemy, found almost under his hand a cluster of wealthy domains, with no heir but a woman, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; the best possible field for his energies. He soon set about its cultivation; but his success was only partial: he was possibly lacking in the needful circumspection and delicacy of touch. He was not able to prevent Mary of Burgundy, whom he terrified by his acquisitive greed, from marrying Maximilian of Austria (August, 1477). The marriage lost him Flanders, Artois and Franche-Comté without counting the rest of the Burgundian succession over which he had no rights. His attempts to force Maximilian to cede the provinces by force of arms failed, and after some indecisive hostilities, it was agreed, under the treaty of Arras (December 23, 1482), that the Dauphin Charles should marry Margaret, daughter of Maximilian and of Mary, and that she should bring him Artois and Franche-Comté as a dowry. There was no further question about Burgundy; Louis retained it as compensation for the felony of Charles the Bold. *The king was victorious over the apanaged. The Burgundian power had been destroyed.* In 1481 the *family of Anjou* had died out and the last Angevin, well aware that Louis would in any case act as though he were heir, bequeathed to him Maine, Anjou and Provence by a formal testament. This bequest was contested by the Duke of Lorraine, the natural heir to the last Count of Anjou; but Louis XI, without

Marriage of Mary of Burgundy

Treaty of Arras (1482)

E. *The king victorious over the apanaged*

The situation at the end of the reign

[3] Granson is in Switzerland, on the right bank of the lake of Neuchâtel, to the south; Morat, on the lake of the same name, a little eastwards of that of Neuchâtel.

settling the legal position, remained in possession of the property.[4]

The house of Armagnac had disappeared with John of Armagnac (+ 1473) and his cousin Jacques of Armagnac, Duke of Nemours (executed in 1477); *that of Alençon*, represented by a prince of dissolute life, was in rapid decadence; *that of Foix* came *en quenouille* (on the distaff side), that is to say, had no direct representatives but women, in 1483. *That of Orléans* was reduced to two princes, one of whom, Louis, married a daughter of the king, Joan of France, and had no issue; the other, Charles, did not marry; *the Duke of Brittany* had no descendants but daughters. Last the house of Bourbon could count, in the elder branch, only two seigneurs, Duke John II, who had no posterity, and his brother Peter, Sire of Beaujeu, whom Louis XI married to his eldest daughter Anne. With the passing of one more generation the king would be able to breathe freely in a kingdom finally cleared of all troublesome feudatories.

The policy of Louis XI in Spain and Italy

The great work of Louis XI was to prepare the way for this desired event; but his devotion to this end did not prevent him from engaging in the affairs of Spain and Italy, in which he displayed an indefatigable and most fruitful diplomatic activity, especially in Italy. In that country, the King of France succeeded in exercising extensive influence, without ever resorting to direct intervention. In his exertions in Spain, where he attempted more direct action, he was less fortunate; nevertheless he conquered Roussillon (1475).

IV

The government of Louis XI

The home government of Louis XI followed in the main the traditions of his father's, but his personal influence

[4] The county of Provence was then considerably more extensive than what we call Provence. It comprised, of our departments, *Bouches-du-Rhône, Var, Basses-Alpes* and a part of *Alpes-Maritimes*. It was Charles VIII who put

A. *Its spirit of absolutism*

made itself felt everywhere with a tyrannical insistence. Convinced that God had placed him, for the *common good*, in his post as king, he considered that he should not be hindered by any opposition or hampered by any right whatever. At frequent intervals he gathered about him "*qualified persons and experts*" for consultation. From time to time he conferred with the States of different provinces; once he even convoked the States-General (1468): in all cases his aims were to obtain advice or approval, never to submit to the least control. He made, but did not keep, a promise of reforms to the States of 1468.

The king's plans

It was not that he was without plans to this end; he projected great reforms, prodigiously bold for his time, such as the reduction to uniformity of the desperate confusion of the Common Law, the establishment of a single system of weights and measures throughout the kingdom, and the suppression of the inland tolls which bore so hardly upon commerce, but he never had leisure enough to effect these changes, alien as they were to the whole spirit of the Middle Ages. But in default of these means he ruthlessly subjected all custom and all individualistic interests to his own will.

The Royal Council

He gathered round him a council drawn, for the greater part, from the ranks of the lesser nobility, men recently ennobled and bourgeois, people of modest station, and however competent, not in the least likely to assert themselves against him. He left to their decision none but questions of no general importance, reserving all others for his own. He was as sedulous to reward zeal and efficiency and services rendered with unintermitting generosity, as he was ruthless to punish all failures; to serve him was sheer slavery. He ostensibly showed great friendship to the towns and voluntarily asked their advice, but in reality kept them in servitude, and he had no mercy whatever

an end to the claim of the Duke of Lorraine by annexing Provence to the domain of the crown (October, 1486).

on the lowest classes, whom he crushed with taxes and exactions.

Justice: Parliaments

He appreciated the need for prompt and righteous justice and was quite willing that it should be established as long as his own interests were not interfered with, but he never admitted that "his judges" were other than his servants. This pretension brought him into frequent conflict with his Parliaments, notably with that of Paris, whose argumentative and inquisitive spirit was his special detestation. He withdrew several important suits from their jurisdiction, bringing them before his own council, or before special commissions, or as supreme judge giving decisions in person on his own authority. In the same way he declined to tolerate the least real independence on the part of his other officials.

Officials of the administration

None the less, he remained impotent really to repress the abuses and robberies of his agents in the provinces. Their misdemeanours, of which he was quite aware, bore heavily upon the common people. For the rest, his government was extremely costly. Enormous sums were absorbed in diplomatic expenses and donations to the king's servants. To these were added the cost of a permanent army, to which he had made considerable additions. In case of need the kingdom might be safer for possessing this army; in normal times it was appallingly oppressed by it. The men-at-arms, often ill-paid, resumed their old habits of rapine and violence, which, in some provinces, lamentably recalled the memory of the Flayers and in all parts did great evil. The royal treasury never attained financial equilibrium while the royal exigencies continuously increased. In 1462 the *taille* (poll-tax), a tax which bore particularly hard on the peasants, produced 1,200,000 livres yearly; in 1481 it mounted to 4,600,000! It can be understood why Louis XI was not popular, why he was more feared than loved, and how he came to pass his last years self-immured in a fortress, dreading as he did the ill-will of all men.

The king's expenditure

Unpopularity

B. *Policy towards the Church*

In no respect did he show himself more despotically grasping and more cynical a despot than in his conduct with the Church, whose elections he took into his own hands and whose rights he completely disregarded. In 1478 he went so far as to convoke a council at Orléans and to seize the temporalities of the bishops who did not attend it.

He used the *Pragmatic Sanction*,[5] which at bottom he did not approve, in order to *manoeuvre* the pope—sometimes suppressing it—sometimes reviving it to suppress it again and negotiate a concordat. As a matter of fact, Sixtus IV paid him in the same coin—that is, by the same kind of blackmail—in the three last years when the astute monarch, in terror of the prospect of approaching death, was expecting from the pope the relic of sovereign virtue which should prolong his life. Rome obtained considerable concessions from this fear on his part.

C. *Efforts for economic restoration*

He continued his father's efforts to restore the economic life of France: he favoured the upper capitalistic bourgeoisie and the corporations which ensured discipline of labour, he took interest in industry, set about the exploitation of mines, introduced into France the weaving of silk. He thought, it is said, of founding a commercial company for the exploitation of the Levant. Whether that be true or not, he took diverse steps inspired by what we call "Protection" and also made real commercial treaties with various neighbours which attest his grasp of the general need for all kinds of commercial activity. One of his last ordinances was one authorising the clergy, the nobles and his own officials to engage in trade.

D. *Interest in the life of the mind*

On the other side, neither letters nor arts found him cold. He founded a university at Bourges in 1464, and in spite of

[5] The Pragmatic Sanction was distasteful to him because it was the work of men for whom he had no liking, such as Thomas Basin, Bishop of Lisieux, who took part in the *Ligue du bien public* and above all because it seemed to favour the hankering after independence of the episcopate. He thought a direct agreement with the pope preferable.

the ill-will of the *libraires jurés* (sworn booksellers) he caused the first printing-press that was erected in the capital to be established in Paris in the Sorbonne (1469?). He employed Jean Fouquet and Michel Colombe, and he helped in the start of Jean Bourdichon, the illustrious miniature-painter of whom we shall speak again shortly.

E. *End of Louis XI.* General view of the man and the king

Louis is on many sides a *modern*, a king so imperious as to be tyrannical, so enterprising as to be rash, so active as to be unable to rest, nervous and calculating, cunning and smooth of tongue; a moralist could find much to blame in his character and conduct, and his subjects were not always happy in their king, but he set himself to work without remission for the greatness and power of his State, nor did he fail to attain his end. He did himself no more than full justice when on his death-bed on August 30, 1483, he gave himself this testimonial: "*Not under us has the crown been diminished, rather it has gained and grown.*"

His death (August 30, 1483)

V

Completion of the work of Louis XI

The new king, Charles VIII (1483-1498), was only thirteen years old, and not particularly forward for his age. The government was taken in hand by his sister Anne,[6] with the help of Pierre de Beaujeu, her husband, a younger son of the house of Bourbon. Her father had said of her, it appears, that "*she was the least foolish woman in the world,*" adding "*there are no wise ones.*" Young as she was—she was only twenty-two—her energy and her gift for business enabled her to execute with considerable success the very difficult task which she had undertaken.

A. *Charles VIII and the Beaujeus*

The first reaction

Louis XI had made many malcontents in all ranks of the nation. As a result, no sooner was he dead than a disquieting

[6] Anne took no official title. Her husband had received from the late king in 1482 upon a pilgrimage which he was making to Saint-Claude (present department of Jura) the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom and in the last days of the king's reign the guardianship of Charles VIII.

reaction arose, directed against his policy, his administration and his confidential servants. The Beaujeus made sundry concessions to some of the great lords, who were raising their heads again, and to Parliament. They permitted the hanging of Olivier le Daim, the most detested among the familiars of the late king and removed the most compromised of the others; in the meanwhile *they governed upon the same lines as Louis XI.* They consented, in principle, to allow the composition of the royal council to be determined by the opinion of the States-General which met at Tours in January, 1484,[7] but assailed on one side by the seigneurs, led by Duke Louis of Orléans and on the other by the Beaujeus, the deputies, hesitating and inexperienced as they were, did not venture to designate councillors. They demanded, it is true, considerable reforms in the State for which they submitted a plan; in particular, they recalled that the right of granting subsidies was theirs and that they should be convoked anew every two years. Their grievances show that the tradition of the assemblies of the fourteenth century was not entirely lost and that the subjects of the prince, while perforce enduring his tyranny, did not, on that account, yet believe it to be legitimate; but their only result was to give occasion for sundry fine speeches [8] and elicit promises which were never kept. The States had no means of making their ideas prevail: *an irresistible impulse was driving the kingdom towards despotism.*

The States-General of 1484

B. *New agitations of the nobles:*

Louis of Orléans

Disappointed at not having done better with the assembly which they had asked for, the great lords decided to resort to revolt. Their chief, Louis of Orléans, was a mere hothead, of no political weight, and they, themselves, for the most part mainly looked forward to wringing pensions and favours from the

[7] With the exception of Brittany, all France was represented at this assembly for the first time.

[8] The memory of that of Philip Pot, the great Seneschal of Burgundy, has been preserved. His boldness has doubtless been exaggerated: his views were a tissue of commonplaces.

king; but they found support from Duke Francis II of Brittany, who himself was attempting to come to an understanding with Richard III of England and Maximilian of Austria. The first of these had not renounced the ancient claims of the Plantagenets in France, nor had the second renounced the heritage of Charles the Bold. The pretext which the French agitators put forward was the release of the young king "*from subjection to Madame de Beaujeu.*" Their venture has been called the "Mad War": all serious opinion in the kingdom disapproved of or disregarded them. Several encounters took place between 1485 and 1488. They terminated in the battle of Saint-Aubin du Cormier[9] (July 27, 1488), where Louis of Orléans was taken prisoner. Finally, on the 9th of September, 1488, the Duke of Brittany died, leaving his inheritance to his daughter Anne, who was only thirteen years of age. Many covetous eyes were cast upon the duchy. All the enemies of the French king—Henry Tudor, who had replaced Richard III in 1485, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Maximilian—united to prevent him from laying hands on it. Maximilian succeeded so far as to marry the little duchess, but only by proxy. Then, in 1491, an army of Charles VIII, having come to besiege Rennes, Anne decided to consider her first marriage as null and to conclude another, direct and real, with the young king. This union paved the path for the annexation of Brittany to France, an acquisition precious beyond others. It is true that its consequence was the loss of Artois and Franche-Comté, since Charles VIII, having married Anne of Brittany, was not in a position to marry Margaret of Austria, whose dowry these two provinces were. He restored them to Maximilian under the treaty of Senlis in 1493.

The *Mad War*

The Breton Succession

Death of the Duke of Brittany

Competition and intrigues

Anne of Brittany married to Charles VIII

A few lines will be sufficient to explain the disappearance of the great feudal houses. Charles VIII died without children,

C. *End of the great seigneurial houses*

[9] Saint-Aubin du Cormier is in the department of Ille-et-Vilaine and the arrondissement of Fougères.

1. Brittany

but Anne on her marriage with him had engaged, if this happened, to marry no one but his successor. She thus married the Duke of Orléans who became Louis XII in 1498, after breaking his union with the unfortunate Joan; she had by him a daughter named Claude, who was given as wife to Francis of Angoulême, king in his turn, under the name of Francis I, in 1515, and the reunion of Brittany to the royal domain was thus definitely accomplished. Louis XII, on ascending the throne, naturally brought in addition the property of his house; namely, the apanage of Orléans. So by the opening of the sixteenth century only one of the great families remained in a position to resist the king: that of Bourbon. It was to disappear under Francis I, when the treason of its head, the Constable, Charles of Bourbon, enabled the king to confiscate his property (1527). This Duke of Bourbon had committed a real anachronism by seeking support from a foreign prince—the Emperor Charles Quint—for the maintenance of his seigneurial interests in France. Such conduct, which would have been still admissible fifty years earlier, could now no longer be tolerated. The king, by the sole force of the movement described, which has swept aside all obstacles to his power, has become *the real master of the whole realm. His absolute personal authority* is no longer contested. Francis I (1515-1547) frivolous, careless and vacillating as he was, perfectly grasped the new situation and was the first to head his ordinances with the formula "*since it is our pleasure*," signifying that henceforward "*the will of the king is the law of the realm.*"

2. The apanage of Orléans

3. The house of Bourbon

The king is master of the whole realm

Conclusion

There still remains in France an arrogant nobility whose egoistic appetites are easily aroused; its spirit is still turbulent, and, upon any favourable conjunction of circumstances, it may still cause anxiety to the king and trouble to the kingdom. It has no longer any means of acquiring, in contravention of the prince, any durable influence upon the government. So, too,

with the great body of officials constituted by the king for his service; so, too, with the Parliaments. These are able, if central control is relaxed—as, for instance, during a minority—to resist ministers not strongly seated and try for an increase in their privileges; but they will always be obliged to bow before the sovereign himself, nor will they dare to deny that it is their duty to do so. In other terms, French monarchy, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, is theoretically absolute; the ambitious programme of the old Capet kings has been carried to a successful end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: Ch. Petit-Dutaillis, *Charles VII, Louis XI et les premières années de Charles VIII* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. iv, second part), book iii; *Lettres de Louis XI,* Charavay and Vaesen edition, 1883 and seq.; Philippe de Commynes, *Mémoires,* Dupont edition, 3 vols., 1840 and seq. B. de Mandrot edition, 2 vols., 1901 and 1903; H. Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique,*[3] vol. ii.

On Louis XI as Dauphin: M. Thibault, *La jeunesse de Louis XI* (*1423-1445*), 1907.

On the Anti-feudal Policy of Louis XI: Longnon, *La formation de l'unité,* lesson xvii.

On the Interior Policy of Louis XI: H. Sée, *Louis XI et les villes,* 1891.

On the Reunion of Brittany: Ant. Dupuy, *Histoire de la réunion de la Bretagne à la France,* 2 vols., 1880; Longnon, *La formation de l'unité,* lesson xviii.

The succession of the Kings of France, from the accession of Louis IX to the death of Henry III (1226-1589).



CHAPTER XVII

THE POLICY OF ADVENTURES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATIONAL POLICY (1494-1559)

I

FRANCE would have needed several more kings, no less realistic than Louis XI, for the completion of her territorial unity, the perfecting of her government and the full recovery of her economic prosperity. For a long time to come she need to observe the greatest circumspection in her foreign policy, while the pressing question of her northeastern and northern frontiers called for immediate attention. Charles VIII (1483-1498), however, rushed without consideration into a hazardous and impolitic enterprise, the conquest of a portion of Italy. His successor, Louis XII (1498-1515), did the like wholeheartedly, as did Francis I (1515-1547) after him, until the day when affairs took such an ominous turn, the emergence on the horizon of so great a peril as the power of the house of Austria, that that prince as well as his son Henry II (1547-1559) found themselves perforce converted to a more reasonable policy. This policy was to be imposed on the King of France for more than a century, up to the moment when the dismemberment of the house of Austria was to be achieved.

The Italian question

A. *The interests of France and the Italian adventure*

Charles VIII was a man little favoured by nature, ill-made, ailing, ill-balanced, of small intelligence, but of much imagination—whose disordered vagaries had been fostered by the perusal of endless romances of chivalry—with little reasoning power and little sense, yet not, for all this, ill-natured; quick to anger, and obstinate, and, above all, a facile follower of advice which flattered his manias. His marriage, made on his own

B. *The kings*

1. Charles VIII

initiative, put an end to the government of the Beaujeus, whose gravity had hitherto somewhat ballasted his reckless levity. They had, in particular, most wisely attempted, in the spirit of Louis XI, to induce the young prince to resist the temptations which were driving him to Italy and direct intervention in the confused affairs of that peninsula. But their influence was not the only one brought to bear on that malleable spirit, and when it weakened, the advocates of adventure had too good an opportunity of stimulating his puerile and inordinate ambition. Did he not dream, in imitation of the Charlemagne of legend, of becoming Emperor of Constantinople and King of Jerusalem, having first pulverised the Turks?

2. Louis XII

Louis XII, his cousin and successor, was less limited in mind without, however, having more than mediocre intelligence. Not devoid of personal worth, he showed, on occasion, discretion in his government, and a humanity which brought him both an immediate and a durable renown, whence his designation as *the Father of the People;* but he was the victim of a weakness in character which was to be abundantly abused by his entourage. His wife, Anne of Brittany, who remained narrowly Breton to the backbone, and his favourite, George of Amboise, gave him often the worst of advice, which he followed only too well. Before his accession he had always adopted a short-sighted policy of feudal type, mean, almost childish, and quite neglectful of French interests. He was to persevere in these paths to his life's end. He suffered from the Italian obsession and in this imagined that he was following the best and basic traditions of his family, in fact, that he was almost fulfilling a duty by not resisting it in any way.

3. Francis I

Francis I, great-grandson of Louis of Orléans, the victim of John the Fearless, was not without intellectual ability. He had mind and wit, he was a lover of the arts and of all beautiful things. Unfortunately he was completely without depth and application. He was abundant in words confidently spoken

upon all subjects, but his knowledge was small and his education deplorable—he had been immeasurably spoilt by his mother. His levity, his fondness for change and the indulgence of his whims, his passion for pleasure, his irresistible propensity for parade and festivity with much pomp and prodigality, and, still more, his indecision and apathy made barren his occasional impulses towards well-doing. He, too, abandoned himself to the influence of his entourage, only too glad to be relieved from the absorbing cares and the painful anxieties of a king who really labours in his vocation. He undoubtedly showed more breadth of mind, greater political insight and, it may be alleged, more sense of French interests than Louis XII, but like the latter he devoted himself with heart and soul to the Italian adventure, which he regarded as the most chivalrous of possible amusements.

4. Henry II

His son, Henry II, of low intelligence, arid, harsh, egoistic, unsympathetic, so dominated by favourites as to have no will but theirs, was unenterprising, and, by nature, apathetic, apart from his taste for the chase and the jousts in which, owing to his bodily strength, he excelled. He followed the course of his predecessors in French politics. This envisaged the domination of Italy as a necessary objective; a postulate which he accepted without seriously debating it. It may be justly affirmed that the character of the four foregoing princes is the prime cause of the Italian wars. The nobles, now unoccupied, as the king no longer permits private war, suffer from tedium and do not know what to do with their time. Their resultant restlessness acts in the same direction. Encouragement from certain Italian lords (especially Ludovic the Moor, Duke of Milan) desirous of making use of the French alliance for their own private ends, did the rest.

Causes of the Italian wars

Further, at the end of the fifteenth century, Italy appeared, owing to her many divisions, a tempting and an easy prey. Although a certain tendency towards union might be seen in

C. *Italy at the end of the fifteenth century*

1. Territorial divisions

the gradual constitution of regional groups of some solidarity, she was still broken up into many small states, of which six were preëminent in resources and prestige; in the Peninsula proper, the kingdom of Naples, the Pontifical states, the republic of Florence; in the northern plain, the duchy of Milan and the republic of Venice; in the Alpine region, the duchy of Savoy somewhat apart. All these states, large or small, maintained their existence by a robust individualism which, though fertile indeed in the domains of culture and art, owing to a beneficial competition and emulation, was an insurmountable obstacle to real national solidarity. To them *Italy* is no more than a word, a geographical expression or occasionally a pretext for a league against one foreign prince or another; she is in no way an object of affection or of devotion.

2. Policy of balance of power

They apply among themselves a policy of balance of power, intended to prevent any attempt at hegemony which would place one above others, and, since their resources in men are meagre, they rely mainly on an astute and subtle diplomacy, which unceasingly constructs, modifies and overturns combinations, alliances and leagues. When they have to make war, which, in spite of their twists and turnings, is often the case, they entrust the work to professional undertakers of battles and sieges, known as *condottieri*.

Diplomacy and *condottierism*

These mercenaries, even when of distinguished families, are still adventurers, who fight one against another in such a way as to do the least possible harm to either party and to extract from every conflict the largest possible profit. All Italian princes of the time may be said, indeed, to have the condottieri spirit.

Ambitions for hegemony

Each would dominate the others but none has the strength to do so; the combinations and leagues at once organised against any one of them as soon as his intention becomes manifest to the others must first be removed from the path, a feat usually impossible. At the particular moment when Charles VIII was preparing for a campaign, it was the Pope Alexander VI Borgia, elected in 1492, who appeared to have

determined upon the next attempt at hegemony. He allied himself with the Venetians against Ferdinand, King of Naples.

3. Wealth and brilliance of civilisation

The country, despite its political troubles, enjoyed great economic prosperity, enriched as it was by maritime commerce and banking. A magnificent outburst of artistic production, known by the name, perhaps somewhat too ponderous, of the *Renaissance*, which had been in progress for more than a century, had filled it with masterpieces, a dazzling array of gems beyond price. Italy was, in fact, the most brilliant centre of contemporary civilisation. If it be true that Italy has at all times proved a special attraction for the *Northerner* and the *Barbarian*, never was she more supremely seductive than at this epoch.

D. *The foreign pretenders*

1. The Emperor

Three foreign princes claimed rights over her. The first was the German emperor, chief of the Holy Roman-Germanic Empire and, as such, nominal suzerain of the Milanese and the little states of Mantua, Modena, Verona and Ferrara. The Emperor was then Maximilian, whom we have already seen in pursuit of Burgundian and Breton hereditaments, and who had just married Bianca Sforza, daughter of Galeas, the late Duke of Milan (1494). She brought him a large dowry and turned his attention to Italy.

2. The King of Aragon

The second was the King of Aragon, then Ferdinand the Catholic, already master of Sicily, who coveted Naples, which appeared to him necessary for the realisation of a plan which he had made to dominate the whole western Mediterranean.

3. The King of France

The third was the King of France, Charles VIII, heir to the house of Anjou in France, intervening on the strength of his claim upon the kingdom of Naples. Louis XII naturally continued the claims of his predecessor to which he added his own or rather those of his house. They referred to the Milanese and went back to Valentine Visconti, his grandmother, daughter of the Duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Visconti, who died in 1402. The direct branch of Orléans disappeared when Louis XII died. But Francis I naturally considered himself

heir, as being the great-grandson of the aforesaid Valentine as well as on the ground that the rights of his predecessors were his.

The game of the Italian princes

The Italian princes had no desire to further the greed of any of the three aspirants, who wished to set themselves over them, but they hoped to entangle them in their own nets, to use them and make them eliminate one another. For this reason, we see them approaching now one, now another, in turn proffering help, withdrawing it, and again proffering it elsewhere. Yet all this cunning availed Italy little in the end, when she sank into servitude under the heavy hand of the house of Austria.

II

The Italian Wars

A. *The general interest they present*

1. From the military point of view

The Italian wars present but little interest in themselves, but they may be briefly considered. They deserve some attention from a military point of view. They show the armament and the tactics of the Middle Ages side by side and concurrent with an armament and system of tactics already modernised. Thus the jointed armour known as *plate* reached its highest perfection at a time when the field artillery and portable firearms which made it useless came to be largely employed. Bayard, "*the knight without fear and without reproach*," whose personal exploits equalled or surpassed those of the most famous warriors of the Middle Ages, Bayard who, single-handed, defended the bridge of the Garigliano and who met his end by the shot of an arquebus, lived side by side with Gaston de Foix who may be considered the first of modern strategists. The military usages prevalent at the end of the war are by no means those which dominate at the beginning; a definite evolution has occurred. It may also be said that we are assisting at the birth of the greater European diplomacy: the Italian princes first practised its methods; these were developed by their imitators and were more and more widely applied to greater

2. From the political point of view

and greater interests. Men are active in negotiation as never before; the final result is to substitute the modern conception of *Europe* for the mediaeval conception of *Christendom*. The European policy of balance of power originates from this clash of conflicting interests and transactions, because the Italian situation soon grows so complicated that it comes to concern the whole Western world. It must further be remarked that the Italian wars, properly so called, end in 1519 when the elevation of Charles of Spain to the imperial throne exposes France to danger from Austria. The period which extends from 1519 to 1559 forms the first part of what is known as the *struggle of France with the house of Austria*.

Evolution of the question

B. *Expedition of Charles VIII* (1494)

French politics had long been concerned with Italy; in particular, the last two Kings of France, Charles VII and Louis XI, had endeavoured to acquire and maintain power in the Peninsula, but however greatly the former might have been tempted to intervene, he actually did nothing, except for the occupation of Genoa, and the latter showed himself more retiring still. Charles VIII, on the contrary, completely under the influence of his favourites, Briçonnet and de Vesc, who incited him to the adventure, encouraged by promises from Ludovic the Moor and the dream of an easy conquest, ignoring the open opposition of all reasonable men in his realm, and the disapprobation of his father's councillors, seized the opportunity afforded by the death of the King of Naples (January 25, 1494) and decided upon a campaign. The task proved easy; he met with almost no opposition before his entry into the kingdom of Naples, though he dispersed some scattered detachments and took some small towns. In general, he received throughout his progress, at least outwardly, an excellent welcome. On the 22d of February, 1495, he made a ceremonial entry into Naples, having met with negligible resistance. Unfortunately, three months later, his two rivals, Ferdinand of Aragon and Max of Austria, developed a sudden sympathy with the

Conquest and loss of the kingdom of Naples (1495)

Italians, in whose territory they had not yet obtained any footing for themselves, joined forces and made an alliance with the pope, the Duke of Milan, and the republic of Venice. Charles VIII, in great danger of being cut off, was obliged to abandon Naples in haste, and able to regain France only by breaking through the army of the coalition (battle of Fornovo, July 5, 1495). The garrison left in Naples held its own till the beginning of 1497, but when the king died from an inglorious accident [1] on the 7th of April, 1498, he no longer possessed anything in Italy. He was, indeed, preparing for a second expedition; it was his successor who carried it out.

C. *The policy of Louis XII*

The ruling idea of Louis XII was to direct his efforts against Milan, which he considered his personal inheritance, and to agree with Ferdinand the Catholic for the partition of the kingdom of Naples. He counted without the treachery of the Aragonese, a man of much craft and no good faith,[2] who shamelessly deceived him. The Milanese was conquered, and Naples as well. But in 1504 the craft of Ferdinand was too much for Louis XII, who had to abandon to him the second of these acquisitions.

Julius II and the *Holy League* against France

Before long the pope, Julius II, who was planning to establish his hegemony over an Italy freed from the *barbarian*, raised against the King of France whom he wished to put first out of the field, a coalition, formed, side by side, by the Italian princes who had interests in Italy, the Swiss Confederation, and Henry VIII of England, attracted by the bait of Guyenne. After some brilliant successes, due to Gaston de Foix and ceasing after his death—he was killed at the battle of Ravenna, in 1512—Louis XII suffered some severe reverses. He was obliged to evacuate Milan. France was being invaded by the

Total failure of Louis XII

[1] He broke his head in forgetting to stoop when passing through a low door, in the castle of Amboise.

[2] Already Charles VIII, by the treaty of Barcelona (January 19, 1493), very ill-received in France, had yielded to the King of Aragon, Roussillon and Cerdagne, acquired by Louis XI.

English on the north and by the Swiss in Burgundy. When peace was reëstablished, in the form of truces, shortly before the death of the king, which occurred on the first of January, 1515, *it involved the loss of Italy.*

D. *Francis I, the Milanese and the Swiss*

Francis I accepted the position no more willingly than his predecessor. This was particularly so in regard to the Milanese; he also cherished a grudge against the Swiss for their good service to the coalition in the preceding war. Without delay he put an adequate army in the field, came to an understanding with the Venetians, and in August crossed the Alps, evading the Swiss outposts which were obliged to retire. He crushed them at Marignan [3] on the 14th of September after two days of extremely heavy fighting in which his own personal vigour and valour did wonders. Negotiations were then opened and led to the conclusion of a *Perpetual Peace* with the Swiss cantons (November, 1516) and simultaneously to a concordat with the pope, Leo X, and last of all to a treaty at Cambrai, with Charles of Spain, heir to Ferdinand the Catholic and Maximilian (March, 1517). To sum up, *the King of France obtained the Milanese* with the consent of his two rivals; *but he gave up Naples.*

Battle of *Marignan*

Conclusion of peace

This peace, a huge relief to all western Europe, and enthusiastically received, apparently ended the Italian wars, but only apparently. It put no end to the rivalries of the Italian states among themselves and it produced the twin complications of Spanish domination in Naples and French domination in Milan.

III

The struggle of the house of France and the house of Austria

The death of Maximilian of Austria which occurred on the 12th of January, 1519, resulted in a competition for the imperial crown between Francis I and Charles of Spain. It was the latter who obtained it by the choice of the Electors on the

[3] Marignan is sixteen kilometres on the southeast of Milan.

28th of June, 1519; by this event the Italian question was both altered and enlarged.

A. *Constitution of the house of Austria*

The new Emperor, who took the title of *Charles Quint*—that is to say, Charles V—held in his own hands the heritage of four *houses*, those of *Austria*, *Burgundy*, *Aragon* and *Castille*. His four grand-parents having been, on one side, Maximilian of Austria and Mary of Burgundy, father and mother to his own father, Philip the Handsome, and on the other side, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella the Catholic, father and mother to his mother, Joan the Mad. He thus possessed from the first house the property of the Hapsburg: Austria, Tyrol and various extensive territories on the middle Danube; from the second house the Netherlands with Artois and Flanders, and Franche-Comté, all the property of Charles the Bold which had escaped the hands of Louis XI; from the third house, Aragon with Sardinia, Sicily and Naples; from the fourth house, Castille, Leon, Granada and others, and the immense colonial empire acquired by the Spaniards in America. It has been justly said that he was a *coalition in himself* and his accession to the imperial crown added prestige to his power.

The inheritances of Charles Quint

Charles dangerous to France. His empire and designs.

He thus represented a great danger for France; he believed that his duty commanded him to assert his rights—those of the German Empire—over the Milanese which, however, he had just renounced, and over Burgundy and Picardy of which the King of France had illegally possessed himself. He thus almost completely encircled the kingdom. Fortunately his empire, huge as it was, was far from coherent, the peoples, whom it united by the mere capricious chances of succession, had neither the same interests nor the same customs, nothing united their diverse countries but the fact that they had a common master and Charles was to find the greatest difficulty in attempting to obtain their coöperation in a common task which was undoubtedly his business, but in no respect theirs. Hence the measures of the emperor would often be thwarted most

Difficulties which weakened the action of Charles

inopportunely by particularist agitation, based on firmly established liberties and usages in Spain, Flanders and Germany, which would occasionally proceed to open insurrection, of which his adversary would be able to take advantage.

His personal superiority over Francis I

Personally, Charles Quint seemed to have the advantage of Francis I. Less brilliant, elegant and witty, he was also less dissipated, less frivolous, less greedy of pleasure. His sobriety was not untinctured with sadness, his piety, mystic and somewhat sombre, inclined him rather to melancholy meditation than to active charity. He was arid and hard of heart and from this defect failed to attract sympathy. But he possessed extensive knowledge, and could both reflect, determine and persevere. He sincerely believed himself to be charged by God with the mission of conferring the Imperial Peace on the Christian world, no less than with that of defending it against infidels and heretics. His claim to reëstablish the Holy Empire in full territorial integrity led him to reopen questions which might have been thought long closed, to assert claims that appeared anachronisms, such as the restoration of *the kingdom of Italy* and of the *kingdom of Burgundy and Arles*. It was difficult, in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, to induce France to admit that Forez, Lyonnais and Vivarais, for instance—namely, the countries which today compose our departments of the Loire, the Rhône and the Ardêche—were German territory; nor were the German contentions, which attempted to include all ancient Lotharingia in the Empire, more acceptable. It is clear that in the war now to be fought the kingdom of France had very different interests at stake from those in that which debated the ownership of Milan or of Naples.

His ideas on the *Empire*

B. *Divisions of the struggle:* the six wars

The struggle comprises six wars, which arise between 1520 and 1559. They are interrupted by ephemeral conventions and short-lived treaties, in effect no more than mere truces. To relate them in detail is not expedient, the more so that their course is somewhat confused. It is enough to say that though

they were not always favourable to France they gave her, at any rate, opportunities for putting her cohesion and power of resistance to the test. In 1521 and in 1524 France was invaded, on the first occasion from the northeast and on the second from the southeast; the resistance of Mézières in the one case and that of Marseilles in the other saved the situation and compelled the enemy to retire. In 1525 Francis I, who had again embarked upon the conquest of the Milanese, lost a few years previously, was beaten and captured at Pavia on the 24th of February. Carried as a prisoner to Spain, he was bored almost to death in a captivity which his victor took care to make strict and unpleasant. He obtained freedom only at the cost of a treaty under which he renounced all suzerainty over Artois and Flanders, all claims upon Italy, and ceded Burgundy to Charles Quint (January 14, 1526). A treaty disastrous indeed and even humiliating, in that it compelled him to yield territory and favour to the Duke of Bourbon, who had betrayed and served against him at Pavia, but far less onerous than he might have expected from his opponent, the Emperor. This he owed to the fact that Charles was put in fear by disturbances in Germany —where Lutheranism was spreading like wildfire—by the ill-will of the Italian princes—in fear for themselves owing to his victory—by the equivocal attitude of Henry VIII—worked upon by Louise of Savoy, mother of Francis and queen regent of France—and finally by the ominous preparations being made by Soliman, Sultan of the Turks. Furthermore, despite the oaths he had sworn, and the guarantees he had consented to give, the captive king was no sooner at liberty than he set to work to evade his engagements. They had been imposed by force and he held them invalid accordingly.

Grave hours for France

1. Invasions (1521 and 1524)

2. Defeat of *Pavia* and treaty of *Madrid*

He therefore held on to Burgundy and made allies of all his rival's adversaries, not only the King of England and the pope, but, in spite of his title of *most Christian King* and *Eldest*

Son of the Church,[4] with the Turks and the German Protestants! The pope was promptly beaten by Charles Quint (sack of Rome by the troops of the Duke of Bourbon who fell in the assault in May, 1527), and Henry VIII caused him more than one disappointment. Yet he held on and, though he had some anxious moments, he never despaired. His carelessness and levity doubtless counted for something in this. In 1536 the Imperial forces appeared again in Provence. In 1544 they entered Champagne and pushed as far as Meaux almost in sight of Paris, but they were quite unable to obtain a decisive advantage, and the play of alliances, diplomatic intrigues and diverse complications, which had paralysed the Emperor's efforts, together with the reconciliations which the situation, viewed as a whole, imposed on his adversaries, always intervened in time to save Francis from irremediable defeat. It does not seem that he ever gave up all hope of recovering even the coveted Milanese.

3. Fresh invasions (1536 and 1544)

When he died on the 31st of March, 1547, it was still his boast that he knew no man on earth whom he need fear. In reality he had never succeeded in getting the better of the Emperor, yet the Emperor had never succeeded in overwhelming him. Point for point he had held his own and, time and age assisting him, he had tired the Emperor out: this was an appreciable success.

The situation at the death of Francis I (1547)

It was not to bear fruit till a half-score years later. In 1552 the troops of Henry II, son and successor to Francis I, held the "Three Bishoprics," Metz, Toul and Verdun, following an agreement with the Protestants of Germany; Charles Quint attempted to recapture them and failed disastrously before Metz (1553). Then finally, discouraged, ill, obliged by the peace of Augsburg (1555), to admit the right of the Lutherans of his empire to existence and exercise of their worship, realising only

C. *Henry II and Charles Quint*

Conquest of the *Three Bishoprics*

[4] It is to be noted that this agreement between Francis I and Soliman the Great marks the beginning of French influence in the Levant.

Abdication of the Emperor

too vividly the gulf between his dreams of thirty or thirty-five years ago and their results in the present, he abdicated (1555 and 1556) and retired into a Spanish monastery where he died on the 21st of September, 1559. He left his Austrian and German states to his brother Ferdinand, already King of Bohemia and Hungary, and the remainder of his heritage to his son Philip II who had married the Queen of England, Mary Tudor, on the 25th of July, 1554. This partition, undoubtedly enforced by hard fact and necessity, divided the house of Austria into two branches. The policy of France will be to prevent their future reunion.

D. *Henry II and Philip II*

Philip II, at first, took the place of his father in the quarrel with Henry II. The forces of England were now at his command and in 1557 his best general, Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, won a victory at Saint-Quentin, which would have opened the way to Paris, but for his neglect to follow it up. He missed the opportunity. On the other hand, the Duke of

Recapture of Calais (1558)

Guise seized one which offered and attacked Calais and Guines, both of which places he took (6th and 8th of January, 1558). Thus France recovered the last fragment of her territory formerly conquered by the English. The grief this caused Mary Tudor is said to have hastened her death, which occurred

Peace imperative

shortly afterwards (November 17). It seemed that war need not now continue much longer: experience should at last have persuaded the King of France to relinquish the Italian adventure and to turn his attention to more reasonable projects on his frontiers of the east and northeast. Incapable of learning from experience, Henry II, confused and uncertain in action, still clung to the program of Francis I. Undoubtedly it involved the return of Savoy, the region of the Jura, Artois, Flanders and even Aragon, but its claims were no less upon Milan and Naples, which he tried once more to conquer in 1557. But the country was tired out and public opinion clamoured for peace. The king's favourite in particular, the Constable Montmo-

rency, who had been captured at Saint-Quentin, and waited for peace to be set free, considered it most necessary. Philip II, on his side, lost in his dream of exterminating Protestantism, was little inclined to continue for problematic profit and at great cost a war with no visible end. Negotiations were thus opened in the last months of 1558.

The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559)

They resulted on the 3d of April, 1559, in the signature of the treaty of *Cateau-Cambrésis*.[5] It was much criticised at the time and considered as the most deplorable of relinquishments. It gave much indeed to Philip II, and if it was rather advantageous than otherwise in sanctioning the abandonment of the French claims upon Italy, properly so called, it might be considered disadvantageous in that it equally involved the French king's renunciation of Savoy, Bugey and Bresse which he then held. The northern frontier was rectified by the inclusion in France of certain fortresses. Calais was retained under condition of an indemnity of 500,000 écus to be paid to the English at the end of eight years if he finally retained the town. There was no question as to the Three Bishoprics, imperial territory which Henry II did not cede. It was finally agreed that Philip II, formerly husband to Mary Tudor, should marry Elizabeth of France, daughter of the king. It was in the course of the marriage festivities that an accident in a tourney put an end to the reign of Henry II (June 29, 1559).

Conclusion

The Italian wars, begun as a kind of *feudal incursion* by hotheads in quest of adventure, and conducted throughout as a matter of *personal policy*, evoked from their complications *a great European question*, that of the hegemony of the house of Austria and a *national policy*, that of resistance to the Hispano-Austrian peril. This return of the rulers of France to sanity, though due indeed rather to the force of events than to

[5] At present a chief town of canton in the department of the North and the arrondissement of Cambrai.

their own will and choice, had the immediate consequence of recalling their attention to the problem of frontiers. In 1552 the Marshal de la Vieilleville had drawn the attention of Henry II to this question of assuring the covering of Champagne by the Three Bishoprics, "*to break into the duchy of Luxembourg and the countries as far as Brussels*": "*to recover the sovereignty of Flanders . . . which belonged to the King of France from immemorial antiquity.*"

In other directions, the overt alliance of the King of France with the Protestants and his agreement with the sultan, marked a profound change in diplomatic usage. The old *Christendom* was dead, there might still be talk of a crusade, but this mattered little to any one.[6] Politics have become secularised and *Europe is born.* This is one of the many signs which show that the *modern spirit* has now come into its own in France.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Survey and Bibliography: H. Lemonnier, *Les guerres d'Italie* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. v, first part), book i; the same, *La lutte contre la maison d'Autriche* (in Lavisse, *H. F.*, vol. v, second part), books vii and viii.

On the Expedition of Charles VIII: F. Delaborde, *Expédition de Charles VIII en Italie*, 1888.

On Louis XII: De Maulde, *Histoire de Louis XII*, 1889 and seq.

On Francis I and the struggle against the House of Austria: Mignet, *La rivalité de François I et de Charles-Quint*, 2 vols., 1875; Baumgarten, *Geschichte Karls V*, 1885 and seq.

[6] The popes still talk of an expedition of all Christian princes against the infidels. They do not, however, give the impression of being seriously in earnest. Without denying the sincerity of Charles Quint or Philip II's faith, it may be safely said that their enterprises against the Barbarians are as political and commercial as they are religious.

END OF VOLUME I

138-7/53